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Chapter 1
Political Protest in Asylum 
and Deportation. An Introduction
Sieglinde Rosenberger
European societies have been confronted with rapid social and cultural transforma-
tion, which took on a new magnitude with the “long summer of migration” in 2015. 
In general, the perceptions and experiences of change never go uncontested; change 
gives rise to conflicts and struggles over collective identities, policy, and legal 
responses. International migration flows and related issues such as asylum and the 
deportation of non-citizens have grown into one of Europe’s most controversial and 
politicized topics. Political parties campaign on these issues, but there is also politi-
cal protest articulated by movements, activists, grassroots organizations and ordi-
nary citizens. These acts of resistance are gaining in qualitative and quantitative 
importance. They include voices for more liberal and open stances towards migra-
tion on the one hand, and voices calling for greater deterrents and coercive policy 
approaches on the other (Daphi 2016; Simsa 2017).
However, although it has recently intensified, this contestation from below is by 
no means new. As early as the 1980s, migrants, citizens, and advocacy groups were 
siding with migrants and asylum seekers, promoting inclusion and legal and social 
rights. The same is true for the right-wing groups acting collectively against immi-
grants and asylum seekers, marching in cities, attacking accommodation centers, 
and petitioning for stricter asylum regulations towards newcomers. In short, there is 
a history of political protest around migration, which has intervened in political 
processes, challenged representative authorities, and affected public debate and 
policymaking (Kriesi 2011; Caiani and Borri 2016; Cinalli 2016).
Research on political protest and contestation in areas like migration, asylum, 
and deportation constitutes a growing academic field. More recently, anti- deportation 
campaigns as well as migrant struggles and refugee activism have received a great 
deal of scholarly attention (Tazreiter 2010; Freedman 2011; Rygiel 2011; Tyler and 
Marciniak 2013; Rosenberger and Winkler 2014; Hasselberg 2014). However, much 
S. Rosenberger (*) 
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of the academic literature has concentrated on individual country studies and has 
mostly considered one type of protest (della Porta and Diani 2006). Moreover, as 
Accornero and Fillieule (2016, 9) have highlighted, the main focus is on progressive 
or left-wing mobilization, which is being examined using the instruments of protest 
and social movement research. Only recently has scholarship also started to employ 
these tools to investigate conservative or right-wing mobilization. To date, restric-
tionist mobilization has predominantly been investigated using lines of thought bor-
rowed from the study of right-wing and populist political parties (Caiani et  al. 
2012). Hence, broader comparisons which take into account the role of different 
political environments, different national and local contexts, as well as observations 
of different types of resistance are considered a research lacuna.
This is the point at which this book steps in. The volume deals with contestation 
and demands around asylum and deportation through the “unconventional tool” of 
protest. The main research questions the chapters attempt to answer are how and 
why protest occurs in these fields, how actors engage with and resist the forceful 
removal of non-citizens on the one hand, and how actors resist the reception of asy-
lum seekers on the other.
Based on comparative approaches across time, political space, and various types 
of protests, as well as on in-depth case studies, the individual chapters provide 
insights into ongoing mobilization and resistance within civil society. They cover 
struggles for and by, but also against, the rights and needs of asylum seekers. Special 
attention is given, first, to organizational aspects and constellations of actors within 
diverse networks and, second, to the interactions between protesters and state actors. 
In more theoretical terms, the book deals, on the one hand, with the power of civil 
society and individuals, citizens and non-citizens, as well as with various cycles of 
policymaking in asylum and deportation; on the other hand, it covers the limitations 
of a liberal state’s coercive capacity to control borders and to make decisions about 
non-citizens who may stay within its territory. Classical studies of deportation 
regimes frame resistance against forced removals as a “contentious relationship 
between sovereignty, space, and the freedom of movement.” (Peutz and De Genova 
2010, 2).
1.1  Defining Protest
In very general terms, political protest is about conflicts and is defined as the “joint 
(i.e. collective) action of individuals aimed at achieving their goal or goals by influ-
encing decisions of a target.” (Opp 2009, 44) The ultimate goal of political protest 
is to have an impact on decision makers. The objectives of political protest therefore 
range from raising awareness over the conflict in question to stirring up public 
debate and controversy to providing the wider public with information on the topic 
and mobilizing people to engage and join a protest group (Kriesi 2011, 294–295).
Following Opp’s classical definition, two constitutive components related to the 
research presented in this book should be clarified: target (the addressees of protest) 
and decisions (the substantive focus).
S. Rosenberger
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The main target or opponent of protest in asylum and deportation is the nation 
state, its institutions and political processes, and the authorities responsible for pol-
icy adoption as well as policy implementation. The nation state still has the legal 
competence to regulate and implement asylum procedures and make decisions on 
reception, accommodation, and deportation. Although a process of Europeanization 
of respective asylum regimes has begun, implying a shift of asylum regulation from 
the national to the European level, the core competence still lies within the respon-
sibility of member states.
At first glance, pro-migrant protesters advance interests that include the right to 
remain for an individual and their family, and securing a particular status and 
humane living environment. Anti-migrant protesters, in contrast, object to migrants’ 
right to settle or to the creation of asylum facilities. However, a closer look reveals 
that fundamental principles regarding the nation state are at stake when protesters 
make asylum-oriented claims and attempt to influence governmental decisions 
(Rucht 2002, 4). The issue of asylum and deportation is one of extraordinary state-
craft, it is about national sovereignty over borders and territory, about citizenship 
and membership. In this vein, state authorities claim that the forced removal of non- 
citizens is a necessary measure to demonstrate the capacity to control migration and 
is proof of the state’s sovereignty over its borders. Protest against deportations can 
thus be read as an intervention into a state’s potential to regulate transnational 
human mobility. Ultimately, both pro- and anti-asylum protests target policy deci-
sions related to the core interests of the nation state, its sovereignty and its statecraft 
(Giugni and Yamasaki 2009).
The substantive focus of this collection is asylum and deportation policies. 
Without any doubt, this is a social and political field with some noteworthy particu-
larities that impact on the ways protest emerges and people engage with the issue. 
Activists’ experiences, their collective actions, concern a field about which many 
citizens have strong opinions and emotions, both positive and negative. Despite the 
fact that asylum seekers and recognized refugees have long been largely invisible in 
the public sphere, the issue of asylum itself is “hypervisible” (Tyler and Marciniak 
2013, 152), in other words, it is highly politicized and polarized. A further aspect 
concerns the characteristics of the affected persons. Obviously, those who are 
affected by protest are relatively powerless groups who lack most conventional 
political resources. In particular, they lack the organizational capacity and voting 
power relevant to stage resistance and to put pressure on decision-makers (Lipsky 
1968, 1144). Specifically, asylum seekers and potential deportees are widely 
deprived of rights, residential security, and social welfare and may be viewed as a 
vulnerable group. Judith Butler (2009) has criticized the normative social and legal 
marginalization of refugees (used as a political and not a legal term) as a non- 
recognition of the lives of migrants. A recognition of these lives would thus be a 
protest for the right to remain, for freedom of movement, or for better living condi-
tions. The famous phrase “the right to have rights” (Benhabib 2004, citing Hannah 
Arendt) poignantly describes one of the main forms of contestation examined in this 
volume.
1 Political Protest in Asylum and Deportation. An Introduction
6
All in all, these briefly cited characteristics inherent to the issue of asylum and 
deportation are assumed to be relevant to the emergence, form, and consequences of 
protest activities and state responses to them (Freedman 2011, 618). As this book 
will demonstrate, these peculiarities are also reflected in the relevance of solidarity, 
social relations and emotional ties, which influence the composition of protest net-
works and the way their dynamics shape strategies and outcomes. In this regard, the 
micro-level of individual behavior meets the macro-level of structures and environ-
ments that facilitate or hinder individual acts of engagement (Opp 2009; Kriesi 
2011; Duyvendak and Jasper 2015).
We will come back to theoretical approaches in the following sections. Before 
doing so, we discuss why we favor the term political protest over social 
movement.
In contrast to various studies on campaigns and protest for the right of asylum 
seekers that refer to themselves, intentionally or unintentionally, as social move-
ments, we tend to favor the term political protest. Karl-Dieter Opp (2009, 41) 
reminds us of two criteria: “[t]he larger the protest group is and the more formal its 
organization is, the closer it comes to a social movement.” Although the literature 
does not provide clear-cut definitions and stable boundaries, in the research pre-
sented in this book we could not find sufficient evidence that the collective activities 
investigated were launched by large groups which could rely on formal internal 
organizations. Thus, political protest is seen as the more fitting term to grasp and 
frame what is happening on the ground.
Finally, some remarks on definitions. With regard to terminology, in this edited 
volume we use the term anti-asylum protest and anti-deportation protest to refer to 
protest activities staged in the field of asylum (accommodation) and deportation 
(forceful removal of non-citizens from a territory and from social relations). 
Regarding different migrant categories addressed in this volume, the anti- deportation 
protests pertain to rejected asylum seekers (mainly in Austria), but also to irregular 
migrants and third country nationals with a toleration card. Anti-asylum protest is 
directed against asylum seekers who have filed a request for protection and are 
accommodated in collective asylum centers distributed around the country. The 
geographical spread of this volume is Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. All three 
are countries of immigration and have well established policy frameworks for asy-
lum and deportation. The three countries differ, however, in national specifics 
regarding the direct involvement of citizens in policymaking, their protest cultures, 
and regarding the degree to which each is a “social movement society” (Meyer and 
Tarrow 1998).
1.2  Aims of the Volume
The volume has several aims and strives to bring together relevant empirical, ana-
lytical, and theoretical contributions that advance the study of political protest in the 
policy fields of asylum and deportation.
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To begin with, the essays aim to draw a nuanced picture of political contestation 
from the bottom up, of political rifts that run through societies, and of tensions and 
relations between institutional politics and protest groups. They attempt to provide 
wide-ranging coverage of anti-asylum and anti-deportation protest activities. To this 
end, we have developed a typology of three manifestations of protest: solidarity 
protests, refugee activism, and right-wing restrictionist protests. The book also con-
tributes to the understanding of how protest from below affects the politicization of 
asylum and deportation and policymaking in the field, as well as taking a distinctive 
look at politicization through political parties and interest groups (see also Caiani 
and Borri 2016; Rosenberger and Ruedin 2017).
Second, the volume aims to advance the state of the art of key features of political 
protest. It attempts to produce rigorous knowledge on actors, agency, and interac-
tions by combining theory with empirical research. Two expressions of interaction 
are central: vertical and horizontal interaction between protest groups, and interac-
tion between protest groups and state actors. Comparing different forms of protest 
across time and political spaces, the volume offers fine-grained empirical knowl-
edge on configurations of actors and their repertoires, on strategies, and on the con-
sequences of protest. The findings demonstrate how diverse protest networks are 
and that much depends on their thematic focus: in anti-deportation protests, ordi-
nary citizens along with groups representing civil society and activists dominate the 
protest networks; in anti-asylum protests, ordinary citizens along with institutional 
representatives, political parties, and elected officials dominate the scene. Different 
forms of protest elicit different forms of overlap and interaction between groups of 
protesters, institutional and non-institutional actors, and experienced activists and 
non-experienced citizens, who share and deploy their resources and capacities to 
organize resistance.
Third, a further aim is to shed light on the range of goals expressed within the 
scope of aspiring to social and political change. Pro- and anti-migrant struggles are 
often grounded in case-based mobilization at a local level rather than in a desire to 
change policy (Ellermann 2009). However, the significance of case-based mobiliza-
tion varies across countries and not only makes a difference in specific cases but 
also serves as a strategic means to mobilize for policy change. In this regard, the 
chapters contribute to the study of protest as case-based mobilization at local levels 
on the one hand, and as seeking change in the understandings and narratives of the 
rightfulness of migration restrictions on the other.
Fourth, the chapters attempt to expand knowledge of the liberal paradox, a term 
invented by Hollifield (2008). The term liberal paradox designates the tension 
between (restrictive) national laws and international regulations that provide basic 
rights for all human beings. Two diverging concepts of politics, the nation-bound 
and the cosmopolitan, are at stake here. However, as this volume shows, it is not 
only states that are confronted with the liberal paradox but also political protest 
networks. Anti-migrant protest activities stress concepts and ideas such as national 
sovereignty as well as the sovereignty of the national demos. Pro-migrant protest 
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relates to universal understandings of human rights and mobility, citizenship and 
membership. However, different protest networks address this challenge in differ-
ent ways.
Fifth, the main concern within protest and social movement research relates to 
the question of what fosters and enables protest activities. Why do people and orga-
nizations get involved? Such questions lead us to theoretical perspectives. The indi-
vidual chapters here engage with and draw on different traditions of thought, 
combining micro-level perspectives such as motives, incentives, and social rela-
tions with macro-level perspectives such as social structures and political frame-
works, integrating endogenous and exogenous factors relevant to protest (for an 
overview of approaches, see Meyer and Minkoff 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006; 
Opp 2009; Roose and Dietz 2016). In this book, great attention is paid to an 
approach we term political opportunity. Yet at the same time, some of the essays 
collected here underscore the explanatory power of local factors (Daphi 2016). 
Moreover, chapters on refugee activism refer to the model of resource mobilization, 
which foregrounds the strategies, networks, and ties between distinct groups and 
their resources. Following these approaches, we strive to contribute to state of the 
art scholarship in this field by combining several theoretical and analytical perspec-
tives, enabling us to arrive at a better understanding of the protests targeted at key 
state interests.
The following section offers an outline of the three aforementioned manifesta-
tions of protest, presents some of their features, and provides an outlook on the 
empirical research findings discussed in the later chapters of the book.
1.3  Manifestations of Protest in Asylum and Deportation
In the interest of a broad understanding of political protest, the volume expands the 
scope of classical social movement scholarship by bringing together progressive, 
leftist movements with protest originating in right-wing populist and nativist move-
ments. For this purpose, we have developed a typology of three manifestations: soli-
darity protests, refugee activism, and right-wing restrictionist protests.
This typology is based on two variables: actors (who organize and make 
demands) and goals (expanding or restricting rights). Although modified here, this 
typology resembles the classification of protest and social movements provided by 
sociologist Robert Schaeffer (2014). Applying the lens of social change, Schaeffer 
distinguished between aspiring, altruistic, and restrictionist movements. Altruistic 
and aspiring movements function in a transformative way, are aimed at social 
change and are inclusive. In contrast, restrictionist movements pursue nationalist 
and xenophobic activities, defend social inequality, oppose processes of democrati-
zation or aim at exclusion directed towards non-citizens (ibid., 12).
Below we describe some of the features of these three distinct forms of protest 
and provide explanations for their emergence.
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1.3.1  Solidarity Protest Against Deportations
The literature on protest in asylum and deportation covers diverse initiatives in vari-
ous countries that support of the social needs and fundamental rights of asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants. Citizens, grassroots associations, advocacy groups 
and social movements organize and participate in collective actions, activate their 
networks, and share their knowledge and influence with marginalized beneficiaries. 
As numerous studies have demonstrated, solidarity protests have become a collec-
tive actor in challenging the machinery of asylum and deportation (Freedman 2009; 
Tazreiter 2010; Hasselberg 2014).
Drawing on existing literature and research findings from the Taking Sides proj-
ect1, we can identify three main features in solidarity movements. Firstly, the indi-
viduals and informal networks which dominate protest groups act in the interests of 
others. Not oriented towards self-interest, they defend the rights, needs, and inter-
ests of those less fortunate or powerful than themselves. This kind of political altru-
ism is aimed at the inclusion of individuals and groups deprived of rights and secure 
status. Protesters’ concerns and goals are considered altruistic, with the outcomes 
benefitting others (on political altruism see Giugni and Passy 2001).
Secondly, moral principles and an ethical vision rather than material interests 
or personal privileges motivate people to turn to collective action. Solidarity net-
works express discontent and grievances about specific policies and seek justice, 
dignity, and fair treatment. Often protest communications and narratives advance 
a rationale of values, morality, and arguments about what is just and humane, and 
about the kind of individuals that create a society (Ellermann 2014; Kusche 
2016).
Thirdly, compared to other protest forms, solidarity protests take on very specific 
contours. In terms of instruments, these are mainly low-level and the types of actors 
extend beyond classic movement activists. Citizens and grassroots groupings with 
diverse ideological views and backgrounds organize and participate in these protest 
activities. In most cases, protest is not staged in line with traditional political divi-
sions but goes beyond the usual basis of collective action and party lines, thus blur-
ring party affiliations and embracing participants from all walks of life (see Part III 
in this volume).
This brings us to the question of how and why discontent and social grievances 
over the state of deportability translate into actions of solidarity. Both macro- and 
micro-level approaches are decisive for understanding why people decide to partici-
pate in unconventional political activities. Different opportunity structures foster or 
hinder access to collective actions (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Moreover, emotional 
processes at a subjective level foster protest development, for instance, when people 
experience moral shocks (Jasper 2014) because migrants they know personally and 
1 inex.univie.ac.at/research/taking-sides/
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have ties with receive a deportation order. This emotionally strained situation can 
move citizens to act by putting pressure on state authorities to revoke a decision.
1.3.2  Refugee Activism for Social Inclusion
In terms of saliency, collective demands by rejected asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants for their rights are a rare and recent phenomenon. The obvious reason for 
this rarity is that irregular migrants lack the capacities for self-representation, the 
organizational infrastructure, as well as the resources to mobilize for a successful 
struggle. Their status as non-citizens, including insecure residence titles, makes 
involvement in protest risky and costly. Collective action, however, requires many 
more resources and is difficult to organize and launch. Civil disobedience and hun-
ger strikes have often been refugees’ only means of raising their voices and resisting 
deportation (Rygiel 2011, 3; Chimienti 2011; Tyler and Marciniak 2013, 152).
Nevertheless, more recently, migrants with insecure status have been taking 
action all over Europe, organizing and participating in protests against deportation 
and for social inclusion and freedom of movement. In these struggles for member-
ship, migrants have become visible political subjects. Consequently, Tyler and 
Marciniak (2013, 143) have concluded that “refugee activism has become a signifi-
cant political force in its own right.”
Academic literature and advocacy organizations alike refer to agency and cap-
ture this form of protest with the concept of citizenship from below (Tyler and 
Marciniak 2013; Ataç et al. 2016). Moreover, when asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants mobilize to lobby for legal and social rights they speak of self-organized 
protest. However, others question this emphasis on self-organization to describe 
refugee activism. Following the resource model approach in social movement stud-
ies (Opp 2009), it has become clear that these acts of resistance also require infra-
structural resources, which are in fact provided by actors with greater access to 
resources. Together, protest groups consisting of both citizens and non-citizens 
organize collective activities and put pressure on state authorities to modify migra-
tion policies and/or their enforcement. Refugee activism relies on vertical solidarity 
networks (della Porta and Diani 2006, 15) or, as Granovetter (1983) calls them, on 
weak and strong ties between civil society and non-citizens. In this volume, the 
chapters in Part IV elaborate on vertical networks from different angles.
1.3.3  Restrictive Protest Against Asylum Seekers
Scholarly debates disagree on whether right-wing groups that mobilize and run 
campaigns against migrants and asylum seekers qualify as social movements (see 
Caiani et al. 2012). Schaeffer’s work (2014) not only looked at progressive move-
ments but also at political protest and social movements which seek to preserve 
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inequality and prevent others from acquiring similar rights and citizenship. Schaeffer 
termed these movements restrictionist movements, while della Porta and Diani 
(2006, 31) called them ethno-nationalist movements.
In several European countries, restrictionist protests against the reception of new 
asylum seekers have been observed for years (for example Grillo 2005). In the wake 
of the massive influx of migrants from the Global South and from war-torn coun-
tries, right-wing initiatives have grown and taken to the streets in larger numbers. 
They aim to stop decision-makers from accepting asylum seekers and their protests 
communicate a belief in the sovereignty of the nation state as the legitimate author-
ity for dealing with asylum. Moreover, protesters emphasize the right of their coun-
try’s nationals to determine who enters a territory and who has the right to stay.
One main feature of restrictionist protest is its network configuration, namely the 
overlap between institutional and non-institutional actors. Drawing on Goldstone 
(2003), protest and social movements should not be considered merely as outsiders 
or challengers to the polity because they do have access to institutionalized politics. 
This proposition is true for anti-asylum protest, but it clearly goes beyond this. In 
the cases presented here, several close links between institutional politics and extra- 
parliamentary contestation are evident. For instance, protests against asylum accom-
modation intersect closely with institutional actors. Often local and/or opposition 
politicians use the instrument of protest to counter decisions taken by higher-level 
government obliging them to take in asylum seekers. For Austria and Germany, the 
chapters by Haselbacher and Rosenberger (Chap. 12), as well as Rucht (Chap. 11) 
in this volume show that the arguments and demands of right-wing protest groups 
resonate with sections of the conservative and far-right parties. Moreover, they dem-
onstrate that institutional politics interact strategically with protest groups, bridging 
the gap between institutional activities and non-institutional ones. In this regard, 
protest serves as an instrument of party politics.
In terms of interests, looking at the motives concealed in these protest events, 
restrictive action is both self-interest-based (the material distribution of private and 
public goods between citizens and non-citizens) as well as ideology-based (main-
taining and strengthening an imagined national homogeneity and nativist culture) 
(see Haselbacher and Rosenberger 2018).
How and why do grievances about decisions on the reception of refugees trans-
late into collective action? Social movement literature distinguishes between stable 
and dynamic opportunity structures to underpin the emergence of protest (Cinalli 
2016, 88). The two chapters in this book addressing societal resistance to the recep-
tion of asylum seekers underline the importance of both historically established 
paths of far-right mobilization and dynamic, short-term contextual developments 
such as migration flows to explain the rise of protest.
Finally, a remark on the term refugee activism. Studies refer discursively to refu-
gees, used as a political notion of self-designation which obviously does not corre-
spond with the legal meaning. In legal terms, a refugee is someone who has been 
recognized as a refugee according to the definition of the Geneva Convention and 
was granted international protection. Chapters 9 and 10 in this volume dealing with 
refugee struggles or refugee protest use this self-designation of the protesters– 
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asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers, irregular migrants, and other categories 
speak about their struggle in terms of refugee protest/refugee struggles.
In sum, one contentious issue runs through all three manifestations of protest, 
namely the tension between universal and case-specific claims raised by protesters. 
Against this background, this question will be elaborated in the following section. 
As this topic is most relevant to pro-migrant protest, the discussion will focus only 
on anti-deportation protest and refugee activism.
1.4  Policy Change and Implementation Stop
Do protests challenge the nation state’s right to remove non-citizens or do they chal-
lenge the policy enforcement in specific cases? Goodman (2004) investigated the 
Australian citizen movement of solidarity with refugees, concluding that it oscil-
lated between “humanitarian norms and national identity, between borderless cos-
mopolitanism and reconstituted nationalism” (ibid., 4). The liberal paradox 
(Hollifield 2008) lies at the heart of this quotation, with reference not only to the 
liberal state but also to protest movements. Bearing in mind the research results 
presented in this book, this statement by Goodman (2004)–implying a confrontation 
between two distinct political directions–is clearly over-generalized and less 
nuanced. Solidarity protest movements and refugee activism include both radical 
claims for borderless human mobility and claims that borders be maintained while 
allowing a few to stay in the country who are perceived as culturally and economi-
cally integrated.
For social movement studies, it has become almost self-evident that individuals 
and networks engaged in political, social and cultural conflicts lobby for social 
change. The primary goal of progressive protests and social movements is change 
and transformation (Passy 2001; Rucht 2002; della Porta and Diani 2006); for right- 
wing groups it is undoing change (Schaeffer 2014). However, the question remains 
as to what kind and what degree of change is called for. Several chapters presented 
in this book engage with different understandings and degrees of social and political 
change and two specifications in particular are presented: firstly, demands either in 
favor of or to undo social and political change; and secondly, demands for changes 
either to policymaking or to policy implementation (Ellermann 2009; Patler and 
Gonzales 2015, 1468).
To begin with, the overall goal of anti-deportation protests is to combat the force-
ful removal of rejected asylum seekers or irregular migrants. These protests are 
carried out by a range of different protest groups. Experienced activists and left- 
leaning groups pursue a wider objective and aim for political change. These players 
reject the general logic of the exclusion of non-citizens from the territory and com-
munity. The other camp, mainly composed of ordinary citizens and acquaintances, 
lobby against the enforcement of a particular deportation case carried out in a spe-
cific way. We term this latter type implementation protest. It is for the most part 
neither oriented towards policy reform nor does it demand the modification of 
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 border control regulations nor a modification of asylum and deportation regimes. 
Rather, it is characterized by activities aimed at saving certain individuals from 
being deported or at least at making the deportation practices more humane. Policy 
implementation protests, including “noble activists” (Anderson et al. 2013, 5) are 
mainly concerned with what is just and what is not just, as applicable in individual 
cases. As mentioned above, solidarity action is driven by actors’ moral judgments. 
Solidarity protest takes joint action against the implementation of general rules. The 
logic of excluding certain people is dismissed, exemptions from the rule are required 
(for a critical debate, see Walters 2010; Hiemstra 2016). It is the discursive rationale 
of deservingness which builds the justification for a strategic or moral intervention 
to expand membership rights to a few “deportable” individuals.
On the question of protesters focusing on the individual enforcement of deporta-
tion rather than on policy regulation, Ellermann (2009) has provided a rational 
choice-oriented answer. She distinguished between the stages of policy design and 
implementation and found that public attention shifts from the benefits of restrictive 
policies to the high and individualized costs once they are visible at the implementa-
tion stage. However, the question remains as to why policy implementation protests 
emerge at all. A major strand of theoretical and empirical explanation refers to the 
phenomenon of social ties and emotions, but also to the subjects of protest, namely 
the people affected. Most interestingly, Flam (2015) has stressed the function of 
emotions in eliciting public declarations of sympathy for refugees and irregular 
migrants.
A revealing account of the role of social determinants relating to the subjects 
affected by deportability was offered by Patler and Gonzales (2015) in a study on 
anti-deportation case-based mobilization in the United States. Their findings high-
lighted that groups with a higher level of social acceptance, such as students, were 
more likely to receive media coverage and eventually be saved from deportation 
than less accepted social groups, such as low-wage workers. Whether a group 
attracts an anti-deportation media campaign thus depends, among other factors, on 
educational status and income.
As we turn to refugee activism calling for social inclusion and membership, the 
fundamental demand for social and political change clearly has a different goal. 
Refugee activism is more radical in that it makes demands concerning modifications 
to the asylum regime, the machinery of deportation and the right to free transna-
tional movement. In their demands, the (moral) right of a nation state to regulate 
borders and to decide on entry and stay is disputed (see the chapters by Mokre 2018; 
Odugbesan and Schwiertz 2018). A potential explanation for this comparatively 
more radical policy is that refugees have almost nothing to lose and therefore do not 
feel the need to appeal to political actors and institutions.
However, implementation protests are not only acknowledged but are also the 
subject of critical reflection in the literature. For instance, Rygiel (2011, 2) points 
out that anti-deportation protests can produce “differentiated modalities of mobili-
ties” and hence “differential inclusion” (ibid., 4). Solidarity protests may well cause 
political authorities to reverse a decision and to prevent a person and their family 
from being shunned by the social and political community, with the consequence 
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that certain people with negative decisions on their asylum applications are allowed 
to stay. However, others who were not lucky enough to provoke protest have to 
leave. Freedman (2011, 620) criticizes this aspect as an apolitical form of 
engagement.
1.5  The Role of National Contexts
The scope of the comparative studies and studies oriented towards individual cases 
examined here spans Austria, Germany and Switzerland. These three countries were 
chosen because they share some history and some political features, but also differ 
in some institutional aspects relevant to understanding protest politics. What all 
three countries have in common is a gradually increasing number of asylum appli-
cations, an increasing political tendency to adhere to removal rhetoric and practices, 
and, finally, few legal arrangements for staying for rejected asylum seekers. In sum, 
the policy field concerning asylum contains very similar components and tenden-
cies (for more on this, see Part II).
All the same, the three countries present institutional and discursive differences. 
They differ in protest culture and in the constellations of their political actors. 
Interestingly, Austria and Switzerland, on the one hand, and Switzerland and 
Germany, on the other, provide similar contexts for (successful) protest and politi-
cization from below. Austria and Switzerland have in common electorally success-
ful anti-migrant parties that protest, campaign and mobilize against migrant and 
refugee rights (Gruber 2014). In Germany, a strong anti-migrant party has only 
recently evolved and protest groups have started taking to the streets in several cit-
ies. On the other hand, Switzerland and Germany share a well-established protest 
culture, including relatively high rates of involvement in politics beyond electoral 
politics, with direct democracy and demonstrative protest repertoires (Hutter and 
Teune 2012). In Germany and Switzerland, better opportunities and a greater num-
ber of access points exist for direct, non-conventional political expression than in 
Austria, where a rather moderate protest culture from below is in place (Dolezal and 
Hutter 2007). So far, Austria does not qualify as what Meyer and Tarrow (1998) call 
a “social movement society,” in which protest activities constitute a major factor in 
shaping politics and society. For Switzerland, several studies discerned, in general, 
an open institutional context for protest (Hutter and Giugni 2009; Balsiger 2016). 
Interestingly, protest by immigrants or against the reception of new asylum seekers 
is almost non-existent in Switzerland; only anti-deportation protest could be 
detected.
Collective action against the implementation of deportations has taken place in 
these countries despite a tendency for public opinion to support restrictive asylum 
legislation, including the right to carry out forceful removals, and despite the often 
negative bias of public opinion against immigrants and asylum seekers. In social 
movement literature, societal support is identified as a relevant structural and dis-
cursive factor in protest development (Caiani and Borri 2016; Baumgarten and 
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Ulrich 2016). Where societal support is for restrictive asylum legislation, this cre-
ates a rather unfavorable opportunity structure for solidarity protests and refugee 
activism. In two countries, Austria and Switzerland, public opinion backs tough and 
restrictive asylum and deportation rules. This was slightly different in Germany at 
the time of investigation, that is until 2016. In contrast, particularly in Austria, 
restrictive protest organizations face favorable opportunities as their goals are 
mostly in line with the preferences and sentiments of the majority in society. In sum, 
solidarity protest and refugee activism have to act against the mainstream; restric-
tive protest goes mainly with the mainstream.
Last but not least, it should be mentioned that the three countries differ slightly 
as concerns the existence of and obligation towards the Common European Asylum 
System. For the European member states Austria and Germany, the European regu-
lations apply in full (e.g. Return Directive, Reception Directive). For the non-EU 
member state Switzerland, Dublin regulations about responsibilities for asylum pro-
cedure also apply. Interestingly, our research shows that the European framework 
has only a minor impact on protest events and activities.
To summarize, nation state representatives are the main targets of protest poli-
tics, and national features influence protest forms and their consequences more 
than European ones. These national particularities and differences in protest char-
acteristics across countries (see Ruedin et al. 2018) lead us to the conclusion that 
national structures are still influential for the emergence and dynamics of 
protest.
Social movement researchers agree that the political environment of a policy 
field sets important parameters for political protest and mobilization. The concept of 
political opportunity structure (POS) is defined as the dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action. In 
other words, the POS is about whether protest groups have easy or difficult access 
to the political process (Tarrow 1994, 85). The concept is widely used within social 
movement and political protest studies but has also met with criticism for its con-
ceptual and definitional uncertainty. In particular, for anti-asylum and anti- 
deportation protests, the POS-approach is revealing as protest activities challenge 
nation state authorities directly. In contrast, Kriesi (2011, 298) stresses that “cultural 
authorities will have a greater degree of autonomy from the political context.” This 
remark points to different explanatory powers of political and national contexts, 
depending on the contested issue. For our theme, we can look very closely at 
national opportunities and unveil their strength when it comes to understanding 
political protest around a highly sensitive subject to the nation state–asylum and 
deportation.
According to Meyer and Minkoff (2004), factors exogenous to protest are more 
relevant for mobilization and the sorts of demands raised than endogenous factors. 
This proposition is contested by our findings on asylum protest. We come to the 
conclusion that endogenous aspects are relevant too and should not missed out (on 
the differentiation between exogenous and endogenous factors, both of which form 
the context of protest, see Johnston 2011). One of the most relevant endogenous 
dimensions is protest as a resource for (further) protest. Our research on all three 
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expressions of protest underscores the mechanism of protest waves, namely that 
protests intensify and spread from one site to another. This observation draws on the 
argument that controversy itself creates further opportunities for controversy 
(McAdam et  al. 2001). Closely related to this is the view that protest diffusion, 
feedback and learning take place and can, to a certain extent, explain protest devel-
opment (Tarrow 2013).
Finally, there is a driving force for protest which is described as neither exoge-
nous nor endogenous: protest as a resource for institutional politics. Protests evolve 
due to structural grievances at an individual/subjective level, facilitated or hindered 
by national contexts and frameworks. However, besides grievances, fear and anger 
over structural transformations, unfair distribution or injustice in an individual case, 
the source of protest can also lie within the political power situation and dynamics 
within configurations of political actors. Several chapters in this book address this 
dimension and show that protest is not purely a meaningful response by citizens to 
humanitarian crises and social transformations. Protest also has a political basis and 
contains components of political conflict between actors within a parliamentary set-
ting and party politics. Della Porta and Diani (2006, 19) consider social movements 
as part and parcel of the political system. Protest is politics–or, more precisely, 
protest is a resource for institutional politics (Lipsky 1968; Goldstone 2003). This 
observation applies to right-wing protest against asylum seekers, where (local) 
institutional actors join protest activities and turn to protest repertoires (marches, 
town meetings, etc.) to resist political decisions taken at regional or federal levels.
1.6  Methods and Data
First of all, this volume presents original work from the three-year comparative 
study “Taking Sides: Protest against the Deportation of Asylum Seekers,” which 
examined anti-deportation protest events in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. In 
the interest of providing a comprehensive picture of political protest, however, the 
scope of this book has been expanded and complemented by studies on refugee 
activism in Hamburg, Osnabrück, and Vienna (see Part IV), as well as by research 
on right-wing mobilization against asylum seekers (see Part V).
Most, but not all, of the chapters refer to a joint methodological approach within 
the trilateral Taking Sides research project and to a jointly produced data set and 
defined categories. The main questions and aims of this volume were developed 
collectively between all the authors in workshops. Although Parts IV and V cover 
different time frames and different methods were used to gather and analyze data, 
the research shares conceptual and theoretical frameworks and contributes to the 
study of asylum protest.
The chapters use both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect and analyze 
data. The book is based on one longitudinal study (1993–2013) and several in-depth 
case studies, either single, multiple or comparative. This mixed method allows for 
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both in-depth knowledge and comparisons between different instances of protest 
mobilization by different constellations of actors across countries and timeframes.
The longitudinal study collected, analyzed, and compared anti-deportation pro-
test events in Austria, Germany and Switzerland over a period of 20 years. For this 
quantitative study, we applied the method of protest event analysis of media reports 
about deportations (Koopmans and Rucht 2002; for more on this, see the chapter by 
Ruedin et  al. 2018). Although newspapers do not chronicle all protests that take 
place, they do provide an important indicator of the public visibility of protest and 
the intensity of contestation. While a bias exists in terms of the ways in which pro-
test is reported in the news, we argue that because of their publicity, protests pre-
sented in mass media are particularly relevant for the general public and 
policy-makers alike (see Van der Brug et al. 2015 for a similar view) and represent 
an important incentive for those interested as well as institutional actors to become 
involved in protest.
Several chapters are based on in-depth case studies of hotly debated instances of 
local protest. In total, 15 in-depth case studies on the issue of anti-deportation were 
carried out within the Taking Sides research project. These case studies include 
interviews with protest actors and politicians, media reports, diverse protest mate-
rial (leaflets, etc.) and official documents such as newsletters produced by munici-
palities, etc. The chapters relying on this methodology strive for new insights into 
protest dynamics, protest success, and protest outcomes. The inquiry refers to forms 
of cooperation between a broad range of participants (vertical and horizontal net-
works) and the interaction between protesters and state actors.
The chapters on refugee activism are situated outside the Taking Sides project. 
They are based on the analysis of a wide range of text material on the protest cases. 
Moreover, they apply the observation method and focus on the conditions, barriers 
and support this kind of activism encounters. Chapters 9 and 10 have the additional 
challenge that the authors were involved in protest activities themselves. This situa-
tion offers additional insights on the one hand, but also requires certain skills to 
maintain distance to the subject of inquiry on the other.
The chapters on right-wing groups focus on the protest activities of recent years 
and rely on the analysis of several kinds of text material and of protest events 
reported in media outlets. The codebook used is similar to the one developed for the 
Taking Sides project.
1.7  Organization of the Volume
This book brings together a group of established academics and young scholars in 
protest research to elaborate on protest trajectories, interactions between different 
types of actors and state authorities, and mechanisms of (successful) protest for and 
against refugees. The collected essays are based on both single case studies and com-
parative findings across time, space and manifestation types. The structure of the 
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book reflects the typology of protest manifestations and is grouped into four parts: the 
three protest types plus a section on political context and issue-specific information.
Part II outlines concrete contextual environments, policy field specifics and 
information on the target of protest (governments, administrative bodies). To do so, 
a chapter focusing on each country sets out the stable and dynamic national con-
texts, including the institutional framework of each country, the functional and ter-
ritorial distribution of powers, and the party system and form of government. 
Furthermore, the chapters address issue-specific regulations, such as asylum laws 
and procedures, deportation laws, and reception and dispersal policies. This is com-
pleted by key information on short-term contextual factors, such as the development 
of asylum applications and numbers of removals. All in all, this forms the national 
contexts, which, according to the POS-approach, have the power to influence the 
rise and dynamics of protest as well as to explain differences in forms of protest, 
actor configurations, and impact. The subsequent chapters in Parts III, IV and V will 
draw on the contextual framework presented in Chaps. 1, 2, and 3.
Part III concentrates on solidarity protests directed against the deportation of 
failed asylum seekers (based on the Taking Sides data set and methodology). It 
includes essays presenting longitudinal perspectives on protest characteristics as 
well as in-depth knowledge on single protest cases.
In Chap. 5, Didier Ruedin, Sieglinde Rosenberger and Nina Merhaut identify 
country-specific characteristics of protest events in a longitudinal study covering a 
time span of 21 years. The analysis shows that the form of anti-deportation protest 
varies across countries and across time. For instance, most anti-deportation protests 
target policy implementation in individual cases rather than a change in policy or in 
policy-making. However, the overall direction depends on the kind of protest net-
works in question. Protests pursuing transnational goals and criticizing the border 
regime are more frequent in Germany, as compared with Austria and Switzerland. 
In Austria, resistance to individual deportations is dominant. The results of this 
investigation underline country-specific differences in the form taken by protests 
and explain these findings with reference to national particularities in protest cul-
tures and institutional frameworks for extra-institutional political participation such 
as direct democracy.
Maren Kirchhoff, Johanna Probst, Helen Schwenken and Verena Stern deal with 
protest success. They analyze multiple case studies conducted in the three countries 
of investigation and attempt to detect patterns of successful outcomes (Chap. 6). By 
addressing the stated deficit of comparisons across country contexts, this chapter 
uses context factors and sheds light on immediate protest outcomes at an adminis-
trative level. Referring to Kolb (2007), they identify a set of institutional mecha-
nisms which have an impact on the prevention of a single deportation. The authors 
conclude that both specific mechanisms and general opportunity structures facilitate 
success in anti-deportation protest.
In Chap. 7, Dina Bader and Johanna Probst investigate how and why citizens in 
Switzerland side with rejected asylum seekers and stand together to protest against 
the authorities’ deportation decisions. According to Bader and Probst, two ideal 
types of protest can be identified in this field: personifying and exemplifying 
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 protests. The former involves Swiss citizens with different political orientations 
coming together with the sole aim of preventing the deportation of a specific person 
or family who is seen as well integrated and thus deserving of the right to stay. 
Exemplifying protests are implemented by groups of left-oriented activists, who 
make strategic use of the case(s) of one or several migrants as examples to illustrate 
the outcomes of a policy they perceive as unjust and whose reform they demand. 
Ultimately, the authors draw on endogenous factors to discuss the type of the pro-
test–leftist protest groups stage exemplifying protests, while protesters from differ-
ent ideological backgrounds, encompassing left and right, experienced and 
non-experienced citizens, initiate personifying protests.
In Part IV, the chapters focus on recent migrant activism and the solidarity net-
works linked to this. These chapters are based on in-depth case studies and analyze 
the nature of protests and the contexts in which asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants, who are socially marginalized and lack the structural resources needed for 
resistance, raise their voices, organize, and participate in protest actions. The spot-
light is on the conditions which influence their capacity to organize and build alli-
ances to campaign for a right to stay and for better treatment of asylum seekers 
whose applications are being processed. As mentioned above, the tension between 
raising universal claims for all those affected or making individual claims to bring 
about change in single cases also runs through the refugee activism presented here.
Sophie Hinger, Maren Kirchhoff and Ricarda Wiese argue in Chap. 8 that taking 
into account the concept of deportability helps to gain better knowledge of the 
dynamics of anti-deportation protests. Based on qualitative fieldwork on the anti- 
deportation protests in the city of Osnabrück, where the Alliance against Deportations 
prevented 36 Dublin transfers from Germany to other European Member States, the 
authors examine how collective protest undermines the isolating logic of deport-
ability in the moment of an (attempted) deportation. Building social relations and 
ties becomes a constitutive aspect of anti-deportation mobilization. Moreover, the 
chapter elaborates on the composition and shared tasks of the protest groups, which 
include a wide range of participants with and without secure residence status.
In Chap. 9, Abimbola Odugbesan and Helge Schwiertz examine self-organized 
refugee struggles in Germany. A major element in self-organization is that protest-
ers organize resistance and articulate demands on their own. The authors view these 
struggles as a “new era of protest,” which must be understood as part of a complex 
history of migratory struggles for membership and social inclusion. The authors 
argue that specific social and political positions, partly shaped by the so-called 
German-European migration regime and its hierarchy of legal statuses, provoke 
conflicts and rifts within the broader movement of migratory and refugee struggles. 
According to the positions of the actors examined here, the framing of these initia-
tives often oscillates between general claims for the rights of all migrants and par-
ticular claims for the rights of the specific protesting group.
In Chap. 10, Monika Mokre analyzes the Refugee Protest Camp Vienna and 
inquires into whether a specific structure of political opportunity facilitated the start 
of the movement. Having traced the history of the camp, the author concludes that 
it did not have a specific triggering point; rather it can be understood as a contingent 
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event. Mokre shows how the protest movement made its interests public by raising 
universal claims, group claims and individual claims at the same time. Furthermore, 
she identifies relations between refugees and supporters that reflect the lines of 
mobilization, strong and weak ties (Granovetter 1983), and a mixture of individual 
support and collective political action. Most importantly, the protesting asylum 
seekers established close social relations (friendships) with people of various social 
backgrounds, citizens and non-citizens, a fact which became an extremely relevant 
resource for the life of the protest.
Part V contemplates the scope of progressive protests by examining restrictive 
protests against the arrival and reception of asylum seekers in Austria and Germany. 
Interestingly, this kind of restrictive protest is not widespread in Switzerland, which 
is why we decided against a case study on it. In particular, the Austrian paper indi-
cates a proximity and connection and connectedness between protesters and institu-
tionalized politics, a feature that clearly distinguishes solidarity from restrictive 
protest movements.
In Chap. 11, Dieter Rucht analyzes protests by right-wing groups against asylum 
seekers in Germany. The author embeds his analysis in the historical context of 
increasingly aggressive right-wing populism and right-wing radicalism. 
Organizationally fragmented but ideologically consistent, as the author stresses, for 
years this right-wing movement has been driving xenophobic activities forward. 
Analytically, Rucht demonstrates and proves that the concepts and tools of social 
movement research can be especially useful in analyzing and explaining the recent 
upsurge in xenophobic sentiment and activities because they allow insights into 
internal networks and repertoires that are taken partly from the parliamentarian and 
partly from the extra-parliamentarian arena.
Miriam Haselbacher and Sieglinde Rosenberger investigate restrictionist protest 
in Austria in Chap. 12. Examining protest events reported in diverse media chan-
nels, the authors elaborate on the features and success of restrictionist protest activi-
ties against the establishment of reception centers for (new) asylum seekers. The 
research findings demonstrate that this protest is mainly local and small-scale, is 
often initiated and supported by state actors, and is successful in terms of achieving 
its main demands, namely that the location in question not become operational. The 
protagonists employ demonstrational as well as confrontational action repertoires. 
The chapter shows that institutional and discursive opportunities are relevant for the 
spread of protest activities, whereas their high rate of success is due to the close 
relationship between protesters and representatives of political parties and political 
authorities (mayors). Initiating and joining protests is revealed to be a resource used 
in institutional politics by governing actors to mobilize people and to send signals 
about their responsiveness towards their constituents.
In Chap. 13, Gianni D’Amato and Helen Schwenken present and discuss the key 
findings of this volume. Summing up the similarities and differences in the charac-
teristics presented by different forms of protest, this chapter stresses protest diffu-
sion and presents evidence for it. Moreover, four anti-deportation protest impacts 
are identified: case-specific impacts, as many deportations could be stopped; 
movement- related impacts in terms of a broadening of protest activities; discursive 
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impacts, which lead to public awareness about deportations; and finally, politicizing 
impacts on the side of protest participants. As the comparative findings in terms of 
concrete outcomes show, refugee activism tends to be less successful than solidarity 
protest, and restrictionist protest tends to be more successful in terms of its impact 
on public debate, framings and policy decisions than solidarity protests. This con-
cluding chapter refers back to some of the features presented in this introduction, 
but summarizes them more accurately with regard to the empirical evidence and 
analytical and theoretical approaches.
Finally, on a practical note, the essays compiled in this volume are available via 
open access. Although there are cross-references between the chapters, our aim was 
that each text should stand alone. To facilitate this, each follows a similar format: 
starting with an abstract and key words, providing information on the data and 
methods used, and ending with a full list of references. This design allows for read-
ers to access each contribution individually.
Nevertheless, we invite you to read the book from cover to cover since we were 
particularly invested in giving it an overall arc and we hope that the entire volume 
will be met with interest. Our goal was to present a comprehensive body of work 
that reflects various levels of protest in the field of asylum and deportation. These 
protests were therefore compared on national and cross-national levels, quantita-
tively and qualitatively, and over a period of two decades, as well as more recently 
and in greater depth. Finally, by moving solidarity protests, refugee activism and 
restrictionist actions into focus, we shed light on different protest types, thereby 
complementing a broader picture of protests on behalf of, by and against asylum 
seekers.
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Chapter 2
Asylum Policies and Protests in Austria
Nina Merhaut and Verena Stern
2.1  Introduction
Austria, like Germany and Switzerland, follows an exclusive model of citizenship 
regime, which makes it harder for immigrants to gain naturalization or political 
membership than, for example, in France or the United States (Koopmans et  al. 
2005, 9). This partly results from the jus sanguinis approach compared to the jus 
soli acquisition of republican or pluralist countries (ibid.). However, another 
important factor was Austria’s refusal to act as a country of immigration; rather, the 
aim was to be regarded as a country of transit where migrants only stay temporarily. 
Historically, post-war Austria took in refugees–most notably from Hungary in 1956, 
from Czechoslovakia in 1968, from Poland in 1980–81, and from former Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s–always with the intention of the refugees’ speedy return to their 
country of origin as soon as the turmoil there had passed. Many of them did, in fact, 
return. In the 1945–73 period, Austria, like most Western European countries, was 
part of the “guestworker” system (Castles and Miller 2009, 97) that attracted mainly 
Turkish labor migrants. The intention was, again, that these migrants would leave 
the country as soon as their labor was no longer needed. Evidently, this was not the 
case, as people settled, had children, and built lives for themselves and their families.
Following this period, a shift in migration occurred: labor migration declined, 
instead refugee and asylum seeking increased (ibid., 123). Subsequently, the 
reception of asylum seekers had implications for the refugees’ possibility to stay. 
The topic became highly politicized and contested as Austria shifted from being a 
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country of transit to a country of destination in the 1980s (Schumacher and Peyrl 
2006, 185). The issue of migration was soon occupied by the Austrian far-right 
Freedom Party (FPÖ), who insisted on the existence of “economic refugees” who 
did not deserve refugee status and advocated for the non-integration of new 
immigrants in order to send them back more easily. This approach prompted the 
Green Party, several NGOs and other parts of civil society to object. Below, we will 
elaborate further on the developments and interactions of politics and policies; for 
now, we want to highlight the topic’s relevance in recent decades (which only 
reached its peak with the so-called long summer of migration in 2015 and its 
aftermath). During this period, protests have emerged, underlining Koopmans 
et al.’s (2005, 3; emphasis in original) observation that:
Combined, these three types of political mobilization around issues of immigration and 
ethnic relations–by migrants, against migrants, and on behalf of migrants–constitute since 
the early 1990s the most prominent and controversial fields of political contention in West 
European polities.
Against the backdrop of Austria’s transformation from a country of transit to a 
country of destination, we examine what factors have led to more restrictive asylum 
regulations since the 1990s and what options have been open to asylum seekers for 
staying in the country. The chapter sheds light on some of the factors regarding 
deportation, reception, and stay that constitute the contextual framework within 
which protests for and against asylum seekers have emerged. Firstly, we examine 
the development of asylum policy in the light of actors and their motivations since 
the 1990s. Secondly, we outline the Austrian asylum procedure and decision-making 
competences. Finally, we conclude with an overview of protest culture and protest 
mobilization in Austria.
2.2  Political Power Relations and Public Opinion 
in Migration
Immigration and asylum are salient, contested, and hence politicized issues on the 
Austrian public and political agenda (Meyer and Rosenberger 2015, 34). Especially 
in the past three decades, asylum politics have come strongly to the fore (Bauböck 
and Perchinig 2006, 735). In this section, we will take a closer look at how asylum 
policies have developed and the role played by European Union directives.
Austria’s geographic position between the Eastern and the Western Bloc during 
the Cold War prompted the country to become an important transit route for refugees 
(Götzelmann 2010, 46). In 1956, only a year after the 1951 Geneva Convention had 
entered into force in Austria, 180,000 Hungarians sought refuge there. In 1968, 
Czechoslovakians brought themselves to safety–most of them later returned home, 
some settled. Beginning in 1972, Austria started to take in non-European asylum 
seekers, mainly because of an international quota system and pressure from NGOs. 
(Ibid.; Genner 2012, 88–93).
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The federal government reacted to the fall of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s and to 
increased migration as a result of the wars in Croatia (1991) and Serbia (1992) with 
further policy changes. Through the Asylum Act (AsylG) of 1991, regulations for 
asylum procedures were created and the legal term asylum was introduced (Rieser 
1995, 59). These regulations, introduced by several SPÖ/ÖVP coalition governments, 
marked the beginning of a restrictive migration and asylum policy (Bauer 2008, 6) 
and comprised more elaborated components than its predecessor, the very first 
Austrian AsylG of 1968 (Rohrböck 1994, 37). More restrictive asylum laws were 
intended to lead to a decline in asylum applications, a noticeable decrease in the 
number of approvals (Schumacher and Peyrl 2007, 18; Bauer 2008, 18), and also an 
increased use of deportation to deal with “unwanted migration.” Making Austria 
less attractive to asylum seekers seemed to be the priority (Dimmel 2006, 638; 
Sonderegger 2006, 14). However, this situation also led to the formation of an 
engaged political opposition and a defiant civil society (Genner 2012, 99).
2.2.1  State Actors
The aforementioned paradigm shift in asylum politics at the beginning of the 1990s 
resulted in a new understanding of Austria as a country of destination, which 
motivated political parties and the media to take up the issues of immigration and 
asylum (Peyrl et  al. 2017, 259). Germany’s more restrictive approach to asylum 
policy in the 1980s (Genner 2012, 99; see also Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2018) appealed 
to Austrian politicians when faced with this new situation. Unemployment and cuts 
to social services also played a role in the use, particularly by the right-wing FPÖ, 
of asylum seekers as scapegoats, defaming them as “economic refugees” who came 
to steal Austrians’ jobs (Genner 2012, 99).
As elaborated in the introduction to this volume (Rosenberger 2018), the nation- 
state–as the legislative–is still the main legal proponent of asylum policy (and, 
consequently, the addressee of protests). Hence, despite the involvement of 
opposition parties, the media, and NGOs in the topic, representatives of the 
governing party are the most prominent actors and dominate the political debate 
regarding asylum and deportation (Götzelmann 2010, 161). For most of the time 
under discussion, the center parties SPÖ (Social-Democratic Party of Austria) and 
ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) led the coalition in the government. At certain points, 
all parties but the Greens were in accord, for example in voting for the AsylG 1991, 
or when the Ministers of the Interior of the SPÖ/ÖVP coalition government, as well 
as representatives of the FPÖ, sought to combat “bogus asylum seekers” in order to 
decrease the number of asylum applications (Langthaler and Trauner 2009a, 447).
Even though the governing parties in the National Council usually exercise the 
most influence over policy, the political commitment regarding asylum and 
deportation policy by the Green Party and, as mentioned above, the FPÖ is also 
salient. Topics relating to immigration are prominent issues on both their agendas, 
with the Green Party ideologically positioning itself in opposition to the 
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 anti- immigrant FPÖ (Meyer and Rosenberger 2015, 32–33). The BZÖ (Alliance for 
the Future of Austria, a splinter faction of the FPÖ) and the FPÖ campaigned for the 
immediate deportation of “criminal foreigners” and demanded stronger border 
protection to prevent immigration of “poverty migrants” and criminals. In contrast, 
the Green Party called for a humanitarian right to stay (Bleiberecht) for “integrated 
families” (Parlamentskorrespondenz 2011), and the Refugee Protest Camp Vienna 
(see Mokre 2018) at the Votive Church in 2012 was also supported by various 
motions put forward by the Green Party.
In 2000, a fundamental change in government–the right-wing FPÖ was now in a 
coalition with the conservative ÖVP until 2005–brought along new, more restrictive 
changes to the Aliens Act. The Interior Minister (ÖVP) capped federal support for 
asylum seekers, which forced many into homelessness (Peyrl et al. 2017, 251), in 
turn prompting protests from NGOs and politicians alike. The situation eased in 
2004, when the Basic Welfare Support Agreement was concluded between the 
federal government and the nine provinces in order to regulate joint action on the 
reception of and temporary basic provisions for asylum seekers. Based on this 
agreement, the federal government has had to provide for basic care for asylum 
seekers once they file an application for international protection, while the provinces 
have had to grant basic welfare support once the application is admitted to the 
in-merit procedure (Rosenberger and König 2011). Through this agreement, Austria 
has also met EU minimum standard to ensure that a country provides for every 
asylum seeker (Schumacher et al. 2012, 252).
Surprisingly, the most prominent resistance to governmental directives has 
occurred at a local level: over recent years, several mayors from the SPÖ and ÖVP 
have acted against their own party positions by protecting asylum seekers living in 
their municipality who faced deportation, or by interfering in protests against 
accommodation centers (see Haselbacher and Rosenberger 2018). Since 2015, the 
right to intervene enables the federal government to intervene regarding the accom-
modation of asylum seekers whose applications have been admitted to the in-merit 
procedure, which usually comes under the legislative competence of the provinces. 
In order to decrease the number of asylum seekers in 2016, the Austrian government 
restricted the rights of recognized refugees, lowering the right of residence to 3 years 
and adding barriers to family reunification (Integrationsfonds 2016).
2.2.2  Non-state Actors
Over time, several NGOs and advocacy groups have formed to support asylum 
seekers. Non-state actors who are advocating for them in public discourse include, 
among others, asylkoordination österreich, Forum Asyl, Asyl in Not, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Amnesty International. 
UNHCR is integrated into the Austrian asylum framework in a unique way: it is 
embodied in the Asylum Act that the UNHCR must be informed immediately when 
asylum proceedings are initiated. It has the right to demand information on every 
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asylum procedure, to examine the files, to contribute to the assessment of fact- 
finding, to be represented at interviews, as well as to get in contact at any time with 
the asylum seekers or refugees. Asylkoordination österreich, Forum Asyl, Asyl in 
Not, and Integrationshaus were all founded in the 1990s, a decade that was charac-
terized by a high number of policy changes and numerous amendments in the field 
of asylum and deportation, as elaborated above. In 1991, several organizations sup-
porting refugees merged to form the association asylkoordination österreich. It 
focuses on public relations and sensitization to the plight of asylum seekers, but also 
coordinates various humanitarian organizations, including education and training 
for counselors for refugees. Forum Asyl1 deals with ensuring protection for refugees, 
the interests of asylum seekers, as well as representing their needs (Span 2010, 
85–86).
Another important NGO is Purple Sheep. Together with a building contractor–
the father of a young boy whose friend had been deported–it established a house, 
called the Freunde Schützen Haus (Protecting Friends House), to create a safe 
environment for failed asylum seekers facing deportation. It often houses families 
who have lived in the country for several years and are regarded as well integrated. 
It played a prominent role during the deportation of a father and his twin daughters 
who were picked up by police at the break of dawn, while a member of staff at the 
house filmed the incident. (On both deportation cases, see Kirchhoff et al. 2018.)
2.2.3  European Union
As highlighted above, legislative power is still generally in the hands of the nation- 
state (Table 2.1). However, some policies were adopted because of Austria’s mem-
bership to the EU, which it joined in 1995. The most prominent example of EU 
directives are the Dublin Regulations. This agreement was first introduced in 1990–
although not as EU legislation, but as part of international law–, together with the 
Schengen Convention (Götzelmann 2010, 43), which allows for free movement of 
persons within this area. “Dublin” regulates which nation-state is responsible for an 
asylum application depending on the asylum seeker’s first point of entry to the EU 
(for further elaboration, see the Glossary in the appendix to this volume).
Austria made adjustments to meet this directive in 1997, when an Asylum Act 
was adopted in order to implement the Dublin Convention (Pfleger 2009, 4–5). The 
Convention laid down the principle that any application for asylum submitted to a 
member country of the European Union (EU) should be assessed by one country 
only. The Safe Third Countries Regulation (Drittstaatenregelung) enabled Austria 
to reject and deport refugees who had reached Austria by a safe third country, since 
1 Forum Asyl was founded in 1997 to strengthen cooperation between several humanitarian orga-
nizations: Amnesty International Österreich, the Austrian Red Cross, asylkoordination österreich, 
Caritas (a Catholic aid organization), Diakonie (a Protestant aid organization), Integrationshaus, 
and Volkshilfe (tied to the SPÖ).
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it is a landlocked EU country and de facto surrounded by safe third countries 
(Bauböck 1996, 21). An application for asylum should therefore be rejected in con-
junction with an expulsion order if another country is responsible for examining the 
asylum application. As Winkler (2011, 48) has noted, such expulsions in the case of 
an inadmissible asylum application by reason of absence of responsibility marked 
the beginning of an “expulsion regime based on asylum law.”
Simultaneously, the conditions for staying became subject to further regulation. 
The new Aliens Act of 1997–in general a time that was characterized by a less rigid 
amendment of asylum policy–created the possibility of issuing a residence permit 
on humanitarian grounds in cases2 of exceptional circumstances.
The 2002 amendment to the Aliens Act of 1997 is of twofold origin: First, it was 
necessitated by European legislation and, second, it reflected the more restrictive 
agenda of the new conservative/right-wing ÖVP/FPÖ coalition compared to previ-
ous governments. In anticipation of the European Council directive concerning the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, a residence certificate 
was introduced in July 2002, a title issued after 5 years of continuous residence and 
entitling the holder to unlimited employment. This reform harmonized residence 
rights with employment rights (Kraler 2011, 35; Bauböck and Perchinig 2006, 737). 
The integration agreement of 2002 obliged newly immigrated migrants or those 
who had lived in Austrian territory since 1998 to attend language courses. Sanctions 
in case of non-fulfilment ranged from punitive fines to expulsions. Technically, 
immigrants who of their own accord failed to fulfil the agreement within 4 years 
might be expelled. However, in practice this provision was not implemented 
(Winkler 2011, 51).
In the same year, Austria implemented EURODAC (European Dactyloscopy), a 
European Council regulation for the comparison of fingerprints to support a more 
effective application of the Dublin Convention. The number of so-called Dublin 
transfers has been rising continuously since the adoption of the system, whereas the 
number of asylum claims has dropped (Langthaler and Trauner 2009b, 35).
The purpose of the Asylum Act of 2005 in this context was to accelerate asy-
lum procedures, to readjust appeals, and to meet legal requirements defined on a 
European level, in particular by implementing the Qualification Directive to 
establish common grounds for granting protection (ECRE 2005, 45; Götzelmann 
2008, 106). The main objectives of the reform were to make Dublin procedures 
more effective by facilitating detention pending deportation and to initiate mea-
sures terminating residency at the earliest possible stage (Schumacher et al. 2012, 
251; 259).
2 These cases included “aliens” exposed to the danger of violation of Article 2 and 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Non-Refoulement Principle), war refugees for the duration of 
armed conflict, and victims of human trafficking for the length of juridical proceedings. 
Nevertheless, it could not be applied and was only granted ex officio.
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2.3  Asylum Procedures and Decision-Making Competences
As protest aims to challenge public authorities and its actions are directed at the 
competent authorities and their decisions, this section outlines the competences of 
the different fields in the asylum procedure.
In 2014, the newly established Federal Agency for Immigration and Asylum 
(Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl, BFA) replaced the Federal Asylum Office 
(Bundesasylamt, BAA) as the first instance authority in asylum procedures. At the 
same time the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, BVwG) 
replaced the Federal Asylum Court as the second instance authority. Along with the 
establishment of the BFA, the competences regarding asylum and immigration 
matters, which had previously been divided between the BAA and Immigration and 
Settlement Authorities respectively (Winkler 2011, 96–97), were modified and 
centralized. The BFA was rendered responsible for decisions within the asylum 
process: issuing documents related to asylum proceedings, granting and withdrawing 
political refugee status, issuing measures to terminate a residence, imposing custody 
pending deportation, and granting subsidiary protection status, toleration status, or 
residence permits in cases of exceptional circumstances. It further assumed the 
competence for basic welfare support (BFA 2016; see Fig. 2.1). To sum up, decisions 
on asylum and thus on reception, deportation, and possibility to stay (by means of 
toleration, subsidiary protection, and a residence title based on humanitarian 
grounds) are taken at the conclusion of administrative procedures on a national level 
by the BFA.
As well as centralizing competences, decision-making was also shifted from a 
political to an administrative level. Until 2014, the Immigration and Settlement 
Authorities made decisions on humanitarian residence permits, but their allocation 
was dependent on the approval of the Minister of the Interior (Asylkoordination 
Österreich et al. 2010, 4). With the establishment of the BFA, this competence of 
final decision-making was handed over to this federal agency.
2.3.1  Development of Asylum Applications
Between 2006 and 2015, 230,680 persons applied for asylum in Austria. Compared 
to high numbers of applications for asylum in the early 2000s due to the war in 
Afghanistan, the numbers from 2006 to 2010 were comparatively low. This decrease 
was due to the accession of Central and Eastern European States to the EU in 2004 
and 2007 and also because of legal changes with regard to the European border 
system (Welz 2014, 5). Since 2011 and the beginning of the civil war in Syria, the 
number of asylum applications has increased again, peaking in 2015 with 88,340 
applications. From 2005 to 2015, the number of recognitions of refugees amounted 
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to 65,335. In 2015, 47% of all concluded proceedings were ultimately negative, 
37% of the final decisions were positive.3
From the establishment of the Asylum Court in 2008 until its termination in 
2013, the duration of asylum appeal proceedings and the number of open proce-
dures fell. In 2012, about 75% of new pending appeal proceedings were concluded 
within 1  year, with Dublin transfers taking place within 2–3  weeks. However, 
because of the loss of the Federal Administrative Court’s control over the outcome 
of the process and the pressure to handle as many cases as possible, the quality of 
proceedings has been criticized (Schumacher et  al. 2012, 254). For the specific 
3 No information on the remainder and what accounts for the gap in the percentages could be 
found. In 2013 two-thirds (62%) of all concluded proceedings had a negative outcome, 25% of the 
final decisions were positive. 13% of the proceedings were closed or became redundant because 
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focus of our analysis it is important to note that the impact of protests might be 
lower in this context because of the sharply reduction in the duration of appeal 
proceedings.
2.3.2  Development of Deportations
After World War II, migrant workers were actively encouraged to come and join the 
work force in Austria, but the situation changed once migration evolved into refugee 
movements and asylum procedures became the central mode of access to the country 
(Fassmann and Reeger 2008). In the early 1990s, the compulsory removal of asylum 
seekers was introduced in Austria as a measure of migration control. The removal of 
non-citizens has become a part of standard migration policy in many Western 
democracies. This development in border-control policy is sometimes referred to as 
the “deportation turn” (Gibney 2008, 146; Paoletti 2010, 4).
Before 1990, deportation was only enforceable in accordance with prohibitions 
on the right to stay based on there being a danger to public order and safety (Pfleger 
2009, 1). Deportation therefore served as a means of “post-entry social control of 
aliens” (Kanstroom 2007). With the amendment of the Aliens Police Act of 1990, 
expulsion (Ausweisung) was introduced and aligned to the legality of entry and stay 
(without a residence permit). This measure of terminating residence, whose aim was 
to enlarge the group of deportable non-Austrians and include those who could not 
be covered by prohibition of stay or displacement, marked a change in deportation 
from a means of “post-entry social control” to one of “extended border control” 
(Kanstroom 2007).
In Austria, the legal basis for mass enforced repatriation of migrants was estab-
lished at the beginning of the 1990s, especially with the introduction of expulsion in 
1990. As in many other European countries, the number of enforced deportations in 
Austria remained consistently high during the 1990s. Between 1991 and 1999, there 
were 85,795 deportations in total. This corresponds to a figure of over 9500 deporta-
tions annually. The peak occurred in 1996 with 10,996 deportations.
Since 2000, the number of deportations has been constantly decreasing (except 
in 2003 and a slight increase in 2009 and 2010). In the long term, a decline in 
deportations can be identified, especially in comparison to the 1990s.
The decrease in the number of deportations can be ascribed to three factors. First, 
since Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995, the geopolitical situation has changed. 
As part of the Schengen Convention, common border checks between Austria and 
other EEA and EU nation-states have gradually been abolished. Border checks have 
been relocated outwards to the current external borders of the EU.  To combat 
unwanted migration, the European border is increasingly being moved to cooperating 
third countries, such as North African countries, and is additionally secured by the 
External Border Agency FRONTEX. It is therefore more difficult for certain migrants 
to reach the “Fortress Europe,” and especially landlocked countries like Austria.
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Second, measures have been taken toward “voluntary” repatriation, also known 
as “assisted return,” at a national and European level since the beginning of the 
1990s. By contrast to deportation, assisted returns come with several political 
advantages. On the one hand, it is cheaper, and on the other hand it seems to be less 
problematic from a human rights perspective (Welz 2014, 5–6).
Deportations and assisted returns are developing diametrically to each other. 
Since 2008, more migrants are being “voluntarily” repatriated than are being 
deported. It could be argued that the pool of those affected by the deportation of 
(rejected) asylum seekers is declining, even if asylum seekers represent the majority 
of deportees since 2008, with increasing tendency (ibid., 15–16).
Third, the decrease is due to European cooperation in the field of asylum. The 
Dublin system enables forced transfers of all asylum seekers whose applications 
have to be processed by other nation-states based on the Dublin regulations. Even if 
eventually these persons are deported, they do not appear in the immigration author-
ities’ statistics under deportations. This is because, according to the definition of the 
Ministry of the Interior (BMI), deportations are only forced repatriations if executed 
to countries of origin or of permanent residence, whereas, by contrast, Dublin trans-
fers are transfers to third countries. In comparison to deportations, Dublin transfers 
have not been declining but increasing since 2004. The numbers of deportations and 
Dublin transfers are stated both separately and together in Fig. 2.2. Considering the 
actual number of forced returns (deportations and Dublin transfers), only a slight 
Fig. 2.2 Deportations, Dublin transfers, and assisted returns, 2004–2015
Based on Parlamentarische Anfrage 2014; BFA 2014, 2015; BMI 2016
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decline is noticeable. Therefore, the above-mentioned relationship between forced 
and assisted return is changing.4
While the number of deportations has remained relatively low over recent years, 
the number of assisted returns increased sharply from 2014 to 2015, reflecting the 
government’s handling of increasing numbers of asylum applications in the context 
of the “refugee crisis.”
2.3.3  Possibility to Stay
In 2009, the government undertook reforms concerning the issue of rejected asylum 
seekers who were long-term residents and other irregular migrants liable to be 
deported, and the inadequacies of regulations for granting residence on humanitar-
ian grounds (Kraler 2011, 41). After a ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2008 
found that existing regulations were inconsistent with the constitution, since they 
only allowed for the ex officio granting of residence on humanitarian grounds but 
not upon application, the government repaired several regulations and introduced a 
right to apply in April that same year. The basic principle of the new regulation 
(which in public is referred to as right to stay–Bleiberecht; Asylkoordination 
Österreich et al. 2010) is that in any case where expulsion is permanently inadmis-
sible due to established family and other private ties, a residence title on humanitar-
ian grounds has to be granted. Specific criteria to be considered were determined, 
covering the duration and nature of stay, the actual existence of family life, the 
vulnerability of the applicant’s personal life, the degree of integration, and the appli-
cant’s integrity. However, the legislature implemented the ruling of the Constitutional 
Court in the most restrictive–and complex–way possible. Following two further 
amendments in 2009 and 2011, there is no residence title on humanitarian grounds 
sui generis within the current regime of the right to stay, but instead the framework 
for the two prevailing residence titles known as the Rot-Weiß-Rot-card plus and 
Niederlassungsbewilligung (settlement permit) has been expanded. Under certain 
conditions, the residence and settlement authorities could decide to grant a resi-
dence title ex officio or upon application. Especially for asylum seekers, criteria 
such as financial independence pose an obstacle to applying for a settlement permit. 
Settlement procedures have no suspensive effects on immigration authorities’ 
procedures, thus measures terminating a residence are enforceable (Asylkoordination 
Österreich et al. 2010; Schumacher et al. 2012).
In the same year, the legislature tightened regulations regarding custody pend-
ing deportation, appeals, and subsequent applications. Thus, deportations can 
increasingly be implemented while asylum proceedings are still pending, even 
4 Fig. 2.2 shows that already in 2008, more people were voluntarily repatriated than deported. 
Moreover, it shows that the number of assisted returns did not reach higher levels than the number 
of forced returns until 2010.
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before the immigration authorities have taken a legally binding decision on the 
asylum application (Agenda Asyl 2010, 35).
The Aliens Police Law article on suspension of deportation has been replaced by 
the term Duldung (toleration). If the authorities state that an expulsion is not 
enforceable for factual reasons, asylum seekers are granted temporary toleration 
status. Whereas the grounds for suspension remained the same, it could henceforth 
only be granted ex officio but not upon application (Winkler 2011, 57). In practice, 
authorities often do not state the inadmissibility of an expulsion ex officio, therefore 
toleration may not be granted and the legal position of those affected is utterly pre-
carious (Slominski and Trauner 2014).
2.4  Protest Culture and Public Opinion in Austria
Austria is characterized by a low level of mobilization of extra-parliamentary pro-
test and a moderate protest culture. Using Protest Event Analysis (PEA), Dolezal 
and Hutter (2007) as well as Hutter and Teune (2012) analyzed the development of 
protest activities on a longitudinal basis and across countries. As they have stated, 
political participation in the form of protest did not increase until the beginning of 
the 2000s in Austria, not least as a reaction of left-wing movements to the rise of the 
New Right. However, the increase was only moderate. Extra-parliamentary mobili-
zation remains less frequent in Austria than in other European countries (Dolezal 
and Hutter 2007, 347; Hutter and Teune 2012, 13). Not only is the frequency and 
level of mobilization lower than in other countries, it is also more moderate in form: 
protests such as demonstrations or occupations are of low importance in Austria.
The reasons for this moderate protest culture can be traced to enduring and rela-
tively stable opportunity structures and to how the actors are configured. Due to 
Austria’s strong state, political challengers seek involvement in informal procedures 
of decision-making. At the same time, Austrian politics is still characterized by 
consensus democracy and party cohesion. The number of parties and the ideological 
polarization of the party system (Dolezal and Hutter 2007, 347) has increased over 
time and political demands are primarily channeled within this institutional 
framework (Rosenberger and Stadlmair 2014, 482).
The Austrian political scientist Herbert Gottweis (1997, 344) states that Austria’s 
history also plays a role in its passive approach towards protest (and political 
participation in general). He also mentions the country’s almost non-existent student 
protests in the 1960s, and how this lack of a movement might have negatively 
affected the emergence and success of further protest movements (ibid., 345).
However, Austria did have its fair share of “traditional movements,” such as what 
is known as the second wave of the women’s movement in the 1970s, including 
demonstrations and protests for the right to abortion and for general equality with 
men. These protests were successful in the long run: consistent pressure on the 
governing SPÖ led to legal establishments of women’s rights, such as the right to 
abortion or the right to enter the work force without a husband’s permission.
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Other important protests revolved around the anti-nuclear movement, which 
started in the mid-1970s when Austria was planning–and started to build–a nuclear 
power plant in Zwentendorf. These protests were important because they gathered 
together a diverse group of protesters drawn from students, conservatives, and 
environmentalists. They managed to influence public and political discourse until, 
eventually, the SPÖ refrained from finishing and activating the nuclear power plant. 
(Ibid., 347) The protests against the nuclear power plant in Zwentendorf, as well as 
environmental protests for the preservation of a nature reserve in Hainburg, were the 
two central movements from which the Green Party emerged.
Evidently, compared to other Western European democracies, Austria’s level of 
protest mobilization is still low. This also becomes apparent in the field of migration 
and asylum policy, as data collected within the framework of the longitudinal and 
comparative project Taking Sides: Protest against the Deportation of Asylum 
Seekers shows. There have hardly been any large-scale demonstrations or mass 
mobilizations (for protest against deportations see Rosenberger and Winkler 2014 
and Ruedin et al. 2018). Most notably, there was the Lichtermeer (Sea of Lights) in 
1993, a demonstration at which approximately 250,000 people protested against an 
anti-migrant referendum initiated by the FPÖ called Österreich zuerst (Austria 
First). A diverse group of actors participated in this protest, including organizations 
from civil society like unions and churches, as well as politicians and in particular 
many first-time protesters (Genner 2012, 121; 241). As a result, the referendum, 
which aimed to gather one million signatures from the Austrian population, received 
only 400,000. More recently, two large demonstrations took place. The first one was 
Genug ist genug (Enough is enough) in 2010, which was initiated in response to a 
very prominent deportation case (see Kirchhoff et al. 2018) and called for a humani-
tarian right to stay for integrated families. The second, Voices for Refugees took 
place in 2015. It was initiated by the NGO Volkshilfe in the wake of the “refugee 
crisis” and was a big concert in solidarity with asylum seekers (Fenniger 2015).
However, large demonstrations for or against asylum seekers that draw in a lot of 
protesters are by far the exception. Despite the fact that it is the nation-state that 
possesses sovereignty of legislature, protests in Austria rarely address the macro 
level. Instead, they most often occur at the level of implementation and are triggered 
by acute cases of pending deportation (Ruedin et al. 2018; Kirchhoff et al. 2018; 
Stern 2017) or by the imminent inhabitation of accommodation centers for refugees 
(Haselbacher and Rosenberger 2018). Individual deportation cases also resonate 
with the public and members of parliament, which prompted the Green Party to 
present “one case a week” in the Austrian parliament to highlight the fates of people 
affected by pending deportation (Genner 2012, 121).
Another important factor is that protest activities, both against the reception of 
asylum seekers or against their deportation, often occur at local levels across the 
country, in particular in rural areas (Haselbacher and Rosenberger 2018; Kirchhoff 
et al. 2018). Cases on an individual and local level tend to have a greater effect on 
potential protesters. By creating emotions that trigger “moral outrage” (Jasper 2011; 
Rosenberger and Winkler 2014), protests are more likely to address implementation 
than legislation.
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Simultaneously, public opinion often affects policy change, not least because of 
its importance regarding votes in elections (Page and Shapiro 1983). Public opinion 
correlates with power relations and discussions on the level of political parties: a 
majority of the Austrian (voting) population holds a negative stance towards 
migrants and has supported tough and restrictive immigration and asylum policy for 
decades (Friesl et  al. 2010, 9; OTS 2004). A study on behalf of the UNHCR 
examined the knowledge, attitudes, and prejudices of Austrians regarding asylum 
seekers and refugees in 2011: more than half of those interviewed associate 
something positive with asylum seekers. Personal contact with asylum seekers was 
primarily the result of neighborhood proximity or work. Distrust of asylum seekers, 
however, was noticeable as well: 47% of those interviewed associated asylum abuse, 
criminality, and abuse of the welfare system with asylum seekers (UNHCR 2011).
These results also mirror our own research: ties between asylum seekers and 
Austrians are crucial for ensuring support for and protests on behalf of asylum 
seekers (Kirchhoff et  al. 2018); a lack of contact can lead to further prejudice, 
reinforcing the dominant discourse towards asylum seekers (Haselbacher and 
Rosenberger 2018).
2.5  Conclusion
This chapter depicted how immigration, as well as Austria’s accession to the EU 
in 1995, motivated developments and amendments in asylum policy. The original 
legal framework from 1968 was altered profoundly in 1991, when–due to geo-
political changes–national identity shifted from being a country of transit to a 
country of destination. The idea of temporarily recognizing the residence of asy-
lum seekers and migrants dating back to the “guestworker” system in the 1970s 
is still deeply inscribed in the Austrian migration and asylum system, and was 
most recently highlighted when the federal government adopted a bill on asylum 
for a limited time.
Simultaneously, individual possibilities for staying for failed asylum seekers 
have emerged in the forms of toleration, subsidiary protection, and a residence 
permit based on humanitarian grounds. However, the allocation of such permits is 
rather restrictive. They are not granted as separate humanitarian residence permits 
within a set of regulations, but rather as residence permits under certain conditions 
and based on certain aspects of integration–which are a necessary condition but not 
in themselves sufficient to obtain a title (Rosenberger 2011).
Decision-making competences regarding asylum, deportations, and possibility 
to stay are centralized in the Federal Agency for Immigration and Asylum. Austria’s 
nine provinces only have decision-making authority with regard to the reception of 
asylum seekers. A right to intervene, however, which was introduced in 2015, 
enables the federal government to intervene in the accommodation of asylum seek-
ers and therefore in the competence of the provinces.
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All these aspects concerning asylum and the asylum procedure present opportu-
nity structures for protests, which have emerged both against deportations (and for 
a right to stay) and against the reception of asylum seekers. Despite rather unfavor-
able conditions for protest due to the high polarization of issues around immigration 
and asylum since the 1990s, Austria’s moderate protest culture, and low civic 
engagement in politics, we can state that protest does emerge–albeit in a different 
form. Compared to other Western European democracies, Austria has developed a 
specific protest culture that is heavily based on individual cases. Rather than protest-
ing against asylum policy in general, protest emerges on the level of implementation 
when residents, neighbors, family, or colleagues are affected by the issue on a per-
sonal level. This circumstance is also expressed in the protesters themselves, as 
these groups mainly consist of those who initiate the protest; NGOs, the church, or 
politicians often only join later through networks. This observation is in accord with 
Jasper (2014, 93), who also notes that the initial group of protestors do not neces-
sarily have to be activists.
As Kraler (2011) states, policy-making in the field of immigration and asylum is 
characterized by continuity. The general trend in Austrian asylum policy is one that 
is increasingly restrictive, prohibitive, and often subordinates humanitarian concerns 
to national interests (Funk and Stern 2010, 259). The numerous amendments are 
characterized by an intensified trend towards control, national security, and 
combating alleged abuse of the asylum system (Agenda Asyl 2010, 1). The use of 
deportation as a coercive instrument of state power has been expanded over time 
and partly replaced by different measures, such as Dublin transfers or assisted 
returns. In light of increased migration and border controls in Europe, it remains to 
be seen how these policies–as well as protests–regarding asylum seekers will 
develop in Austria over the coming years.
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Despite the late acknowledgment of Germany being an “immigration country”, 
migration has been a heated topic throughout the last few decades, with peaks in the 
late 1980s, the early 1990s and the mid-2010s. This time has been marked by an 
increasing Europeanization of policies concerning asylum and deportation. Policy 
developments in this field are thus influenced by political debates and struggles both 
on the national as well as the supranational level. These controversies and multilevel 
politics have resulted in a contradictory mixture of restrictive regulations regarding 
the admission of migrants, as well as increased possibilities for residence. 
Regulations regarding deportations show a similar ambivalence.
The aim of this article is to contextualize contentions over asylum and migration 
in Germany during the last few decades. We first review literature as well as (policy) 
documents, campaign materials, and statistics, in order to describe the development 
of Germany’s asylum and deportation policies. After this general context, which is 
central to understanding the protests analyzed in this book, we illustrate the decision- 
making authority over asylum, deportation, and stay as specific points of reference 
for protests. Finally, we sketch the broader protest culture in order to further contex-
tualize contention around asylum and deportations.
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3.2  Contentions Over Asylum and Deportation in Germany
In order to illustrate developments in the field of asylum and deportation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany,1 we must go back to the early 1970s. This was a time, 
when, following the economic crisis, Germany’s “guest worker regime” came to an 
end. Debates around migration were put on the political agenda in Germany, includ-
ing specific demands regarding the return of “guest workers” whose stay had been 
initially conceptualized as temporary (Karakayalı 2008, 169–173). Furthermore, in 
the late 1970s, several states (Länder) governed by conservative parties (Christlich 
Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU/Christlich Soziale Union, CSU) had 
started a campaign against the “abuse of asylum,” which became a central motif in 
debates on asylum for the following decades.
Migration was seen as an important policy field in the 1980s, and the public dis-
course on asylum and deportation became more and more polarized: On the one 
hand, right-wing actors organized campaigns to stop the admission of foreigners in 
the context of local and federal election campaigns (Der Spiegel 1982). On the other 
hand, a marginalized, but nonetheless considerable fraction of the population was in 
favor of liberal asylum and migration policies and the pro-migrant and anti-racist 
movement of the 1980s succeeded in establishing long-term influential actors: In 
the early 1980s–a time of massive anti-deportation protests2–Refugee Councils 
(Flüchtlingsräte) were established on the state level. In the run-up to the 1987 fed-
eral elections, a nationwide lobbying group, Pro Asyl was founded, consisting of 
refugee councils, church representatives, unions, and human rights organizations. 
These groups attempt(ed) to constitute a voice countering the anti-migrant dis-
course, and to influence parliamentary decisions. At the same time, they directly 
support(ed) asylum seekers and migrants with precarious legal status, often via 
legal means (Müller 2010, 148–149), and continue to be major non-parliamentarian 
actors in migration politics in Germany (see also below in the part on protest 
culture).
In 1982 diverging positions regarding security, social and economic policy led to 
the collapse of the social-liberal coalition (composed of the Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, SPD & the Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP). Following the 
anti-migrant focus of the 1980 federal election campaign, the new conservative- 
liberal government (CDU/CSU & FDP) put important policy changes into place in 
the early and mid 1980s, including the maintenance of the recruitment ban, a restric-
tion on family reunification and the promotion of assisted “voluntary” return. Even 
though the government continued to deny that Germany was an “immigration 
1 When talking about the era before the 1990s, we refer to the Federal Republic of Germany, as the 
scope of the West German Asylum and Foreigners Acts was extended to East Germany with reuni-
fication in October 1990 (Herbert 2003, 297).
2 In 1983, Kemal Altun, an asylum seeker from Turkey, committed suicide during his court process 
in order to escape his likely deportation. Subsequently, mass protests against the deportation of 
political activists with more than 10,000 people took place; this was a decisive moment of politici-
zation for many migrant initiatives and anti-racist groups (Seibert 2008, 187).
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 country,” incentives for return were combined with the concept of “integration” for 
the first time. This mix was characteristic of the following decades and led to a par-
ticular discursive connection between deportation and integration still valid today: 
deportations of undesired migrants are presented as a way to make room for those 
considered desirable (Oulios 2013, 220).  Furthermore, asylum procedures, resi-
dence requirements and collective accommodation were restructured, and work per-
mits for asylum seekers were restricted in the early 1980s. These changes also 
served as the roots of regulations regarding “safe third countries” and “safe coun-
tries of origin” and initial restrictions on asylum: applications referring to a general 
emergency or war could from now on be swiftly rejected (Müller 2010, 159).
The breakdown of the socialist states in 1989–1990 fundamentally changed the 
background of the debate on asylum. The context of the Cold War had led to a 
highly ambivalent position among conservative groups regarding asylum seekers 
from socialist states, as they were seen as evidence of success in the global competi-
tion between capitalism and socialism (Bade and Oltmer 2004, 106). Furthermore, 
asylum seekers, now increasingly coming from the Global South, were considered 
potentially problematic migration. As a consequence, the discourse on “bogus asy-
lum seekers” who “abused” the “generosity” of the German asylum system grew in 
the early 1990s, with increasing discussions on limited capacities and the costs of 
reception (Müller 2010, 159–161). “Overforeignization” (Überfremdung) became 
one of the dominant topoi. As a response, restrictive asylum policies found increas-
ing public and parliamentary support (Der Spiegel 1990). Yet, in 1990 this was still 
far from being a (parliamentarian) majority position.
In the following years, laws restricting asylum gained support, resulting from 
political developments both on the national and supranational level. In the early 
1990s, more and more people sought protection from the wars in former Yugoslavia. 
The rising numbers of asylum applications were accompanied by an escalation of 
the discussions of further policy changes. Increasing hostility to “foreigners” con-
tributed to the electoral success of right-wing parties in several state-level parlia-
ments, as well as attacks on migrants in the street and arson attacks on their homes 
and accommodation (Bade and Oltmer 2004, 108–110). Following one of the most 
contentious political debates in post-war Germany–as well as strategic negotiations 
on the European level (Kannankulam 2014, 110), the conservative-liberal govern-
ment finally agreed with the Social-Democratic opposition on the so-called Asylum 
Compromise (Asylkompromiss) in December 1992. The majority of the German 
population backed this (Oulios 2013, 226). Nevertheless, a strong opposition made 
its dissent public: In 1992, hundreds of thousands of people took part in demonstra-
tions against the asylum reform; in May 1993 10,000 people blocked the govern-
ment quarter in Bonn (Die Zeit 2012), but could not prevent the law from entering 
into force.
In order to demarcate itself from its national-socialist past, the right to asylum in 
Germany had not only been grounded on the basis of international obligations 
emerging from the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951, but also had constitutional 
status since 1949, stating: “Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the 
right of asylum.” (Basic Law, Grundgesetz, GG). The amendment of the Basic Law 
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and the Asylum Procedure Act fundamentally restricted the right to asylum. The 
physical route asylum seekers took to Germany became one of the key points in 
their asylum applications: asylum would not be granted if an asylum seeker either 
came from a “safe country of origin” or if s/he had entered Germany through “safe 
third countries,” which by definition Germany is surrounded. The recognition of 
refugee status according to the Refugee Convention thus became the most common 
form of refugee protection, far outnumbering positive decisions regarding asylum 
on the ground of §16a GG (for an overview on the different status of protection, see 
Table 3.1). An additional result from the Asylum Compromise was the adoption of 
the Social Welfare Law for Asylum Seekers (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, 
AsylbLG), which excluded asylum seekers from the standard welfare system.3 This 
law allowed mainly for in-kind payment and imposed the primary provision of 
housing in shared accommodation, forcing the social isolation of persons in pend-
ing asylum procedures (Classen and Kanalan 2010, 243).
Following the Asylum Compromise, an overwhelming number of asylum appli-
cations were rejected (see Fig. 3.1); their claims of being in danger of persecution 
were declared unfounded, or were rejected for formal reasons. Consequently, the 
rejected asylum seekers were obligated to leave the country (Bade and Oltmer 2004, 
113). This development was reflected in the German deportation statistics, with a 
peak of nearly 100,000 deportations from Germany in 1993 (see Fig. 3.2).
In the mid-1990s, the focus of public debates in the field of migration shifted 
away from trying to close the channels of legal immigration to the return of those 
migrants who had either entered Germany without permission, had overstayed their 
visa or had had their asylum claims rejected. While other European countries had 
granted residence and working permits to migrants fleeing from Bosnia because of 
civil war, Germany had only provided so called Duldung, which literally means 
toleration. The status as a temporary suspension of deportation is a characteristic 
feature of Germany’s migration regime even today. Following the Dayton Peace 
Agreement in December 1996, migrants from Bosnia were supposed to return to 
that country. While it was not possible to deport all of these people, the combination 
of high numbers of deportations, the strict and uncompromising enforcement in 
representative cases, and financial incentives for return led to the removal of more 
than half of the Bosnian migrants in Germany (Oulios 2013, 231–234; 
Ausländerbeauftragte 2001, 81).
Assisted returns were increasingly used, and were presented as a humane alter-
native to deportations. Correspondingly, 4 years after the deportation peak in 1993, 
in 1997 a sharp rise in assisted returns is to be observed (see Fig. 3.2). In the follow-
ing 4 years, more than 330,000 people left Germany with support of state-funded 
return programs, many to Bosnia and Kosovo (Kreienbrink 2007, 26). While most 
governmental actors highlighted the need for resolute return policies, the enforce-
ment of deportations was highly contested, with a growing number of church 
3 The system was extended from asylum seekers to tolerated migrants (in 1997) and in the context 
of new residence types introduced in the Immigration Act to further groups in 2005 (see Classen 
and Kanalan 2010, 243).





Permission to remain in the federal territory while 





application (e.g. due 
to Dublin Procedure)
Permission to remain in the federal territory 
expires




Entitlement to asylum Residence permit for three years, permanent 
residence permit possible after three years (§25 & 
§26 AufenthG)Refugee protection
Subsidiary protection Residence permit for one year, with possible two-
year extension per filing; permanent residence 
possible after five years [including the duration of 
the asylum procedure] if other preconditions are 
met (§25 & §26 AufenthG)
National ban on 
deportation
Residence permit for at least one year, repeated 
extensions possible; settlement permit possible 
after five years [including the duration of the 
asylum procedure] if other preconditions are met 
(§25 & §26 AufenthG)
Application judged as 
manifestly unfounded
No residence permit
Requirement to leave the territory (§50 AufenthG)





Suspension for as long as deportation is impossible 
in fact or in law and no temporary residence permit 
is granted, this does not effect the obligation to 
leave the territory (§ 60a AufenthG)
Case of hardship Residence permit may be granted if a Hardship 
Commission decides to file a hardship petition 
after establishing that urgent humanitarian or 
personal grounds justify the foreigner’s continued 
presence in the federal territory (§23a AufenthG)
Granting of residence 
due to “sustainable 
integration”
Residence permits can be granted to juvenile or 
adolescent as well as adult foreigners whose 
deportation has been suspended if certain 
preconditions are met (§ 25 a & b AufenthG)
Source: Compilation by the authors based on AsylVfG, version: 12/1/2013 and
AufenthG, version: 12/2/2013)
Table 3.1 Selected status and respective residence permits according to German legislation, prior 
to changes in 2015/2016
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 sanctuaries and public protests. In these, but also the following years, deportation 
moratoria were frequently put in place during the winter (Flüchtlingsrat Baden- 
Württemberg 2013).
Furthermore, discussions began around what to do with those who could not be 
returned (Müller 2010, 168–169). Many migrants could not be deported: some 
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Fig. 3.1 Asylum applications and decisions in Germany, 1990–2015. Based on BAMF 2013, 
2014, 2016a; Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2003 (Positive decisions 
include entitlement to asylum, refugee status and subsidary protection as well as national bans of 





































Fig. 3.2 Deportations and assisted returns from Germany, 1990–2015. Based on BAMF 2016b; 
Deutscher Bundestag 2016; IOM Deutschland 2014; Kreienbrink 2007. (The number of deporta-
tions in this Figure is the sum of the official numbers of deportations (Abschiebungen) and rejec-
tions (Zurückschiebungen) for each year.)
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their deportation was prohibited. Some rejected asylum seekers were tolerated “as 
long as deportation is impossible in fact or in law” (§60a (2) AufenthG) due to dif-
ferent reasons such as the unavailability of identification papers or internal conflicts 
in the home country. Many people remained without legal regularization, trapped by 
the toleration of their unlawful presence on German territory. Consequently, there 
was a considerable population of tolerated people who lacked access to the most 
fundamental social rights: more than 250,000 tolerated migrants were registered on 
12/31/2000 (Ausländerbeauftragte 2001, 81). In an effort to end again and again 
recurring temporary suspensions of deportation, several backlog regulations have 
been passed since 1996. However, only a small number of those eligible have actu-
ally received a residence permit based on these regulations because of strict criteria. 
These backlog regulations were supposed to be accompanied by an increase in 
deportations of rejected asylum seekers (Müller 2010, 168–171).
In October 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty transferred migration and asylum poli-
cies into the first pillar of the European Union. The aim was to create a common 
asylum system based on the comprehensive application of the Geneva Refugee 
Convention. This entailed an integration of the Schengen Acquis as well as the 
Dublin Convention into the common laws. The subsequent externalization of the 
European “Border Regime” (see Hess and Kasparek 2010) and the implementation 
of the Dublin System–together with the end of the Balkan civil wars–contributed to 
a significant decrease of asylum applications in Germany (see Fig. 3.1). Furthermore, 
several EU directives were passed in order to harmonize national laws.4
The end of the conservative-liberal coalition and the inauguration of a Social- 
Democratic- Green government in 1998 led to a shift towards more liberal migration 
policies. Examples included new naturalization regulations (1999), the announce-
ment of the Green Card Initiative (2000) and the acknowledgement of Germany as 
an “immigration country” (Kannankulam 2014). However, conservative actors 
remained influential, and managed to succeed in making their mark on legislation 
under the new government.5 The focus on labor migration was also reflected on the 
European level with discussions on a European Blue Card. In the years, migration 
debates most often referred to the mobility of highly educated workers (Geiger and 
Hanewinkel 2014). Furthermore, migration was framed in a securitized way follow-
ing the attacks of 9/11/2001 (Gibney and Hansen 2005, xxi). Considerations of 
employability and security have remained influential in asylum and migration dis-
courses up to today.
4 E.g. the Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and with-
drawing refugee status (Council Regulation 2005/85/EC) or the Directive on minimum standards 
for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted 
(2004/83/EC).
5 This is partly connected to the federalist structure of the political system. To be passed, some laws 
need the support not only of a majority of the German lower house (Bundestag), but also of the 
upper house (Bundesrat). After 2000, the Social Democratic-Green government had a majority in 
the Bundestag, but not in the Bundesrat.
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On 1/1/2005, the Immigration Act (AufenthG) entered into force; it included 
liberalizations such as the introduction of non-state reasons for persecution as 
grounds for asylum (for example, gender-related persecution) and residency permits 
due to serious humanitarian or personal reasons. However, these were discretionary 
provisions that entailed several restrictions. Moreover, the Act introduced stricter 
requirements for the asylum procedure, and led to the equal treatment of people 
who had been granted asylum and refugees according to the Geneva Convention, 
with both now receiving temporary residence permits (Müller 2010, 178–180). 
Whereas many (pro-)migrant groups had hoped for a general regulation on hard-
ship, the Act (only) provided for the regional possibility of installing hardship com-
missions (Härtefallkommissionen). These commissions can, but do not have to, take 
up a specific case. Finally, the decision of a hardship commission is only a recom-
mendation–the final decision lies with the respective Ministries of the Interior–and 
there is no possibility to appeal their decision (BMI 2016, 180). The hardship regu-
lation thus does not confer subjective rights, but provides for a “power of pardon” 
in exceptional cases. Despite some improvements entailed by the Immigration Act, 
the positive expectations of many migrant and refugee (support) organizations 
resulted in frustration (Schuster 2003, 218). The anti-migrant consensus created in 
the debates on asylum in the 1980s and 1990s remained influential. The passing of 
the Immigration Act signaled a shift away from a highly repressive migration policy 
towards neoliberal migration management underpinned by utilitarian consider-
ations. Yet this shift took several years of negotiations, as it was strongly contested, 
and only possible against the background of demographic change and a skills short-
age in German society (Kannankulam 2014, 93).
Since the 2000s, the “integration” of migrants became critical in discussions on 
migration policy and in the policies themselves (Oulios 2013, 242). In November 
2006, the Conference of the Ministers of the Interior (Innenministerkonferenz, 
IMK) decided to legalize the stay of those tolerated people who had lived in 
Germany for more than 6 years on the day of the IMK decision if they were able to 
prove they had become “economically and socially integrated”. All together 20,000 
people (out of around 147,000 applicants) received a residency permit until 
September 2007 because of these changes.
Following public pressure, the IMK implemented another backlog regulation 
that was integrated into an amendment of the Immigration Act in 2007 (Müller 
2010, 180). This stated that migrants could apply for a residence permit if they had 
lived in Germany for 8 years (or 6 years for those with children). It was again lim-
ited by several exclusionary mechanisms.6 Due to these changes to the statutory 
backlog regulation, another 38,000 people received a residence permit. Still, the 
number of migrants whose deportations were suspended continued to increase7 due 
to the temporary character of this regulation (Oulios 2013, 238).
6 E.g. applicants have to prove that they have enough living space and income to support them-
selves without access to government funds (§104a & b AufenthG).
7 On 1/1/2010, more than 100,000 people in Germany were tolerated, 60,000 of them for more than 
six years (GGUA 2010, 5).
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The first regulation granting residence to young, long-term tolerated migrants 
without a time limit was introduced in 2011: A residence permit was to be granted 
to “well integrated young people and adolescents” if they had lived in Germany for 
6 years8 (AufenthG, version: 7/1/2011). Based on the applicant’s education perfor-
mance and living conditions, administrative staff would have to forecast if “he or 
she will be able to integrate into the way of life which prevails in the Federal 
Republic of Germany” (ibid.). Moreover, non-cooperation in one’s own deportation 
is considered a reason for denying residence permits. Interestingly, this option is 
detached from the residence status of the youth’s parents, who are, however, able to 
be granted a subsequent residence permit under certain conditions. While the regu-
lation was considered an important step, it has been criticized as being geared 
towards economic rather than humanitarian interests. Pro Asyl thus underlined the 
need for an unconditional right to residence as well as to expand the regulations to 
sans papiers (Pro Asyl 2010, 4–6).
Parallel to this development on the national level, the European integration pro-
cess increasingly influenced asylum and migration politics and policies in Germany. 
In March 2003, the Dublin Convention was replaced by the Dublin II regulation. 
The biometric fingerprint database EURODAC, introduced with Dublin II, was par-
ticularly influential, enabling administration in all member states to reconstruct 
travel routes of asylum seekers into the European Union. In the following years, 
many Dublin transfers were based on this powerful tool. In 2004, the EU was 
enlarged, which relocated the common European external border further east. The 
Hague Program (2005–2010) sought to create a common asylum procedure and a 
consistent legal status for people in need of international protection. However, many 
member states, including Germany, insisted on retaining strong national control 
over migration regulation. Despite this, the Council passed several asylum and 
migration-related directives during these years. Furthermore, the Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (Frontex) was created in 2004 (Council regulation 
2007/2004/EC). Since then, the EU states have frequently conducted collective 
deportations on charter flights through this agency (Oulios 2013, 346). In 2007, the 
governing Grand Coalition reassessed the Immigration Act, in order to implement 
11 EU directives into national law. The amendment also included some further limi-
tations regarding family reunions not connected to the EU directives (Müller 2010, 
182). Moreover, border control was assigned the task of refusing entry to asylum 
seekers coming from “safe third countries” or a country responsible for their appli-
cation according to the Dublin II regulation (§18 (2) AsylG).
In 2008, the European Return Directive (Council regulation 2008/115/EC) was 
passed. Among other aspects, it included possibilities to bring people into custody, 
to secure deportation and a re-entry ban up to 5 years. While the passing of the 
Directive led to protests in several European countries–especially in France against 
the “directive de la honte” (directive of disgrace)–in Germany, mobilization stayed 
away, presumably because of the little deterioration compared to the  already- existing 
8 In 2015 this was reduced to four years (§25a AufenthG).
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return regulations and practices. In the following years, Germany’s Residence Act 
was amended several times to transpose the Directive into national law. However, 
the few pro-migrant changes the Directive entails, such as an effective monitoring 
system for deportations or alternatives to deportation detention, have hardly been 
considered. Accordingly, in 2014, Germany was criticized harshly by EU 
Commissioner for the Interior (Keßler 2014, 416). In the same year, following a 
complaint of several detainees pending deportation supported by Pro Asyl and the 
Jesuiten Flüchtlingsdienst, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided that a 
reform of custody policies in Germany would be necessary to comply with the 
Return Directive. Both the ECJ and the German Federal Court found a violation of 
the “separation rule” of the Return Directive, according to which deportation pris-
oners were to be accommodated exclusively in special facilities. This was especially 
relevant for persons in Dublin cases who had to be released (Pro Asyl 2014).
At this point in time, the European/German border regime came under pressure 
from several developments that were partly connected to each other. In late 2010/
early 2011, a number of states in Northern Africa that had previously acted as exter-
nalized gatekeepers to the European Union ceased to stop migrants on their way to 
Europe due to strong political upheavals. This was paired with increasing arrivals 
through the Balkan corridor. As such, the numbers of asylum applications started to 
rise again, in particularly after 2012 (see Fig. 3.1). After several years of being low 
on the political radar, asylum and migration became a publicly contested issue once 
again, coinciding with the widespread media attention of the refugee protests in 
2012 (see Odugbesan and Schwiertz 2018). Despite broad public support, official 
reactions were either repressive or non-existent (Steinhilper 2016).
Simultaneously, the discourse around the “abuse of asylum” was reactivated by 
conservative politicians. In 2013, the ruling Grand Coalition agreed to classify the 
West Balkan states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Macedonia as safe 
countries of origin (CDU/CSU & SPD 2013, 76). Despite these restrictions, asylum 
applications continued to rise. The temporary collapse of border controls and the 
broader crisis of the Dublin Regime, as well as the escalating wars in Syria, Iraq, 
and Afghanistan, resulted in the number of asylum applications in 2015 reaching 
nearly 480,0009 (BAMF 2016a, 10).
At this time, broader parts of society became engaged with the topic of asylum 
and migration. On the one hand, there was an increase in anti-migrant discourse and 
actions: The new right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für 
Deutschland, AfD), founded in 2013, gained considerable support in state elections 
in 2014–2015 (see Rucht 2018). In the same time frame, the numbers of racist 
attacks against refugee accommodation centers and people perceived as foreigners 
rose sharply. This led to an escalation of the public discourse comparable to the 
anti- migrant discourses in the early 1990s. On the other hand, and in contrast to 
the 1990s, the increased pro-migrant mobilization now included a broader spectrum 
9 The actual number of entries is significantly higher. Due to a lack of capacity, the process has been 
characterized by delays (BAMF 2016a, 10).
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of society. Particularly in the summer of 2015, uncountable volunteers supported 
refugees, providing services the state failed to provide.
In September 2015, some European member states opened a humanitarian cor-
ridor for people arriving in Greece to travel to Germany. In contrast to the peak in 
applications in 1992, a significant share of applications was accepted: In 2015, more 
than half of the asylum decisions led to international protection of the applicants 
(see Fig.  3.1). This moment of openness was soon accompanied by another 
increase in legislative restrictions: On 8/1/2015, the new Residence Act (Gesetz zur 
Neubestimmung des Bleiberechts und der Aufenthaltsbeendigung, AufenthG) 
entered into force. It entailed changes to facilitate and accelerate the enforcement of 
deportations, including the reinstallation of custody procedures (Pro Asyl 2015). It 
also contained some key liberalizing elements, though, as for the first time there was 
a legal option for those who had been tolerated for a long period of time to apply for 
a residence permit independent of length of stay or age restrictions (§25b AufenthG).
In reaction to the large numbers of asylum seekers that had reached Europe and 
Germany in August and September 2015, the Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act 
(Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz, Asylum Act) was passed in October 2015. 
This act entailed several changes to existing laws, such as the prohibition of 
announcing a date for deportation once the limit for assisted return had expired and 
the classification of Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro as “safe countries of origin”. 
Asylum seekers arriving from these countries would now have to stay in initial 
reception centers until the end of their asylum application process or until their 
departure in the case that their claim was rejected. These changes also reduced the 
time for complaints or appeals against asylum decisions.10 All in all, these changes 
in asylum laws can be seen as the most encompassing restrictions since the early 
1990s.
This overview shows that migration (policy) has been highly contested through-
out the last decades. This led (and still leads) to ambivalent legislation, combining 
liberalizations with restrictions, which influence the scope of contestation over asy-
lum and deportation. In order to understand the specific context for such struggles, 
we will now focus on the (political and) administrative decision-making authority 
in this field.
3.3  Administrative Decision-Making Authority
The main laws regulating asylum, deportation, and stay/residence are the Asylum 
(Procedure) Act (Asyl(verfahrens)gesetz, Asyl(Vf)G),11 and the Residence Act 
(AufenthG). In general, administrative authorities on the municipal, state, and 
federal level are responsible for the majority of decisions regarding asylum, depor-
10 Ultimately, it included changes in the AsylbLG, most importantly the return to payment in-kind 
(§3 (1) AsylbLG) and a restriction on access to benefits (§1a AsylbLG).
11 In Oktober 2015, the new Asylum Act replaced the former Asylum Procedure Act.
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tation, and stay. However, the Asylum Act and the Residence Act allow for tempo-
rary political decisions to be made by political governmental agencies, mostly on 
the state level, but also on the federal level. Administrative decision-making author-
ity is highly complex due to the multiple levels involved. Competences may also 
differ between the different states and have been shifted between levels. In the fol-
lowing, we describe administrative authorities for decision-making prior to the 
changes of 2015/2016,12 and do not go into regional details or changes over time.
Decisions over asylum applications are made by the federal administration: the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge, BAMF), which is affiliated with the Federal Ministry of the Interior as 
the higher federal authority. Prior to the examination of an asylum application, the 
BAMF checks responsibility for the asylum application according to the Dublin 
regulation. In case an asylum procedure is processed or completed in another mem-
ber state, the BAMF files a transfer request.13 In case Germany is responsible for the 
asylum application, the BAMF examines different forms of protection in an indi-
vidual procedure: first, it checks entitlement to asylum, refugee protection and sub-
sidiary protection when none of the former forms of protection is granted, a national 
ban on deportation (§60 (5) + (7) AufenthG) can be issued if specific grounds apply 
(see Table 3.1). Asylum applicants have the permission to reside for the length of the 
pending asylum procedure. When the procedure is terminated, the four different 
protection statuses result in different entitlements with regards to residence permits. 
This decision is binding and cannot be revoked.
In the case of a negative decision, the BAMF serves a deportation warning in 
combination with the rejected claim (§34 AsylG). Asylum seekers whose applica-
tion has been judged as inadmissible or been rejected can file court cases against the 
BAMF decision within a short time frame. They may not be deported or transferred 
until the ruling has been handed down.
According to the Residence Act, state-level Immigration Authorities acting as 
higher state-level authorities are in charge of decisions surrounding the specific 
enforcement of deportations. However, in the case of rejected asylum seekers, the 
BAMF, as a federal agency, decides on whether a person should be deported. 
Nevertheless, it is still up to the state Immigration Authority to decide upon the 
actual enforcement of the deportation. The Immigration Authority organizes the 
deportation, but its physical enforcement is carried out both by state and federal 
police. If conflicts arise, the Immigration Authority is dependent on the local police, 
subordinated to the state Ministry of the Interior, to enforce the deportation order. 
This divided authority may open up the scope for direct action against deportation 
(see Hinger et al. 2018).
12 The German cases analyzed in the remainder of the book (see Hinger et al. 2018; Kirchhoff et al. 
2018) occurred before 2015/2016. For an overview on policy changes in 2015/2016 see Pichl 
2017.
13 If the transfer is not carried out within 6 months (extended in case of detention or if a person is 
not traceable), responsibility for the asylum procedure is transferred to the German authorities.
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The Immigration Authority can assign a temporary suspension of deportation to 
people whose deportation is impossible in fact or in law. Even though the state 
Immigration Authorities are legally responsible, most states delegate this responsi-
bility to the municipal Immigration Authorities (Bogumil and Jann 2009, 104). 
Whereas general decision-making authority lies at the state and federal level, the 
scope for decision-making on the municipal level should not be underestimated, as 
the Residence Act includes several discretionary clauses. Finally, and adding 
another layer of complexity, most of the deportations from Germany are carried out 
by passenger flights on private airlines. Once the doors of an airplane close, the pilot 
has the legal authority and can decide whether or not to carry out a deportation. This 
extra-state decision-making power has been a leverage point for protests against 
deportations at airports (Seidlmayer 2012).
As mentioned above, the law confers political decision-making power on the 
state Ministers of the Interior and the federal Minister of the Interior as the highest 
federal and state authorities responsible for this policy field. Examples of this 
include the collective deportation moratoria in winter or hardship decisions. In the 
latter case, hardship commissions on the state level14 decide if a residence permit 
should be granted on humanitarian grounds. The responsibility for final decisions in 
hardship cases lies with the respective Ministry of the Interior of the state. 
Furthermore, the state and federal Ministries of Interior can take charge of deporta-
tion proceedings “if a special interest on part of the Federation applies” (§58a 
AufenthG). The most frequent political decisions regarding the implementation of 
the Residence Act are taken by the Conference of the Ministers of the Interior. In 
their semi-annual meetings, resolutions have to approved by consensus (IMK 2016).
Courts also play an important decision-making role. In general, appeals of 
administrative procedures or decisions are directed to state-level administrative 
courts.15 They decide, for example, whether the rejection of an asylum claim is 
valid, whether a Dublin transfer is in accordance with human rights, or on detention. 
In the last years a great share of BAMF decisions has been revised through admin-
istrative court decisions. The regional administrative courts handle everyday deci-
sions. Furthermore, some appeals can be lodged at the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), the highest legal authority in Germany. If 
constitutional rights are at risk, the BVerfG can declare provisional legal protection, 
e.g. against deportations. The enforcement of the deportation order is then stopped 
until a final court decision has been made. This happened, for example, in the case 
of a Dublin transfer to Greece in 2009; in the following court proceedings, the 
BVerfG suggested the government to stop all Dublin transfers to Greece. In order to 
14 States have autonomy over how the commission is formed and proceeds. The hardship commis-
sion in Hamburg is, for instance, formed by representatives of every party elected to the state par-
liament and all decisions had to be unanimous until a change in regulations in 2015 (HFKG §1 & 
§5). In contrast, the hardship commission in Lower Saxony is composed of a variety of actors, 
including state representatives, a medical practitioner, representatives of the church, and the 
Refugee Council and decides by majority vote (NHärteKVO §2 & §6).
15 In the case of social welfare, pleas can also be directed to social courts (Classen 2008, 
229–239).
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avoid a decision before the BVerfG, the Ministry of Interior declared that they 
would not carry out any further deportations to Greece until the situation of the 
asylum system and the living conditions in Greece had improved (Meyerhöfer et al. 
2014, 161).
On the European level, it is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that are involved in decisions concerning 
deportations. The ECtHR judgements are based on the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR); however, decisions are only legally binding in the specific 
states involved in the court case. In January 2011, the ECtHR declared that a Dublin 
transfer of one person from Belgium to Greece violated Article 3 (torture and inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment) and Article 13 (effective remedy) of the 
ECHR. Following this decision, most of the member states of the European Union 
stopped Dublin transfers to Greece (ibid., 163). The ECJ is the highest legal author-
ity in matters of European Union law. Its decisions are legally binding for all mem-
ber states and their courts. National or federal courts can submit cases to the ECJ if 
the case concerns European law. In the field of deportation, it is the enforcement of 
Dublin transfers that is a regular matter for the ECJ.
As we have shown, administrative and political decision-making authority is 
highly complex due to the multiple levels involved. This is complemented trough a 
strong judiciary. While this complexity may be confusing for those confronted with 
state decissions concerning asylum and deportation, it provides different entry 
points and scope for contestation of such decissions. We will now sketch the protest 
culture in the Federal Republic of Germany in order to further contextualize protests 
in this field.
3.4  Protest Culture
The Federal Republic of Germany has been characterized as a “movement society.” 
Participation in social movements, political campaigns, citizens’ initiatives, and 
protest groups all form part of the political repertoire, as does membership to politi-
cal parties, associations, and other institutionalized organizations (Roth and Rucht 
2008, 10). Between 1950 and 1994, the average number of protests and the number 
of protest participants increased (Hutter and Teune 2012, 11–12). Protests as a 
means to express one’s political opinion were increasingly accepted and spread 
from big organizations such as unions to smaller, more local, and partly informal 
groups (Neidhardt and Rucht 2001, 36). Local and regional mobilization greatly 
exceeds national protest mobilization. Protest forms such as demonstrations, but 
also direct actions like blockades and occupations, have increased disproportion-
ally. While judicial forms of protests have comparatively been small in number, they 
may have nevertheless had a significant impact on the outcome of several conflicts 
(ibid., 51–55). Even though protest mobilization at the end of the 1990s and the 
2000s was more moderate than in the 1980s and early 1990s, protests remain “a 
standard repertoire of politically active persons” (Hutter and Teune 2012, 12). 
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The relevance of protest participation has to be seen, in part, against the background 
of the political system in Germany. This system provides few access points for 
challengers despite its federalist structure and strong judiciary; policy decisions are 
based on representative democracy, with very few direct-democratic elements 
(Kriesi et al. 1992, 222–224).
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, migration became one of the most contested 
issues in the reunified Germany. As described above, at that time the government 
was in the hands of a conservative-liberal government. Still, the pro-migrant protest 
movement succeeded in consolidating its interests, with the establishment of influ-
ential organizations such as Pro Asyl and the Refugee Councils, thereby exerting its 
influence far beyond the protest cycle of the 1980s. Since then, both institutional-
ized structures have had a relatively high proximity to protest movements compared 
to NGOs in other countries. These institutions continue to be important resources in 
the political struggle for asylum and against deportations in Germany. In contrast, 
protest movements against asylum seekers have no equivalent institutionalized 
counterpart (see Rucht 2018).
In the first half of the 1990s, one-third of all protests were related to migration 
(Neidhardt and Rucht 2001, 40–42). Up until this point, protests had mainly been 
composed of actors from the liberal or radical left, but from the 1990s onwards, the 
radical right gained in importance (Hutter and Teune 2012, 15). The increase in the 
number of militant radical right-wing protests against migrants, though, was out-
numbered by pro-migrant protests which mobilized a broad spectrum, from left 
anti-fascist groups to the middle classes (Roth and Rucht 2008, 34). Since the new 
wave of anti-migrant protest by PEGIDA and related groups that began in 2013 
anti- migrant protests have started to catch up with numbers of pro-migrant protests 
(see Rucht 2018, 246).
The number of migrants participating in protests on the issue of migration espe-
cially increased in the early 1990s (Neidhardt and Rucht 2001, 49). At this time, 
several pro-migrant initiatives were founded. The focus of these initiatives was less 
to influence policy processes, but to counteract the consequences of these policies. 
In contrast to mass demonstrations, forms of direct action and disruption gained 
importance. In 1994, five African asylum seekers founded The Voice Refugee 
Forum to protest against isolation prescribed by the new asylum laws. In the same 
year, the federal working group on church sanctuary BAG Asyl in der Kirche was 
founded to ensure further examination of rejected asylum cases (Kirchhoff 2017, 
51). This also underlines the importance churches have played in contention over 
asylum and deportations since the early 1980s.
In order to highlight the highly precarious status of illegalized migrants and to 
connect anti-racist and church groups in their support of such persons, the German- 
wide initiative no one is illegal (kein mensch ist illegal, kmii) was founded during 
the documenta international art exhibition in 1997. kmii appealed for direct support 
of migrants, “the provision of work and identity papers […], the supply of medical 
care, education and training, accommodation, and material survival” (kmii 2017). 
Still, the aim to influence public opinion was hardly abandoned; kmii directly 
attacked the image of Lufthansa by pointing to their involvements in deportation 
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enforcement, applying new forms of “communication guerrilla warfare” with the 
deportation.class campaign (Kirchhoff 2017, 51).
Furthermore, protests continued to address policymakers. In the run-up to the 
German federal elections in 1998, the Caravan for the Rights of Refugees and 
Migrants, an organization of migrants with various residency statuses as well as 
German citizens, mobilized a country-wide tour to gain visibility and call for “socio- 
political justice, equality and respect for the fundamental human rights of everyone” 
(The Caravan Berlin 2013). In 2005, Youth without Borders (Jugendliche ohne 
Grenzen) was founded, demanding a right to stay for all. The group regularly pro-
tests during the conference of the state Ministers of the Interior, which repeatedly 
decides on provisions regarding deportations, but also on possibilities to stay (see 
Odugbesan and Schwiertz 2018).
The refugee protests of 2012 relied on this strong tradition of self-organization 
of migrants and asylum seekers as well as pro-migrant organizations. They suc-
ceeded in becoming visible and raising public awareness of their demands (Jakob 
2016, 8–18). In addition, in 2014 and 2015, the numbers of people volunteering to 
support the newly arrived persons peaked. Several authors (Kanalan 2015; Jakob 
2016) have argued that this increase needs to be understood against the background 
of the visibility that refugees and migrants gained through the refugee protests since 
2012. It might be worth further analysis about how far voluntarism has become 
established as a new form of political activism, as this potentially depicts a further 
shift in the changing protest culture of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3.5  Conclusion
The discussion about asylum and migration has been one of the fiercest societal 
debates in the history of (Western) Germany since the 1980s and continues to be so 
today. In the context of racist mobilizations and “moral panic” about the “abuse of 
the asylum system” (Kannankulam 2014, 102), conservative political actors suc-
ceeded in setting the agenda of a restrictive migration and asylum policy, which 
culminated in the Asylum Compromise of the newly reunified Germany. This was 
countered by (pro-)migrant mobilizations, the foundation of several self-organized 
initiatives of (rejected) asylum seekers, and support from German citizens, pro- 
migrant NGOs, and churches. While this broad network of (pro-)migrant mobiliza-
tion could hardly influence policy making in the field during the late 1980s/ early 
1990s, it can be seen as a structural basis for protests challenging the implementa-
tion of restrictive asylum (and migration) policies including protests against depor-
tation until today.
Since the early 2000s, at a time of rather low numbers of asylum applications, 
Germany started to be officially acknowledged as an “immigration country.” This 
has been reflected by an increasing amount of regulations that grants residence to 
migrants who have stayed in Germany for a long time, often under extremely inse-
cure conditions. This shift can be understood as a reaction to the strong organization 
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by and for migrants, as well as a general shift away from conservative migration 
policy agendas and towards a new economic logic of migration management. 
However, as a concession to conservative positions, the restrictive character of asy-
lum and residence laws remains strong. As such, German migration and asylum 
policy has a highly ambivalent character.
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, policies in the field of asylum and resi-
dency have, contradictorily, been both restricted and liberalized: Possibilities to be 
granted residence have increased, so did attempts to increase state capacity to deport 
unwanted migrants as delinquents or “bogus asylum seekers”. The actual number of 
deportations has been relatively limited, due to legal revisions of BAMF decisions 
or the application of alternative regulations in the Residence Act. In June 2015, 84% 
of the formerly rejected asylum seekers possessed either a limited or an unlimited 
residence permit (Deutscher Bundestag 2015, 29). This may also be interpretated as 
the result of careful legal support in individual cases. Still, the large number of 
migrants with a precarious legal status remains one of the characteristic features of 
the migration regime in Germany.
With the rising numbers of asylum seekers in 2014 and 2015, protests against 
and for  migration increased again. In September 2015, the journalist Sebastian 
Friedrich stated: “We are in the midst of an open social conflict” (Friedrich 2015, 
translation by the authors). Again, this open conflict was answered by further restric-
tions of the asylum laws and the intention to divide between “good” and “bad” 
asylum seekers, to find a compromise between politics of welcome and of barriers. 
More than two years later, an end of this social conflict is not in sight. It remains to 
be seen how the revitalized anti-migrant discourse and violence against migrants as 
well as the constant (pro-)migrant mobilization will develop and affect both policies 
and contentions around asylum and deportation in Germany in the long run.
Acknowledgements This paper emerged from the project Taking Sides, which analyzes anti- 
deportation protests in Austria, Switzerland and Germany. The project has been funded under the 
DACH scheme of FWF, SNF and DFG (SCHW1389/5-1). We also thank Marlene Becker, Helen 
Schwenken, Ricarda Wiese, Helge Schwiertz, Tatjana Ulshöfer, Sophie Hinger, and the editors and 
anonymous reviewers for their comments, as well as Madelaine Moore and Matt Rees for linguis-
tic revision.
References
Ausländerbeauftragte. (2001). Migrationsbericht der Ausländerbeauftragten. http://www.bmi.
bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/149602/publicationFile/15184/migrationsbericht_2001.pdf. 
Accessed 18 June 2016.
Bade, K.  J., & Oltmer, J.  (2004). Normalfall Migration: Deutschland im 20. und frühen 21. 
Jahrhundert. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
Baden-Württemberg, F. (2013). “Winterabschiebestopp” in Baden-Württemberg: Humanität hat 
Vorrang? http://fluechtlingsrat-bw.de/informationen-ansicht/winterabschiebestopp-jetzt-auch-
in-baden-wuerttemberg.html. Accessed 1 Aug 2016.
BAMF. (2014). Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2013. http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/
Publikationen/Broschueren/bundesamt-in-zahlen-2013.html. Accessed 12 Oct 2014.
3 Between Illegalization, Toleration, and Recognition: Contested Asylum…
66
BAMF. (2016a). Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2015. http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/
Publikationen/Broschueren/bundesamt-in-zahlen-2015.html. Accessed 12 July 2016.
BAMF. (2016b). Migrationsbericht 2014. http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/
Publikationen/Migrationsberichte/migrationsbericht-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
Accessed 26 Feb 2016.
BAMF, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. (2013). Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2012. https://
fragdenstaat.de/files/foi/14716/2013_bundesamt-in-zahlen-2012.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2016.
Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration. (2003). 
Migrationsbericht 2003. http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/149604/publication-
File/15185/migrationsbericht_2003.pdf. Accessed 12 July 2016.
BMI, Bundesministerium des Inneren. (2016). Häufig gestellte Fragen zum Thema: Ausländerrecht. 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/FAQs/DE/Themen/Migration/Auslaenderrecht/20.html. 
Accessed 15 July 2016.
Bogumil, J., & Jann, W. (2009). Verwaltung und Verwaltungswissenschaft in Deutschland: 
Einführung in die Verwaltungswissenschaft. VS: Wiesbaden.
CDU, CSU, SPD. (2013). Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten. Koalitionsvertrag. https://www.cdu.de/
sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf. Accessed 28 Oct 2016.
Classen, G. (2008). Sozialleistungen für MigrantInnen und Flüchtlinge. Handbuch für die Praxis. 
Karlsruhe: Von Loeper.
Classen, G., & Kanalan, I. (2010). Verfassungsmäßigkeit des Asylbewerberleistungsgesetzes. 
Informationen zum Arbeitslosenrecht und Sozialhilferecht, 6(2010), 243–249.
Der Spiegel (1982, May 3). Ausländer: “Das Volk hat es satt”. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/
print/d-14348246.html. Accessed 7 Sept 2016.
Der Spiegel (1990, August 20). Asyl. Letztes Paradies. http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/
print/d-13501091.html. Accessed 14 Sept 2016.
Deutscher Bundestag (2015). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage zu Zahlen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland lebender Flüchtlinge. Drucksache 18/5862. http://dip21.
bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/058/1805862.pdf. Accessed 16 Oct 2016.
Deutscher Bundestag (2016). Antwort der Bundesregierung. Abschiebungen im Jahr 2015. 
Drucksache 18/7588. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/075/1807588.pdf. Accessed 26 
Feb 2016.
Die Zeit (2012, November 29). Asylkompromiss von 1992. http://www.zeit.de/2012/49/Debatte-
Grundrecht-Asyl-1992/komplettansicht. Accessed 14 Nov 2016.
Friedrich, S. (2015). Konflikt statt Konsens: Gegen einen Kompromiss zwischen Rassismus und 
“Willkommenskultur”. http://www.sebastian-friedrich.net/?p=362. Accessed 21 July 2016.
Geiger, M., & Hanewinkel, V. (2014). Politik der Arbeitsmigration. In P. Gans (Ed.), Räumliche 
Auswirkungen der internationalen Migration (pp. 162–179). Hannover: ARL. http://shop.arl-
net.de/media/direct/pdf/fb/fb_003/fb_003_09.pdf. Accessed 11 Oct 2016.
GGUA, Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft zur Unterstützung Asylsuchender. (2010). Arbeitshilfe: Zur 
Umsetzung des § 25a AufenthG-Bleiberecht für Jugendliche und Heranwachsende. http://www.
asyl.net/fileadmin/user_upload/redaktion/Dokumente/GGUA25a.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016.
Gibney, M., & Hansen, R. (Eds.). (2005). Immigration and asylum from 1900 to the present. 
Volume 1: Entries A to I. Santa Barbara et al.: ABC Clio.
Herbert, U. (2003). Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung.
Hess, S., & Kasparek, B. (2010). Grenzregime. Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa. 
Hamburg: Assoziation A.
HFKG, Hamburgisches Gesetz über die Härtefallkommission nach § 23 a des Aufenthaltsgesetzes. 
(2005, May 4). http://www.landesrecht-hamburg.de/jportal/portal/page/bshaprod.
psml?showdoccase=1&doc.id=jlr-HFKGHArahmen&doc.part=X&doc.origin=bs&st=lr. 
Accessed 15 July 2016.
Hinger, S., Kirchhoff, M., & Wiese, R. (2018). “We belong together!” collective anti-deportation 
protests in Osnabrück. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest movements in 
asylum and deportation (pp. 171–194). New York: Springer.
M. Kirchhoff and D. Lorenz
67
Hutter, S., & Teune, S. (2012). Deutschlands Protestprofil im Wandel. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 
62(25–26), 9–17.
IMK, Innenministerkonferenz. (2016). Ständige Konferenz der Innenminister und-senatoren der 
Länder. Aufgaben und Arbeitsweise. http://www.innenministerkonferenz.de/IMK/DE/aufga-
ben/aufgaben-node.html. Accessed 12 Oct 2016.
IOM Deutschland. (2014). Bericht über die Programme zur Unterstützung freiwilliger Rückkehr 
der Internationalen Organisation für Migration Deutschland 2013. http://germany.iom.int/
sites/default/files/REAG/AVR_Report_2013.pdf. Accessed 29 Mar 2016.
Jakob, C. (2016). Die Bleibenden. Wie Flüchtlinge Deutschland seit 20 Jahren verändern. Berlin: 
Ch. Links.
Kanalan, I. (2015). Jugendliche ohne Grenzen. Zehn Jahre Proteste und Kämpfe von Geflüchteten 
Jugendlichen  – Creating Utopia? movements. Journal für kritische Migrations-und 
Grenzregimeforschung, 1(2). http://movements-journal.org/issues/02.kaempfe/10.kanalan-
-jugendliche-ohne-grenzen.html. Accessed 3 Aug 2016.
Kannankulam, J.  (2014). Kräfteverhältnisse in der bundesdeutschen Migrationspolitik. Die 
Asyldebatte als Schlüsselereignis des schwerfälligen Wandels vom Gastarbeitsregime 
hin zu Managed Migration. In Forschungsgruppe Staatsprojekt Europa (Ed.), Kämpfe um 
Migrationspolitik (pp. 93–112). Bielefeld: Transcript.
Karakayalı, S. (2008). Gespenster der Migration: Zur Genealogie illegaler Einwanderung in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bielefeld: Transcript.
Keßler, S. (2014). Erreichen des Klassenziels gefährdet. Zur (Nicht-)Umsetzung der 
Rückführungsrichtlinie in Deutschland. Asylmagazin, 12(2014), 416–420.
Kirchhoff, M. (2017). Vor und nach dem Willkommen. Zur Geschichte und Aktualität von Protesten 
gegen Abschiebungen. In BdWi et  al. (Eds.): Krise der EU. Kontroversen – Perspektiven – 
Linke Alternativen (pp. 50–52). Studienheft 11.
Kirchhoff, M., Probst, J., Schwenken, H., & Stern, V. (2018). Worth the effort: Protesting success-
fully against deportations. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest move-
ments in asylum and deportation (pp. 126–148). New York: Springer.
kmii, no one is illegal. (2017). Manifesto. https://noii2017.wordpress.com/portfolio/manifesto-
english/. Accessed 26 June 2017.
Kreienbrink, A. (2007). Voluntary and forced return of third country nationals from Germany. 
Research study 2006 in the framework of the European Migration Network. http://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-
studies/return-migration/4a._de_emn_ncp_return_country_study_final_may2007en_version_
en.pdf. Accessed 3 Aug 2016.
Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Guigni, M. G. (1992). New social movements 
and political opportunities in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 22(2), 
219–244.
Meyerhöfer, A., Hartl, U., Lorenz, D., Neumann, S., & Oeser, A. (2014). “Dublin II kippen!” 
Kämpfe um selbstbestimmte Migration in Europa. In Forschungsgruppe Staatsprojekt Europa 
(Ed.), Kämpfe um Migrationspolitik (pp. 151–167). Bielefeld: Transcript.
Müller, D. (2010). Flucht und Asyl in europäischen Migrationsregimen. Metamorphosen einer 
umkämpften Kategorie am Beispiel der EU, Deutschlands und Polens. Göttingen: Göttinger 
Universitätsverlag.
Neidhardt, F., & Rucht, D. (2001). Protestgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950–1994: 
Ereignisse, Themen, Akteure. In D. Rucht (Ed.), Protest in der Bundesrepublik (pp. 27–70). 
Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
NhärteKVO, Verordnung über die Härtefallkommission in Niedersachsen nach dem 
Aufenthaltsgesetz. (2006, August 8). http://www.mi.niedersachsen.de/download/103919/
Niedersaechsische_Haertefallkommissionsverordnung.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2016.
Odugbesan, A., & Schwiertz, H. (2018). “We are here to stay” – Refugee struggles in Germany 
between unity and division. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest move-
ments in asylum and deportation (pp. 195–214). New York: Springer.
3 Between Illegalization, Toleration, and Recognition: Contested Asylum…
68
Oulios, M. (2013). Blackbox Abschiebung. Geschichten und Bilder von Leuten, die gerne gebli-
eben wären. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
Pichl, M. (2017). Die Asylpakete I und II: Der politische und rechtliche Kampf um die 
Asylverschärfungen. In S. Hess et al. (Eds.), Der lange Sommer der Migration. Grenzregime 
III (pp. 163–175). Berlin: Hamburg Assoziation A.
Pro Asyl. (2010). Hier geblieben! Anforderungen an eine neue Bleiberechtsregelung. http://
archiv.proasyl.de/fileadmin/fm-dam/a_Startseite_und_Aktionsseiten/Startseite/2011/
Anforderungen_neue_Bleiberechtsregelung_2011.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2016.
Pro Asyl. (2014). Nach EuGH und BGH-Urteil: Ende der Abschiebungshaft oder neues 
Inhaftierungsprogramm? https://www.proasyl.de/news/nach-eugh-und-bgh-urteil-ende-der-
abschiebungshaft-oder-neues-inhaftierungsprogramm/. Accessed 26 June 2017.
Pro Asyl. (2015). Bundestag beschließt Ausweitung der Abschiebehaft und Bleiberechtsregelung. 
https://www.proasyl.de/news/bundestag-beschliesst-ausweitung-der-abschiebungshaft-und-
bleiberechtsregelung/. Accessed 1 Aug 2016.
Roth, R., & Rucht, D. (Eds.). (2008). Die Sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein 
Handbuch. Frankfurt/New York: Campus.
Rucht, D. (2018). Mobilization against refugees and asylum seekers in Germany: A social move-
ment perspective. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest movements in 
asylum and deportation (pp. 234–255). New York: Springer.
Schuster, L. (2003). The use and abuse of political asylum in Britain and Germany. London: 
Routledge.
Seibert, N. (2008). Vergessene Proteste: Internationalismus und Antirassismus 1964–1983. 
Münster: Unrast.
Seidlmayer, E.-L. (2012). Last Minute Protest. Hinterland, 19, 34–37.
Steinhilper, E. (2016). Selbstbewusst und Laut  – Politische Proteste von Geflüchteten. In 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (bpb) (Ed.). Kurzdossiers. http://www.bpb.de/gesell-
schaft/migration/kurzdossiers/227542/politische-proteste-von-gefluechteten. Accessed 18 July 
2016.
The Caravan Berlin. (2013). About the Caravan. http://karawane-berlin.org/about-the-caravan/. 
Accessed 18 July 2016.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
M. Kirchhoff and D. Lorenz
69© The Author(s) 2018 
S. Rosenberger et al. (eds.), Protest Movements in Asylum and Deportation, 
IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74696-8_4
Chapter 4




Is Switzerland a country of political asylum? A controversial question at first sight. 
After all, Switzerland has built its humanitarian reputation on the principle of neu-
trality and the actions of the International Red Cross (Parini 1997b, 51). Moreover, 
the Swiss authorities offered asylum to numerous political activists and intellectuals 
during the nineteenth century, mostly middle- and upper-class Western Europeans 
escaping struggles and political conflicts within European countries (Portmann- 
Tinguely/von Cranach 2016). During the first half of the twentieth century, 
Switzerland offered shelter to opponents of communist regimes (Efionayi-Mäder 
2003, 5). So why does Parini (1997b, 51) assert that Switzerland’s reputation as a 
land of asylum is a “myth that has been challenged by history”?
This chapter aims to provide contextual elements to understand pro- and anti- 
deportation protests in Switzerland. First, it discusses the issue of asylum in the 
division within Swiss society, between partisans of either closed or open borders. 
Then, it examines the current Swiss asylum policy which is at the center of debate 
and criticism for both groups of protesters while providing an historical overview of 
the revisions and agreements that have shaped it since the 1990s. This section 
examines the different stages within Swiss asylum policy: the refugee definition, 
the criteria for inadmissible and unfounded applications, the role of deportations in 
the asylum system and the issue of return assistance, and ultimately the legal 
support available to potential deportees either to stay in Switzerland or to return 
when deportation could not be avoided. To understand who is the focus on action 
for the protesters, the following section describes the state actors involved in the 
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implementation of deportation policy and the mechanisms of executive federalism. 
The fourth and last section discusses the overall Swiss protest culture and reveals 
the advantages and constraints of direct democracy in the case of civil society 
protests.
4.2  The Swiss Asylum Policy
Since the entry into force of the first Swiss Asylum Act (AsylA) in 1981, the issue 
of asylum has been “one of the most discussed themes in the Swiss political agenda” 
(Parini/Gianni 2005, 209). Although asylum is protected by international law, it has 
become a sensitive political issue in Switzerland (D’Amato 2008, 178). In fact, 
from 1981 to 2008, Swiss authorities conducted 15 partial or total revisions of the 
law (Piguet 2009). These revisions have often led to the adoption of more restrictive 
measures, as a result of increasing suspicion over the sincerity of asylum appli-
cants’1 motives in the public sphere (see below). In fact, Swiss citizens are often 
asked to vote on the revision of the asylum policy. Swiss direct democracy allows 
its citizens to have an influential voice in the political system. They can further use 
the instruments of direct democracy such as popular initiatives and referendums to 
express their opinion. As explained by Kriesi and Wisler:
The popular initiative exists on the federal level since 1891. It allows 100,000 citizens, by 
signing a formal proposition, to demand a constitutional amendment as well as to propose 
the alteration or removal of an existing provision. […] Contrary to the referendum, which 
intervenes at the end of a decision making process, the initiative forms its point of depar-
ture. (1996, 20)
Adopted by the Swiss population on February 9, 2014, the federal popular initia-
tive “against massive immigration” challenges the principle of the free movement of 
persons within the European Union (EU) and the 1951 Geneva Convention. 
Launched by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC), a nationalist and traditionalist 
right-wing party, it suggests establishing quotas for immigration to Switzerland, as 
well as for asylum. Given the consequences of such a proposal, which puts the 
Swiss government at odds with the EU and compromises the bilateral treaties, this 
popular initiative has not been fully implemented yet. Nonetheless, this voting 
outcome is symptomatic of changes in policies made by the Swiss authorities with 
the introduction of the AsylA. Until 1981, Switzerland did not have a proper asylum 
law and relied exclusively on the Geneva Convention. Accordingly, Swiss authori-
ties granted asylum and refugee status to Hungarians in the 1950s, Tibetans in the 
1960s, and Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese “boat people” in the late 1970s 
(Piguet 2009). From the 1980s onwards, the arrival of people coming mostly from 
1 Because the term “asylum seeker” refers to a legal status in Switzerland (permit N), which means 
that the application is being processed, I use the general term “asylum applicant” to refer to any 
person requesting asylum in Switzerland, independently of the stage in the acceptance procedure 
(I will explain this more in detail in the next sub-sections).
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the “global South” (D’Amato 2008, 178), has contributed to the overlapping of anti- 
immigration discourses–given by nationalist parties–with the field of asylum. 
Additionally, in 1991, Switzerland faced its first so-called asylum crisis, which 
occurred at a time of unprecedented number of asylum requests2 related to the war 
that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia (Piguet 2009, 79). Consequences were 
twofold: on the one hand, in 1995 Switzerland stopped accepting refugee quotas 
established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ibid.). On the 
other hand, asylum applicants from Africa and the Balkan regions represented 
henceforth the Others, replacing Italian labor migrants in the Swiss imagination 
(Maire/Garufo 2013) following a shift in the collective representation of “cultural 
distance” (D’Amato 2010, 136).
Against this background, the left wing unites such groups as No Border activists, 
Dublin challengers, relief organizations, and NGOs in order to ensure that authori-
ties respect their “moral duty to assist” (Parini 1997b, 62). Thereby, pro-migrant 
protests by civil society actors offer alternative discourses that aim to broaden the 
refugee definition in opposition to its ever-narrower interpretation by the Swiss 
authorities. Swiss society appears mainly divided between two leading political 
forces, the Socialist Party and the SVP/UDC. Each holds different perspectives on 
whether the definition of a refugee shall be inclusive or exclusive, which determines 
who should be granted asylum and who should leave the country. Overall, the issue 
of asylum highlights the tensions and power relations within past and contemporary 
Swiss history regarding the question: who ought to stay? Protest culture thus plays 
a major role in the very emotional field of asylum, in which contentions, challenges, 
and negotiations operate behind the scenes of the humanitarian reputation of 
Switzerland.
4.2.1  The Refugee Definition
Swiss asylum law is grounded both on the Geneva Convention (signed in 1954) and 
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, which entered into force in 
Switzerland in 1968 (Bersier 1991, 31). Indeed, the Swiss legal system is monist, 
meaning that international standards directly apply in the national law. Hence, 
Switzerland bases its refugee definition on the one suggested by the Geneva 
Convention. Accordingly, Swiss authorities grant asylum to those “who in their 
native country or in their country of last residence are subject to serious disadvan-
tages or have a well-founded fear of being exposed to such disadvantages for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or due to 
their political opinions” (Art. 3 para. 1 AsylA). Since this definition fails to mention 
gender-based persecutions, as highlighted by some political parties and women’s 
organizations (ODM 2005, 7), the Swiss government decided in 1998 to add in a 
2 Efionayi-Mäder (2003, 5) notes that the number of asylum applications grew from about 1000 per 
year before the 1980s to a peak of 40,000 in 1991 due to the Yugoslav Wars.
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second paragraph that “Motives for seeking asylum specific to women must be 
taken into account” (Art. 3 para. 2 AsylA).
In Switzerland, however, a distinction is made between “recognized refugees” 
(permit B; see Table  4.1) and “provisionally admitted refugees” (permit F). 
Recognized refugees are persons granted asylum, whose personal persecution has 
been attested. “Provisionally admitted refugees” are persons who qualify for the 
refugee status according to the Geneva Convention but not in the sense of the Swiss 
AsylA. This latter category–which has no equivalent in the European legislation 
(Matthey 2012, 448)–includes, for instance, persons who have the quality of refu-
gees because of their post-exile conduct (e.g., political activism, public coming-out; 
Art. 54 AsylA). Another telling example is the case of deserters. Until 2012, Eritrean 
asylum applicants who claimed grounds based on desertion were systematically 
recognized as refugees (permit B), in accordance with the 2005 decision of the 
Federal Administrative Court (TAF 2006/3–029). As a result, the number of asylum 
requests of Eritrean deserters strongly increased in Switzerland. In 2012, though, 
Swiss citizens adopted by vote the proposal of the government to revise the AsylA 
in order to add a statement in the refugee definition that those who “have refused 
to perform military service or have deserted” are no longer considered refugees 
Table 4.1 Status and permit according to the Swiss AsylA and their equivalent in the EU 
legislation
Swiss 
permit Status in Swiss AsylA Status in EU legislation
None Inadmissible application: Inadmissible application:
  Dublin transfer   Dublin transfer
  Dismissed applicant   No equivalent
Unfounded application: Unfounded application (including 
manifestly unfounded applicationa):
  Rejected asylum seeker   Rejected applicant
N Asylum seeker Person being a subject of a pending 
application
S People in need of temporary protection Person granted temporary protection 
status
F Provisionally admitted person Person granted subsidiary protection 
status
F Provisionally admitted refugee 
(according to the Geneva convention)
No equivalent
B Recognized refugee (according to the 
AsylA)
Person granted refugee status
B Person granted residence permit for 
humanitarian reasons
Person granted authorization to stay for 
humanitarian reasons
Sources: EUROSTAT, Matthey (2012)
aManifestly unfounded applications are an EU sub-category of unfounded applications (Art. 32 
para. 2, Dir. 2013/32/EU) which does not exist in Swiss law. Thus, clearly fraudulent applications 
are likely to be considered as inadmissible applications in Switzerland without further distinction, 
and thereby are excluded beforehand from any ordinary asylum proceedings
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(Art. 3 para. 3 AsylA). The number of Eritrean refugees granted the less advanta-
geous status of admission (permit F) subsequently increased in 1 year by 52% (SEM 
2015).
Since Switzerland is not an EU member state, the Swiss asylum policy is not 
required to include all EU directives regarding asylum. Nonetheless, the following 
instruments are fully incorporated into the Swiss legal system (Matthey 2012, 
35–38): the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the directive 2001/55/CE on the 
temporary protection granted to a group of people in need (see permit S), the Dublin 
Convention (see below), the directive 2003/9/CE guaranteeing minimum standards 
for reception conditions, the directive 2008/115/CE on common standards and pro-
cedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, the directive 2011/95/
UE on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection, and ultimately the directive 2013/32/EU 
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. 
Additionally, the Swiss government has decided to collaborate with the European 
Asylum Support Office, part of the Common European Asylum System, despite this 
not being required within the Schengen and Dublin agreements.
4.2.2  The Right to Seek Asylum
Although the right to seek asylum is a fundamental human right (Art. 14 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights), the practices of some European governments seem 
to disallow it (Schuster 2003, 234). This is, for instance, true with the Swiss asylum 
policy. In contrast to the EU legislation in which all asylum applicants (except 
Dublin cases) are admitted to the ordinary procedure, Switzerland distinguishes 
between two categories of applications. Yet, only one category gives access to the 
Swiss admission procedure: persons with the “asylum seeker” legal status (permit 
N), meaning that they may qualify for the granting of asylum because they indicated 
“that they are seeking protection in Switzerland from persecution elsewhere” (i.e., 
definition of an application for asylum, Art. 18 AsylA). Accordingly, their asylum 
application is materially examined in depth by the Swiss authorities. In case they do 
not fulfil the aforementioned refugee definition in the sense of the Swiss AsylA 
(including in the sense of the Geneva Convention), their application is considered 
unfounded and they become “rejected asylum seekers”.
Despite some overlapping within the EU directive 2005/85/CE (Matthey 2012, 
257; now 2013/32/EU), unfounded applications need to be distinguished in 
Switzerland from inadmissible applications, since this category does not allow to 
the ordinary procedure, and thereby excludes some asylum applicants from the 
“asylum seeker” legal status (permit N). Therefore, we call them “dismissed appli-
cants” to differentiate them from “rejected asylum seekers”. Indeed, the 1990 revi-
sion of the AsylA introduced the possibility of dismissing asylum applications 
through “accelerated processing” (read: shortened; ibid., 139) in response to the 
first “asylum crisis” mentioned earlier. It states that applications can be formally 
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dismissed–that is, are not considered on their merits. For instance, an application 
is considered inadmissible if the applicant refuses or fails to cooperate (Art. 8 para. 
3bis AsylA), likewise if economical or medical motives are claimed for asylum 
(Art. 31a para. 3 AsylA). Moreover, since 1990, the Swiss government is allowed 
to establish a list of presumably “safe countries”, where it is assumed that there 
will be no persecutions (Art. 6a para 2 let. a AsylA). Accordingly, asylum applica-
tions of persons who are native or have travelled through those countries are 
dismissed, unless they can prove being victim of persecution (Matthey 2012, 58). 
Jurisprudence has, however, shown that countries of origin and third countries 
were categorized as safe if Swiss authorities assessed that there are possibilities of 
escape within the country (II. Politique intérieure et extérieure 1993, 103). Several 
civil society actors such as the Swiss Refugee Council (now OSAR) and Amnesty 
International contested the criteria of “safe countries” assessment (ibid.). Despite 
public criticism, Switzerland signed an agreement with Sri Lanka in 1994 for the 
resumption “in security and dignity” of deportations (III. Politique intérieure et 
extérieure 1995, 90).
The entry into force of the 1998 Federal Decree on Urgent Measures for Dealing 
with Asylum Seekers and Foreign Nationals further allows the Swiss government to 
systematically dismiss asylum applicants who are (truthfully or fictitiously) undoc-
umented3 (Parini/Gianni 2005, 220). This is the first time that asylum applications 
were dismissed on formal grounds such as the absence of identity documents 
(Matthey 2012, 60). Again, this decree was established in response to massive arriv-
als (up by 72.2% in 1997–1998) of Kosovan asylum applicants fleeing war in their 
homeland. The 1998 revision of AsylA also reduced the number of days (30 to 5) 
during which a dismissed applicant can appeal (ibid.). Consequently, appeal against 
the authorities’ decision became more difficult and selective, since it limits the 
access to those dismissed applicants who can afford the cost of a lawyer (or receive 
legal assistance from NGOs) in a very short period of time.
Another case of inadmissible applications are Dublin transfers. In contrast to the 
other aforementioned situations for dismissal, Dublin cases are dismissed on formal 
grounds without any material examination. Four years after signing the Schengen 
agreement, Swiss deportation policy faced a new era with the enactment in 2008 of 
the Dublin Convention, involving the deportation of asylum applicants to the EU 
member state where they first sought asylum (Art. 64, paragraph 2 Federal Act on 
Foreign Nationals, FNA). However, the Dublin Convention also has its constraints. 
First, Swiss authorities had to take the asylum applicants from other European 
countries who first requested asylum in Switzerland. Second, Swiss authorities are 
obliged to examine the asylum applications of those who were not deported to a 
member state within the 6-month time limit. Nonetheless, Swiss authorities point 
out that:
3 For the sake of clarity, I use the term “undocumented” to refer to foreigners without identity 
papers, and “irregular” for illegally staying foreigners in Switzerland (whether they are undocu-
mented or not). For a discussion on the issue of terminology, see Della Torre (2016).
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Collaboration with the Dublin states works well in principle. By virtue of the [Dublin 
Convention], Switzerland was able to transmit significantly more cases to other States than 
it had itself to admit. (DFJP 2015, 37)
Being refused the legal status of “asylum seeker” (permit N), persons with inad-
missible or unfounded applications both enter the category of sans-papiers, that is, 
irregular migrants. Although they are threatened with immediate deportation (Piguet 
2009) in the sense of the aforementioned EU returns directive 2008/115/CE (Art. 64 
para. 1 FNA), the principle of non-refoulement in the sense of Art. 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights ensures that the risks irregular migrants might 
encounter in their country of origin or in a third country is assessed prior to any 
deportation (UNHCR 1997). As stated in Art. 83, paragraph 1 FNA, “[i]f the 
enforcement of removal or expulsion is not possible, not permitted or not reason-
able”, Swiss authorities must order provisional admission (permit F). Permit F for 
“provisionally admitted persons” was introduced in 1987 (Ruedin/Efionayi-Mäder 
2014). As stated by Parini and Gianni (2005, 210–211; original emphasis), permit F 
“allows Switzerland, while fulfilling its duties of relief to people in distress, to 
ensure that these people do not settle.” However, what was meant to be a short-term 
compromise has become a long-term status. In the Swiss imagination, “provision-
ally admitted persons” are awaiting deportation. In reality, however, the latter often 
live in Switzerland for more than 7 years (ODM 2013) and are rarely threatened 
with deportation. Given this fact, the life conditions related to the permit F (e.g., 
integration, work, and family reunification) have been improved in the 2008 FNA 
(Wichmann et al. 2011, 83).
Figure 4.1 shows the number of negative decisions to grant asylum has followed 
the number of asylum applications. Negative decisions include inadmissible and 
unfounded applications, as well as the number of “provisionally admitted persons” 
(permit F). Moreover, we observe that throughout the 1990s and up to 2013, Swiss 
authorities delivered a relatively stable number (>4000) of residence permits (per-
mit B) and provisional admission to refugees (permit F; i.e., positive decisions). In 
other words, despite an overall increase in the number of asylum applicants (for 
instance during the Yugoslav Wars in the early 1990s), the number of positive deci-
sions has not fluctuated much.
4.2.3  Deportation and the So-Called Bogus Refugee
Threat of deportation is considered the “ultimate instrument” to guarantee civil obe-
dience and respect of the asylum system (Wicker 2010, 241). Swiss authorities do 
not hide their deportation policy. This strategy is mobilized as a dissuasive message 
for economic migrants tempted to enter Switzerland by requesting asylum. Indeed, 
because of the restrictive Swiss migration policy, asylum is “the principle manner of 
entry for nationals of non-European countries to stay permanently on Swiss terri-
tory” (Fresia et al. 2013, 12). Consequently, “refugee politics” have been reframed 
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as an “asylum problem” (Efionayi-Mäder 2003, 5). Public discourse thus distin-
guishes between “genuine refugees” and “bogus refugees” (Parini/Gianni 2005, 
229). People who apply for asylum are called asylum seekers instead of political 
refugees. The latter status is only granted to those who are legally recognized as 
such (permit B or F). Hence, these distinctive terms mark the power of the state to 
determine who is entitled to its protection (Efionayi-Mäder 2003, 5). Accordingly, 
it highlights who is the holder of rights: it is the right of the state to grant asylum and 
not the right of the applicant to receive it.
To be able to initiate the deportation procedure, Swiss authorities must identify 
both the country of origin and prior travel history of the undocumented migrants. 
Consequently, some asylum applicants hide their real names and their identity docu-
ments as protection against what they fear are poor chances of receiving refugee 
status (Piguet 2009). Then, some countries such as Eritrea, Cuba and Algeria do not 
allow the return of their exiled citizens by force. Thus, Swiss authorities cannot 
deport natives of those countries. Based on this knowledge, some Moroccan and 
Tunisian asylum applicants declare themselves Algerian in order to avoid deporta-
tion. However, Swiss authorities have reacted to this strategy by hiring Algerian 
interpreters whose mission is to identify the “bogus” Algerians by their accent. 
More recently, recognized refugees (permit B) might also be subjected to deporta-
tion. In 2010, Swiss voters approved the federal popular initiative of the SVP/UDC, 
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Fig. 4.1 Asylum applications and decisions in Switzerland, 1994–2015. (Compiled by the author 
based on SEM 2013; SYMIC 2016)
D. Bader
77
tion of foreign criminals”. This popular initiative–whose legal provisions entered 
into force in October, 2016–demands the strengthening of the FNA which already 
stipulates the revocation (under certain conditions) of the residence permit for con-
victed foreigners (Wicker 2010, 231). According to this, administrative and legal 
authorities can revoke the residence permit of any foreigner who either received a 
minimum 12-month sentence for criminal offences (Art. 62, letters b and c, and Art. 
63, letter b FNA) or intentionally derived long-term social security benefits (Art. 62, 
letter e, and Art. 63, letter c FNA). However, being protected by the principle of non- 
refoulement, recognized refugees will be deported only for serious criminal offence 
(such as terrorism; Art. 63 para. 2 AsylA).4
Under certain conditions, return assistance is offered before proceeding to depor-
tation. Introduced in the early 1990s, return assistance provides financial help for 
so-called voluntary departures, meaning a return to the country of origin or third 
country on a commercial flight, without being held by physical restraints. In return, 
dismissed applicants and rejected asylum seekers receive financial support for a 
new start in life. In case of refusal to either sign for return assistance or to leave 
Switzerland, irregular migrants can be put into administrative detention for disobe-
dience and threatened with deportation. Indeed, in 1995 the revision of the Federal 
Act of March 26, 1931, on the Residence and Permanent Settlement of Foreign 
Nationals (LSEE) established measures of constraint to “allow authorities to place 
under detention any migrants (and their families) who might intend to evade the 
administrative decision of deportation” (Parini/Gianni 2005, 216). This procedure 
was established of as a preventive measure against the risk of losing from the 
authorities’ radars the dismissed applicants and rejected asylum seekers who would 
go into hiding. This measure was further strengthened with the partial revision of 
the AsylA in 2006, which aimed “to put an end to the abuse currently observed in 
the field of asylum and resolve the problems associated with the repatriation of 
[dismissed and rejected asylum seekers]”.5
Figure 4.2 shows that the assistance policy of “voluntary departure”–less 
expensive to the state than deportations (Matthey 2012, 273)–was relatively 
successful in the 1990s. In fact, the number of assisted returns was higher than 
deportations (to countries of origin or third countries). Assisted return peaked in 
2000 when 25,548 persons agreed to exit Switzerland after the revocation of their 
provisional admission (permit F) at the end of the civil war in Kosovo. Since 2002, 
however, deportations have outnumbered assisted returns (with two exceptions in 
2012 and 2013), and thus the assistance policy of “voluntary departure”–which was 
more generous in the early 2000s for natives of the Balkan regions than today–
seems to have reached its limit.
4 The deportation order will not apply to the spouse and the children (Art. 63 para. 4 AsylA).
5 https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/fr/home/aktuell/gesetzgebung/archiv/teilrev_asylg.html 
(accessed March 3, 2016).
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4.2.4  Legal Support to Stay or Return
There are two ways of obtaining a residence permit (permit B, see Fig. 4.3). First, 
the opportunity to stay depends on the personal situation of the potential deportee in 
Switzerland. According to the principle of cases of hardship, foreigners born or 
raised in Switzerland can call upon their integration in Swiss society and the absence 
of links with their country of origin (e.g., the absence of close relatives or poor lin-
guistic skills). Similarly, holders of permit F (provisional admission) and of permit 
N (asylum seekers being subjects of a pending application) who have been in 
Switzerland for more than 5 years (Art. 84, paragraph 5 FNA; Art. 14 AsylA) may 
both equally refer to this rule. The criteria to determine whether a foreigner is 
(well-)integrated differ between cantons (Wichmann et al. 2011), according to the 
principle of executive federalism (see next section). Generally, the following criteria 
are examined: the level of communication skills in the language of the canton of 
residence (French, German, Italian, or Romansh), the respect of the law, the familial 
and financial situation, the length of the stay,6 the medical status, and the chances of 
6 In some cases, a long stay in Switzerland is a reason for authorities to argue against a residence 
permit for foreigners who are therefore considered to have been in Switzerland for too long. The 
length of stay and the subsequent integration of dismissed applicants and rejected asylum seekers 
are rather arguments mobilized by protest actors who dispute the decision of the authorities (see 
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Fig. 4.2 Deportations (to countries of origin or third countries), Dublin transfers and assisted 
returns from Switzerland, 1994–2015. (Compiled by the author based on SYMIC 2016)
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being reintegrated in the country of origin (Art. 31 ASEO7). Overall, the most 
important criterion is the respect of the law. Both the absence of a criminal record 
and debts must be proven by the so-called certificate of good conduct. In some 
cases, the fact that migrants’ children attend Swiss schools is considered as an addi-
tional sign of good integration or, at least, an argument to extend the deportation 
delay until the end of compulsory education.
Second, the opportunity to return to Switzerland, when deportation could not be 
avoided, implicates a third party, namely either Swiss citizens or foreigners with a 
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Fig. 4.3 Relation of asylum, deportation and stay in Switzerland. (Author’s illustration)
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residence permit with whom the deportee has built affective or professional rela-
tionships. Indeed, the social capital of the deportee, that is, their relationships with 
members of the host country, is fundamental. Their commitment enables them to 
restore the initial lived situation prior to deportation. Concretely, the options are 
marriage and employment. In fact, immigration in Switzerland is regulated on the 
basis of a so-called two-circles-system (Bolzman 2002). This system implies that 
migrants of countries of the first circle (EU/EFTA8 nationals) have priority in get-
ting a residence and work permit, which was already the case before the enactment 
of the principle of free movement of persons in 2002. Thus, natives of countries of 
the second circle (the remainder) are only admitted, apart from being granted asy-
lum, either for family reunification (the majority) or for work (the minority). Hence, 
marriage with a Swiss citizen (Art. 42 FNA) or a foreigner with a residence permit 
(permit C9 or B, Art. 43–44 FNA) allows the dismissed applicant and rejected 
asylum seeker of the second circle to live in Switzerland according to the principle 
of family reunification. Likewise, support of a Swiss employer can help in obtaining 
a work permit if the deportee has particularly sought after professional skills (Art. 
23, paragraph 3, letter c FNA). Therefore, marriage and employment may be options 
used as counter-strategies by protesters who defend deportees.
4.3  Competences for Administrative Decisions 
Regarding Reception, Deportation and Stay 
in Switzerland
Asylum in Switzerland is regulated by administrative law, according to a system of 
“multi-level governance” between the Swiss confederation and its member states, 
that is, the 26 cantons (Parini/Gianni 2005, 239). First, decisions on whether to dis-
miss/reject asylum applications or grant asylum are centralized at the federal level. 
Specifically, these decisions are given by the federal administration located in the 
capital Bern, that is, the State Secretariat for Migration (hereafter SEM; formerly the 
Federal Office for Migration) related to the Federal Department of Justice and Police. 
Their decisions are then communicated to the cantonal administrations who are in 
charge of implementing them according to the principle of executive federalism. A 
quota of asylum seekers whose application is being processed (permit N) is allocated 
to each canton (Art. 21 AsylO 110). The cantons are responsible for providing shelter 
and activities for the asylum seekers, and compulsory education for minors (Art. 80, 
paragraph 4 AsylA11), as well as compulsory basic health insurance (Art. 80, para-
graph 3 AsylA). They are further responsible for the organization of the deportation 
8 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 by the Stockholm 
Convention, and includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
9 Person with a permanent residence permit.
10 Asylum Ordinance No. 1 of August 11, 1999, on Procedural Matters (RS 142.311).
11 In Switzerland, each member of the family who requested asylum (children included) is counted 
as one asylum request.
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decided by the SEM of the dismissed and rejected asylum applicants who refused 
assisted return. In cases of hardship, however, the decision- making procedure is 
reversed, so bottom-up. In 2007, a new regulation concerning cases of hardship 
entered into force (Art. 14 AsylA). The cantonal administrations have henceforth 
been allowed to suggest to the SEM the names of dismissed applicants and rejected 
asylum seekers fulfilling the aforementioned criteria of hardship. Consequently, 
those who stayed underground in Switzerland for several years despite the eviction 
order may submit their demand to the administration of their canton of residence. If 
the cantonal administration decides to forward their request to the SEM, the latter has 
the final say on whether the claimant is allowed to receive a provisional admission 
(permit F) or even the residence permit for humanitarian reasons (permit B).
In some cases though, cantonal administrations disagree with the SEM regarding 
either the dismissal/rejection of the asylum application or the deportation order of a 
specific asylum applicant. Thus, it is not unlikely that the former disobey the latter’s 
decisions by refusing to implement them. Sometimes, this is the result of protests 
from civil society actors that have raised media attention. Consequently, the can-
tonal administration may demand that the SEM makes an exception to the rules on 
the grounds of hardship. In such cases, the cantonal government will first interfere 
and then, involve the Swiss government (federal level) represented by the head of 
the Department of Justice and Police to which the SEM is subordinated. Politics is 
thus only involved in disputes. Similarly, dismissed applicants and rejected asylum 
seekers can appeal against the deportation order to the Federal Administrative Court 
(Art. 105 AsylA). The court decides whether the SEM’s interpretation of the law 
was accurate. If the Federal Administrative Court confirms the validity of the depor-
tation decision, the claimant can make one last appeal either to the European Court 
of Human Rights or a United Nations organ such as the Committee against Torture. 
To succeed, the claimant must prove that their deportation would contravene their 
fundamental human rights. Specifically, they may invoke the principle of non- 
refoulement in the sense of Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(i.e. prohibition of torture) to dispute the Swiss authorities’ assessment of the safety 
of either the country of origin or third country mentioned in the deportation order.
4.4  Protest Culture
Switzerland is a country of wide-spread direct democracy, instruments such as the 
popular initiative and the referendum offer social movements increased access to the 
political system (Kriesi/Wisler 1996, 22). The importance of public opinion is acknowl-
edged by the authorities; criticism from the bottom is taken seriously at the top. As 
highlighted by Vatter (2008  in Hutter/Giugni 2009, 430), Switzerland is a “case of 
weak state and consensus democracy”. First, this means that the state delegates tasks 
such as humanitarian aid to NGOs (Balsiger 2016, 293). Social organizations are thus 
regarded as partners of and important interlocutors for the authorities. Second, this 
means that social organizations and Swiss civil society in general have political clout. 
As Sciarini and Trechsel (1996, 30; original emphasis) argue: “due to the ‘pressures to 
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collaborate’ by either the referendum threat or the risk of failure in a popular vote, the 
power to choose whether or not a consensual strategy is partially theoretical; the elite 
who would openly choose to renounce the consensus is likely to be disavowed during 
the plebiscitary phase”. Accordingly, civil society (including social organizations) 
is often expected to take a position during the drafting process of laws (Art. 45, 
paragraph 1, letter c ParlA12) in order to avoid further optional referenda.
Switzerland offers an “open institutional context” to social movements “due to 
its federal structure, proportional representation, multiparty government coalitions 
with rather undisciplined parties, weak public administration, and the presence of 
direct-democratic instruments” (Hutter/Giugni 2009, 430). However, direct democ-
racy encourages “institutionalized protest strategies” (ibid.). Well-organized protest 
movements which have forged political alliances and moderate action repertoires 
are indeed more likely to succeed in Switzerland (ibid.; Wisler 1993). Conversely, 
spontaneous protest movements and radical action repertoires (such as illegal occu-
pation) are discouraged and frowned upon, considering the availability of direct- 
democratic instruments (Hutter/Giugni 2009, 430; Wisler 1993) and their greater 
legitimacy (Balsiger 2016, 288). However, direct-democratic instruments require 
financial resources and considerable commitment from protesters as they need to 
collect a significant number of signatures within a given timeframe (Giugni 1995). 
As a result, the Swiss context is selective towards social movements: being open for 
some and closed for others (Wisler 1993, 7–8).
Protest mobilizations were more numerous in Switzerland in the 1980s than they are 
today (Hutter/Giugni 2009). By comparison to other European countries, Switzerland 
had a high level of “overall mass mobilization” (Kriesi et al. 1992, 226). Despite the 
primacy of direct-democratic means of participation, Kriesi et  al. (ibid.) observe 
that the number of petitions in Switzerland was higher than in Germany and France, 
where moderate forms of protest are less popular. Nevertheless, Kriesi and Wisler 
note heterogeneous protest behaviors among the linguistic regions in Switzerland:
[D]irect-democratic institutions are more frequently used in the German-speaking regions. 
The difference is small for the referenda, but very strong for popular initiatives. As a conse-
quence, the action repertory of the social movements in the Latin regions turns out to be 
more radical than that of their counterparts in German-speaking Switzerland. (1996, 24)
During the last decades of the twentieth century, new social movements (NSMs) 
arose in Switzerland. Each NSM has marked a particular era in terms of the number 
of protest events: the anti-nuclear movement (1970s), the peace movement and 
urban movements (1980s), and the global justice movement (2000s) (Balsiger 2016; 
Hutter/Giugni 2009). The transition from the old labor movement to NSMs is due to 
“the pacification of the traditional class cleavage in Switzerland and the importance 
of a new cleavage in the middle class” (Balsiger 2016, 289–290). The emergence of 
NSMs was made possible by the support of the Socialist Party, which is their main 
ally (Passy 1998, 43). The Party thus constitutes a bridge between NSMs and the 
authorities, as a spokesperson of the protest message in the political arena. Yet, 
because of the reality of coalition governments in Switzerland, it may occur that 
12 Federal Act on the Federal Assembly of December 13, 2002; RS 171.10.
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members of left-wing parties are responsible for implementing anti-immigrant poli-
cies for instance, which puts them at odds with their political base. In fact, the politi-
cal agreement between the Socialist Party and left-wing citizens is challenged when 
the socialists head either the cantonal governments or the SEM (federal administra-
tion). Indeed, both positions are executive and require from the political elites that 
they implement popular initiatives approved by the Swiss people. The consequent 
shift of status from opposition party to government party results in a delicate com-
promise for socialist elites to consent to and adopt political positions that their con-
stituents oppose (Goto 2013). Consequently, left-wing activists hold the ambivalent 
position of being careful not to delegitimize their own elites while simultaneously 
challenging migration policies such as the Dublin agreement.
As early as the 1980s, civil society actors were organizing resistance against the 
side-effects of Swiss asylum policy. For instance, several churches–mostly in the 
Latin part of Switzerland–offered shelter to rejected asylum seekers who had been 
awaiting a decision regarding their asylum application for 6 years and in the mean-
time had integrated into Swiss society (Parini 1997a, 144). Likewise, several protest 
actions were conducted in different regions of Switzerland to express the overall 
disapproval to Swiss asylum and deportation policies. As Parini (ibid., 147) states, 
“the peak of the resistance activities occurred in the period from 1985 to 1988, 
which also witnessed the creation of several resistance movements against the 
restrictive policy that was gradually being implemented”. Passy and Giugni (2005, 
903) stress that the defense of migrants in Switzerland is often organized by protest 
groups “whose political goals are not directly and specifically related to migration”. 
This includes for instance NGOs, human rights activists and, to a lesser extent, 
trade unions and churches (ibid.). According to the two scholars however, protest 
activities in the field of migration face difficulties succeeding in Switzerland:
Switzerland is structured on an ethno-cultural and monistic design of the nation which 
makes access to the national community difficult. The imagined conception of Swiss 
citizenship thus poses a double-bind, both in the individual and collective access to the 
nation. This double-bind shapes a relationship to otherness where exclusion prevails and 
where it will be difficult for the actors who defend migrants and fight against racism to 
intervene in the political debate of this country. (Ibid., 899)
Against this background, Koopmans et al. (2005, 128) note that protests carried out 
by migrants in Switzerland mostly mobilize claims for political change in their 
homelands. This result places Switzerland in a singular position, with the study by 
Koopmans et al. (ibid.) showing that migrant protests in the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, France, and (to a lesser extent) in Germany mostly address the host coun-
try. Yet, this variation might partially be explained by two factors. On the one hand, 
the presence of international organizations and the United Nations in Switzerland, 
particularly in Geneva, offers the opportunity of having an international audience 
through local political protests. On the other hand, direct-democratic instruments, 
which form the main tool for social engagement in politics, are exclusively available 
to Swiss citizens (Kriesi/Wisler 1996, 26).
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4.5  Conclusion
This chapter began by asking whether Switzerland is a country of political asylum. 
Unfortunately, there are as many criteria of assessment as answers to this question. 
Nevertheless, I argue that, although Switzerland cherishes its humanitarian reputa-
tion abroad, it cannot be distinguished from its European neighbors on the argument 
of a particularly “welcoming” policy towards asylum applicants. Drawing on national 
statistics, I have first shown that the relatively small number of positive decisions in 
the asylum procedure has been stable throughout the years, despite peaks of asylum 
applications during foreign conflicts, such as the 90s Yugoslav Wars. Second, I have 
provided an overview of contemporary Swiss asylum policy and of the different laws 
and political decisions that have shaped it from the 1990s onwards. My review sug-
gests that the ever-growing suspicion towards the so-called bogus refugees who 
would abuse the asylum system has contributed to an increasingly restrictive policy. 
As such, the threats of deportation by the authorities are a key element of Swiss asy-
lum policy. Third, I have demonstrated that, although this mistrust towards asylum 
applicants is to be found in most European countries, the direct democracy system of 
Switzerland, allowing Swiss citizens to access the political system, gives the institu-
tional opportunity to inscribe proposals driven by this feeling into the law. 
Accordingly, after the 2013 popular vote, desertion is no longer considered in 
Switzerland grounds for asylum, even though it qualifies for refugee status in the 
Geneva Convention. As a result, Switzerland has introduced a unique status that has 
no equivalent in other European countries, namely the “provisional admission for 
refugees” (permit F). Ultimately, direct democracy affects also the Swiss protest cul-
ture. Indeed, direct-democratic instruments such as popular initiatives have primacy 
over other action repertoires. Since these instruments are accessible to all Swiss 
citizens who follow the established procedure, other action repertoires such as 
demonstrations are less accepted by the authorities. However, the direct-democratic 
instruments require significant financial means and human resources that privilege 
the wealthiest political parties like the populist right-wing SVP/UDC, which pro-
mote closed-border policies. With less means but strong motivation, pro-migration 
and anti-deportation protests of civil society actors provide a counter-reply to the 
question of who ought to stay. These protests are resistant to the restrictiveness 
shown towards dismissed applicants and rejected asylum seekers who have been 
attracted and then disillusioned by the so-called Swiss humanitarian tradition.
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Tracing Anti-deportation Protests: 




In the 1990s, a tightening of the migration and border system was adopted across 
Western Europe and deportation started to become a central element of immigration 
control, particularly of rejected asylum seekers (Wong 2015). While deportations 
signal and maintain national sovereignty over borders, they also often contravene 
the spirit of human rights legislation and impose danger and high costs on individuals. 
As a consequence, deportations are met with feelings of injustice, unease, and moral 
outrage in an increasingly wide part of society (Nyers 2003; Ellermann 2009; 
Freedman 2009, 2011; Tazreiter 2010; Anderson et al. 2011). In the three countries 
under investigation, Austria, Germany and Switzerland, mobilization and protest 
against this forceful measure appeared both at the local and national level, often 
spontaneously and diffusely organized. Civil society, friends, neighbors and political 
groups alike, took action to prevent the implementation of deportations of 
individuals, or to engage in movements that challenge the deportation system.
Several campaigns and protest incidents in the field of deportation are well docu-
mented (Nyers 2003; Ellermann 2009; Freedman 2009, 2011; Patler and Gonzales 
2015), but little research has examined how this particular type of protest–targeting 
both individual human rights issues and core aspects of nation states–manifests 
itself across time and space. On the basis of an empirical, long-term perspective 
combined with a cross-country framework, the aim of this chapter is to identify 
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central dimensions of protest and to characterize protest activities in this sensitive 
field. To this end, we raise the following questions: As it is individuals with restricted 
rights who are at the center of the protest activities, to which extent does protest take 
place on behalf of others and therefore constitutes solidarity protest (see Giugni and 
Passy 2001 on political altruism and solidarity movements)? To which extent do 
claims raised in the protest events focus on the implementation of certain deporta-
tions and individual solutions, and to which extent do they focus on policy reforms 
(Jasper 2014)? Are protest activities organized at a local or national level, or do they 
even qualify as a transnational movement that tackles not only individual deporta-
tions but restrictive migration and border regimes (De Genova and Peutz 2010; 
Tazreiter 2010)?
This chapter addresses these questions by presenting a comparison of anti- 
deportation protest activities across three countries and over 20 years (1993–2013). 
A protest event analysis (PEA, i.a. Koopmans and Rucht 2002) drawing on 
newspaper articles was conducted to examine trajectories, country-related 
differences and similarities in terms of protest frequency, main actors, repertoires, 
and claims.
5.2  Conceptualizing Anti-deportation Protest
5.2.1  Notions and Concepts
Social movement literature distinguishes different modes of institutionalized 
engagement and confrontational participation against governmental decisions. 
Several concepts are applied to analyze the contention of politics and policies, in 
particular mobilization, protest, and movement. Despite being central to this 
literature, social movements remain a poorly defined concept. In our view, a good 
definition combines two elements: that movements emerge “in reaction to particular 
issues”, as Claudia Tazreiter (2010, 204) highlights, and that movements encompass 
“sustained and intentional efforts” to achieve legal or social change, as James Jasper 
(2014, 5) emphasizes.
We understand political mobilization as the process of setting something in 
motion to promote action. With regards to social movements, a wide range of actors 
and networks seek to mobilize people in the public sphere and make them take 
action for or against a certain issue (Della Porta and Piazza 2008; Rucht 2012, 4).
A specific form of mobilization is protest, characterized by the direct participa-
tion of individuals or collective actors to put pressure on decision makers (Caiani 
et al. 2012, 11), and to act against government policies or against specific adminis-
trative decisions (Kriesi 1993, 3; Opp 2009). A protest is defined by its focus on a 
specific policy or decision, but in contrast to a social movement, it does not address 
broader issues–be these social or political issues. Protests can take the form of 
movements or be part of one (Jasper 2014, xi).
D. Ruedin et al.
91
This chapter analyzes contentious action as mobilization through protest from 
below. Potential deportees, citizens, and political activists mobilize or are mobilized, 
and act against political decisions on deportation policies, or administrative deci-
sions regarding their implementation.
5.2.2  Analytical Framework of Anti-deportation Protest
Despite literature addressing anti-deportation protests (Freedman 2009, 2011; 
Tazreiter 2010; Patler and Gonzales 2015), there is a lack of conceptualization of 
how the forceful exclusion of human lives from (national) territory and social 
relations is contested.
As has been noted repeatedly, as a coercive state act, deportation is a highly sen-
sitive political and human rights issue (Ellermann 2009). It is related to normative 
ideas of state sovereignty, as well as political positions on border control, migration 
policies, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain categories of people more gener-
ally (Nyers 2003). Against this background, it can be asserted that anti- deportation 
protest activities target a policy area which “pose[s] a more serious threat to the 
authorities in that they strike the core interest of the state” (Giugni and Yamasaki 
2009, 469), namely sovereignty over borders and coercive capacity to implement 
measures of border control.
In the following we develop a nuanced conceptualization of anti-deportation pro-
test to evaluate the empirical findings across time and across countries. To do so, we 
draw on literature on migrant protests (Monforte and Dufour 2013; Tyler and 
Marciniak 2013) and develop a framework with three features: participants’ 
interests, claims, and the level of mobilization and organization (see Table 5.1).
5.2.3  Self-Interest Versus Solidarity Protest
With regard to interest and personal concern of the participants, the literature indi-
cates two types of protest: so-called refugee protests based on self-interest,1 and 
solidarity protests based on interests and needs of others. Self-interest is evident if 
1 Self-interest is understood with regards to the issue of deportation and refers to the person directly 
affected–the potential deportee.
Table 5.1 Analytical framework of anti-deportation protest
Interests Self-interests versus interests on behalf of others 
(solidarity interests)
Claims Aspiring (policy change-oriented) goals versus 
individual solutions
Level of mobilization and organization Local–national–transnational levels
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the person threatened with exclusion attempts to prevent his or her deportation, 
respectively the deportation of members of their own group. As “acts of desperation” 
resistance arises in situations where the “individual has nothing left to lose” and 
comprises hunger strikes, self-harm, suicide attempts, or the destruction of 
documents (Monforte and Dufour 2013, 85).
In the last decade, collective refugee protests rather than individual resistance 
have increased, taking the form of protest marches, camps or strikes (Tyler and 
Marciniak 2013). These are instances where (rejected) asylum seekers protest 
against deportation and asylum policies. Examples include the Sans-Papiers 
movement in France (McNevin 2006), A Day without Immigrants in the US (De 
Genova and Borcila 2011), the Refugee Camp Vienna in Austria (see Mokre 2018), 
as well as refugee protests in Osnabrück, Germany (see Hinger et  al. 2018) and 
Lausanne, Switzerland. Such refugee protests have been described as a consequence 
of the increase of border control and security measures (Nyers 2007). They reveal 
conditions and consequences for asylum seekers, generated by coercive state 
measures, but also challenge the rhetoric and depiction of asylum seekers as objects 
and underline the agency of refugees (Ataç 2016).
Refugee protests apart, protests against deportation tend to be organized by those 
who have a secure position and are not threatened by deportation: solidarity protests 
by individual citizens, local communities, or political groups. These actors may or 
may not have personal ties with the potential deportee. Solidarity protests can push 
against the enforcement of a specific deportation, or seek broader legal and social 
change within an immigrant society. The participants of a solidarity protest act on 
behalf of others and defend the rights and interests of individuals who otherwise 
have limited opportunities and resources to defend themselves (Freedman 2009; 
Chimienti 2011). The act of political mobilization does not serve their personal 
interest and can be described as altruistic (Giugni and Passy 2001). Mobilization 
and protest as solidarity or altruism is often inspired by perceptions of universal 
human rights (Benhabib 2004).
Central to collective action is solidarity between citizens and non-citizens 
(Rygiel 2011; Mokre 2015). For solidarity to emerge, common interest, personal 
ties, or emotions are essential. For instance, Rigby and Schlembach (2013) examine 
the solidarity between migrants and No Border activists in camps in Calais, France 
which was mobilized in their protest against policies of mobility control and illegal-
ity. Their joint engagement, based on a common interest related to border control 
and citizenship, “opened up spaces for collective protest” (Tyler and Marciniak 
2013, 147) and created “bordering solidarities” (Rygiel 2011, 13). Solidarity can 
also emerge as affective emotion because of existing personal ties between citizens 
and asylum seekers, established at work, in church, or school (Rosenberger and 
Winkler 2014). Personal ties are in this case relational resources (Jasper 2007) and 
increase the chances of protest mobilization of citizens (McCammon and Moon 
2016).
In the data examined in this chapter, we expect that most protest against the 
deportation of rejected asylum seekers is on behalf of the potential deportees. 
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As non-citizens, potential deportees usually lack the possibilities to make their 
voices heard in decision-making bodies. They also likely lack the necessary 
resources for effective protest to reach the media. This renders their positions largely 
invisible in public, at the same time as the issue of migration and asylum seekers is 
“hypervisible” (Tyler and Marciniak 2013, 152) and biased against immigrants and 
foreigners (Decker et al. 2010; Friesl et al. 2010). As non-citizens subject to depor-
tation, involvement in protest–becoming visible and demanding rights–is risky and 
increases chances of arrest and actual deportation (Rygiel 2011; Monforte and 
Dufour 2013). The situation is quite different for those who protest on behalf of 
rejected asylum seekers: As citizens they have access to formal political processes 
and often access to resources that render protest more effective.
5.2.4  Aspiring Political Claims or Individual Enforcement 
Solutions
Anti-deportation protests often challenge the underlying logic of exclusion, the fact 
that deportations (forcibly) remove and exclude certain people from a given territory 
and from social relations. While rejected asylum seekers often attempt to resist their 
own deportation (Monforte and Dufour 2013), solidarity anti-deportation protest 
may go beyond the individual deportation, and press for social or legal change.
In this respect, we distinguish between case-specific, anti-enforcement-driven 
claims on the one hand, and aspiring claims on the other. Case-specific claims call 
for individual solutions, aim to prevent a single deportation, and the protest outcomes 
directly benefit the potential deportees: a certain individual or a family. Protest for 
individuals is often associated with feelings of injustice towards individuals and a 
frame of “deservedness” based on the degree of inclusion and integration 
(Rosenberger and Winkler 2014). Aspiring protest, by contrast, is defined by its goal 
of social change (see Schaeffer 2014 for a categorization of aspiring, altruistic, and 
restrictionist movements). It challenges deportation and migration policies more 
generally, and aims to redefine the legal order or seeks to transform and politicize 
the presence of asylum seekers using a human rights frame (Monforte and Dufour 
2013).
In the context of this chapter, we expect that most protest focuses on a specific 
deportation instead of making claims for social or legal change. This is assumed 
because anti-deportation protest often takes place on behalf of and for certain 
individuals who are facing deportation, and because claims and goals of protests 
depend on the composition of the protest group, its reasons to participate and the 
frames used (Benford and Snow 2000; Statham 2001). Moreover, we expect that 
personal ties with and concern for individuals as a result of emotional involvement 
are decisive factors in triggering protest participation of citizens (Ellermann 2009; 
Freedman 2011).
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5.2.5  Local, National or Transnational Protest
The literature distinguishes three levels of protest–local, national, and transna-
tional–, which we identify based on two dimensions: the level at which networks of 
actors organize, and the level at which protest is mobilized. Local protests are small-
scale and organized on an informal, group- or issue-specific basis (Schumaker 1975; 
Kriesi 2015). Anti-deportation protest on the local level comprises action against 
individual deportations, as well as riots or hunger strikes by rejected asylum seekers 
(Tyler and Marciniak 2013). Actors participating in local protest are often mobilized 
through their personal ties with asylum seekers or other protest actors, or based on 
geographical proximity (Rosenberger and Winkler 2013).
While local protest may be able to achieve positive outcomes for individual asy-
lum seekers, protest seeking policy reform often draws on international media or 
networks of “external agents” to create international resonance (Tazreiter 2010, 
212). Social movements have become increasingly transnational in their organization 
because of the growing importance of international politics and organizations. 
Transnational social movements can be understood as formal or informal “networks 
of actors” that operate at local, national and trans- or international levels (Smith 
2013, 1). In the case of anti-deportation protest, transnational protest, such as the 
NoBorders (Rigby and Schelmach 2013), the No One Is Illegal (Stierl 2012) and the 
Sans-Papier movement (Freedman 2009), have emerged in form of coalitions and 
“horizontal umbrella networks” to connect protest actors, and to extend social 
networks and social capital. Put differently, transnational movements extend social 
relations between citizens and non-citizens beyond the national (Rygiel 2011).
We expect that anti-deportation protest is mostly mobilized on a local level and 
organized by local actors, and, although it is of national importance in some cases, 
it rarely includes transnational actors. For one thing, deportations become visible at 
their (local) implementation (Ellermann 2009), and anti-deportation protest is often 
directed against these. Moreover, calls for the suspension of a certain deportation or 
for possibilities to stay often appeal to “local notions of citizenship” (Tyler and 
Marciniak 2013, 146), such as living and working in a place or the existence of 
personal ties with citizens.
5.3  The Participatory Context of Anti-deportation Protest
As protests are a form of political participation, we embed anti-deportation protest 
in the general extra-parliamentary participation and protest culture in the three 
countries. We assume that this general protest culture is reflected in national 
differences in protest activities against the deportation of asylum seekers.
While extra-parliamentary mobilization in Germany and Switzerland was high 
during the 1980s, when New Social Movements reached a peak, in Austria it only 
increased at the beginning of the 2000s (Hutter and Teune 2012). Despite this 
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relative increase in Austria since the 1990s, protest participation is still less frequent 
than in other European countries and more moderate in its form (Dolezal and Hutter 
2007). This particularity is explained by relatively stable opportunity structures and 
the configuration of actors. With its (past) consensual decision-making procedures, 
Austria traditionally constitutes an inclusive state (Kriesi et al. 1995). However, this 
inclusiveness primarily covers the actors within the social partnership, whereas 
new social movements and protests that challenge elites have usually been excluded 
from institutionalized politics. Participation generally takes place in the electoral 
arena and is party-based. Political challengers aim to be involved in the political 
decision-making process and political demands are still primarily channeled through 
the institutional framework (Rosenberger and Stadlmair 2014).
In Germany, several waves of protest have taken place, with peaks in the 1960s 
(student movement), the 1980s (New Social Movements), and the 1990s (racist 
attacks as well as counter-protests). Until the 1980s, protest was dominated by left- 
wing activists and organizations, which changed after German unification: 
Demonstrations and street violence from the political right increased (Hutter and 
Teune 2012). While right-wing parties gained strength in Austria and Switzerland, 
they were until recently “virtually absent” in Germany (see Rucht 2018; Dolezal 
et al. 2010, 172). Germany is also the most exclusive of the three countries: Although 
its federalism and strong judiciary provide access points for challengers (Kriesi 
et  al. 1995), the undeniable prioritizing of representative democracy without 
significant direct-democratic structures constitutes an unfavorable structure for 
mobilization by outsiders. These unfavorable conditions may induce more disruptive 
or radical forms of protest (Kriesi et  al. 1992). Although the number of protest 
events dropped at the beginning of the 2000s, the protest frequency continued at a 
higher level than before. Moreover, over time no tendency toward moderation of 
protest repertoires can be identified, and the amount of confrontational protest 
increased (Hutter and Teune 2012).
Switzerland is most inclusive towards challengers. Its federalism and the direct- 
democratic instruments provide many access points for challengers and render 
political elites more sensitive to changes in public opinion; the consensual 
democratic style is directed towards the inclusion of diverse interests and actors 
(Linder 2009). After a peak in the 1980s and lower mobilization during the 1990s, 
protest resurged in Switzerland in the early 2000s. This rise can be explained by, 
among other things, changes in the political context, such as cleavages between 
integration and demarcation. However, in a longitudinal perspective the increase of 
protest in the 2000s was rather moderate. Despite the greater salience of migration- 
related topics, the cleavage between integration and demarcation had less impact on 
mobilization than changes in party politics and the rise of right-wing parties (Hutter 
and Giugni 2009).
These developments of extra-parliamentary mobilization in the three countries 
are also reflected in the willingness of people to participate in protest. While the 
disposition to (possibly) participate in confrontational protest such as boycotts or 
strikes was substantially higher in Germany than Austria during the 1990s 
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(Halman et al. 2011),2 it reached a similar level in both countries in the 2000s. With 
regard to demonstrative protest, the differences between the countries are even more 
pronounced. While demonstrations have become more important over time in 
Austria and Switzerland, the participation and willingness to participate in 
demonstrations has decreases in Germany between 1990 and 2008. This suggests a 
higher mobilization in Germany during the 1990s and an increase of protest actions 
in Austria and Switzerland in the 2000s.
5.4  Data and Methods
In order to portray protest against the deportation of rejected asylum seekers in 
Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, we draw on news reports about such protests in 
national print media. While insider views and case studies (e.g., Mokre 2018; 
Hinger et al. 2018) can provide more detailed and in-depth knowledge of certain 
protest incidents and their organization, a protest event analysis provides a more 
comprehensive picture of trajectories, variations, and dynamics of protest. It allows 
us to systematically analyze various dimensions of protest activities (Koopmans and 
Rucht 2002; Caiani et al. 2012).
While newspapers clearly do not chronicle all protests that take place, they pro-
vide an important description of the general visibility of protest (Van der Brug et al. 
2015). There are obvious news biases in which kinds of protest are reported and a 
tendency to report local protests,3 but we argue that protests present in the print 
media are particularly relevant for responses by policy-makers (see Van der Brug 
et al. 2015 for a similar reflection). We also expect that media presence is an impor-
tant incentive for many actor types to become involved (or not). With a focus on 
protest against deportation, low-key actions behind closed doors are excluded by 
design, and the relative importance of protest vis-à-vis other actions cannot be 
enumerated. Furthermore, there might be a difference between actual protests, the 
media representations thereof, and its impact on the political debate (Smidt 2012). 
While it is clear that certain stories are more likely to be picked up by the media, we 
assume that such biases due to newsworthiness are constant over time and thus do 
not affect the analysis a great deal.
For the empirical analysis, we draw on a sample of all newspaper articles on 
deportations published in six major newspapers in Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland between 1993 and 2013. The analysis covers Die Presse and Der 
2 There are no data available for Switzerland for the two surveys in 1990 and 1999.
3 Specific analysis with local newspapers suggests that the reporting of local protest is common-
place, but it does not seem to bias the kind of protest reported (actors involved, their affiliation, or 
the protest forms used). See Ruedin (2016) for details on local reporting of protest against deporta-
tion in Switzerland. A corollary of this analysis is that we do not examine regional differences 
within the three countries: The choice of newspapers appears to have too much influence on what 
is reported in this respect.
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Standard in Austria, Die Tageszeitung (TAZ) and Süddeutsche in Germany, Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) and Le Temps in Switzerland. These newspapers were 
chosen for their national coverage, but given the longitudinal research design access 
to newspaper archives also played a role. Of the newspapers, the NZZ has a more 
international outlook than the others, which reflected in the relatively high number 
of reports on protests against deportations in other countries.
The original article selection was deliberately inclusive, and used the following 
keywords (as stems): deportation, deported, right to stay.4 All sections of the 
newspapers were included, as well local and regional news. The intuition is that 
these are relevant protests, and since we do not have the aspiration to identify the 
absolute number of protest frequency–let alone compare this across countries–, 
local and regional protests are relevant material rather than the ‘nuisance’ they can 
be in different contexts.
Among the 50,234 articles in the corpus there are many false positives: articles 
that are not really about deportation, or not about immigrants or asylum seekers. By 
design, articles about deportation cases that do not mention the deportation are not 
included in this analysis. Keywords were used to identify articles that are likely 
about protests (as stems): protest, demonstration, signature, blockade, attack, 
occupation, boycott, arson, march, vigil, bomb, hostage, human chain, chain of 
lights, flash mob, open letter, sit-in, initiative, activist, supporter, whistle, church 
asylum, civil disobedience, action.5 Because of the large number of articles in the 
TAZ (N  =  4111), a random sample of 500 articles was retained; for the other 
newspapers all articles were retained. The articles were then manually coded using 
an extensive codebook to describe the protest of each event. At this stage the 
remaining false positives were filtered out (manually), including articles reporting 
protest events in other countries. Multiple articles can describe the same protest 
event, and for this chapter all reports on a specific protest event were combined: The 
protest event is the unit of analysis (Table 5.2).
4 Search string in German: abschiebung*, abschiebe*, abgeschoben*, ausschaffung*, ausschaffen*, 
ausgeschafft*, bleiberecht*.
5 Search string in German: protest* demo demos demonstr* kundgebung* unterschrift* blockade* 
blockier* anschläg* besetz* boykott* brandstift* mahnwache* marsch* bombe* geisel* lichter-
kette* menschenkette* farbbeutel* flashmob flash-mob “flash mob” “offene* brief*” sit-in* bür-
gerinitiative* aktivist* unterstützer* trillerpfeifen* hungerstreik* kirchenasyl* supporter “zivil* 
ungehorsam*” aktion*.
Table 5.2 Article selection 
and unit of analysis
N Description Selection
50,234 Articles about deportation Keywords
14,271 Of which: Articles about protests Keywords
7852 Of which: False positives [removed] Manual
6419 Articles coded Manual
1508 Reported protest events Manual
986 Protest events [unit of analysis] Manual
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The period 1993–2013 was chosen to capture the increase in adopted policies 
related to deportations and forced removal during the 1990s (Gibney 2008). With 
this relatively long time span it is possible to trace the developments of protests, to 
discover peaks in protest frequency, and identify changes in main actors, action 
repertoires and claims. For analytical reasons–to maintain a sufficient number of 
cases–and to identify changes in these categories over time we sometimes divided 
the whole period into two phases: 1993–2003 (first decade) and 2004–2013 (second 
decade).
5.5  Protest Frequency
Between 1993 and 2013 we observe a marked increase in the number of protest 
events covered in the newspapers (see Fig. 5.1). Of all the protest events covered, 
around one half occurred in the first decade (1993–2003) and the other half in the 
second decade (2004–2013). When looking at the countries separately, however, 
developments vary. The number of protests increases in Austria, in the past few 
Fig. 5.1 Protest frequency over time by country
Number of protest events each year by country and for all three countries combined. The smoothed 
trend lines are LOESS lines with default bandwidth of 2/3
D. Ruedin et al.
99
years in Germany, but not in Switzerland. In Austria and Germany, the distributions 
are more skewed, with a majority of recorded protest events in Germany (64%) 
occurring in the first period, while 76% of protest events in Austria occurred in the 
second period.
In Fig. 5.1, each dot stands for the number of protest events recorded in a year, 
while the trend line is LOESS-smoothed: No assumptions are made with regard to 
the shape of the trend. Given the nature of the data and the relatively small number 
of protest events in some years, individual dots should be interpreted with care, 
while the trend line remains a valid description of the development over time. The 
sharp increase of the smoothed trend line in Germany is driven by the many protests 
at the end of the period covered: 2012 and 2013.
As far as can be determined from news reports, participant numbers in the aver-
age protest event have remained stable over time in all three countries. In this sense 
the protest frequency indicated in Fig. 5.1 is likely to correspond to the protest vol-
ume. The median number reported is 100 participants, and there are few large pro-
tests with more than 1000 participants.
5.6  Protest Actors and Their Repertoires
5.6.1  Main Actors
A wide range of actors is involved in protests: citizens and non-citizens directly 
affected, and non-affected individuals, as well as transnational actors. For this 
chapter we divided the reported protest actors into groups of main actors: local 
communities and individuals with personal ties to the potential deportee, grass-root 
organizations and individuals without personal ties, NGOs, church-related actors, 
political actors, as well as the potential deportees. Main actors describe principal or 
predominant actors in protest events, but do not comprise all participating actor 
groups. Based on main actors we do not portray the composition of actors of a 
certain protest event, but track the importance of dominant actors across countries 
and over time.
In most of the reported protest events actors mobilize on behalf of potential 
deportees, in which case altruistic motives may play a role (Giugni and Passy 2001; 
Rigby and Schlembach 2013). This is highlighted by the fact that in the majority of 
protest cases all the groups who protest on behalf of potential deportees, such as 
grass-roots, individuals with personal ties or NGOs, belong to the category of main 
actors. In more than a quarter of events, the main actors are individuals or grass-root 
organizations without personal ties to the affected individual (see Fig.  5.2). For 
these actors, there is no stake in helping or saving a friend or colleague from 
deportation. While we cannot rule out the existence of ties through the media 
reports, what can be said is that if such ties exist they are not substantial enough to 
the protest to be picked up by the media. Overall, formal non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and church-related actors such as priests have seen a small 
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reduction in protest participation, while political actors are involved to the roughly 
same extent over time. These relative declines do not suggest that for instance 
church-related actors became less important over time in absolute numbers–church 
occupations continue, and indeed there are many in the second period under 
consideration–but other actors are dominant and appear as main actors, especially 
individuals with and without personal ties, as well as potential deportees.
Over time, the share of designated deportees as main actors of protest events has 
increased, while there is a decline of those with personal ties to the individual under 
threat of removal. This result can be understood as those affected increasingly 
(being able to) speak up for themselves. However, as asylum seekers possess only a 
limited protest repertoire due to their marginalized legal and social position, self- 
organized protest by rejected asylum seekers continues to depend on coalition- 
building with actors with secure residence status and their involvement in protest.
The main actors vary by country, and to some extent across time within countries 
(see Table  5.3). Potential deportees are particularly common as main actors in 
Germany, and responsible for the clear increase (see Fig.  5.2); in Austria and 
Switzerland their involvement appears to have somewhat declined. In Austria, 




































No Strong Ties Mentioned
Politics
2010
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Fig. 5.2 Main actor of protest event over time, all countries combined
Note that the scales on the y-axes vary to make changes over time more visible. Given are the % of 
protests in a year, in which a particular kind of actor was the main actor; other kinds of actors may 
also be involved. The smoothed trend lines are LOESS lines with default bandwidth of 2/3
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already in custody pending deportation (Schubhaft). This suggests that there are 
particular climates in which affected individuals can protest against their deportation, 
a situation where they do not fear immediate negative consequences. In Austria and 
Switzerland we observe an increase of actors with personal ties to the affected 
individuals mentioned in the news articles–close persons who act on behalf of the 
potential deportees. In Austria and Switzerland, increasingly also politicians are 
involved on behalf of potential deportees (see Table 5.3).
Actors affiliated with the political left are central to protest against deporta-
tions (compare Ruedin 2017), but seem to become somewhat less dominant as main 
actors over time, particularly in the case of Switzerland. While protesting on behalf 
of marginalized groups may generally be associated with left-wing organizations, in 
the case of protest against the deportation of asylum seekers, this is not universally 
the case. In Fig. 5.3, a distinction is drawn between actors on the political left, and 
other actors–that is the political center and right. Two things should be noted. First, 
when the three countries are combined (bottom right-hand panel of Fig.  5.3), in 
none of the years covered was left affiliation dominant. This is a result of the fact 
that for many actors no clear political affiliation can be determined, and highlights 
that these protests are not a specialty of certain left-wing organizations like the 
Global Justice Movement. Although activists of the Global Justice Movement and 
non- governmental organizations participate in protest events, they are part of the 
protest, but they do not dominate it. What we see from our data is that protest events 
in all three countries are mostly mobilized and organized by local actors, such as 
individuals and grass-root organizations with and without personal ties to the poten-
tial deportee.
Second, over time, the share of actors with a clear left affiliation has declined or 
remained stable, emphasizing that these protests probably draw from a wide 



















Potential deportees 36 25 38 50 38 33
Grass-root organizations and 
individuals with personal ties 
mentioned
8 14 16 9 10 17
Grass-root organizations and 
individuals with no personal ties 
mentioned
14 23 29 28 28 22
NGO 16 10 7 8 13 5
Church-related 4 4 5 0.4 6 5
Politics 8 13 2 1 3 8
Other 14 12 3 3 2 9
Two decades are differentiated: 1993–2003, 2004–2013. Given are the % of protests in a year, in 
which a particular kind of actor was the main actor; other kinds of actors may also be involved. 
We checked yearly numbers and trend lines to check that the averages presented here do not hide 
heterogeneity within the periods
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spectrum with potential for alliances in the protest against the deportation of rejected 
asylum seekers. Particularly in protest focusing on a specific deportation, mobiliza-
tion appears to be cutting across traditional cleavages.
5.7  Repertoires of Protest
When different actors mobilize against deportation, they do so in many different 
ways. We follow the categorization of protest repertoires introduced by Kriesi et al. 
(1995), distinguishing conventional, demonstrative, confrontational and violent 
forms, but refer to institutionalized rather than conventional protest, and combine 
confrontational and violent protest into a single category, to which we refer as 
Fig. 5.3 Left affiliation of main actor over time
Percent of main actors affiliated with left-wing politics by year. Because of a small number of 
cases in Austria before 2006, and for several intermittent years in Switzerland, the individual 
observations (dots) should be interpreted very carefully. The span of the smoothed trend line is 1 
rather than the default 2/3 (used elsewhere) to give less emphasis on the last few years; left is 
understood as opposed to center, right, actors where no affiliation was mentioned were set to ‘not 
left’. Left affiliation was determined on the basis of party affiliation, and assumed for all grass-root 
organizations, NGO, migration organizations, individuals affiliated with the church (but not the 
church as an institution), labor union, and creative artists
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confrontational protest in the following.6 Figure 5.4 outlines to what extent different 
repertoires are used in the three countries. When the countries are combined, 
demonstrative protest is the most common form (48%). Institutional protest (28%) 
is more common than confrontational protest (24%).
Germany has the largest share of demonstrative protest, which remains relatively 
constant over time, while in both Austria and Switzerland the use of demonstrative 
protest has increased after 2005. At the same time, in Germany, the proportion of 
confrontational protest has increased, while it may have increased in Austria during 
6 Institutionalized forms of protest: press mailings, press conference, comment in newspaper, inter-
view, flyer, petition or open letter, church asylum, support activities, question in legislative, direct-
democratic initiatives, public statement; demonstrative forms of protest: demonstration, protest 
march, protest camp, public assembly, human chain, flashmob, blockade, strike, occupation, soli-
darity event, online activities, other forms of protest; confrontational protest forms: damage of 
property, attack, looting, scuffles, self-harm, injury, hunger strike, murder, manslaughter, suicide 
(attempt).
Fig. 5.4 Institutionalized, demonstrative, and confrontational protest over time and by country
Shown are the LOESS lines with default bandwidth of 2/3; for reasons of legibility the individual 
observations are not shown. Percent are of all protests in a year and country. The number of obser-
vations in Austria before 2006 is small, and the changes should be interpreted with care
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the 1990s and dropped after 2000. Because of the relatively small number of protest 
events in Austria during that time, we do not interpret this change.
Overall, there are clear country differences and important changes in the means 
of protest over time (Table 5.4). The use of communicative protest material, such as 
flyers or (online) petitions, increased from 16% in the first decade to 21% in the 
second decade. This is offset by a clear decline in press mailings, which are no 
longer common in Switzerland. The opposite trend can be observed in Austria, 
where press mailings were almost unused in the first decade, but are now part of the 
staple protest repertoire. Self-harm–notably hunger strikes–was relatively common 
in Austria in the first decade, but has declined in usage since. Church asylum and 
occupations are less common in Switzerland in the second decade, but they remain 
much more common than in the other countries. There are differences between the 
countries in the extent to which demonstrations are used: They are almost twice as 
likely in Germany in both decades than in the other two countries. Similarly, the 
importance of blockages rises in Germany from the first decade of analysis (6%) to 
the second (13%), but remains the same in Austria and Switzerland (around 5% 
each).
Despite the differences, the countries are united in the relatively common use of 
demonstrations, protest material, blockades, and self-harm–mostly hunger strikes. 
Damage to property or other persons is rare in all three countries.
The use of demonstrative and confrontational protest is associated with the actor 
type. This is because different actor types come with different protest repertoires. 
Using two logistic regression models, it is examined under what circumstances 
actors choose confrontational and demonstrative means respectively–as opposed to 
other forms of protest. Table 5.5 shows predicted probabilities of a protest using 
confrontational forms depending on the actor type (top row). According to the 
model, a potential deportee has a 66% probability of engaging in confrontational 
protest, while individuals and grass-root organizations without personal ties to the 
designated deportee have an 18% probability to do so. The more formally organized 
NGOs are much less likely to engage in confrontational forms, and politicians 
Table 5.4 Protest repertoires by country
Institutionalized Demonstrative Confrontational
Material Press Demo Church Support Block Property Person Harm
AT 22% 3% 17% 2% 11% 7% 0% 0.3% 12%
DE 15% 2% 38% 5% 5% 9% 3% 0.3% 13%
CH 20% 12% 25% 5% 7% 4% 2% 1% 4%
Shown as different forms of protest repertoires are: institutionalized protest–press material, press 
conferences and press mailings; demonstrative protest–demonstrations, church occupations 
(‘church asylum’), and support events; confrontational protest: blockages, damage against 
property, persons, and self-harm. These broad forms of protest were combined on the basis of over 
30 different forms coded. Given are the % of all protest events by country. Protest forms that could 
not be coded–like protesting–are not shown: 27% in Austria, 11% in Germany, and 19% in 
Switzerland
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hardly ever do. Potential deportees, by contrast, are not very likely to engage in 
demonstrative protest, something much more common for grass-root organizations, 
NGOs, church-related actors, and in particular members from formal politics. 
According to the model, politicians have a 62% probability to use demonstrative 
protest forms, much greater than what remains for institutionalized forms of protest.
These probabilities of actor types using a certain form of protest form are robust 
against a range of control variables. Whether the main actor has left-wing affiliation 
makes no difference, nor do the results change between decades under consideration. 
In country-specific regression analyses, the coefficient signs of the actor variables 
remain the same, but they are not consistently statistically significant.
5.8  Protest Claims
Protest against deportation varies in its goals and claims. While most protests 
involve both claims, the prevention of a specific deportation incident and a critique 
of the deportation system more generally, the focus of each protest event tends to be 
on either aspect. In 59% of cases, the focus is on policy reform, and in 41% of cases 
the focus is on a specific deportation: The primary aim is to prevent the deportation 
of a specific person or group, to obtain residence rights for that person, or on rare 
occasions to ensure that a deported person can return. In this regard there are clear 
country differences: Protest in Austria and Germany is more likely to focus on 
specific deportations (72% and 57% respectively), while in Switzerland a focus on 
policy reform is more common (60% focus on policy reform).
Over time we observe a decline in protest focusing on specific deportations (see 
Fig. 5.5). While in Germany the decrease has been relatively steady, in the other two 
countries there was a peak in protests about specific deportations around 2004 
(Switzerland) and 2007 (Austria). A focus on a specific deportation means that the 
mobilization space of most protest is local or regional: 65% of protest events 
focusing on a specific deportation are local or regional rather than national (34%) or 
even transnational.















66 12 18 5 20 1
Demonstrative 
protest
7 22 27 37 33 62
Also in the model are other actor types (reference: affected), specific case (set to “no”), country 
(reference: Austria), and decade (reference: 1993–2003). Differences to the reference category are 
significant at p < 0.05
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Protest on a national level is more common in Austria than in the other countries, 
but this is likely to be partially explained that the regional focus of the newspapers 
included in Austria also covers the capital city. Of local and regional protests, 66% 
are about specific deportations, and of national protests 52% are about policy 
reform. As in the overall analysis, protest focusing on a specific case is more likely 
to use confrontational protest forms, and less likely to use demonstrative protest 
forms.
Whether a protest focuses on a specific deportation is associated with the actor 
type. Using logistic regression analysis, it is examined under what circumstances a 
protest focuses on a specific deportation–as opposed to policy reform. If the potential 
deportee is the main actor, the predicted probability to focus on this specific 
deportation is 73%. Interestingly, the predicted probability to focus on a specific 
deportation can be higher when others protest on behalf of the potential deportee: 
Individuals and grass-root organizations with personal ties are more likely to focus 
on a specific case than potential deportees. By contrast, NGOs are relatively less 
likely to focus on a specific deportation and instead highlight policy reform 
(Table 5.6).
Fig. 5.5 Focus on specific cases over time and by country
Shown are the LOESS lines with default bandwidth of 2/3, % of all protests in a year and country
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There is no significant interaction between country and decade, suggesting a 
universal decline in the focus on specific deportations. In country-specific 
regressions, the signs for the actor types generally agree with the tendencies out-
lined here. Overall, it appears that increasingly protest against deportations focuses 
on changing the asylum system, although differences between actor types remain 
dominant.
5.9  Differences and Similarities in Protest Trajectories
The frequency of protest, the main actors, their repertoires and claims vary across 
countries and have changed over time, but also show striking similarities. These 
differences and similarities are summarized in the subsequent paragraphs and 
related to features of the broader protest cultures and modes of extra-parliamentary 
participation in the three countries.
While the number of protest events has increased in Austria, it has decreased in 
Switzerland with a moderate peak at the beginning of the 2000s. In Germany, the 
number of protests was high during the 1990s before it decreased rapidly during the 
early 2000s, only to increase again in the last years under consideration (2012, 
2013). These differences clearly underline that protest frequency is not associated 
with the number of enforced deportations: In Austria the number of deportations has 
declined significantly (see Merhaut and Stern 2018) while protests have increased; 
in Germany the number of deportations has declined (see Kirchhoff and Lorenz 
2018) with a large number of protests in some years; in Switzerland the number of 
deportations has increased (see Bader 2018) while the frequency of protest has 
fallen recently.
These empirical developments of the frequency go hand in hand with changes in 
the constellation of main actors and protest repertoires over time. In Austria, during 
the 1990s many of the anti-deportation protests were by designated deportees in 
custody pending deportation, which led to a higher level of confrontational protest 
in the form of self-harm. With the increasing protest frequency in the 2000s we 
observe more involvement of actors with personal ties to the potential deportees as 
well as politicians, and with the involvement of politicians an increase of 
Table 5.6 Predicted probabilities of focusing on a specific deportation
Affected Personal Ties No Ties NGO Church Politics
Predicted probability 73% 86% (68%) 59% (83%) 74%
93–03 04–13 AT DE CH
Predicted probability 59% 47% 59% 45% 33%
Also in the model are other actor types (reference: affected), country (reference: Austria), and 
decade (reference: 1993–2003). Differences are significant at p < 0.05; predicted probabilities in 
brackets are not significant at p < 0.05
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demonstrative protest forms in both Austria and Switzerland. At the same time, the 
involvement of potential deportees as main actors appears to have somewhat 
declined.
The level of demonstrative protest forms and the participation of activists and 
individuals without personal ties were higher in Switzerland in the 1990s than in 
Austria with its rather moderate protest culture. In Germany, on the other hand, both 
individuals with and without personal ties were more likely to be involved in anti- 
deportation protest in the 1990s, a decade of higher protest frequency compared to 
the 2000s. Potential deportees are particularly common as main actors in Germany, 
and they are responsible for the clear increase in protest frequency and the use of 
confrontational protest forms in 2012 and 2013.
The clear differences and changes over time suggest that protest against the 
deportation of rejected asylum seekers is strongly influenced by local and especially 
national particularities and the situational context, such as to what extent a broad 
actor constellation forms (across cleavages) in a specific (local) context. Hence, 
political opportunity structures for protest against the deportation of rejected asylum 
seekers vary between the three countries and offer a plausible explanation for 
differences in protest. With only three countries and stability in many of the 
indicators over time, we have refrained from a formal analysis of how political 
opportunity structures shape protest, but rather examined anti-deportation protest in 
view of the general political culture of the three countries.
Our empirical findings show that trajectories in anti-deportation protest reflect 
the general mobilization of each country, and that differences in actors, repertoires 
and claims are related to each protest and participation culture. The overall higher 
level of demonstrative protest forms over the period of investigation emphasizes the 
status of Germany as a “movement society” (Roth and Rucht 2008, 10). While the 
participating actors, their repertoires and the focus on specific deportations and 
individual solutions reflect Austria’s more moderate protest culture, the strong focus 
on policy-oriented claims in Switzerland can be embedded in its tradition of direct 
democracy.
At the same time our findings show that in Austria and Switzerland protest fre-
quency is disconnected from the legal adaption of migration and deportation poli-
cies. Only in Germany during the 1990s was protest aimed at the adoption of more 
restrictive policies.
While country differences seem to dominate, we also notice similarities: Both 
repertoires and claims are associated with the actor type. Demonstrative protest 
forms are much more common for individuals and communities with and without 
personal ties. Moreover, NGOs, church-related actors and politicians, potential 
deportees have a high probability of engaging in confrontational protest. Likewise, 
potential deportees and individuals with personal ties to the affected asylum seekers 
are more likely to focus on the specific deportation, while NGOs usually seek policy 
reform. Put differently, the same kind of actors use the same kind of repertoires and 
demand the same kind of claims across countries. These aspects of protest against 
the deportation of rejected asylum seekers are relatively constant over time and 
across countries, and are likely to characterize this kind of protest more generally.
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5.10  Solidarity, Case-Specific, Local Protest Movement
Based on our analytical framework of three dimensions of protest mobilization, we 
evaluate whether anti-deportation protest is characterized by self-interest or 
solidarity, is policy change-oriented, or tends to focus on individual solutions, and 
whether it is organized at a local, national or transnational level.
5.10.1  Solidarity Protest
Related to actors and their interests we identify anti-deportation protest as predomi-
nantly solidarity protest. While potential deportees play an important role in protest 
and represent a significant proportion of main actors, most anti-deportation protest 
is on behalf of the affected people. Here two kinds of solidarity come into play: soli-
darity based on personal ties, and solidarity based on altruism. In Austria and 
Switzerland, actors with personal ties to the affected individuals–who act on behalf 
of friends, neighbors or colleagues–gained in importance over time and also played 
a key role in Germany, especially in the first decade under consideration (1993–
2003). Often, however, altruistic actions are central: It is more common to find 
individuals and local grass-root organizations without personal ties to the affected 
persons than organizations with personal ties. This indicates that often protests are 
about saving someone other than a close friend or colleague: altruism and 
solidarity.
The fact that in Germany potential deportees are more likely to be involved in 
protests against deportation than in Austria and Switzerland suggests that the context 
is quite different and the directly affected people feel safe enough to expose 
themselves in protest, while in the other two countries, it is others who take the lead 
because public protest is probably too risky for the potential deportee. The rising 
number of so-called refugee protests in Europe in recent years (Tyler and Marciniak 
2013), which can be observed in all three countries, suggests an overall increasing 
visibility of asylum seekers as protest actors. However, coalition building with other 
protest actors–solidarity–remains important even as potential deportees increasingly 
speak for themselves (see Mokre 2018; Hinger et al. 2018).
5.10.2  Case-Specific Protest
Both altruistic and aspiring activities are involved in the protest against deporta-
tions, and with the involvement of the potential deportee in some of the protests 
instrumental reasons also seem to play a role. While in all three countries protests 
against deportations increasingly focus on policy change rather than preventing spe-
cific deportations, protest for an individual person or family constitutes a large 
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proportion of the protest events, especially in Austria and in Germany. In Switzerland, 
which is more likely to focus on change-oriented protest, the situation appears to be 
somewhat particular with its entrenched tradition of direct democracy with explicit 
possibility to express opposition against decisions by government and parliaments 
at all levels of governance (Ruedin and D’Amato 2015). Overall more claims 
demand the prevention of a deportation over policy reform.
5.10.3  Local Protest
In all three countries mobilization takes place primarily on a local level, with small- 
scale protest events and a low protest volume. The prevailing protest focusing on a 
specific deportation is mostly local. By contrast, national protest events may be less 
frequent, but they are predominantly change-oriented.
The importance of the local level is strongly demonstrated by organizational 
aspects: protests are mostly mobilized by local actors, local communities with 
personal ties and local grass-roots without personal ties. National actors, on the 
other hand, such as NGOs or national politicians, are less involved as main actors. 
While protest is mostly mobilized and organized on a local and national level, 
transnational actors and global justice organizations occasionally participate in anti- 
deportation protest. Their participation indicates that transnational elements and 
actors are part of anti-deportation protest, but the protests are not (necessarily) part 
of such movements. Put differently, while we know that global justice organizations 
like No Borders are active in all three countries, this has not led to transnationaliza-
tion. Protests are mostly small-scale and local, trying to prevent a specific deporta-
tion rather than changing the asylum system as such.
Although protest activities mostly take place at a local level, some protests are 
mobilized beyond the local. At a national level, different kinds of protest are 
organized. On the one hand, protest regarding a specific deportation may be 
organized in several places or in the national capital. On the other hand, there are 
large-scale events, mobilizing many people. With the level of organization, the kind 
of actors change too: At the national level organized groups, such as NGOs and 
church- and party-related organizations, are increasingly found (Rosenberger and 
Winkler 2014).
5.11  Conclusion and Outlook
This chapter provided results from a longitudinal comparison of collective protest 
against the deportation of rejected asylum seekers in Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland from 1993 to 2013. Using protest event analysis, we examined 
trajectories, time- and space-related differences and similarities in regard to 
frequency, main actors, protest repertoires and claims.
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The frequency of protest activities has increased in Austria and Germany, but not 
so in Switzerland. In Germany potential deportees became more important as main 
actors in relative numbers, which led to an increase in confrontational protest forms. 
In both Austria and Switzerland, the involvement of actors with personal ties as well 
as politicians increased–and thereby demonstrative protest forms. While protest in 
Switzerland tends to seek social and political change and policy reforms, protest 
activities in Austria and Germany are more likely to focus on specific cases and on 
preventing deportations.
Differences across countries and over time can be traced back to local and 
national participatory contexts and time-specific factors, the frequencies, actors and 
repertoires of anti-deportation protests seem to reflect the courses of the general 
extra-parliamentary mobilization in each of the three countries.
Besides differences, relevant similarities of protests in terms of actors exist: 
Despite different actor constellations in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and 
their different and changing strength over time, we see that the same actor types are 
involved in all three countries, using the same kind of repertoires and claims. 
Considering the similar logic that the protests follow and based on our analytical 
framework of three dimensions we identify anti-deportation protest as predominantly 
solidarity protest organized on a local level focusing on individual solutions rather 
than social or legal change of the migration and border regime.
The focus on specific cases highlights the significance of local and national con-
texts in anti-deportation protests. Many protests against deportations take place 
independently, or are only loosely associated. Although transnational activists and 
organizations are involved in protest activities, there is little evidence of diffusion or 
transnational mobilization. The divergences in protest repertoires identified in this 
chapter lead us to presume that the protest events are not all part of a single global 
movement coordinating protest across national borders, but rather emphasize the 
wide range of mostly local actors.
In the light of the “summer of 2015”, that is, the massive influx of refugees and 
restrictive political responses, the question arises of how anti-deportation protests 
will develop. The current migration flow to Europe led to changes in the legislation, 
to a more restrictive access to asylum and more deportations. Many initiatives 
sprang up to provide support to asylum seekers, but xenophobic and anti-migrant 
activities also increased.
At the same time, the visibility of so-called refugee protests increased in the past 
few years. Will protest thus focus more on social and legal change or rather on 
individual solutions? How will that change the kind of protest that anti-deportation 
protests constitutes? Will the protest frequency increase in view of the higher 
visibility and presence of the issue of deportations? Or will it decrease considering 
the shorter duration of asylum proceedings and the lack of time to establish ties with 
citizens and to build up support? Above all, which implications do these developments 
have on the sovereignty of nation states over borders and migration regulation? 
These aspects and questions require further investigation, but based on the analysis 
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in this chapter we expect that much of the protest against deportations will continue 
to be organized on a local level, relatively independent of a transnational movement 
that may have gained traction in the past few years.
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Chapter 6
Worth the Effort: Protesting Successfully 
Against Deportations
Maren Kirchhoff, Johanna Probst, Helen Schwenken, and Verena Stern
6.1  Introduction
One of the most exciting but certainly also the most difficult questions of social 
movement research is determining whether and how protest activities spur change 
in the direction intended by the protesters. From the protest actors’ point of view, 
this comes down to wondering whether it was “worth the effort,” as alluded to in 
the title of Giugni’s (1998) article on the impact of social movements. As an exami-
nation of our data from a research project on anti-deportation protests as well as the 
literature on deportation reveals, there is no consensus on the patterns of success. 
Some protest actors tend to explain their success in challenging deportations 
according to the duration, intensity, and determination of their investment, as illus-
trated by this quote: “You don’t need a lot of people! … The only thing you need is 
this absolute willingness that we all had. It was very time-intensive, but no one 
complained.” (Interview CH5_2).1 By contrast, Albert Scherr (2015, 168, transla-
tion by the authors) has depicted the stopping of deportations as complex and 
contingent:
1 Interviews were conducted in English, German, and French. All translations into English were 
done by the authors. References to the interviews indicate country (A = Austria; CH = Switzerland; 
D = Germany), case and interview number, e.g. CH5_2 refers to interview No. 2 in Swiss case 
study No. 5.
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Both the scope for decisions of courts and the randomness of the conditions that affect the 
availability of lawyers, of support by civil society groups, or the decisions of the Hardship 
Commission and petition committees, constitute an unpredictable and unsafe situation for 
refugees.
For our study on anti-deportation protests in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, 
this raises the question of whether there are patterns that lead to successfully pre-
venting the enforcement of a deportation order. Is there a formula for success or 
failure? To what extent can protest actors influence the outcome? To find answers to 
these questions, the use of analytical concepts from social movement studies is the 
first choice, although we do not investigate a movement aiming at social change per 
se, but protests with a clearly defined goal, namely to prevent an impending deporta-
tion, and often performed by people who are not necessarily social movement activ-
ists. Most scholars in the field of social movement studies (Amenta et al. 2010; Bosi 
and Uba 2009; Giugni 1998) focus on the impact of social movements and their 
contributions to social change as well as legal and political reforms more generally. 
Our case specificities, however, have led us to adjust the instruments used by social 
movement studies to analyze successful protest outcomes. We mainly draw on Felix 
Kolb’s  (2007) concept of causal mechanisms of political change. Examining our 
material with regard to four of the mechanisms described by this author–public pref-
erence, political access to decision-making authorities, judicial means, and disrup-
tion–at least one of the four mechanisms can be identified for all successful cases.
In order to explain protest outcomes, social movement studies often distinguish 
between exogenous and endogenous factors. To some extent, our analysis diverges 
from this distinction, because we observe a creative moment in some of the protests 
where exogenous conditions were actively redefined and interpreted to make them 
work for the protest. Some of these exogenous factors are part of the political oppor-
tunity structures, of which many are national. However, we find in the so-called 
Dublin transfer cases that a specific European opportunity structure allowed the 
protesters to successfully activate the disruption mechanism (as explained below). 
Given our sample of 15 qualitative case studies and our findings that show mecha-
nisms working similarly in all of the three national contexts, we cannot safely pro-
pose the existence of patterns at the national level that explain the outcomes (see 
Part III of this book, in particular Ruedin et al. 2018). Instead, we argue that the four 
mechanisms we have identified are accessed or used in their specific local and 
national contexts. This means that institutional and political contexts indeed matter. 
Nevertheless, the distinctions are not clear enough to explain outcomes according to 
specific national factors.
6.2  Explaining Success in Protests against Deportation
The explanation of a movement’s success or failure is one of the big questions in 
social movement studies–one that remains largely unresolved. William Gamson 
(1990) attempted to boil down a rich body of studies to factors that could explain 
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success, finding for example that groups which use violence, groups with single- 
issue demands, and well-organized groups have a higher likelihood of success than 
other groups. Though Gamson’s meta-study has been perennially contested (Giugni 
1998; Giugni et al. 1999), it nevertheless continues to highlight the difficult task of 
analyzing movement outcomes.
This chapter is located at the intersection between social movement studies and 
research on migration and deportation. Deportation and anti-deportation protests 
have been increasingly investigated in scholarly research in recent years. However, 
only few of these studies have investigated the outcomes of anti-deportation pro-
tests. Even fewer have referred to empirical research on this issue from a compara-
tive perspective–a research gap that motivated this trilateral comparative project. 
After presenting some studies on anti-deportation protests, we discuss selected 
social movement studies that address the question of movement outcomes in order 
to identify different explanations for success. Our case-study data then prepares the 
ground for our empirical analysis of mechanisms favoring success.
While some studies on anti-deportation protests focus explicitly on explaining 
the success or failure of such protests, others tackle the issue more implicitly. Based 
on a comparative analysis of deportation practices in Germany and the United 
States, Antje Ellermann (2005, 1219) identified differences in the “capacity of 
bureaucrats to implement contested deportation orders” due to shifting interests of 
policymakers at various stages of the policy process:
[A]s policy moves from legislation to implementation, public attention changes its focus 
from the benefits of deportation to its costs, with important consequences. As public atten-
tion shifts, so do the incentives of state actors. This … unstable nature of state actors’ incen-
tives threatens to undermine the state’s socially coercive capacity. (Ellermann 2009, 14)
This analysis goes beyond a postulation of the self-limited sovereignty of liberal 
states, focusing on power relations rather than normative restrictions. Shifting from 
a focus on street-level bureaucrats and politicians to the migrants themselves, 
Ellermann (2010) noted that due to the proclaimed limited sovereignty of liberal 
states, undocumented migrants under a deportation order often succeed in subvert-
ing the states’ exercise of sovereign power by strategically destroying their official 
documents.
Despite a very different theoretical starting point and a focus on different actors, 
Miltiadis Oulios (2013, 312, translation by the authors) came to the same conclu-
sion as Ellermann, emphasizing that long before petitions and public campaigns, the 
main form of resistance for those who were to be deported was the strategic han-
dling of formal identity:
Organizing demonstrations is more laborious than declaring another name or having no 
passport, even though it is a merely passive resistance that is accompanied by a massive 
deprivation of rights. By tactical reduction of their “true” identity, more people succeed in 
hindering their deportation than could be prevented solely by public actions.
From this perspective, acts of resistance carried out by the concerned persons 
themselves seem to be, at first glance, more effective for preventing deportations 
than other less direct protest activities–but certainly not for obtaining a permanent 
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legal status. Focusing either on the scope of action available to migrants or on poli-
cymakers’ openness to anti-implementation protests in general, neither Oulious’ 
nor Ellermann’s contributions help us to appraise the differences in protests against 
deportation with regard to their outcomes.
A profoundly skeptical view on the attempt to find patterns for successful out-
comes, as already mentioned in the introduction, has been outlined by Scherr 
(2015). His study points to several aspects that may prevent deportations in a con-
siderable amount of cases, where the designated deportees receive support from 
civil society actors, including competent legal advice, successful petitions, and 
hardship applications or medical reports. However, for Scherr, it seems that the 
relationship between a specific deportation and its prevention by any specific means 
is erratic and contingent. He then refers to the legal system and the fact that not even 
experienced lawyers can foresee whether a claim might be successful or not.
The literature on anti-deportation protests thus presents a whole spectrum of 
answers to the question of success or failure–from executive actors’ capacities to 
enforce deportations over factors internal to the movement (strategic competency) 
to complete contingency. While acknowledging that the process contains elements 
of contingency, we try to locate these in a more precise way and to identify mecha-
nisms that favor successful protest. For that purpose, it seems promising to us to 
draw on additional theoretical insights from social movement research explicitly 
tackling the question of social movements’ outcomes and impact. However, this 
does not bring easy solutions. Several studies (Gamson 1990; Giugni 1998; Giugni 
et al. 1999; Bosi and Uba 2009; Amenta et al. 2010) have pointed out the various 
methodological problems of such an analysis. According to Marco Giugni (1998, 
373), one main difficulty is the establishment of a causal relationship between social 
movement actions and observed changes in society. Research on movement impact 
has therefore come to very different conclusions regarding, for example, the use of 
disruptive tactics and actions. Giugni pointed out that the key to solving this prob-
lem lies in acknowledging the role of the political context, both for the mobilization 
and outcomes of protests as well as for the varying effectiveness of certain strategies 
(Giugni 1998, 379). This does not mean that issues of context such as public opinion 
or political opportunity structures alone can explain the outcome of protests, but 
they have to be taken into consideration. In line with Giugni, Kolb (2007, 274, his 
emphasis) argues:
…whether or not a social movement will succeed in activating a mechanism of political 
change depends on three factors: 1) the strength of the movement; 2) its strategy–defined as 
the use of certain tactics to pursue specific political goals; and 3) the cultural, economic, 
and, particularly, political context.
Kolb’s work thus suggests that applying the concept of a causal mechanism 
enables us to cognitively connect external conditions and the intervention of mobi-
lizations to the likelihood of political change. He noted that while several dynamic 
mechanisms often work together, a “particular kind of policy effect should be iden-
tifiable” for each mechanism (Kolb 2007, 72). To analyze these mechanisms, it is 
important to identify the circumstances necessary for their activation. Kolb (ibid., 
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72–94) presented five different causal mechanisms of political change: disruption, 
public preference with regards to the issue at stake, political access of the mobilized 
actors, judicial means, and international politics. He thus reinterprets factors such as 
political opportunity and public opinion, which are generally conceived as exoge-
nous factors influencing protests. Instead of taking these factors for granted as struc-
tures strictly external to social movement influence, he emphasizes the specific 
interventions of challengers and analyzes how such mechanisms could be activated 
with regard to the goals of the protest. Such an approach also suits our data better 
and carries greater explanatory potential than more standard approaches in social 
movement studies, and so we have adopted Kolb’s approach regarding mechanisms 
to a large extent. This comes down to analyzing how protesters refer to and deal 
with structural conditions in order to achieve their aims–thus redefining them as 
endogenous factors of protest outcome. At the same time, we do not deny the exis-
tence and relevance of institutional factors, such as national political opportunity 
structures, but we do argue that they (alone) turn out to be insufficient for a deeper 
understanding of the outcome of anti-deportation protests. Our use of Kolb’s mech-
anisms will be described in more detail later.
6.3  Data and Methodology
This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of 15 anti-deportation cases which 
occurred in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland between 2007 and 2015, and which 
form part of a larger, trilateral research project on contested deportations. The selec-
tion of the cases was based on a broad media analysis of two newspapers per coun-
try, analyzing media reports between 1993 and 2013 (see Ruedin et al. 2018). The 
five cases from each country were, among other criteria, selected with regard to 
their outcome: Drawing on information from the media, each national corpus 
includes two successful outcomes (in which deportation was prevented due to pro-
test), two unsuccessful outcomes (in which deportation was carried out despite pro-
tests), and one case still pending at the time of writing (involving recent protests 
against Dublin transfers). Taking the information obtained throughout the qualita-
tive case studies into account, the corpus ultimately includes eight cases of success-
ful protest in which planned deportations were suspended. In seven cases, protesting 
was unsuccessful. However, as we learned during our fieldwork, in six of these 
seven cases, the deportees were able to reenter the respective country, most likely 
with the protesters’ help and due to official or unofficial agreements.
The case studies are mainly based on qualitative interviews with the principal 
protest actors (sometimes including the beneficiaries of the protest2) conducted by 
the three country teams (more than 90 interviews in total). The interview transcripts, 
as well as protest material collected throughout the field study, were thematically 
2 In the following, we use the term beneficiary/-ies to designate the individual/s whose impending 
deportation is challenged by the protesters.
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coded in MAXQDA on the basis of a joint codebook with 26 codes. Drawing on this 
data, we analyzed the cases in light of the literature presented above, referring espe-
cially to Giugni and Kolb.
It is the strength of such comprehensive case-study data that allows us to recon-
struct–in detail and with the necessary complexity–the constellations of cases and 
actors, and to shed light on protest dynamics. This led us to engage each of the pos-
sible mechanisms to explain protest outcomes. Because we were dealing with quali-
tative data based on a limited number of cases, we were cautious about (but did not 
completely refrain from) drawing general conclusions on exogenous determining 
factors related to political opportunity structures and national contexts (see Part II in 
this volume) or cause-effect relations. The subsequent analysis reconstructs the 
cases and identifies case-specific mechanisms, allowing us to better understand why 
certain protests resulted in the successful prevention of deportations whereas others 
did not.
6.4  Mechanisms Favoring Success of Anti-Deportation 
Protests
In this section, we seek to understand the mechanisms that favor (or prevent) suc-
cess in protests against deportations.3 One of our first and most basic observations 
was that success and failure are in reality less binary than they seem to be in theory. 
As mentioned before, six out of seven deportees were, with the protesters’ support, 
able to return to the country from which they had been deported. Conceiving of this 
particular outcome (post-deportation return) as “success” would be legitimate from 
the protesters’ perspective.4 From the researchers’ perspective, as was observable in 
all 15 cases, intensive mobilization against deportations nearly always manages to 
undo initial deportation decisions. The primary and central issue of the conflicts 
which we studied was the implementation of a deportation decision. In order to take 
into account the capacity of the various states in question to implement such a deci-
sion in the face of resistance, we decided to define “success” as effectively prevent-
ing the implementation of the deportation decision, regardless of what happened 
afterwards. We furthermore have to acknowledge that some of the protests under 
investigation included claims beyond the case at hand, such as a general right to stay 
or the abolition of borders in general (Bader and Probst 2018). For our present 
3 We note that the protests studied in this research project are mainly organized by members of 
established civil society with secure residency status and thus differ from self-organized migrant 
protests (see Part IV in this volume). Nevertheless, the beneficiaries generally take part in the 
protests, in a more or less active way.
4 Equally, the suspension of a deportation decision does not always lead to a permanent right to 
stay, as is typical in the Dublin cases we observed. Renewed attempts to implement deportation 
may occur later on.
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purposes, however, we define success exclusively with regard to the protesters’ cen-
tral goal of preventing a particular deportation.
The comparison of the “successful” and “unsuccessful” cases, thus defined (see 
Table 6.1), at first glance reveals no striking patterns: The two groups of cases do 
not differ significantly with regard to any fundamental characteristic. A closer look 
at the beneficiaries’ initial situation, the various aspects of the local context and, 
above all, the protesters’ interventions, reveals that certain protest strategies tend to 
be effective in certain contexts–an issue which we will refer to in the following as 
mechanisms.
First and foremost, the initial situation of the beneficiaries, especially with regard 
to legal aspects and their personal backgrounds, largely determines the kind of pro-
test activities that develop. The concept of deportability (De Genova 2002, 438), 
signifying the possibility of being deported, can indeed materialize in different 
ways: Subjects become “deportable” for different reasons, such as the material or 
formal (Dublin) rejection of an asylum claim, the discovery of a situation of irregu-
larity, and so forth. Deportation must be understood as a process which can be 
halted, disrupted, or blocked at different points in time. The initial situation thus 
determines the possibilities of intervention or, in other words, the kinds of strategies 
that have the potential to be successful in preventing deportation. This corresponds 
to Giugni’s and Kolb’s insights that the success of movement strategies can only be 
Table 6.1 Overview of cases and outcomes (n = 15)
Deported Not deported
Austria A_2 (young girl from Kosovo, rejected 
asylum claim, post-deportation return)
A_1 (young Nigerian man, rejected 
asylum claim)
A_3 (family from Kosovo, one son a 
soccer talent, rejected asylum claim)
A_5 (5 Syrian asylum seekers in 
Dublin procedure)
A_4 (young twin sisters and father from 
Kosovo, rejected asylum claim, post- 
deportation return)
Germany D_2 (Roma family with two children, 
rejected asylum claim, post-deportation 
return)
D_1 (2 schoolgirls from Latin 
America, stay as undocumented 
migrants)
D_3 (young man from Kosovo, stay as 
undocumented migrant, post-deportation 
return)
D_4 (Pakistani man, rejected asylum 
claim, in custody pending 
deportation)
D_5 (over 30 asylum seekers in 
Dublin procedure)
Switzerland CH_1 (man from Kosovo, stay as 
undocumented migrant, post-deportation 
return)
CH_2 (man from Kosovo and family, 
long stay as undocumented migrant)
CH_4 (Iraqi man in Dublin procedure, 
post-deportation return)
CH_3 (6 African men in Dublin 
procedure)
CH_5 (twin sisters and mother from 
Serbia, lost residency permit after 
legal stay)
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assessed in relation to the specific case context. Depending on the given situation, 
the actors are likely to mobilize a certain repertoire of protest forms.
Whereas Kolb has reflected on broad social movements aiming at social and 
political change in the long run, our research deals with intermittent protests 
expressing specific claims and relating to a shorter timespan. With reference to 
Giugni (1998, 373), we look at minor changes at the meso-level, arguing that four 
of the five mechanisms identified by Kolb (2007, 73)–namely (a) public preference, 
(b) political access, (c) judicial means, and (d) disruption–can be applied to explain 
the outcomes of specific anti-deportation protests. In the following, we introduce 
our conceptualizations of these mechanisms and analyze how protesters were able 
to successfully activate them. As our cases show, actors do not usually rely on one 
mechanism exclusively, but instead employ a combination–even though these do 
not necessarily accumulate to the benefit of the deportees (in the sense of “more is 
better”). Instead, combinations can also work in a counterproductive way and even 
decrease the chances of success.
 (a) Public Preference
When looking at anti-deportation protests in Germany and the United States, 
Ellermann (2009) pointed out that the goal of most of these protests was to influence 
the calculus of politicians involved in the policymaking process, as “public attention 
shifts from the purported benefits of regulation to its harsh cost” (ibid., 16). This 
finding dovetails with Kolb’s (2007, 77) more general claim that one key strategy of 
social movements is to form public preferences for their demands in order to con-
vince policymakers to modify their personal preferences. The forming of public 
preference is understood here as the efforts made by protesters to create favorable 
publicity; this means ensuring that their claims are heard and consequently shared 
by a broad public. This is mainly achieved by attracting media attention to the 
deportation case itself as well as the protest activities that are designed to prompt a 
revocation of the deportation decision.5
To influence public opinion on the case, and thereby to put pressure on decision 
makers, media coverage does not only need to be broad but also positive, influenc-
ing the audience’s opinion on the case in a way that supports the protesters’ claims. 
In most of the cases we analyzed, “going public” was a consciously selected strat-
egy in order to demand a change to the administrative decisions by referring to 
public preference. This mechanism was deliberately adopted in cases where there 
was no pre-established access to influential actors in the administrative and/or polit-
ical sphere, and thus where an immediate discretionary decision by those actors 
seemed difficult to obtain (see (b) below on the mechanism of political access). 
Furthermore, media attention is considered an important means of controlling 
administrative agencies and politicians, preventing unlawful decisions that only few 
people would have noticed without the media spotlight (Eule 2014, 84). The public 
preference mechanism turns out to be most effective when public outrage is 
5 Due to the method by which the studied cases were selected (media articles), our sample includes 
only medialized cases.
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 produced on the basis of broadly shared moral principles of justice, compassion, or 
family values. However, public preference alone is not a sufficient condition for 
success, as the following Austrian cases illustrate:
One of the cases in which public preference proved to be pivotal was the case of 
a father and his two daughters who were deported to Kosovo and thus separated 
from the family’s mother, who was undergoing psychiatric treatment for suicidal 
thoughts at the time of the deportation enforcement (case A4). After a documentary 
was released depicting their removal from an NGO-run shelter6 for persons with 
precarious residency status, the deportation was heavily criticized. Following mas-
sive protests the three were brought back to Austria by order of the Minister of the 
Interior (Austrian People’s Party) and received a humanitarian residency permit. 
Here, the effectivity of public preference unfolded after the deportation, since pro-
testers managed to bring about the family’s return.
The potential to transform public anger into success in anti-deportation protests 
is greater when the outrage is based on legal errors, such as in case A1: Having lived 
in Vienna for 8  years, a 24-year-old apprentice was taken into custody pending 
deportation. At this point, he had already submitted an application for permanent 
residency. He was not allowed to communicate with the outside world. However, his 
girlfriend informed other people who initiated a protest. His legal advisors and 
members of the Green Party started to agitate against the deportation and detention 
order. Moreover, public pressure mounted through media reports and blog posts 
calling for demonstrations against this specific deportation case and against custody 
pending deportation in general. After 3 days, the affected person was released dur-
ing a demonstration in front of the detention center. One legal adviser interpreted 
the success as follows:
They made a lot of mistakes in this case, where [we were able to intervene]. Together with 
the publicity that was generated by friends and supporters, this… created the… necessary 
pressure on the Ministry of the Interior. (Interview A1_5, lawyer)
In this case, the Minister of the Interior probably revoked the administrative deci-
sions as a reaction to both the public attention and the outrage as well as the dubious 
legal circumstances.
The Swiss case CH5 took place against the backdrop of a municipal election, 
which contributed to successful activation of the public preference mechanism. 
Benefiting from very large and positive media coverage, the case was increasingly 
picked up in the electoral battle between two competing candidates. Both professed 
solidarity with the family and backing supportive declarations. A local court finally 
decided to grant the right to stay, invoking an argument that one of the two candi-
dates had often brought up. In both CH5 and A3, success was achieved by simulta-
neous activation of the public preference mechanism and the judicial means 
mechanism; the latter is described in section (c) below.
6 This shelter was created after the deportation of a Kosovan family (A3). The entire family had 
already been deported when the protests began.
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The potential power of media attention, which in most cases accompanies the 
public preference mechanism, also has its downsides and can, at times, turn against 
the beneficiary. Many interviews revealed the intense pressure which media expo-
sure exerts on the beneficiaries (for example D1_2, D2_1, CH1_4). During the 
entire protest, the beneficiary has to behave impeccably and their image must be 
perfect, since the slightest faux pas can resonate negatively in the media and there-
fore thwart any potential success of the protests. Our case studies further corrobo-
rate the negative effects which publicity and strong media attention can have on the 
case outcome: It may reinforce the resolve of political decision-makers who want to 
prove themselves incorruptible and capable of straightforward law enforcement, 
and wish to avoid potentially setting a precedent. Austrian case A2 demonstrates 
that intense activation of the public preference mechanism might lead the respective 
decision-makers in the spotlight of media attention to demonstrate their determina-
tion: Following several months of contestation and massive media coverage, the 
Minister of the Interior declared that she would not let herself be influenced by the 
protests. The concerned persons were deported, but were able to return to Austria 
later with education and work visas. This case shows how the public preference 
mechanism can turn out to be counterproductive. This dilemma is also illustrated by 
the following quotation of one of the interviewees in our study, reflecting the chal-
lenge of finding the right way of asserting pressure and articulating public prefer-
ence in a way that it is compatible with other goals of decision-makers:
You always have to deliberate whether protest makes sense or not.… It is important not to 
put too much pressure [on the politicians]; however, at the same time… one way or the 
other you have to show them via publicity that there is public interest, which is a legal 
expression, that goes beyond the personal outrage of friends and left-wing activists.… 
There is always the question at which point do I go public. Where am I producing too much 
or bad pressure and where am I producing the [right] pressure, where they say, Ok, we are 
representatives of a restrictive residency policy, but we are also representatives of the citi-
zens. This is always a tricky thing. (Interview D1_6, lawyer)
Our analysis shows that the public preference mechanism is widely applied, but 
also that it does not guarantee success and may even negatively interfere with other 
mechanisms. It may be especially successful in cases and in national contexts in 
which political channels for exceptional decisions exist, such as in hardship cases, 
offering solutions to the problem of precedents.
 (b) Political Access
According to Kolb (2007, 83–85), the political access mechanism mainly works 
through acquisition of the right to vote or of electoral representation, with its effects 
unfolding in the long run. In our cases, however, which revolve around the aim of 
preventing a specific deportation, such long-term effects are irrelevant. Keeping in 
mind the different scope of Kolb’s analysis by contrast to our own, we argue that 
this mechanism can nevertheless be adapted. According to Kolb (ibid., 80–81), the 
“political access mechanism abandons the idea that social movements are powerless 
political outsiders, doomed to stay outside the official political process.” We 
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 understand the political access mechanism as protesters’ ability to influence the 
 preferences and behavior of decision-makers, whether in the judicial, legislative, or 
executive branch, without the detour of the public. What is particularly useful for 
our research is what Kolb calls “state-movement intersections,” which are central to 
the political access mechanism. Political access results from connections between 
protesters and decision-makers. Support may be obtained either spontaneously or 
on the basis of access to the political arena which some protesters already have, 
allowing them to contact persons in relevant positions (similarly to the practice of 
lobbying in other fields).
In case D1, the support from the advisor of a member of the state’s Hardship 
Commission supposedly played a crucial role (we take this up in section (c) on 
judicial means). A former politician of the Christian Democratic Union involved in 
the preparation of cases for the Hardship Commission was concerned with the case 
of three schoolgirls. He actively supported the three minors who had come to 
Germany with their mother on a tourist visa that they then overstayed for 6 years. 
Situated at the intersection between the protest and the decision-making sphere, he 
embodied a point of political access. A supportive lawyer told us that one protest 
strategy was to approach the members of the Hardship Commission and convince 
them that a decision for hardship would also represent their party’s position (D1_6). 
This was backed by a positive media campaign that resulted in a broad public pref-
erence in favor of the family staying.
Whereas political access and public preference mechanisms can go hand in hand, 
as in D1, their simultaneity may also be adverse to the outcome. In case CH4, the 
protesters forcefully activated the public preference mechanism and, at the same 
time, looked for political access. They gained the support of two politicians who 
raised the issue in the Swiss Federal Assembly. However, the decision-makers 
remained intransigent and deported the beneficiary. We assume that they were try-
ing to avoid setting a precedent, as the protests took place in the initial implementa-
tion phase of the Dublin regulation in Switzerland in 2009. One supportive politician 
(quoted below) as well as other protest actors and the beneficiary himself expressed 
the view that the strong media attention (public preference mechanism) ultimately 
thwarted the effectivity of the political access mechanism:
Why did this case not work out? From my point of view, it is because it became a media 
spectacle. When a case receives such media attention in a political context in which political 
authorities have very little room for maneuver, and cannot prove themselves to be… flexible 
by making exceptions…. So you can see here very well that when you have to make an 
intervention in Bern, it is sometimes better not to create any publicity around the case, 
because you would be putting the authorities in front of a choice that becomes unbearable. 
(Interview, CH4_3, politician)
As we can see from this example, public preference may in certain cases counter 
the effects of political access. Indeed, several of our interviewees pointed to the fact 
that certain protests exclusively employ the political access mechanism by finding 
influential supporters who engage in silent negotiations with the decision-makers in 
order to obtain a right to stay for the beneficiary. Due to our research design, the 
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cases we studied all received (prominent) media attention. However, our sample 
includes one case (CH1) with weak public attention, where the political access 
mechanism was activated silently. Here, negotiations with the decision-makers 
allowed for a compromise which included the deportation and the arranged post- 
deportation return of the beneficiary thanks to the acquisition of a work permit for 
particular talents. Even if deportation could not be impeded, a possibility of return 
and regularization could be achieved by the protesters–a case outcome that can 
hardly be seen as a complete failure and that we will come back to in the 
conclusion.
We ultimately have to acknowledge that, on our level of observation, the political 
arena where decisions are produced appears to a large extent as a black box. This 
black box contains negotiations behind closed doors, such as those of Hardship 
Commissions, and deal-making with persons who are able to decide on or influence 
the decision-making process in a particular case. As political scientists such as 
Kenneth Shepsle (1998, 238) have shown, “politicians engage in deal-making all 
the time,” making it appear as a key feature of institutionalized politics. It lies in the 
nature of deals that they are secret, reciprocal in character, and at the moment of the 
deal “victimizing one of the parties” (ibid.), because the payoff for the other party 
comes only later. These features of deal-making are therefore often difficult to 
accept for civil society actors who do not participate in the deal-making, especially 
in cases of negative decisions for the beneficiaries of anti-deportation protests.
The case studies show on the one hand that political, administrative, and judicial 
decisions suspending the enforcement of deportations are doubtlessly influenced by 
protest activities. These, on the other hand, are influenced by other processes we can 
hardly assess. One example is case D2, of a Roma family. The negative decision of 
the Hardship Commission might have resulted from the fact that one of the commis-
sion members had been harshly accused of ethical impropriety by the family’s father 
(interviews D2_2, D2_3); it might have been grounded in the desire not to create 
cases of precedent for further Roma (at that time, about 7000 were threatened with 
deportation in one city alone, interview D2_8). Given the non-transparent character 
of the hardship decisions and the competing interpretations of the interviewees, 
alternative explanations need to be considered.
To sum up, processes aiming at political access are methodologically difficult to 
fully reconstruct. Our sample nevertheless contains one case that was obviously 
successful due to political access, direct negotiation, and deal-making. In case CH2, 
an interviewee–a politician participating in the protests–told us that the person that 
pronounced the final decision owed him a favor. This debt was settled through the 
regularization of our interviewee’s protégé (Interview CH2_4). This dimension 
might be worth exploring for future research.
 (c) Judicial Means
Judicial contestations of deportation orders have proven to be particularly rele-
vant for a number of cases in our sample. In his general approach to explaining 
social movement success, Kolb (2007, 86) pointed out that “litigation has long been 
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known as an important movement tactic,” although it has otherwise received little 
attention. In our study, the judicial mechanism has proven to be central: In at least 
four out of eight cases where physical removal could have been prevented at any 
point in the case, judicial aspects played a decisive role for success.
Rights are not granted per se; they depend on the specific case constellation and 
have to be activated in order to be(come) effective (Buckel and Wissel 2009). 
Preconditions for the successful activation of judicial mechanisms are the existence 
of either legal gaps, i.e. procedural mistakes and ambivalences, or alternative regu-
lations including international human rights law and regional treaties that constrain 
expulsion.
The case of a 24-year-old apprentice (A1) illustrates how a deportation order can 
be revoked due to procedural mistakes. However, even if the initial deportation 
order was legally solid, alternative regulations might be successfully applied. As 
Anderson et al. (2011, 560) have pointed out, mobilization against deportation often 
refers to “constraints on expulsion imposed on governments by international human 
rights law and regional treaties.” In two of our cases, administrative courts on the 
state/cantonal and federal levels stopped deportation orders with reference to inter-
national law. In one case from Switzerland (CH5), a mother and her two teenage 
daughters who had been living in Switzerland for more than 15 years received a 
deportation notice following the mother’s divorce. It took three and a half years of 
mobilization–public protest and judicial contestation–until the final decision of the 
cantonal administrative court. The court referred to the children’s right to private 
and family life (Art. 8 ECHR), and argued that they should not be held accountable 
for their mother’s mistakes and thus had a right to reside in Switzerland. In this case, 
a combination of judicial means with the public preference mechanism presumably 
contributed to the successful outcome.
In case D4, a Pakistani fled via Greece and Hungary to Germany and was detained 
by the German federal police. During interrogation, he claimed asylum, but due to 
the Dublin regulation, the police decided to execute his transfer to Hungary. Accused 
of illegal entry, he was taken into custody pending deportation. Following nearly 
3 months of detention, the third deportation attempt was stopped by the administra-
tive court which decided that a transfer to Hungary was not in accordance with EU 
law as a constitutional asylum procedure could not be guaranteed in Hungary.
In addition, several national regulations include exceptional grounds by virtue of 
which a residency permit might be granted (see Chaps. 2, 3, and 4 in this volume). 
In Germany (§23a AufenthG) and Switzerland (Art. 14 §2 AsylG), so-called 
Hardship Commissions (Härtefallkommissionen) can reopen cases in which all 
other avenues have been exhausted. In Austria, the possibility exists to apply for a 
residency permit based on humanitarian grounds. However, this does not equal a 
humanitarian right to stay. These three different national regulations thus enable 
quasi-judicial decisions. Their existence appears to be an aspect of the opportunity 
structure, offering the protesters the possibility of exploring this solution and 
thereby activating the judicial mechanism. We have to consider, though, that deci-
sions of Hardship Commissions rely on mercy and not on the claimable rights of 
6 Worth the Effort: Protesting Successfully Against Deportations
130
migrants. The granting of a residency permit is subject to public interest. In all posi-
tive decisions the respective Minister of the Interior has the final say. The outcome 
is highly dependent on the fulfilling of necessary preconditions as well as the politi-
cal will of the decision-makers.
As mentioned above, rights are not granted per se, but have to be activated in 
order to be(come) effective. This not only depends on the existence of legal gaps or 
institutions such as hardship commissions, but also upon dynamic factors of mobi-
lization: Designated deportees need to have access to legal advice by lawyers or 
NGOs in order to get reliable information and support during legal procedures. 
Some individuals in our cases had this legal back-up while others did not, the latter 
often lacking contacts, social ties, and money. What we can safely say with our data 
is that constant support seems indispensable for persisting with a case to the point 
of a positive judicial decision. As the case of the divorced mother and her daughters 
(CH5) demonstrates, legal contestations can take years.
Activating the judicial mechanism seems to be a strategy of contestation in 
deportation cases that has realistic prospects of success, especially when the initial 
decision seems legally debatable. Furthermore, they might work as precedents for 
other cases, as the 2009 decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on 
Dublin transfers to Greece showed (Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2018). The Dublin II/III 
regulation with a time limit on transfers of 6  months7 indeed offers a particular 
political opportunity structure on the European level for contestations of Dublin 
transfers (as in D5, A5, and CH3 in our sample, as well as various other protests 
against deportation in recent years).8 By different forms of disruption (see the fol-
lowing section), activists were able to surpass this time limit in all these cases.
 (d) Disruption
Whereas Kolb (2007, 74) refers to disruption as a means that is used by protest 
groups to challenge the societal order and thus achieve concessions, we apply this 
notion on a smaller scale in the literal sense of an interruption of the enforcement of 
a specific deportation attempt.
In the three cases D5, A5, and CH3, disruption was used to shield the beneficia-
ries from the physical access of immigration and police officers. Following an 
announced deportation, activists got together to evaluate the situation (D5). After 
having gathered information on the legal framework of Dublin transfers, they came 
up with a strategy: Their idea was to prevent the expulsion of the beneficiaries until 
7 The Dublin Regulation states in Article 29, Section 1: “The transfer of the applicant… from the 
requesting Member State to the Member State responsible shall be carried out… after consultation 
between the Member States concerned, as soon as practically possible, and at the latest within 
6 months of acceptance of the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the 
person concerned or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect 
in accordance with Article 27(3)” (EP/European Council 2013). For further details and context, see 
Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2018.
8 The currently discussed reform of the Dublin Regulation foresees canceling this time limit for 
transfers (PRO ASYL 2016, 2).
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the end of the 6-month period, during which the Dublin transfers had to take place. 
This resulted in a series of protest events between March 2014 and July 2015. In this 
timeframe, almost 40 Dublin transfers were prevented through collective actions 
held in front of accommodation centers for asylum-seeking persons (Hinger et al. 
2018). As in case D5, in case A5 acts of civil disobedience were performed in a 
small Austrian village in which five asylum seekers were threatened with Dublin 
transfers. The protest was initiated and largely supported by the village’s mayor as 
well as the local priest who, at one point, also gave shelter to the five beneficiaries. 
As in D5, the protesters in case A5 devised a phone tree that supporters signed up 
for. All the members on this list were informed in case of a deportation announce-
ment in order to gather and take sides with the beneficiaries, preventing the police 
and immigration officers from taking the person with them. When the actual depor-
tation attempt took place in the Austrian case, however, this was not prevented by 
such a gathering, but by the simple coincidence that the beneficiary was not in the 
accommodation at that point in time. In case CH3, disruption was based on a church 
occupation (without the explicit agreement of the church’s priest) when six asylum 
seekers, whose applications had been formally rejected due to the Dublin regula-
tion, and several Swiss activists moved into a church in order to hinder the potential 
execution of deportations of these persons and to express their public protest against 
Dublin transfers in general. The deportation of the six initial occupiers of the church, 
but also of further asylum seekers successively sheltered in the church, has been 
prevented since the beginning of these protests in March.
Disruption also turned out to be successful when physical access had already 
taken place, as in the case of the Pakistani who fled to Germany via Hungary (D4). 
The first anti-deportation protest event took place when the beneficiary had already 
been accompanied to the airplane by police officers. Both the beneficiary and 
another passenger in the deportation flight refused to sit down in the airplane. 
Consequently, the pilot, who has the authority to decide whom to transport, declined 
to take the two resisting passengers with him, stating he would not be able to guar-
antee the safety of the flight given their resistance.9
Despite slightly different moments in the deportation process, all these cases 
show that disruption works as a means of a last resort in order to interrupt the depor-
tation at the final stage of the physical removal of the beneficiaries. The mechanism 
is chosen when an immediate short-term reaction is necessary. This observation is 
supported by Jasper (2007, 4457), who pointed out that “[m]ilitancy, like most risky 
strategies, generally succeeds when a goal can be attained quickly and irreversibly.” 
In all of these Dublin cases, the protesters were able to prevent the imminent depor-
tation through disruption. This short-term success has to be read, as Kolb (2007, 
274) suggests, as a product of the protest group’s strength, its strategy, as well as the 
context. With regards to a possible state response to disruption, Kolb  (ibid., 74) 
highlighted that disruption practices cannot easily be repressed if a certain degree of 
9 This first deportation blockade was followed by two more blockades, the last one due to the court 
decision described above.
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sympathy from the public towards the actions of the protesters exists (also see (a) in 
this chapter for the public preference mechanism). In case D5, this sympathy was 
even indirectly expressed by the State Minister of the Interior and a former mayor 
of the city in which the protests took place. Following the media coverage and 
 public support caused by the mobilization, he saw no reason for a more repressive 
strategy in dealing with the protest actions, nor did he condemn the protesters 
(Fisser 2014). Without the support of the police, immigration officers were unable 
to enforce these deportation orders. In case D4, it was the specific constellation of 
authority which provided the basis for successful prevention thanks to disruption. 
While disruption turned out to be successful in these specific contexts in the short 
term, and was obviously necessary for potential success in the long term, it does not 
constitute a sufficient strategy to bring about long-term success. In our cases, the 
blockades indeed enabled the beneficiaries to gain access to an asylum procedure in 
the country of their choice–a success in the mid-term so to speak. In cases A5, D5, 
and CH3, this was achieved on the basis of the aforementioned timeframe for Dublin 
transfers, which opened up room for maneuver. In case D4, access to the asylum 
procedure did not directly follow exceeding the time-frame, but was based on the 
above-mentioned court decision. While the successful blockade of a deportation 
attempt by disruption does not necessarily mean that the concerned persons will be 
able to stay in the country in the long term, in the four above-mentioned cases 
almost all of the beneficiaries were ultimately either recognized as refugees, granted 
asylum or subsidiary protection, or received some other residency status that 
allowed them to stay.
6.5  What Is Worth the Effort?
Using Kolb’s approach, this chapter has described mechanisms that protesters may 
successfully activate, depending on the given political opportunity structures and 
the deportee’s particular situation. In our 15 case studies, we identified four key 
mechanisms, evaluating how and under which specific circumstances they were 
decisive for success or failure in the observed cases. It turned out that due to the 
particular character of anti-deportation protests, the choice of protest strategies was 
to a significant extent issue-specific and–despite some national differences, for 
example church asylum or occupation–demonstrated similarities between the three 
countries. This also holds for the explanation of success. Despite some difference in 
national regulations, several general observations with regard to the mechanisms 
can be made across the countries.
The judicial means mechanism relies on the legal contestation of deportation 
orders or the utilization of legal gaps or ambiguities allowing to juridically counter 
the decision. As the successful activation in many of the analyzed cases indicates, it 
appears to be especially effective in those cases where the initial decision is legally 
debatable. Its activation further requires the availability of competent legal advice 
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as well as often financial resources. If successful, it often entails a permanent right 
to stay for the beneficiary and provides the most sustainable solution.
Disruption, in contrast to judicial means, consists in physically obstructing the 
impending removal of the designated deportee. Even if it has proven to be an effec-
tive strategy in situations that demand immediate action in order to prevent an 
imminent deportation, it does not entail granting a permanent right to stay. In those 
cases where Dublin regulations applied, disruption appeared as a powerful tool to 
make the 6-month period of potential deportations to first-entry countries elapse. In 
these cases, the successfully activated public preference mechanism additionally 
provided a setting that made police and other executive officials hesitate to perform 
further attempts to deport.
Public preference and political access both aim to influence decision-makers’ 
opinions, either through public pressure and media coverage, or through direct 
negotiations via protest supporters who have access to decision-makers. Whereas 
most of the observed protests activate the public preference mechanism, it appears 
to be a risky strategy that may in certain contexts reinforce the authorities’ resolve 
and reduce the effectiveness of other mechanisms.
Indeed, most often several mechanisms are used in combination. While a strate-
gic and cumulative activation of mechanisms may favor success, some of our case 
studies showed how such strategies can backfire. The combination of public prefer-
ence and political access appeared to be counterproductive when the pressure 
exerted on authorities discouraged them from responding positively to attempts of 
direct negotiation, as they risked being perceived as weak or creating a precedent.
Final decisions on deportation cases are often the fruit of negotiations between 
political or administrative actors behind closed doors. Although we could observe 
how some protests managed to exert an influence on these actors by successfully 
activating the political access or the public preference mechanism, crucial negotia-
tions are hardly accessible with our methodological tools and therefore remain a 
black box–this is deserving of further investigation in subsequent studies.
6.6  Conclusion
The results presented in this chapter contribute to the body of protest and social 
movement literature in two ways: First, this chapter addresses the outcomes of anti- 
deportation protests by analyzing how and under which circumstances different 
mechanisms favor or hamper success. Even though explaining the outcome of some 
of the observed protests turned out to be difficult in some cases, we were able to 
identify patterns for success. Second, we engaged ourselves with another old debate 
within social movement studies and the political opportunity structures approach, 
specifically the relationship between exogenous and endogenous factors that lead to 
social change. In our cases, the interaction of contextual factors with protest- 
immanent mechanisms proved to be instructive, showing how existing opportunities 
are seized and transformed into effective protest strategies by actors.
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The third result goes beyond the analysis of mechanisms and, unexpectedly, 
questions the very notions of success and failure. For the purpose of this analysis, 
we defined success as preventing an impending deportation. However, the case stud-
ies showed that a form of success may be attained after a deportation is imple-
mented against the protesters’ resistance. Indeed, six of the seven deported  persons/
families–the negative cases in our sample–were able to return to the country from 
which they had been deported and ultimately obtained a residency permit. Since 
these returns were in all cases supported and co-organized by the participants of the 
previous protests, we conclude that the impact of protest activities reaches beyond 
the enforcement of a deportation order and may reveal its full effect at a later 
moment. These “late successes” also point to the overwhelming importance of 
social ties between the beneficiary and the protesters, as other researchers have also 
emphasized (see Rosenberger and Winkler 2014 and Part IV in this volume). 
Predating the protests and constructed or reinforced by them, these social ties indeed 
tie migrants to the country they chose to live in, allowing for effective resistance to 
the state’s attempts of forced removal. The determination of these persons to resist 
their deportation, and if necessary to return after having been deported, combined 
with the persistent solidarity and support of civil society actors from the host coun-
try, may thus be interpreted as one of the most influential aspects explaining success 
in the long run.
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 Appendix 1: Interviews
Interviews for the Austrian case studies (A1-A5) were led by Verena Stern (VS) and 
transcribed by Sandra Müller. Interviews for the German case studies (D1-D5) were 
led by Maren Kirchhoff (MK), Sophie Hinger (SH), David Lorenz (DL), Ricarda 
Wiese (RW), Stephan Liebscher (SL), and transcribed by Stephan Liebscher, 
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studies (CH1-CH5) were led by Dina Bader (DB) and Johanna Probst (JP), and 
transcribed by Hermione Lacour and David Lorenz (DL).
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Abbr. Interviewee(s) Date Place Interviewer
D1_1 Journalist 06/15/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_2 Designated deportee (oldest 
daughter)
06/09/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_3 Teacher 06/09/2015 Hamburg MK & SL
D1_4 Classmate/friend 06/09/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_5 Section leader, scout 
association
06/10/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_6 Lawyer 06/11/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_7 Member of Hardship 
Commission
06/16/2015 Hamburg MK
D1_8 Politician (Christian 
Democratic Union)
07/09/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_1 Designated deportee (middle 
daughter)
06/15/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_2 Leader of the institution in 
which the oldest daughter did 
an internship
06/08/2015 Hamburg MK





D2_4 Teacher (of the two youngest 
children)
06/08/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_5 Acquaintance 06/16/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_6 Acquaintance 06/16/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_7 Supporter activated through 
media
06/17/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_8 Former member of Hardship 
Comm.
06/17/2015 Hamburg MK
D2_9 Social worker 06/18/2015 Hamburg MK
D3_1 Two activists (pro-migrant 
group)
06/02/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_2 Social worker 06/02/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_3 Member, Young Greens 06/02/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_4 Politician (Green Party) 06/02/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_5 Immigration officer 07/10/2015 Göttingen MK
D3_6 Activist, airport protest group 07/14/2015 Frankfurt MK
D4_1 Designated deportee 05/20/2015 Berlin DL
D4_2 Activist with secure residency 
status
05/20/2015 Berlin DL
D4_3 Activist with secure residency 
status
06/01/2015 Berlin DL
D4_4 Lawyer 06/01/2015 Berlin DL
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Abbr. Interviewee(s) Date Place Interviewer
D5_1 Activist with secure residency 
status, No Lager & AG 
Flüchtlingshilfe
07/06/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_2 Activist with secure residency 
status, AG Flüchtlingshilfe
07/08/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_3 Activist with secure residency 
status, No Lager
07/16/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_4 Lawyer 07/20/2015 Osnabrück MK
D5_5 Neighbor, accommodation 
center
07/20/2015 Osnabrück SH + MK
D5_6 Activist with secure residency 
status, networker
07/21/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK & RW
D5_7 Protest participant with secure 
residency status
07/22/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_8 Church representative, AG 
Flüchtlingshilfe
07/22/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_9+ 10 Participants of spontaneous 
protest, insecure residency 
status
09/15/2015 Osnabrück SH & MK
D5_11 + 12 Designated deportee (and 
activist) & activist with secure 




Osnabrück Michael Ruf (Bühne 
für Menschen-rechte)
A1_1 Politician (Green Party) 05/12/2015 Vienna VS
A1_2 Lawyer 05/29/2015 Vienna VS
A1_3 Psychiatrist for custody prior 
to deportation
06/22/2015 Vienna VS
A1_4 Politician (Green Party) 07/21/2015 Vienna VS
A1_5 Activist 05/20/2015 Vienna VS
A1_6 Social media expert, blogger 08/18/2015 Salzburg VS
A1_7 Activist 09/21/2015 Vienna VS
A1_8 Activist 09/29/2015 Vienna VS
A2_1 Doctor 10/02/2015 Upper 
Austria
VS
A2_2 Former politician (Social 
Democratic Party)
09/30/2015 Vienna VS
A2_3 Activist 10/02/2015 Vienna VS
A2_4 Priest & activist 10/02/2015 Upper 
Austria
VS
A2_5 Journalist 10/13/2015 Vienna VS
A2_6 Activist 10/21/2015 Vienna VS
A2_7 Activist 11/16/2015 Via e-mail VS
A2_8 Activist 11/03/2015 Via e-mail VS
A3_1 Journalist 05/13/2015 Vienna VS
A3_2 Journalist 05/28/2015 Vienna VS
A4_1 Lawyer 09/28/2015 Vienna VS
A5_1 Activist 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
(continued)
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Abbr. Interviewee(s) Date Place Interviewer
A5_2 Lawyer 08/21/2015 Vienna VS
A5_3 Activist, social worker 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_4 Priest 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_5 Activist 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_6 Activist 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_7 Activist 10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_8 Mayor (Austrian People’s 
Party) & activist
10/10/2015 Vorarlberg VS
A5_9 Activist 10/10/2015 Via e-mail VS
CH1_1 Employer & deputy at local 
council (Christian Democratic 
Party)
03/09/2015 Fribourg DB
CH1_2 Worker 03/09/2015 Fribourg DB
CH1_3 Designated deportee 03/09/2015 Fribourg DB
CH2_1 Designated deportee 21/07/2015 Geneva DB
CH2_2 Teacher, deputy at local 
council (extreme left)
10/07/2015 Geneva DB
CH2_3 Former officer in Swiss Army 13/07/2015 Geneva DB
CH2_4 National representative 
(Socialist Party), physician
19/08/2015 Geneva DB
CH2_5 Music producer 26/08/2015 Geneva DB
CH3_1 Activist 08/07/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_2 Activist, former journalist 30/06/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_3 Lawyer, extreme-left deputy, 
activist
07/07/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_4 National Councilor (Green 
Party)
08/07/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_5 Pastor 25/09/2015 Vaud DB
CH3_6 Two designated deportees 08/07/2015 Vaud DB
CH4_1 Legal advisor 18/08/2015 Vaud JP
CH4_2 Designated deportee 25/08/2015 Vaud JP





CH4_4 Journalist 22/09/2015 Vaud JP
CH4_5 Artist 07/08/2015 Vaud JP
CH4_6 National Councilor (Socialist 
Party)
16/09/2015 Via e-mail JP
CH5_1 + 2 Journalist 10/09/2015 Zurich JP
CH5_3 Member of local council 
(Social Democratic Party), 
activist
26/08/2015 Zurich JP
CH5_4 Manager of a company 23/09/2015 Zurich JP
CH5_5 Policeman, cantonal councilor 
(Swiss People’s Party)
01/10/2015 Zurich JP
CH5_6 School director 27/10/2015 Zurich JP
6 Worth the Effort: Protesting Successfully Against Deportations
138
References
Amenta, E. N., Caren, N., Chiarello, E., & Su, Y. (2010). The political consequences of social 
movements. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 287–307.
Anderson, B., Gibney, M. J., & Paoletti, E. (2011). Citizenship, deportation and the boundaries of 
belonging. Citizenship Studies, 15(5), 547–563.
Bader, D., & Probst, J. (2018). Saving the deportee: Actors and strategies of anti-deportation pro-
tests in Switzerland. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest movements in 
asylum and deportation (pp. 141–160). New York: Springer.
Bosi, L., & Uba, K. (2009). Introduction: The outcome of social movements. Mobilization: An 
International Journal, 14(4), 409–415.
Buckel, S., & Wissel, J. (2009). Entgrenzung der Europäischen Migrationskontrolle. Zur Produktion 
ex-territorialer Rechtsverhältnisse. Soziale Welt. Sonderband Recht und Demokratie in der 
Weltgesellschaft, 18, 385–403.
De Genova, N. P. (2002). Migrant “illegality” and deportability in everyday life. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 31, 419–447.
Ellermann, A. (2005). Coercive capacity and the politics of implementation: Deportation in 
Germany and the United States. Comparative Political Studies, 38(10), 1219–1244.
Ellermann, A. (2009). States against migrants: Deportation in Germany and the United States. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Ellermann, A. (2010). Undocumented migrants and resistance in the liberal state. Politics & 
Society, 38(3), 408–429.
Eule, T. (2014). Inside immigration law: Migration management and policy application in 
Germany. London: Routledge.
Fisser, D. (2014, November 22). Die Lager sind voll. Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung. https://www.
wiso-net.de/document/NOZ__2058943. Accessed 1 Aug 2016.
Gamson, W.  A. (1990). The strategy of social protest. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company.
Giugni, M. (1998). Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and consequences of social movements. 
Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 371–393.
Giugni, M., McAdam, D., & Tilly, C. (1999). How social movements matter. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Hinger, S., Kirchhoff, M., & Wiese, R. (2018). “We belong together!” collective anti-deportation 
protests in Osnabrück. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest movements in 
asylum and deportation (pp. 163–184). New York: Springer.
Jasper, J. M. (2007). Social movements. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociol-
ogy (pp. 4451–4459). Oxford: Blackwell.
Kirchhoff, M., & Lorenz, D. (2018). Between illegalization, toleration, and recognition: 
Contested asylum and deportation policies in Germany. In S.  Rosenberger, V.  Stern, & 
N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest movements in asylum and deportation (pp. 49–68). New York: 
Springer.
Kolb, F. (2007). Protest and opportunities. The political outcomes of social movements. Frankfurt 
am Main: Campus.
Oulios, M. (2013). Blackbox Abschiebung. Geschichten und Bilder von Leuten, die gerne gebli-
eben wären. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
Rosenberger, S., & Winkler, J. (2014). Com/passionate Protests: Fighting the deportation of asy-
lum seekers. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 19(2), 165–184.
Ruedin, D., Rosenberger, S., & Merhaut, N. (2018). Tracing anti-deportation protests: A lon-
gitudinal comparison of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & 
N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest movements in asylum and deportation (pp. 89–115). New York: 
Springer.
M. Kirchhoff et al.
139
Scherr, A. (2015). Wer soll deportiert werden? Wie die folgenreiche Entscheidung zwischen den 
“wirklichen” Flüchtlingen, den zu Duldenden und den Abzuschiebenden hergestellt wird. 
Soziale Probleme, 26(2), 151–170.
Shepsle, K. A. (1998). Political deals in institutional settings. In R. E. Goodin (Ed.), The theory of 
institutional design (pp. 227–239). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
6 Worth the Effort: Protesting Successfully Against Deportations
141© The Author(s) 2018 
S. Rosenberger et al. (eds.), Protest Movements in Asylum and Deportation, 
IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74696-8_7
Chapter 7




In the past few decades, civil society initiatives have increased. These initiatives are 
characterized by a narrowing and downscaling of protest aims, and a growing num-
ber of protesters involved intermittently (Rucht 2002; Ion 2011). Among these ini-
tiatives, we find protests launched by national citizens to defend undocumented 
migrants (such as rejected asylum seekers) against administrative deportation deci-
sions enforcing immigration law. These pro-migrant protests can be described as 
altruistic and largely based on compassion, since there is “little overlap between 
activists and beneficiaries” (Goodwin et al. 2004, 422; see also Ataç et al. 2016; 
Passy 2001). Ostensibly, the protesters’ personal interest does not play a role given 
that they act for a third person (hereafter called the beneficiary1 of the protest). 
Surprisingly, research on this kind of protest is sparse – especially in Switzerland. 
Despite the important role members of civil society have played in protests concern-
ing migrants’ right to stay2, most empirical studies analyze protest activities initi-
ated by migrants themselves (Laubenthal 2006; Schwenken 2006; Chimenti 2011; 
Antony 2010; Eggert and Murigande 2004).
This chapter contributes to the literature by addressing the question of how and 
why Swiss citizens take sides with undocumented migrants and stand together in 
anti-deportation protests. It does not explore the participation in general protest 
1 For reasons of readability, in the following, we will mainly use the singular form (beneficiary) and 
the gender-neutral they. Depending on the case, one or several individuals may be concerned.
2 This assertion relies on a preliminary analysis of protest events reported in the journal Vivre 
Ensemble from 1999 to 2014. It was carried out only in Switzerland in order to take a first glance 
at the Swiss protest culture in this field. The results show that in the vast majority of the events, 
civil society actors are present.
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events such as the World Refugee Day or those against restrictive measures decided 
by parliament, commonly referred to as “change-oriented protests” (Ruedin et al. 
2018). Instead, it examines case-specific protests that seek to protect an identifiable 
beneficiary, which can last several months, sometimes even years. The aim is to 
grasp how deportation decisions – as concrete applications of the law – are chal-
lenged. Based on five Swiss case studies, we strive to identify patterns of case- 
specific protests. We argue that the latter are neither singular contestations nor social 
movements, but something in between. We distinguish two ideal-types (in the sense 
of Weber’s understanding) of case-specific protests according to the strategies 
adopted and the role of the beneficiary in the protest. In the first type, the protection 
of the beneficiary is both the means and the end of the protest. The sole goal of the 
protest is that the beneficiary be not deported. In the second type, the protest against 
the deportation of the beneficiary is merely the means through which a broader mes-
sage about policy change is communicated. The defense of the beneficiary serves to 
express overall criticism against deportation policies. This second type shows that 
case-specific protests and change-oriented ones can be intertwined. In other words, 
some anti-deportation protests are neither purely case-specific nor change-oriented, 
but rather a combination of both (case specific in the means and change-oriented in 
the purpose). Overall, the typology developed in this chapter allows a theoretical 
generalization of empirical observations that encompasses both the actor structure 
and the strategies underlying altruistic protests.
7.2  Theoretical Framework
The main idea introduced in this chapter is that solidarity protests vary with regard 
to their ideological background and the scope of their claims. The theoretical foun-
dation for this argument is an in-depth study of civil society protests against the 
deportation of rejected asylum seekers in Austria (Rosenberger and Winkler 2014). 
Rosenberger and Winkler observe that these protests are nearly always strongly 
linked to particular deportations presented by the protesters as unjust with regard to 
the beneficiary’s life story. Protesters put forward the good civic and social integra-
tion and thus the “deservingness” of the beneficiary to argue their “individual right 
to stay [that] is presented as an exception of the general rule” (ibid., 180). Yet, 
Rosenberger and Winkler’s findings suggest that the law governing migrants’ stay 
in the host country and deportations is not contested or challenged. To explain how 
these altruistic and case-specific protests emerge in a context described as unfavor-
able, the two authors emphasize emotions and social ties. Here we expand on their 
approach in two ways.
Firstly, we argue that social ties – obviously a crucial element in the emergence 
and persistence of protests – need to be described in a more differentiated way. We 
refer to Granovetter’s (1973) distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties. Strong 
ties refer to close and affective relationships between persons who know each other 
well and who frequently interact, whereas weak ties can be described as 
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 acquaintances belonging to the broader social network of a person. Weak ties form 
connections between different social circles. A weak tie is “not merely a trivial 
acquaintance tie but rather a crucial bridge between the two densely knit clumps of 
close friends” (Granovetter 1983, 202). Granovetter shows that weak ties are indeed 
quite “strong” with regard to their networking power: Weak ties play a crucial role 
in connecting a person to wider social circles. Strong ties tend to exist among simi-
lar people, whereas weak ties are links to different kinds of people. According to 
Putnam (2001, 22), relationships based on similarity and strong ties are bonding; 
they “tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups”. Relationships 
including weak or loose ties are ‘bridging’, since they connect unlike persons to 
others and “encompass people across diverse social cleavages” (Svendsen and 
Patulny 2007, 22).
Secondly, we argue that case-specific protests are not a homogeneous category. 
Differences in the profile of the actors involved and the strategies used may occur. 
Some case-specific protests show similarities with what several authors define as 
social movements, “collective challenges to elites, authorities, other groups or cul-
tural codes by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions 
with elites, opponents and authorities” (Tarrow 1994, 2). Social movements distin-
guish themselves, among others, by the fact that they try to “promote or resist change 
in the group, society, or world order of which it is part” (McAdam and Snow 2010, 
1). Even though the kind and degree of change sought may vary radically, social 
movements always “refer to the fundaments of society” (Rucht 2002, 4; our transla-
tion). Analyzing social movements in a broader historical context, Rucht notices that 
large social movements seeking an alternative model of society, as they existed in 
the twentieth century, have largely vanished. Contemporary movements do not chal-
lenge the foundations of institutions and procedures, but challenge shortcomings in 
their embodiment with regard to widely accepted basic principles (ibid.). Today, 
protest activities tend to focus on specific issues, operate on a smaller scale, express 
more concrete claims, and struggle for less ambitious aims (see also Ion 2011).
7.3  Data and Methods
The dataset used for this study draws on an international research project carried out 
between 2013 and 2016  in three European countries: Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland3. Based on the inventory of protests compiled through a systematic 
media analysis (see Ruedin et al. 2018), we have selected five case-specific protest 
cases which occurred in Switzerland during the past decade. Three of the five pro-
test cases took place in French-speaking cantons of Switzerland (Geneva, Fribourg 
and Vaud), one in a German-speaking canton (Zurich) and one covering both 
linguistic regions (Vaud-Zurich). We chose recent cases in order to increase our 
3 Taking Sides: Protest against the Deportation of Asylum Seekers, Project I 1294, under the direc-
tion of S. Rosenberger, H. Schwenken and G. D’Amato.
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chances of finding the protesters for interviews. Each case study includes an average 
of five interviews carried out in summer 2015 with both former protesters and, in 
four of the five cases, the beneficiary who currently lives in Switzerland (see 
Table 7.1). Furthermore, we analyzed protest material found both on the Internet 
and received from protesters. We fully transcribed the 26 conducted interviews, and 
then coded them with the qualitative data analysis software MaxQDA according to 
a 26-theme codebook.
For the present study, we focused on six variables. On the one hand, we deter-
mined the protesters’ profile by examining whether they had previous protest expe-
rience in migration issues or in general, their political orientation, and social ties 
with the beneficiary of the protest. On the other hand, we analyzed the strategies 
adopted by the protesters. Specifically, we looked at what the protesters were 
requesting (claims), the arguments put forward (frames) and, the protest forms used 
to show the contestation (action repertoires). We have conducted both a content 
analysis to establish facts, and a frame analysis to understand the construction of 
meaning (Goffman 1974) of what, according to protesters, constitutes the problem 
with the deportation of the beneficiary and triggers protest activities (Neidhardt and 
Rucht 1993, 308). As Benford and Snow (2000, 615) argue,
Collective action frames are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared 
understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, 
make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrange-
ments, and urge others to act in concert to affect change.
We examined frame alignment processes (Snow et  al. 1986), whereby we 
observed how protesters’ individual reasons to participate assemble and adjust to 
establish collective goals and strategies for the protest.
Table 7.1 Description of the five protest cases (CH)
CH1 CH2 CH3 CH4 CH5
Beneficiary Single man Family Five single 





































aAccording to the Dublin regulations, these asylum seekers are to be transferred to another 
European country (here Italy) responsible for the processing of their asylum claim.
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7.4  Personifying and Exemplifying: Two Ideal-Types 
of Case-Specific Protests
Our analysis of five different protests brought to light two ideal-types, that is, two 
conceptual models of case-specific protests. As shown in Table 7.2, three of the 
cases studies (CH1, CH2, CH5) correspond to the first ideal-type that we have 
called personifying protests. The other two (CH3, CH4) display the features of the 
second ideal-type or exemplifying protests. These labels refer to the argumentative 
strategy used by protesters, which appears as the main distinctive feature of our case 
studies. As we will develop in more detail in the next sub-sections, personifying 
protests strongly focus on the beneficiary’s personal and particular characteristics, 
arguing for their exceptionality. They do not challenge deportation or migration 
policy as such, but rather aim to prevent the deportation of one or several outstand-
ing person(s). Conversely, exemplifying protests tend to illustrate a broader criti-
cism of (inter-)national deportation or migration policy by focusing on a particular 
deportation case, thus presented as example of the system’s injustice.
Table 7.2 Results of the five case studies
CH1 CH2 CH3 CH4 CH5
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While comparing the patterns and features of each ideal-type, we will first 
describe the protesters’ profile and the actor structure observed. Second, we will 
discuss the strategies adopted by exposing the claims and frames mobilized, and the 
action repertoires used.
7.4.1  Actor Structure: The Initiator, the Hard Core of Support, 
and the Network
The five cases studied show similar patterns regarding the protest’s actor structure, 
within which we distinguish three categories. First, the initiator is the person who 
starts the protest activities. Second, the hardcore of support uniting the initiator 
together with a few actors strongly committed to the protest form. Third, the network, 
a group of civil society members active in the protest, who give it qualitative or quan-
titative strength. Within these three categories of actors, we observe significant differ-
ences along the ideal-types of protests, as described below. Furthermore, these three 
categories of actors participate in the protest dynamics in three consecutive steps.
7.4.2  Initiator: The Strength of the Beneficiary’s Weak Ties
Following Rosenberger and Winkler’s (2014) terminology, the beneficiary can be 
described as the object of solidarity protest. This designation underlines their rather 
passive role in the protest, compared to the civil society actors qualified as protest 
subjects. Even if the beneficiary does not take part in the protest activities in the same 
way as the civil society actors, we argue that their role cannot be described as passive. 
Our results show that the beneficiary of the protest is equally its protagonist. 
Representing the case defended by the protesters, the beneficiary has to face the 
media, break the silence and accept to reveal his identity. The particularity of case-
specific protests is indeed that the beneficiary does not remain anonymous. They 
leave the shadow in which other undocumented migrants remain, afraid of what 
might be seen as a strategy with an uncertain outcome (Antony 2010, 15). As described 
by one beneficiary we interviewed, beginning a public protest requires courage:
That demands a lot of work, and then it requires a lot of organization. Not everyone can do 
it. At the start we were about ten people in Geneva in the same situation. […] I called them 
all ten, and said: ‘What shall we do now? A team of ten or I go alone?’ They answered: ‘Oh 
no, I cannot declare my identity, they will understand that I am underground’. I said: ‘Good 
well then stay, I’m going alone’. (Personal interview, beneficiary CH2_1, Switzerland, July 
21, 2015; translation from French by the authors)
The beneficiary’s “coming-out” of their irregular status and their public denun-
ciation of the authorities’ deportation decision is both a sign of despair and hope 
that they can change their precarious condition. Hence, the beneficiary takes the first 
step towards making their situation public. The very initial moment of a protest 
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occurs when the beneficiary first communicates the threat they are facing to an 
acquaintance who is a citizen of the host country. In response to the beneficiary’s 
call for help, the initiator will launch the protest. As a matter of fact, all the protests 
we studied derive from a social tie between the beneficiary and one or several citi-
zens. The initiator is not chosen randomly – he or she is a person whom the benefi-
ciary can trust and expect help from. We observe that the social tie between the 
beneficiary and the initiator is “weak”, rather than “strong” (Granovetter 1983). The 
migrants’ strong ties, that is, their close and affective relationships, generally prove 
less helpful in improving their situation since they often lack the knowledge of 
migration policies or the tools (e.g., influential network) to initiate support activi-
ties. Consequently, the beneficiary turns towards acquaintances they feel can help 
them, making an instrumental use of their weak ties to members of the established 
civil society. Even though there is no close or affective bond between them at that 
moment, the beneficiary’s situation will trigger feelings of compassion and indigna-
tion in the initiator (Goodwin et al. 2004, 422) and encourage them to act, as one 
beneficiary says:
[She] was my son’s teacher. When I explained the situation to her, she got angry. She said: 
‘But how can that be? How does that work? This isn’t true, this isn’t possible!’ Afterwards 
it is [she] who helped me a lot. She made things move. (Personal interview, beneficiary 
CH2_1, Switzerland, July 21, 2015; translation from French by the authors)
This basic pattern in the initial situation can be observed throughout all of the 
five cases. Beyond that constant in the protest dynamics, we nevertheless notice a 
difference regarding the origin of the ties between initiator and beneficiary. As 
Rosenberger and Winkler (2014, 172) point out, the actors in case-specific protests 
come from different backgrounds. The authors do not mention what our findings 
revealed: participation of actors from a given background is linked to the type of 
protests. In personifying protests, the social tie with the initiator exists thanks to the 
beneficiary’s participation to social structures and networks of the host society. The 
initiator is part of the “personal environment” of the beneficiary (e.g., neighbor, 
school teacher, colleague; ibid.). In exemplifying protests, the beneficiary knows 
the initiator due to their condition of being a migrant. Accordingly, the initiator is 
either a “professional” or a “representative of associations” (e.g., the initiator is a 
legal councilor from a supporting NGO or a social worker; ibid.). Beyond this dis-
tinction, we conclude that the social tie linking the beneficiary to the protesters is 
weak but has a bonding power, it will trigger a networking-process among the civil 
society actors first aware of the beneficiary’s situation.
7.4.3  Hard Core of Support: Leading and Coordinating 
the Protest
Once the beneficiary and the initiator have decided to launch a protest against the 
deportation-decision of the former, the recruitment process to reinforce the protest 
begins with weak ties among their respective social capital. What we call the hard 
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core4 of support is generally formed by a small number of citizens with a strong 
commitment. They are the nerve center of the protest, determining which strategies 
to adopt and coordinating action accordingly. Most often, the hard core is structured 
at the very beginning of the protest and persists until the end; some members how-
ever may join once the protest activities have already started. What differentiates 
members of the hard core from other protesters is their extraordinary dedication to 
the beneficiary’s cause and their full commitment to defending their right to stay. 
They are ready to defend them to the very end despite sometimes heavy conse-
quences in terms of time, energy and financial resources.
This protester declares how he joined the hard core of support determined to stay 
until the case would be defended before the federal administration, that is, the 
supreme decision-making body:
This guy inspired confidence. His eyes, you see, the way he spoke to me, the way he 
answered my questions. Yes, it was… And there I decided to be part of this support commit-
tee and to go all the way, that is, the goal was to go to Bern. (Personal interview, protester 
CH2_3, Switzerland, July 13, 2015; translation from French by the authors)
We observe that such far-reaching and unconditional commitment emerges when 
the beneficiary’s request for assistance echoes with either profound values of the 
members of the hard core (e.g., human rights, love of one’s neighbors, charity, 
social justice), or a (biographical) sensitivity, or a preexisting history of activism in 
humanitarian, philanthropic or political causes. Furthermore, the beneficiary’s 
request for help often coincides with a favorable timing in the protester’s life. The 
protester is open to consider such a commitment. One could say that the request 
falls on “fertile ground”.
In some instances, we observe that involvement in the protest is seized as an 
opportunity to pursue personal projects or political goals and gain media attention. 
Often, members of the hard core do not measure accurately the time they will invest 
in their cause. Once they are engaged, the achievement of the initial goal – helping 
the beneficiary to obtain permanent residence – progressively becomes a personal 
project towards which considerable personal resources are mobilized – yet “without 
regret” according to the protesters interviewed.
The importance of the hard core is equivalent in both ideal-types of protest, even 
though its members’ motivations to participate may vary radically. In a personifying 
protest, the involvement of the hard core is essentially motivated by the sympathy 
towards the beneficiary’s personality and life story, thus a personal tie to them. Even 
though this tie is weak (according to Granovetter’s understanding), it is strong 
enough to trigger emotions of compassion and solidarity that will lead to action. 
4 We chose to use this term in order to highlight the power and the durability of this small group of 
actors. In other words, we do not understand “hard core” in the adjectival sense of a particularly 
radical activism (“hardcore”) but rather as the decision-making and organizing body of the 
protest.
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Our analysis suggests that the involvement of the hard core is not the result of a 
long-term pro-migrant activism or the adoption of political ideas in favor of immi-
gration but rather appears as the result of knowing about the beneficiary’s distress 
and the emotion this knowledge provokes. The fact that the hard core of personify-
ing protests does not collectively carry an ideological claim but stands together only 
to prevent the beneficiary from deportation explains the presence of multiple politi-
cal orientations among the protesters. A broad political spectrum is represented: 
conservative right-wing politicians (among them several of the Swiss People’s 
Party) are enrolled side to side with center and left activists for the beneficiary’s 
‘right to stay’. The participation of actors hostile or critical towards immigration can 
be understood in two ways: first, people holding very different views on societal 
issues such as migration sporadically join in order to defend a particular person or 
case they consider worthy of their support; second, the “degree of pacification of the 
Left” (Giugni 2004, 169) and their use of moderate forms of protest (see below) 
could constitute a favorable ground for such a political alliance. To sum up, the hard 
core of personifying protests is characterized by a wide alliance and the diversity of 
the protesters’ political backgrounds and opinions.
In contrast to personifying protests, the hard core of exemplifying protests is 
composed of citizens who bring along a sensitivity for migration issues. They are in 
line with a political orientation that aims to challenge what they describe as harmful 
externalities of a restrictive migration policy. As such, they generally share “a moral 
vision or ideology which suggests that the world should be different from the way it 
is” (Jasper 2011, 291). As in the case of personifying protest, their commitment 
goes back to a weak social tie with the beneficiary. Yet, it generally exists because 
of the nexus of the protester’s activist interests (for migration issues) with the status 
of the beneficiary (being a migrant). In other words, they know each other because 
one is a migrant and the other a pro-migrant activist whose commitment is not 
defined by the beneficiary’s personal situation but by the migrants cause as a whole. 
As one protester says:
Oh, you know, there are many groups working on the issue of the right of asylum in [name 
of the canton] […] and these groups are coordinated to organize this church occupation. 
Actually this occupation was born of necessity, that is to say, a number of people were 
threatened with deportation to Italy without their case for asylum being processed, and they 
did not want to go back so there was a kind of pressure that was exerted for us to find a 
solution. (Personal interview, protester CH3_3, Switzerland, July 7, 2015; translation from 
French by the authors)
Accordingly, the hard core of exemplifying protests is mainly or exclusively 
composed of left-winged persons often engaged in other militant activities for the 
defense of migrant interests or other issues traditionally taken up by leftist actors. 
The hard core thus appears to be more homogeneous with regard to the opinions 
held by their members.
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7.4.4  Network: The Power of Democratic Legitimacy
The hard core of support can be seen as the base from which the protest message 
and claim will spread. Therefore, its members start to activate weak ties among their 
respective social circles which they consider potentially sensitive to the cause and 
helpful for the achievement of the protest goals. Indeed, Rosenberger and Winkler 
(2014, 167) state that “pre-existing social ties and informal networks among poten-
tial protesters function as mobilizing structures”. Thus weak ties allow for the acti-
vation of other social circles that one does not belong to (Granovetter 1983) – and 
the bridging function of the corresponding type of social capital (Putnam 2001). 
The network is coordinated by the hard core. In contrast to the latter, the network is 
a group of protesters who do not participate in actions on a regular basis. Their par-
ticipation is intermittent and moderate in comparison to the hard core’s, which is 
intense, unconditional and emotional. The network provides either additional or 
complementary tools to the central body (the hard core). As one of the hard core 
members explains:
At the time I was 26, so I wasn’t really aware of which doors to knock at. Moreover, we 
didn’t know all the ropes. At least myself. That is why we needed help and people who 
knew more in order to go forward. (Personal interview, protester CH1_2, Switzerland, 
September 3, 2015; translation from French by the authors)
The instrumental use of the network must be understood in terms of both quality 
and quantity. In quality, the network serves to provide useful contacts. These con-
tacts are mobilized because of either their previous protest history (in social or 
political fields), their powerful positions (e.g., with influence on the decisional 
level), their professional skills (e.g., legal, communicative, artistic), or their ability 
to increase media coverage. In quantity, the network is composed of sympathizers 
who support the protest, by signing a petition or attending demonstrations, for 
instance. Winning the sympathy of the general public is of foremost importance. 
The volume of participation of the network provides “political weight” to the pro-
testers’ claims (Giugni 1995, 290). Indeed, it allows the protest to shift from a group 
of discontented individuals to the expression of the general will in the sense of 
Rousseau. As Passy and Giugni (2001, 94) put it, networks “provide a concrete 
opportunity to translate individuals’ willingness to act into actual action”. Thereby, 
the support of a significant number of sympathizers to the cause reinforces a form 
of democratic legitimacy that emphasizes the principle of “democracy by, of, and 
for the people” (Schmidt 2004, 982).
7.4.5  Strategies: The Role of the Beneficiary
As mentioned above, our research object is anti-deportation protests whose trigger 
component is the defense of one or several specific deportees. As such, personifying 
and exemplifying protests are both case-specific. Yet, the differences among the two 
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ideal-types become particularly salient when considering the diverging argumenta-
tive strategies (i.e., claims and frames5) and action repertoires used for the protest. 
Ruedin et  al. (2018) distinguish case-specific from change-oriented claims. 
However, as our case studies show, this binary classification – necessary for a quan-
titative analysis of protest events – fails to identify hybrid combinations. Indeed, our 
qualitative examination of the protests suggests that these two features are not 
exclusive, but can be cumulative. In fact, while personifying protests are pure exam-
ples of case-specific protest (only person-centered claims), exemplifying protests 
appears to be case-specific protest bearing change-oriented claims.
7.4.6  Personifying Protests and Person-Centered Claims
Personifying protests carry person-centered claims, exclusively focalized on the 
beneficiary’s case. In personifying protests, protesters require a right to stay for a 
beneficiary (sometimes with a family) insisting on the singularity of their situation 
and the uniqueness of their qualities and skills. The beneficiary is presented as 
exceptional, that is, different from most of the undocumented migrants, above all by 
virtue of their high degree of integration into the host society and the fact that they 
have already proven themselves to be honest, morally upright and all in all not a 
burden but a gain for the host society. When conservative right-wing actors defend 
particular cases, they sometimes describe the beneficiary as “one of the rare well- 
integrated immigrants”, thus pointing out “the absurdness of the decision to deport 
that singular positive example”. This kind of position can for instance be found in 
CH5, where a supporter from the hard core explains his taking sides with the benefi-
ciary as follows:
I am no way thinking that we should keep all of them here, so fundamentally the migration, 
it is so extremely difficult at the moment in Europe, but for sure, we cannot solve the prob-
lems of Ethiopia or wherever by saying that all those that manage to come here can stay, 
right? This is completely absurd. And leads to a huge business for those who bring them 
here, and we will assume the enormous costs for these people that will not be able to inte-
grate here, right? So indeed, there are enough people that do not integrate, right? That we 
could send back. But as we often see, it is easier to deport the well-integrated ones. […] It 
is very difficult to deport criminals; then Amnesty International will come running. 
Meanwhile well-integrated families, they will finally just board the airplane or the train or 
the bus and be gone, right? (Personal interview, protester CH5_1, Switzerland, September 
10, 2015; translation from German by the authors)
Against this background, claims centered on the individual case are generally 
justified by the beneficiary’s characteristics and particularities, to begin with the fact 
that they are part of the personal environment of some members of the hard core 
with whom they share mutual sympathy. As expressed by the following protester:
5 Although protesters of one ideal-type may individually use frames attributed to the other ideal-
type, we here present the frames that were mobilized collectively for each model of protest.
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But yeah, they had a face, stories people know, classmates had spent hours with them. This 
of course is very different from 150 undocumented migrants who occupy a church and say, 
they want to stay. You cannot compare that. (Personal interview, protester CH5_5, 
Switzerland, October 1, 2015; translation from German by the authors)
From this personal tie, protesters derive arguments about the particularity of the 
beneficiary’s situation and mobilize the integration-deservingness frame. This 
frame emphasizes the beneficiary’s “good integration”, an assessment relying on 
the official criteria of the Swiss administration, including privileged contact to 
Swiss citizens, lawful behavior and financial independence (Wichmann et al. 2011). 
Consequently, the beneficiary appears as deserving; the protesters’ claim for the 
beneficiary’s right to stay is directly deduced from their achievements in terms of 
integration and their subsequent “civic membership” (Ellermann 2014). This 
integration- deservingness frame is embedded in a general agreement with the Swiss 
immigration policies and a fundamental acceptance of the state authority. The ques-
tioning and challenging of a single administrative decision expresses a critique con-
cerning the application of the law in this particular case and not of the law as such. 
As declared by an interviewee:
Well, it was quite clear: we do not have to fight against the state, we just have to manage 
that they can stay. This is another content in a way. So, we accepted the state as being the 
state, we accepted that there are rules, but we just made sure that they respect these rules, 
that they find the gaps. […] Because there are gaps in this legislation that exist intentionally, 
so that exceptions are possible. (Personal interview, protester CH5_6, Switzerland, October 
27, 2015; translation from German by the authors)
The integration-deservingness frame is sometimes accompanied by an instru-
mental frame which highlights the benefits that the beneficiary’s presence implies 
for the host society. This latter frame resulting from “value-oriented assessments of 
ends” (Habermas and Cronin 1993, 8) mainly applies to highly skilled individuals 
presenting an interest for the Swiss economy. As stated by the employer of one 
beneficiary and the initiator of the protest:
Well, the fact that he speaks French, that he is fairly well integrated, it is clear that helped 
indirectly or directly. Nobody ever confirmed that to us but I nevertheless think that it is 
always a matter of integration. So we played on that: integration, his diligence at work, his 
competences. Because he arrived, we trained him in the field and he learned by doing but 
now he knows everything. And he is committed to us. He has always been assiduous, always 
devoted, always… You cannot reproach him for anything. (Personal interview, protester 
CH1_1, Switzerland, September 3, 2015; translation from French by the authors)
As mentioned, the integration-deservingness and instrumental frames are the 
ones taken up by the Swiss administration, since they are in line with the official 
criteria regarding naturalization and migration policy. Moderate forms of action 
such as petitions, banners, motions used in personifying protests are the most popu-
lar in Switzerland (Bader 2018). In other words, personifying protests challenge the 
authorities’ decision regarding the beneficiary with direct-democratic and well- 
tolerated means.
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7.4.7  Exemplifying Protests and Change-Oriented Claims
At the opposite of personifying protest, exemplifying protests carry change-oriented 
claims. Here, claims go beyond the particular case and challenge national or inter-
national policies and legislation. This type of protest is what Passy (2001) defines as 
“political altruism”. Even though protest refers to a specific impending deportation, 
the protesters want more than its non-execution – they want political reform, that is, 
changing the laws determining the admission of immigrants, modifying or abolish-
ing the practice of deportation and the associated coercive measures such as custody 
pending deportation. Accordingly, our analysis shows that they mobilize the ‘human 
rights’ frame that require the respect of fundamental rights of migrants, and the 
‘asylum’ frame that appeals to a more inclusive and protective asylum law. As 
Rosenberger and Winkler note “arguments stressing rights and principles, such as a 
child’s well-being, protection of privacy and family life, or protection against tor-
ture, are almost always made by NGOs and political actors.” (Rosenberger and 
Winkler 2014, 174) Indeed, some protesters express their ideological beliefs through 
additional frames such as ‘no border’ and ‘freedom of movement’ that demand the 
cancellation of borders and nation states limiting the free movement of human 
beings.
Since exemplifying protests ask for policy change, any person threatened with 
deportation in application of a legislation the protesters perceive as unfair or violat-
ing the migrants’ fundamental rights can serve as an illustration of their critique. As 
declared by an interviewed NGO member:
We do not only defend the six persons who are here because we have claims that are more 
collective, like for example we ask the cantonal government to stop all deportations to Italy, 
and furthermore that it ceases the automatism of all Dublin deportation to other states. Now 
it is clear that already on one hand we do not know all rejected persons in the canton, the 
militant networks do not allow us to have that many contacts. There are persons who are 
very isolated, there are persons who hide away, there are persons who don’t have any con-
tact with organizations nor with the local population. (Personal interview, protester CH3_2, 
Switzerland, June 30, 2015; translation from French by the authors)
In this statement, the beneficiary appears as one of many and is used to exem-
plify, and give more power to the criticism of the rules in force. Exposing the per-
sonal life story of the beneficiary serves to prove what protesters consider as the 
“devastating effects” of enforced immigration law on migrants’ lives. According to 
the protesters, the strong focalization on the beneficiary’s situation is a means to 
point at the fundamental problem they have become a victim of. As expressed in the 
following interview, this case is an example for a broader political statement:
His deportation was unjust with regard to the right of asylum. It was an exemplary case of 
a misapplication of asylum law at a moment where this law got more and more restrictive 
with the lex Blocher6. [Name of the beneficiary] was a person who had to be protected. He 
also became a friend of mine but my commitment was above all motivated by the injustice 
6 Revision of Asylum Act in 2006 promoted by the far-right politician Christoph Blocher (Swiss 
People’s Party), then head of the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police.
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of this deportation decision. […] For me, [name of the beneficiary] incarnated a jeopardized 
ideal of humanism. (Personal interview, protester CH4_5, Switzerland, August 7, 2015; 
translation from French by the authors)
In other words, bringing to light a particular case aims at drawing attention to the 
numerous persons in similar situations, suffering from restrictive immigration poli-
cies. In contrast to personifying protests, exemplifying protests underline the simi-
larities rather than the differences between the beneficiary and the many other cases. 
Accordingly, the beneficiary appears as interchangeable. This is well illustrated by 
the protest practices observed in CH3 (see Table 7.1), where the beneficiaries, a 
group of asylum seekers in a Dublin procedure sheltered in an occupied church, 
changed over time. Once they obtained the right to file for asylum in Switzerland, 
they were replaced by other deportable asylum seekers. Nevertheless, protesters 
using such an exemplification strategy are sometimes criticized by fellow left- 
winged activists for a disproportional engagement in favor of one case that could 
appear as unjust given the great number of persons not given the same attention – a 
reproach to which this interviewee replied in the following way:
After people would say: ‘You do that for him, you spend so much energy for him, but you 
don’t do that for all the others!’ We responded: ‘Do something yourself!’ Everybody 
defends one, one by one! We are not going to do anything for one because we cannot do it 
for all, what kind of logic is that? There are always people that say: ‘But there are so many 
others as much in crap as he is but about whom nobody speaks!’, then you say: ‘well yes, 
but at least this one, well we talk about him’, and then we have anyway tried to put some 
light on the fact that there are others! (Personal interview, protester CH4_1, Switzerland, 
August 18, 2015; translation from French by the authors)
Indeed, according to the protesters using the exemplification strategy, the “mass” 
of undocumented migrants similarly affected by the policies that the protesters chal-
lenge indirectly benefits from the protest actions, gaining increased public attention 
for their situation and encouraging policy reform.
In contrast to personifying protests, exemplifying protests use action repertoires 
that can be “provocative”, such as demonstrations, human chains, or sometimes 
even “illegal”, like church occupations and hiding the beneficiary. Although they 
also use moderate forms such as petitions, the protesters interviewed expressed the 
need “to be heard” with powerful actions widely visible in the public space and 
which raise media attention (Kriesi and Wisler 1996, 29).
7.5  Discussion and Conclusion
The starting point of our research was the question respectively of how and why 
Swiss citizens stand together to protest against the deportation of one or several 
specific undocumented migrants. For this purpose, we have conducted five case 
studies of case-specific protests in Switzerland in which the beneficiary was clearly 
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identified by the protesters. We analyzed the cases along, on the one hand, the pro-
file of the protesters (i.e., protest experience, political orientation, and social ties 
with the beneficiary and among the protesters); on the other hand, we examined the 
strategies of the protests (i.e., claims, frames, and action repertoires).
From our empirical material we established a classification of the five case stud-
ies in two types of case-specific protests presented as two conceptual models in this 
chapter. Although both ideal-types share a common protest actor structure, they dif-
fer when considering the features of the actors involved and the argumentative strat-
egies used (see Table 7.3). Personifying protests involve Swiss citizens with various 
political orientations exclusively trying to prevent the deportation of a specific per-
son or family seen as “deserving” to stay. The beneficiary is perceived as exception-
ally well-integrated and fitting into the Swiss society. Protesters often hold diverging 
political views reaching from leftist to rather conservative or even far- right posi-
tions. They stand together precisely because the protest does not carry an ideological 
claim, that is, does not request social change. Touched by the beneficiary’s personal 
life story, the protesters hold the consensual view that they deserve to stay. Thus, 
personifying protests do not criticize the law but rather its reading, namely its appli-
cation in a specific case. Protesters are not against deportation in general but rather 
sporadically refuse deportations concerning migrants who have stayed in Switzerland 
for years and have proven themselves to be law-abiding and able to integrate. 
Consequently, the beneficiary of personifying protests is necessarily a migrant that 
has been living in Switzerland for quite a period of time, allowing them to integrate 
and to enrich their social capital with members of the established society.
Conversely, exemplifying protests are implemented by groups of left-oriented 
activists using the case(s) of one or several migrants as examples illustrating the 
outcomes of a policy they perceive as unfair and the reform of which they defend. 
The protesters usually adhere to politically left positions. Their activist engagement 
for migrants’ rights and a more liberal migration policy is prior to their mobilization 
for the particular case we observed and will most likely last beyond it. They see 
themselves as spokespersons not only of the beneficiary of the protest but also of all 
Table 7.3 Features of the two ideal-types of case-specific protests
Personifying protests Exemplifying protests
Origin of the ties with 
initiator
Personal environment NGOs, support organizations
Political orientation Diverse Left




Asylum; human rights; freedom of 
movement; No border
Action repertoires Moderate Moderate, provocative, illegal
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migrants affected by restrictive immigration policies whose precarious situation 
remains unnoticed. The beneficiary thus becomes the face of their claims and politi-
cal critique. In other words, the particular case serves to transmit the protest  message 
to a large public, assuming that civil society may better understand it when illus-
trated by a concrete situation.
Our typology shows two different ways of defending deportable migrants. All 
protests can be understood as social conflicts ignited by the fundamental question of 
who belongs to and is allowed to live in Swiss society. Yet, personifying and exem-
plifying protests answer that question differently; the borders of their respective 
“imagined community” (Anderson 2006) are not drawn in the same way. On the one 
hand, personifying protests mobilize a collective representation of both the nation- 
state and national citizenship. In this narrative, the beneficiary is presented as “one 
of us”. The focus on their “good integration” and their often long stay in Switzerland, 
allows a rhetoric that obscures the beneficiary’s origins and underlines their per-
sonal virtues perceived as in line with values the protesters associate with Swiss 
society. Accordingly, the beneficiary is presented as a ‘national’ citizen in the being 
(essence), as distinct from their condition (legal status). This rhetoric allows the 
support of right and far-right politicians for whom the beneficiary’s stay in 
Switzerland is in line with their philosophy of deservingness regarding migration 
issues. As Ellermann (2009, 126) puts it:
Advocates will be careful to select cases in which “deservingness” is beyond dispute, while 
staying well clear of individuals whose personal history may tarnish their reputations – such 
as immigrants with criminal records or similar social stigmas.
Our findings suggest that Ellermann’s general statement of case mobilizations is 
particularly evident for personifying protests; such precautions of knowing with 
whom one is dealing before engaging in protests for the sake of a beneficiary is not 
applicable to exemplifying protests. This being said, personifying protests mirror 
above all the mobilizing power of social ties generating empathy, insights and com-
prehension with regard to socio-political processes that would otherwise have 
stayed abstract and remote for the citizens involved. In fact, personifying protests 
appear to be a salient illustration of the unease that may arise when general rules 
affect people’s immediate social surroundings. With regard to the deportation issue, 
Gibney and Hansen observe contradictory opinions and values in civil society “we 
support immigration control, but we don’t like deporting migrants. More broadly, 
people have nothing good to say about immigration, but much good to say about 
actual immigrants.” (Gibney and Hansen 2003, 12).
On the other hand, exemplifying protests seem to support the ideology of cosmo-
politanism (Appiah 2006), that is, the conception of a global citizenship based on 
the shared status of being human beings and the rejection of national communitari-
anism. Accordingly, the beneficiary is presented as one of them, a non-national citi-
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zen who is victim of nationalistic migration policy. Therefore, protesters consider 
the beneficiary’s need of protection on the basis of their condition (legal status), 
without considering their being (whether they conform to an essentialist definition 
of national citizenship or not). As stated by Passy and Giugni (2005, 899):
In France and Switzerland, collective access to the nation is based on a monistic imagina-
tion, which rejects any cultural particularism and hardly allows the expression of competing 
identities. This constraint will have a strong impact on the expression of protest, which will 
focus on a universalistic repertoire of the defense of migrants.
Consequently, the ideological scope of the protest explains the homogeneity in 
the political orientation of the protesters. It now becomes clear that exemplifying 
protests reveal forces in civil society that challenge immigration policies along cases 
functioning as examples of its enforcement, thus questioning the fundamental politi-
cal orientation of a society and, to a certain degree, aiming at social change. They are 
often embedded in broader militant activities contesting Swiss and/or European 
migration policies. Considering these characteristics, exemplifying protests appear 
to be closer than personifying ones to what different authors refer to as “social 
movements” (Rucht 2002). Yet, when considering the current trends described by 
Rucht (2002) and Ion (2011) with regard to social investment, we notice that per-
sonifying protests show more similarities with its contemporary forms. As Ion 
states: “The increase in pragmatic engagements of limited duration searching for 
tangible results expresses itself throughout the multiplication of initiatives trying to 
directly help one’s nearest without waiting for political change.” (Ibid., 45; transla-
tion by the authors). According to Rucht (2002, 6), the steady interference in politics 
is the central function of modern social movements. We finally have to acknowledge 
that, beyond the differences between the two ideal- types of case-specific protests, 
both appear to be a contribution to the debate on fundamental social questions: How 
should the society deal with migration? Who is entitled to live in Switzerland and for 
which reasons? Thus, in moving away from their “success” with regard to the 
enforcement of the contested deportation decision, they nevertheless manage to fuel 
the debate on these questions and keep dialogue and the democratic process between 
the civil society and the decision makers alive.
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 Appendix 1: Interviews
Abbrev. Interviewee(s) Date
CH1_1 Protester hard core, artisan and employer 09/03/2015
CH1_2 Protester hard core, and artisan 09/03/2015
CH2_1 Beneficiary 06/21/2015
CH2_3 Protester hard core and retired from the Swiss army 07/13/2015
CH3_2 Protester network and NGO member 06/30/2015
CH3_3 Protester hard core, lawyer and leftist deputy 07/07/2015
CH4_1 Protester hard core, NGO member and legal advisor 08/18/2015
CH4_5 Protester hard core, artist 08/07/2015
CH5_1 Protester hard core, father of classmate and director of a company 09/10/2015
CH5_5 Protester network, politician and policeman 10/01/2015
CH5_6 Protester hard core and school director 10/27/2015
References
Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 
London/New York: Verso Books.
Antony, E. (2010). La mobilisation des sans-papiers: une revendication de l’invisible? Genève: 
Université de Genève.
Appiah, K. A. (2006). Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers. New York: Penguin Books.
Ataç, I., Rygiel, K., & Stierl, M. (2016). Introduction: The contentious politics of refugee and 
migrant protest and solidarity movements: Remaking citizenship from the margins. Citizenship 
Studies, 20(5), 527–544.
Bader, D. (2018). Who ought to stay? Asylum policy and protest culture in Switzerland. In 
S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest movements in asylum and deportation 
(pp. 69–86). New York: Springer.
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639.
Chimenti, M. (2011). Mobilization of irregular migrants in Europe: A comparative analysis. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 34(8), 1338–1356.
Eggert, N., & Murigande, A. (2004). Modèles de citoyenneté et mobilisation politique des migrants 
en Suisse: Le rôle des cantons. Swiss Political Science Review, 10(4), 125–145.
Ellermann, A. (2009). States against migrants: Deportation in Germany and the United States. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ellermann, A. (2014). The rule of law and the right to stay: The moral claims of undocumented 
migrants. Politics & Society, 42(3), 293–308.
Gibney, M.J., & Hansen, R. (2003). Deportation and the liberal state: The forcible return of asy-
lum seekers and unlawful migrants in Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom. UNHCR 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, working paper no. 77.
Giugni, M. (1995). Entre stratégie et opportunité: les nouveaux mouvements sociaux en Suisse. 
Zürich: Seismo.
D. Bader and J. Probst
159
Giugni, M. (2004). Social protest and policy change: Ecology, antinuclear, and peace movements 
in comparative perspective. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. New  York/
Evanston: Harper and Row.
Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (2004). Emotional dimensions of social movements. In 
D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to social movements 
(pp. 413–432). London: Blackwell Publishing.
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 
1360–1380.
Granovetter, M. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. Sociological 
Theory, 1, 201–233.
Habermas, J., & Cronin, C. (1993). Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ion, J.  (2011). Bénévolat, assistance2026 Pourquoi s’engage-t-on? Sciences Humaines, 223, 
44–46.
Jasper, J. M. (2011). Emotions and social movements: Twenty years of theory and research. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 37(1), 285–303.
Kriesi, H., & Wisler, D. (1996). Social movements and direct democracy in Switzerland. European 
Journal of Political Research, 30(1), 19–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.
tb00666.x.
Laubenthal, B. (2006). Der Kampf um Legalisierung. Soziale Bewegungen illegaler Migranten in 
Frankreich Spanien und der Schweiz. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Forschung.
McAdam, D., & Snow, D. A. (2010). Readings on social movements: Origins, dynamics and out-
comes. New York: Oxford University Press.
Neidhardt, F., & Rucht, D. (1993). Auf dem Weg in die „Bewegungsgesellschaft“? Über die 
Stabilisierbarkeit sozialer Bewegungen. Soziale Welt, 44(3), 305–326.
Passy, F. (2001). Political altruism and the solidarity movement. An introduction. In M. Giugni 
& F.  Passy (Eds.), Political altruism? Solidarity movements in international perspective 
(pp. 3–25). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Passy, F., & Giugni, M. (2001). Different issues, same process: Solidarity and ecology movements 
in Switzerland. In M. Giugni & F. Passy (Eds.), Political altruism? Solidarity movements in 
international perspective (pp. 87–109). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Passy, F., & Giugni, M. (2005). Récits, imaginaires collectifs et formes d’action protestataire. Une 
approche constructiviste de la contestation antiraciste. Revue française de science politique, 
55(2005), 889–918. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfsp.555.0889.
Putnam, R. (2001). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: 
Simon and Schuster.
Rosenberger, S., & Winkler, J. (2014). Com/passionate protests: Fighting the deportation of asy-
lum seekers. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 19(2), 165–184.
Rucht, D. (2002). Anstösse für den Wandel  – Soziale Bewegungen im 21. Jahrhundert. 
Gründungsversammlung für “Die Bewegungsstiftung – Anstösse für soziale Bewegungen”.
Ruedin, D., Rosenberger, S., & Merhaut, N. (2018). Protests revisited: Political configurations, 
political culture and protest impact. In S. Rosenberger, V. Stern, & N. Merhaut (Eds.), Protest 
movements in asylum and deportation (pp. 273–291). New York: Springer.
Schmidt, V. A. (2004). The European Union: Democratic legitimacy in a regional state? JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(5), 975–997.
Schwenken, H. (2006). Rechtlos, aber nicht ohne Stimme Politische Mobilisierungen um irreg-
uläre Migration in die Europäische Union. Bielefeld: Transkript Verlag.
Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment pro-
cesses, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 51(4), 
464–481.
7 Saving the Deportee: Actors and Strategies of Anti-deportation Protests in Switzerland
160
Svendsen, G. L. H., & Patulny, R. (2007). Exploring the social capital grid. International Journal 
of Sociology and Social Policy, 27(1/2), 32–51.
Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective action and politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wichmann, N., Hermann, M., D‘Amato, G., Efionayi-Mäder, D., Fibbi, R., Menet, J., et al. (Eds.). 
(2011). Les marges de manoeuvre au sein du fédéralisme: la politique de migration dans les 
cantons (Documentation sur la politique de migration). Berne-Wabern: Commission fédérale 
pour les questions de migration.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
D. Bader and J. Probst
Part IV
Refugee Activism for Inclusion
163© The Author(s) 2018 
S. Rosenberger et al. (eds.), Protest Movements in Asylum and Deportation, 
IMISCOE Research Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74696-8_8
Chapter 8
“We Belong Together!” Collective  
Anti- deportation Protests in Osnabrück
Sophie Hinger, Maren Kirchhoff, and Ricarda Wiese
8.1  Introduction: Deportability and Anti-deportation 
Protests
Deportation […] continues, through its routinized practice, to obscure the historically par-
ticular and administrative processes by which deportability is produced and imposed. 
(Peutz and De Genova 2010, 6)
In recent years, there has been an increasing academic engagement with deporta-
tions (see Rosenberger 2018). One important theoretical contribution to these 
debates has been the concept of “deportability” (De Genova 2002; Paoletti 2010), 
which refers to the omnipresent possibility of being deported. As De Genova (2002) 
and Hasselberg (2016) have argued, migrants’ deportability is “embedded in their 
daily lives, social relations and sense of the self” (ibid., 96). Studies on protests 
against deportation have tended to focus on protests by citizens against the deporta-
tion of individuals (e.g. Rosenberger and Winkler 2014) or on those that are part of 
broader refugee protests (e.g. Ataç 2016). These studies discuss such protests in the 
context of contestations over belonging (Anderson et al. 2011), or as forms of activ-
ist (Nyers 2003; Isin 2008) and radical egalitarian citizenship (Schwiertz 2016). 
Few of these works, however, have explicitly applied the analytical concept of 
deportability to anti-deportation protests. The exceptions being for example, 
McGregor (2011) who has analyzed the consequences of deportability for political 
agency, arguing that detained and designated deportees, lacking other possibilities 
for political action, tend to use radical forms of protests such as hunger strikes. And 
Schwiertz (2016), who notes that the undocumented youth movement in the US 
does not only challenge concrete deportations, but “directly protests subordination 
and the fear of the permanent threat of deportation” (ibid., 616).
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We argue that taking the analytical insights of deportability into consideration 
when analyzing anti-deportation protests may be revealing. This is because such an 
approach can shed light on dimensions of the protests that might be overlooked if 
we only focus on the efforts to prevent the act of removal. The framework of deport-
ability may therefore provide a broader understanding of the struggles that anti-
deportation protests encapsulate and their possible consequences.
We will lay out this argument by discussing the anti-deportation protests in 
Osnabrück, a mid-sized city in the German state of Lower Saxony. Between March 
2014 and July 2015 the Osnabrück Alliance against Deportations (henceforth 
referred to as the Alliance) prevented 36 Dublin deportations through collective 
actions held in front of accommodation centers for asylum-seeking persons. As we 
will show, the practices connected to these protests were not restricted to the moment 
of deportation, but confronted deportability more broadly. We therefore believe that 
this case study can contribute to the ongoing debate on deportability and anti- 
deportation protests.
One of the reasons why we chose this case for a closer investigation was the 
composition of its participants. The Alliance brought together a wide range of actors 
with different legal and social statuses. To define our terms, we understand these 
protests as collective actions1 in the sense of “contentious politics” (Ataç et  al. 
2016). Originally coined by McAdam et al. (2001) in a different way, contentious 
politics has been defined by Leitner et  al. (2008, 157) as “concerted, counter- 
hegemonic social and political action, in which differently positioned participants 
come together to challenge dominant systems of authority, in order to promote and 
enact alternative imaginaries”. We were particularly interested in the role that col-
lectivity played in the struggles of the Alliance.
What also makes the case of Osnabrück interesting is that; unlike in other depor-
tation protests, the main aim was not to prevent the deportation of one or several 
well-known and particularly “deserving” persons. Instead, in this case, some of the 
beneficiaries of the deportation preventions were not known among the protest 
participants.
To explore how the collective anti-deportation protests in Osnabrück effect and 
were affected by deportability, we consider three dimensions that are crucial for the 
understanding of deportability: isolation, in/visibility and uncertainty. Peutz and De 
Genova (2010, 23) have pointed out that deportation “tends to operate as a radically 
individualizing and thus also […] isolating event.” Unlike citizens, people in a state 
of deportability suffer from what Arendt has described as public invisibility, that is, 
they are denied access to the “space of appearances” (Arendt 1958, 198–199) where 
individuals speak and are also seen and heard (Borren 2008). At the same time, 
bereft of their legal personality, people threatened by deportation become privately 
visible (ibid.). Lacking the social and legal security of citizenship, they can be 
1 Despite a slightly different use, this conforms to Ataç’s (2016) definition of collective action. 
With reference to Isin (2008) and Nyers (2010), Ataç defines collective actions as “performative 
acts and as moments of rupture that challenge power relations and open up new political possibili-
ties” (Ataç 2016, 632).
S. Hinger et al.
165
apprehended by the police at any time. This insecurity, or private visibility, is closely 
tied to potentially the most critical characteristic of deportability: The uncertainty 
over whether the affected persons will be able to stay (De Genova 2002, 427, 
Hasselberg 2016, 96–97).
How people are legally categorized is at the heart of struggles against deporta-
tions. Thus, for scholars who (co-)produce categorizations, there is a need to be 
highly sensitive to the terms employed. We refer to all persons who actively contrib-
ute to the prevention of deportations either as members of the Alliance or activists, 
instead of distinguishing between “asylum seekers” and “citizens” or “refugees”2 
and “supporters”. Our choice is also connected to the above-mentioned conceptual-
ization of the anti-deportation protests in Osnabrück as collective protests. However, 
given that the social position assigned by legal status decisively influences the scope 
of possible action, we distinguish between activists with and activists without secure 
residence status. In the case of designated deportees we recognize their particular 
and precarious legal position. However, mostly we refer to the protesters as the 
Alliance. We chose this general terminology despite these differences between par-
ticipating groups and individuals (Stockmann 2015; Doppler 2015), because we are, 
above all, interested in the collective acts of the people involved. Where necessary, 
we give more detailed information and differentiate e.g. between activists with a 
background in a local anti-racist initiative and members of a neighborhood welcome 
initiative.
The chapter is divided into seven sections: Following this introduction and a 
short overview of the data and methodology we will briefly present the Alliance 
against Deportations in Osnabrück. Subsequently, we will focus on the aforemen-
tioned aspects of deportability – isolation, in/visibility, and uncertainty – in the con-
text of the collective struggles of the Alliance. We conclude by summarizing how 
these aspects are negotiated and the consequences of this, before finally discussing 
the benefits of a broader deportability perspective.
8.2  Data and Methods
This article is based on qualitative fieldwork. We draw on 11 interviews3 that we 
conducted in person with protest participants in the summer of 2015 (for a complete 
list of interviews see Appendix below). The semi-structured interviews were partly 
based on interview guidelines developed in the context of the project Taking Sides: 
2 The term “refugee” is frequently used as a self-identification of persons seeking asylum, whereas 
the term “supporters” commonly denotes activists with a secure residence status supporting those 
without such status (Tsianos and Kasparek 2013; Ataç 2016). The people we interviewed often 
used these terms.
3 All interviews were conducted in German except for the interviews D5_9 + 10 and D5_11 + 12, 
in which Urdu, English, and Somali were spoken as well as German. In the following citations all 
translations into English are by the authors.
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Protests against Deportations in Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The questions 
were adapted for each interview, depending on the interviewee’s legal position and 
role in the protests. The interview D5_11 + 12 with two interviewees was made 
available to us by the theatre group Bühne für Menschenrechte who conducted it for 
the documentary theatre play Asyldialoge. Even though this interview was not based 
on the same interview guidelines, it covered relevant topics, and thus could be used 
to complement our data set alongside local newspaper reports and official 
documents.
Based on our engagement with the material  – especially the interview tran-
scripts–and theoretical discussion on deportability and anti-deportation protests, we 
developed five codes (in/visibility, framing, voice, political subjectivities and social 
ties) that helped to structure the analysis. In our analysis we also drew on our per-
sonal experience as participants in several of the protest events and group meetings. 
Through this participation we have been able to follow the developments of the 
protests since March 2014. Accompanying the Alliance over this extended period 
gave us access to background and insider information, which proved vital in the 
analysis and interpretation of the interviews.
8.3  The Alliance Against Deportations in Osnabrück
The protests against deportations in Osnabrück began when residents of a recently- 
opened municipal accommodation center received letters announcing their deporta-
tions to Italy (and other first-entry countries according to the Dublin III regulation) 
and showed them to other people they knew in the city (see Fig. 8.1). These contacts 
had mainly developed through the activities of two groups: The antiracist initiative 
No Lager Osnabrück (henceforth referred to as No Lager) and the neighborhood 
welcome initiative AG Flüchtlingshilfe.4 Following the assumption that the newly 
arrived asylum seekers would be allowed to stay, many of the supporting activities 
(such as German classes) provided by members of the AG Flüchtlingshilfe were 
aimed at facilitating “a good start to life in Osnabrück” (Interview D5_13). Yet, the 
deportation letters confronted those involved in these groups with a different reality. 
Nina,5 who intended to give German classes, remembered:
Until then I had always thought that people flee to Germany and ask for asylum, and then it 
takes two months and the people know that they can stay. [T]hen I heard about a Dublin 
regulation for the first time, and that [for] so many people, once they have come through 
[…] the Mediterranean Sea […], the actual forced migration begins from one European 
country to another. (Interview D5_6)
Learning about the Dublin regulation caused a “moral shock” for Nina. According 
to Jasper (1997) “‘moral shocks’ are often the first step toward recruitment into 
4 The informal working group AG Flüchtlingshilfe became the association Flüchtlingshilfe 
Rosenplatz e.V. in February 2016.
5 For anonymity, pseudonyms have been used for all interviewees.
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Fig. 8.1 Timeline of the anti-deportation protests in Osnabrück
Own illustration. In addition to the disruption of deportations three general demonstrations against 
deportations were organized in the spring of 2014. In two cases deportations were prevented in 
Osnabrück without the help of the Alliance
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social movements: when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a 
sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action.” 
(ibid., 106) After the first spontaneous assembly6 (which included about 40 partici-
pants) at the scene of an announced deportation resulted in the police officers and 
representatives of the Immigration Authority (Ausländerbehörde) leaving without 
the designated deportee (see Fig. 8.1), members of No Lager and AG Flüchtlingshilfe 
got together to evaluate the situation. They had the information that around 80 other 
people in the city fell under the Dublin regulation and thus risked deportation. After 
researching the legal framework of Dublin deportations, the activists came up with 
a strategy; their idea was to prevent the removal of the designated deportees until the 
end of the six-month period in which Dublin transfers had to take place. If deporta-
tions took longer than 6 months, the asylum request would eventually be taken over 
by the German authorities (Interviews D5_6, D5_1).
Activists decided to connect via a telephone list (which was later transformed 
into a web-based texting and emailing list) so that they could quickly organize 
assemblies whenever a deportation was supposed to take place. This community 
was later given the name Alliance against Deportations.7 At the time of our inter-
views, more than 300 people had signed up for the list, including antiracist activists, 
church representatives, members of different political parties, students, pensioners, 
and people with and without secure residence status. As Brigitte, a protest partici-
pant with secure residence status described: “These are people from the age of 18 to 
80 […], many groups of society are represented […]. And I think, that’s the strength” 
(Interview D5_2). What united these diverse actors8 was their shared disagreement 
with the practice of deportations. The focus on Dublin deportations was not only a 
strategic choice because of the six-month timeframe described above (see also 
Kirchhoff et al. 2018), but also because it became a common target, uniting protest 
participants in the course of the protests. No Lager activist Bruno remembered that, 
“even […] the Catholic Church [representatives] […] bluntly said: ‘Dublin needs to 
stop!’” (Interview D5_1). There was also a focus on the Dublin deportations in the 
official framing of the protests, as the call for the second demonstration organized 
by the Alliance on April 26, 2014 illustrates:
6 The question, which terms (not) to use – an issue already discussed in the introduction–must also 
be posed with regards to the protest repertoire. Whereas the gatherings in front of the accommoda-
tion centers are frequently called ‘blockades’ by activists, media and others, some of our inter-
viewees insisted that ‘blockade’ was not an adequate way to describe the collective “breakfasts” 
and also made them more vulnerable to attempts at designating their actions illegal (Interview 
D5_1). We have thus chosen the more neutral terms gathering and assembly.
7 This name had already been used by a different union of initiatives in Osnabrück that had been 
active against deportations between 1997 and 2005 (Avanti! 2005).
8 The question, how broad alliances come together is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it 
seems fruitful to explore this question further both to elucidate the dynamics of the Alliance and to 
contribute to social movements literature more broadly. Especially Gould’s work on the emergence 
of alliances across chasms of perceived differences and the role of emotions would provide a good 
starting point for such an undertaking (Gould 2015).
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Here we want to voice our demands to end all deportations according to the EU-DUBLIN 
agreement, both in Osnabrück and in the whole of Germany. (No Lager Osnabrück 2014a, 
original in English)
The political demands to end Dublin deportations were supported by humanitar-
ian arguments against the severe conditions in countries of first residence, which 
included homelessness and detention (see Bündnis gegen Abschiebungen 2014). 
The Alliance also emphasized the peaceful nature of the protests (ibid.). That the 
actions remained non-violent were not only important to a majority of the partici-
pants (Interviews D5_2, D5_6), but also resonated with the broader conception of 
Osnabrück as the City of Peace.9 Although the Alliance used arguments that focused 
on the bad humanitarian conditions in some Dublin countries as cited above, Paul, 
another activist with secure residence status explained that no distinction was made 
between people facing deportation to a supposedly problematic country like 
Hungary, or to a country like Norway, “about which you only hear good things” 
(Interview D5_3). In discussions over such differentiations, it was agreed within the 
Alliance that what mattered most was where a person wanted to live (ibid.). Nina 
underlined this point stating:
If a person […] says ‘I am supposed to be deported to Italy but I rather want to stay here in 
Osnabrück’, then this is reason enough for me to become active on that person’s behalf. 
(Interview D5_6)
In contrast to what has been described for other cases of anti-deportation protests 
(e.g. Rosenberger and Winkler 2014, 181), the protests did not rely on deserving-
ness frames. This absence can be partly explained by the composition of the benefi-
ciaries of the protests. The designated deportees in the Osnabrück case were not 
individuals or families who had been living in Osnabrück for a long time, most were 
single men and many of the protest participants came to the assemblies without 
knowing them beforehand. Deservingness thus would not have worked as a strate-
gic frame and consequently did not play a role in the protests. The absence of 
deservingness as a frame also resonated with the primary form of protest utilized in 
the struggle: The disruption of deportations. In contrast to, for example, negotia-
tions with politicians, disruption did not require deservingness claims in order to 
positively influence the protest outcome.
None of the 36 assemblies were dissolved by force, irrespective of whether 100 
people or, as in one case, “only very, very few […] maybe 25” (Interview D5_6) had 
followed the protest call via the SMS list. In each case the immigration officers left 
without the designated deportees and physical force was never employed.10 This can 
partially be understood as resulting from the fact that the Alliance was confronted 
9 Osnabrück is commonly referred to as the City of Peace, a name that commemorates the signing 
of the Treaty of Westphalia in the city in 1648.
10 Despite this, several measures were taken by the authorities to discourage the protesters: When 
confronting the gatherings, the immigration officers threatened the protesters several times that 
their action would have negative consequences. Furthermore, No Lager received an e-mail by the 
provincial State Protection Office concerning their involvement with the deportation preventions 
(Interviews D5_1, D5_6; personal communication with the interviewee of D5_6 on 09/24/2016).
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with different (local) state agencies with somewhat diverging interests or instruc-
tions (Stockmann 2015, 42–43): The Federal Ministry for Migration and Refugees 
(BAMF) issues deportation orders to the local Immigration Authority. If conflict 
develops, the Immigration Authority is dependent on the local police to enforce the 
deportation order, who are subordinated to the State Ministry of the Interior. In 
November 2014, the Minister of the Interior of Lower Saxony and former Mayor of 
Osnabrück, Boris Pistorius, said that he saw no reason to change police strategy in 
dealing with the protest actions, nor did he condemn anyone participating in the 
protests (Fisser 2014). In contrast, the local Immigration Authority reacted to the 
protests by exerting more pressure on the designated deportees to cooperate in the 
deportation enforcement, which will be discussed in more detail below. However, 
without police enforcement the immigration officers were not able to challenge the 
protest strategies of the Alliance and carry out the deportation. This points to the 
importance of the specific political context in which the protests took place.
The collective actions against deportations in Osnabrück can only be understood 
within the context of the change of government in Lower Saxony in 2013. The new 
government coalition of the Social Democrats and the Green Party introduced sev-
eral changes concerning the accommodation of asylum seekers and deportation pro-
cedures. The new policies were presented as “more humanitarian” (Lower Saxony 
Ministry of the Interior and Sports 2014), possibly as a reaction to the harsh critique 
against the strict enforcement of deportations promoted by the former conservative 
Minister of the Interior. The new approach entailed the announcement of deporta-
tion dates so that the designated deportees could “prepare themselves” (ibid.). Also 
new was the transfer of asylum seekers, including those affected by the Dublin regu-
lation, from first reception centers (Erstaufnahmeeinrichtung) run by the State to 
municipal accommodation centers, which in the case of Osnabrück are partly 
located in inner-city residential neighborhoods.11 Both the announcement of the 
deportations and the inner-city residency of designated deportees played a decisive 
role in the emergence and development of the anti-deportation protests in Osnabrück. 
However, the political context changed drastically in late 2015 (see also Kirchhoff 
and Lorenz 2018). The “summer of migration” (Kasparek and Sperr 2015, transla-
tion by the authors) was followed by an “autumn of reaction” (Schwiertz and 
Ratfisch 2015, 19, translation by the authors). In September 2015, with only few 
exceptions, the government of Lower Saxony decided to no longer announce depor-
tations. In October 2015, a general prohibition on announcing deportations was 
integrated into the Residence Act (§59 (1) Residence Act of October 24, 2015). 
Since July 13, 2015 no further deportation preventions have taken place. However, 
members of the Alliance have met several times to discuss the changing legal and 
11 In Lower Saxony, before the change of government, state-run reception centers did not only 
serve as a place of “first reception”. It was common practice to keep asylum seekers supposedly 
“without a perspective to stay” in the centers for months in order to hinder their integration into 
local communities and to facilitate their deportation (Pieper 2008, 205–266). The Asylum 
Procedures Acceleration Act (Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz), passed in October 2015, 
generally foresees that persons from so-called safe countries of origin and others without a per-
spective to stay, have to stay in first reception centers until the end of their asylum procedure.
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political context and to think of anti-deportation strategies in the absence of depor-
tation announcements.
In the following section, we analyze the collective protests against deportations 
in Osnabrück between March 2014 and July 2015. By focusing on the three dimen-
sions of deportability – isolation, in/visibility and uncertainty – it becomes apparent 
how the Alliance not only prevented deportations, but confronted deportability more 
broadly.
8.4  Breaking Isolation
[…] in the end we said, the least we can do is to accompany this person to his accommoda-
tion, to stand by him before his deportation […] and to not leave him alone with this […]. 
(Interview D5_1)
This is how No Lager activist and member of the Alliance, Bruno, described the 
decision reached in the No Lager group the night before the first deportation preven-
tion in Osnabrück. Confronted with a scenario they had not experienced before, the 
group members had little time to think about how best to react. They agreed to liter-
ally take sides with the affected person. Thus what was at first a spontaneous reac-
tion would later become a core feature of the deportation preventions of the Alliance. 
Through confronting the officers arriving at an accommodation center to carry out 
a deportation with the presence of a group instead of an isolated individual, the 
Alliance acted against the logic of individualization and isolation inherent in the 
deportation practice (Peutz and De Genova 2010, 23).
As the letters announcing the upcoming deportations in Osnabrück during this 
period show, the practice of deportation was supposed to be a confrontation between 
the designated deportees with the immigration and police officers. Initially, the 
recipients of the deportation letters were asked to await their deportation inside their 
rooms. However, the demands of the letters changed after several deportations had 
been prevented by the Alliance through assemblies in front of bedroom and building 
doors. Isolation, which aimed to simplify face-to-face communication and physical 
contact between the officers and the targeted individual, was then stipulated more 
directly. The recipients of the letters were asked to present themselves in front of the 
accommodation centers and later, following another change in the letters, to also 
“stay away from a demonstration that could possibly take place.” (Interview D5_6). 
Despite this, the protesters continued to prevent the physical isolation of the desig-
nated deportee; now they either stood side-by-side with, or in front of, the desig-
nated deportees outside of the accommodation. Besides being a strategic reaction to 
the authorities’ instructions, this can be understood as an expression of collectivity: 
Protesters and designated deportees formed a group as they were physically and 
symbolically standing together. The centrality of this collective bodily practice in 
the protest of the Alliance underlines the centrality of the bodily dimension of con-
tentious politics that has been observed elsewhere (see Häberlen and Spinney 2014).
Furthermore, our analysis shows that participating in collective action at the 
moment of the attempted deportation, allowed protest participants to question isola-
8 “We Belong Together!” Collective Anti-deportation Protests in Osnabrück
172
tion more broadly. For example, Paul, a member of the No Lager group, expressed 
that for him “one of the most important forms [of protest] is the getting to know 
each other,” the mixing of people with and without secure residence status. He 
explains his argument by pointing to structures that are put into place to prevent 
such contact and experiences of solidarity: Persons whose deportations are pre-
vented by the Alliance have to live in designated accommodation centers for asylum 
seekers, and are neither allowed to work, nor to attend school, university or state- 
sponsored language courses (Interview D5_3). These conditions, linked to the state 
of deportability, are indeed likely to produce isolation from the local community. 
Furthermore, they are experienced as a barrier to political self-organization 
(Schwenken 2006, 144–145). Naife, an activist living in an asylum seeker accom-
modation center, remembers the situation before joining the No Lager group:
We made up our own refugee group in one of the Heime [accommodation centers] to find a 
way to handle the situation. But we did not know anything about the laws of Refugees in 
Lower Saxony and we did not have the resources (money, people, knowledge, etc.) to orga-
nize our own protests. (Cit. in: No Lager Osnabrück 2014b)
However, our interviewees described numerous and diverse practices through 
which structurally conditioned isolation could be disrupted: Visits to the accommo-
dation centers by No Lager activists and members of the neighborhood initiative AG 
Flüchtlingshilfe, political and festive get-togethers in the autonomous social center 
as well as encounters through German classes, bike rental offers and other forms of 
voluntary support. Notably, some of these practices preceded the first deportation 
preventions and had the explicit aim of questioning the social marginalization of 
asylum seekers.
The described encounters challenge deportability not only through acts of sup-
port and collective protest, but also by making the danger of deportation “some-
times simply irrelevant” (Interview D5_3). While the logic inherent to deportability 
tends to make a person’s legal status the all-dominating frame of their daily life and 
social ties, the interviewees described how friendship created spaces and experi-
ences beyond deportability (Doppler 2015, 7–8; see also Mokre 2018). In a group 
interview with her friend Wazir, Linda, an activist with secure residence status 
recalled:
We really became friends between the demonstrations and your [attempted] deportation 
[…] I remember this one night, […] we simply stayed longer after plenum, turned on some 
music, got drunk, and talked so much […] and yes, then we realized that we like each other 
a lot. (Interview D5_11 + 12)
Besides breaking down the isolation in Osnabrück, the social ties formed in the 
context of the collective protests also enabled the members of the Alliance to make 
connections to activists in other cities and to the transnational refugee movement. 
Wazir described how his involvement in the No Lager group encouraged him to 
participate in the Refugee March for Freedom 2014 from Strasbourg to Brussels:
I went with [the other members of the Alliance participating in the March], because I 
thought, the people fight for themselves, the refugees, and why don’t we, too? Most fighting 
takes place in Osnabrück at the moment, and I also belong to this group, and that’s why I 
went with them […] After all, we also belong to them! (Interview D5_11 + 12)
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When Wazir joined the March for Freedom, he had to violate the obligation for 
rejected asylum seekers to stay within a restricted district (Residenzpflicht). His 
participation in the local activist group led him to challenge the state-imposed isola-
tion through connecting with a refugee movement and attending events happening 
outside of Osnabrück.
Against this background, we argue that social ties and friendship, which are a 
precondition for anti-deportation protests (Rosenberger and Winkler 2014) as well 
as an outcome of protest movements (Ataç 2016), should also be understood as 
constituting their own form of protest or resistance. In the case of Osnabrück, the 
activists of the Alliance questioned the isolating logic of deportability in various 
ways–both in the moment of an (attempted) deportation and in the daily lives and 
relations of the people involved.
8.5  Reversing In/Visibility
While “getting to know each other” (Interview D5_3) is indeed vital in the struggle 
against deportations, it does not automatically lead to trust or actions of resistance. 
As Susanne, a member of the AG Flüchtlingshilfe made clear: “[…] many refugees, 
I realized, are rather reserved when it comes to talking about problems […]” 
(Interview D5_13). Instead, trust and ultimately resistance depends on the agency of 
the designated deportees to share their problem with others. It requires hope12 that 
the deportation decision can be revised as well as courage to ask for support. In the 
interview with the close friends Linda and Wazir, Linda made clear that she was 
very surprised when and how Wazir announced his upcoming deportation to the No 
Lager group:
What I found so impressive was that you came to the Plenum and said yourself that you had 
received a deportation date. Before it was mostly the friends of people who were supposed 
to be deported [who came to the plenary and] sometimes the persons were not even there 
themselves. They took a back seat for understandable reasons. But you just came and said: 
Hey guys, it’s my turn. Here is my letter. I want a blockade. (Interview D5_12)
Wazir- an active member of the No Lager group who speaks English and has 
already experienced the success of earlier deportation preventions - chose this rather 
public way to speak about his deportation. Other designated deportees lacking these 
skills and experience had to find people who could translate, and whom they trusted 
enough to speak on their behalf.
In this section, we argue that the difficulty for people with an insecure residence 
status to reveal their status and to talk about an upcoming deportation can be better 
understood if we consider deportability in the sense of in/visibility. From an 
Arendtian perspective, being a citizen means having the right to be publicly visible, 
12 The centrality of emotions for (collective) political (in)action, such as hope and fear in our case, 
has also been highlighted by various social movement scholars (see Goodwin et al. 2001; Goodwin 
and Jasper 2004).
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that is, to have a voice and to appear in public, as well as the right to be privately 
invisible; to retreat into a private realm of protection and security (Borren 2008). 
The reverse is true for people in the state of deportability: They often have to stay in 
assigned accommodation centers with little or no privacy. Moreover, even those 
who live in a private room or flat know that their home can be inspected and their 
life interrupted at any moment. This can be framed as a condition of harmful private 
visibility (ibid.). At the same time, people with an insecure residence status lack 
political rights, or in the words of Arendt, they are denied access to the “space of 
appearances” (Arendt 1958, 199). For Arendt, such public invisibility means not to 
be recognized as a human being and to forego the chance to lead a meaningful life: 
“Whatever lacks this [public] appearance comes and passes away like a dream” 
(ibid.). The state of deportability and enforcement of deportations are indeed, often 
invisible to the public eye. However, based on the case of Wazir and others, and in 
line with studies on “acts of citizenship” (Isin 2008; Nyers 2010; Darling 2014) or 
put differently, the political agency of non-citizens (McGregor 2011), we argue that 
people threatened with deportation and those acting in solidarity with them, can 
reverse harmful public invisibility and private visibility by engaging in contentious 
politics.
One way for people with an insecure residence status to reverse public invisibil-
ity is to reveal their condition to others as Wazir and others did. In US-American 
social movement and broader academic debates, revealing one’s insecure residence 
status to others has been described as “coming out of the closet” or as “coming out 
of the shadows” in accordance with the practices of “coming out” in the LGBTQ 
movement (Nicholls 2013; Schwiertz 2016). The practice of coming out about a 
pending deportation turns what is otherwise experienced as an individual problem 
into a public or collective issue. It opens up possibilities for the creation of new 
political subjectivities, relationships, and ultimately new ways of thinking 
citizenship.
In Osnabrück, following the first act of coming out–through the public statement 
of deportation–a further step toward public visibility and political claim making was 
taken through organizing the first assembly. Those who took part in the first assem-
bly underlined that they wanted “to get this [issue] out of the shadows and to show 
us and our protest” (Interview D5_1). The action was directed at the authorities 
(“we […] show the deportation authorities that we don’t agree”, ibid.), but also to a 
wider public. Nina, an activist, stressed that she preferred the assemblies that took 
place in front of one of the inner-city asylum seeker accommodation centers, 
because people who passed by noticed the protests (Interview D5_6).
The Alliance also organized demonstrations to raise more awareness of the issue 
and to make the protest more visible. One week after the first deportation was suc-
cessfully prevented, about 600 people – with and without secure residence status – 
walked through the city to demonstrate against the deportations. Public marches can 
be a powerful means to transform the presence, or recognition, of people with an 
insecure residence status in public spaces; another step in challenging their in/visi-
bility (Monforte and Dufour 2013, 87). Such public manifestations can work as 
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“acts of emancipation” (ibid.) and as a platform for people without secure residence 
status to present themselves, their stories, and claims, in public and to the media. 
Even during the first demonstration in Osnabrück, some people – under the threat of 
deportation – seized the chance to talk about their situation:
We didn’t have any speeches prepared […]. We just handed around a loudspeaker. Speeches 
were held spontaneously with spontaneous translations. (Interview D5_12 + 13)
Two interviewees (Interviews D5_1, D5_ 3) explained how difficult it was to 
create a platform for the voices of people dealing with both insecure residence sta-
tus and an imperfect command of the German language. This was not only because 
of exclusionary policies, but also because of other actors and practices that enabled 
the public visibility of some, while contributing to the public invisibility of others:
Often the press says: ‘No, that’s not possible [to do interviews in English]. We have to do it 
in German.’ That’s really stupid, because it is such a misrepresentation of the people in the 
group, because almost half of us have experienced forced migration and they can represent 
themselves very well. (Interview D5_3)
One time, a local television group wanted to film an interview with an activist in 
one of the accommodation centers. Bruno, an activist with secure residence status 
and the only German native speaker present, was asked to give the interview. When 
he suggested conducting it together with one of the activists without secure resi-
dence status, the journalist told him that he had no time and if he did not do the 
interview they would leave right away. In the end, Bruno told us, he gave a “shitty 
interview”, and the journalists ended up doing another one with Sam – one of the 
activists without secure residence status – in English, and in the final clip only Sam 
was included. Bruno concluded that this was the first time “a refugee was given a 
chance to talk [in front of a camera] but only because we always systematically 
include them and say: ‘Here, they are with us too […].’” (Interview D5_1). The 
above situation highlights that it is possible to reverse the public invisibility of peo-
ple with insecure residence status. At the same time, it also points to the difficulties 
within collective protests to challenge power asymmetries and the dominant differ-
entiations e.g. between activists with and without secure residence status (Mokre 
2015).
As Bruno remarked, reversing the public invisibility of people without a secure 
residence status often depends on those with a secure residence status to act as a 
mediator. This became obvious in a self-organized deportation prevention by the 
residents of an accommodation center. The incident took place in the summer of 
2015  in an accommodation center for women and families. Unlike the previous 
deportation preventions most of the people involved were women. The deportation 
was unannounced because Maria, the designated deportee, had not been present at 
the first announced deportation date. Her roommate, Semira, called the downstairs 
neighbor when the immigration officers, accompanied by the police, entered the 
house early in the morning. Soon, several residents, some accompanied by their 
children, stood in the staircase of the house and screamed. In contrast to the other 
cases in Osnabrück, the officers tried to force the designated deportee out of the 
building. According to Semira, the officers tried to pull Maria by her arm, but her 
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housemates also held on to her so that the officers eventually left without her. While 
the media had covered most other deportation preventions in Osnabrück this 
attempted deportation – including the physical violence exerted – was not reported. 
This was to some degree, due to the fact that the people involved did not want any 
media coverage. Their hesitation must be understood in context, as political action 
of non-citizens can be criminalized.13 Maria’s housemates eventually chose another 
way to share their experience with others: Sometime after the event, Ahmed, one of 
Maria’s neighbors and a friend decided to go to a plenum of the No Lager group to 
talk about the incident (Interview D5_9 + 10).
The Alliance attempted, through multiple ways, to create a sphere of private 
invisibility and thus protection for the designated deportees. During the first anti- 
deportation actions, this was simply done by assembling in large numbers in front 
of the person in question in order “to block the view of the officers” (Interview 
D5_3). As one of the activists described: “the idea was that the person [supposed to 
be deported] stays in the back area of the protest and is ready for the departure […]” 
(ibid.). When the letters changed and the authorities asked the designated deportees 
to make themselves visible by verbally identifying themselves, the protesters’ coun-
ter-strategy was a collective identification with, or as, the deportee: “We then 
decided when they [the authorities] come [asking]: ‘who is the one?’ We will all 
say: ‘It’s me! It’s me!’” (Interview D5_11 + 12).
While collective protests like those of the Alliance cannot fully restore the pri-
vate invisibility and public visibility of people in a condition of deportability, they 
can create (temporary) spaces where the harmful politics of in/visibility are reversed. 
In the interview with Linda and Wazir, they explained that Wazir, on the day of his 
own deportation, did not stay in the back of the crowd that had gathered to prevent 
it. “You just bopped around outside and you made breakfast and distributed tea”, 
recounted Linda. Underlining this (temporary) reversal of in/visibility, Wazir added 
that after the authorities had left, he made a speech and he stressed: “I was the first 
[of the refugees] who held a speech.” (Ibid.)
8.6  Lessening Uncertainty
Linda:
When we dissolved the blockade and Wazir went away with a good friend, I relaxed. When 
not even a police car stops, this shows that nothing serious will happen, if you do a block-
ade. Even if we always wonder ‘what will they come up with next?’ this somehow give us 
security.
13 Semira, Maria and some of the other housemates had to report to the local authorities after the 
incident. They were told that their behavior was “completely unacceptable”, that it could count as 
a criminal offense, and that they would have to leave the accommodation center if they got involved 
in this kind of action again (Personal communication with interviewee of D5_7, 09/07/2015).
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Wazir:
Until my interview, it can take six or eight months. And after this, I don’t know. […] I think 
I have a 60 to 70% chance that I may stay, thus 30% that I cannot stay. (Interview 
D5_11 + 12)
As the above quote indicates, insecurity and uncertainty pervade anti-deportation 
protests in Osnabrück in different ways. In the short-term and especially at the 
beginning of the protests, insecurity and uncertainty dominate the moments of 
deportation prevention, whereas in the long-term it shifts to the likelihood of being 
allowed to stay. Hasselberg (2016) has shown that deportability affects “the every-
day lives of migrants facing deportation” (ibid., 97) as they internalize and embody 
an acute uncertainty “as to whether or not they will be able to remain“(ibid., 96).14 
We argue that even though insecurity cannot be (fully) dissolved, the different prac-
tices of the Alliance show that the feeling of uncertainty inherent to deportability 
can be lessened through collective actions.
As described above, the first deportation prevention was organized spontane-
ously out of the conviction that the designated deportee should not face his deporta-
tion alone. Although unexpected by protest participants, the assembly in front of the 
accommodation managed to prevent the enforcement of the deportation. Despite 
this initial success one of the policemen told them that this might have negative 
consequences for the affected person. As members of the Alliance were unsure 
whether, and how, the authorities would try to enforce the deportation a second 
time, some tried to reduce uncertainty by organizing a church sanctuary. As Bruno 
remembers, “this was a reaction to the fear that we could not cope with [another 
removal attempt] and that he would be deported by force.” (Interview D5_1). 
Although it turned out that this case – as well as several following cases – was suc-
cessful in the long run, the initial insecurity remained for some time. As Nina, one 
of the activists with secure residence status, told us:
For the first times […] the designated deportees packed their whole properties as they didn’t 
know if the police would cross the blockade […]. And we always wanted to make sure that 
they are ready for their deportation like the authorities demand in order to avoid negative 
consequences. (Interview D5_6)
To reduce uncertainty with regards to possible negative consequences, members 
of the Alliance were in constant contact with lawyers. They carefully developed 
their protest strategy to fit within the small space available for possible action that 
would not harm those facing deportation. Furthermore, the (gradual) predictability 
and reliability of the behavior of both protesters, and immigration and police offi-
cers, contributed to lessening uncertainty: With more and more deportation preven-
tions, a certain routine developed, which partly consisted of a breakfast ritual with 
protest participants bringing their picnic blankets and refugees preparing tea 
(Interview D5_7).
14 Hasselberg (2016) analyzes different modes of coping with uncertainty. Some of these coping 
mechanisms are also reflected in our interviews. However, we will not concentrate on these rather 
individual mechanisms, but on how uncertainty is dealt with collectively.
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The procedure was clear for all involved. Firstly, the officers arrive and the des-
ignated deportee is in the house. Later, as requested, the deportee moves outside 
where the participants are assembled in front of the accommodation; when asked it 
is the participants who identify themselves as the designated deportee, at which 
time the officers leave. In some cases the officers did not show up or even get out of 
their vans. This collective protest routine reduced the insecurity for all participants. 
As Alliance member Brigitte, when referring to the sanctuaries that were organized 
to handle the initial insecurity of the situation, concluded: “By now we do not need 
a church sanctuary anymore!” (Interview D5_2).
However, the impact of these routines is moderate given that uncertainty remains 
for the affected people, because of their insecure residential status. Besides the need 
to conform to the orders of the Immigration Authorities in order to avoid negative 
consequences, the designated deportees packed their belongings so as to be ready 
for their deportation as they could not be sure that it would be prevented. Furthermore, 
they had to rely on other activists, people they frequently did not know. The inten-
sity of insecurity is thus incomparable to what is felt by activists with secure resi-
dence status. As Bruno reflected: “I have no clue how stressful this is for the refugees 
who have to trust that it will function outside” (Interview D5_1). Additionally, the 
success of the protests was dependent on other factors outside the participants’ con-
trol. As described previously, Ahmed and a friend went to the plenum of No Lager 
to speak about the self-organized deportation prevention of Maria. The participants 
of the plenum told Ahmed to call them if the police showed up again. Still, this did 
not alleviate Maria’s security concerns who, after the incident, was too afraid to stay 
in her own house at night. While Ahmed appreciated the offer, he remained some-
what skeptical about the prospect of such deportation preventions: “You might call 
without answer, or [people] sleep. When there’s a fixed day it’s super, but without 
it…” (Interview D5_9). Ahmed’s comment points to an important limitation of 
direct interventions in preventing deportation enforcement: The announcement via 
letter of a concrete date of the deportation had been one of the requirements for the 
success of the protest (see also Kirchhoff et al. 2018).
Furthermore, uncertainty is not restricted to the moment of direct intervention 
against deportation enforcement but lingers long after the assemblies, as the follow-
ing example of Amir shows. After Amir’s deportation was prevented through an 
assembly of the Alliance, he had to get his passport renewed at the local office of the 
Immigration Authority:
[…] he really didn’t dare to go there [as he] thought that if he appeared there, they would 
immediately call the police and they would arrest him to deport him and for a couple of 
nights, he also didn’t sleep at his place, because we thought that the police would come 
again a few hours later or the next day. (Interview D5_6)
Amir no longer felt secure in his own home, as he feared that the authorities 
could deport him at anytime and anywhere. As we have illustrated above with refer-
ence to isolation and in/visibility, protests also took place beyond the moment of 
attempted deportation through non-public processes. With regards to lessening inse-
curity and uncertainty, sleepovers became a regular action in the post-protest reper-
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toire of the Alliance. Many people who were concerned about future deportation 
attempts stayed over at other people’s houses in order to avoid the authorities.
In addition, Nina started what we call ‘follow ups’ to ensure “that people are bet-
ter off afterwards” (ibid.); that the blockades actually improved the situation of 
those whose deportation attempts had been prevented by the Alliance. In the begin-
ning, the activists assumed that the responsible authorities would automatically pro-
ceed with asylum applications once the timeframe for transfers had expired. 
However, it turned out that the first person whose deportation was prevented did not 
receive any information from the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees 
(BAMF) for many months (ibid.). Nina invited people with pending asylum proce-
dures for such “status meetings” (ibid.) in order to discuss what information they 
wanted from the authorities. She took care of these requests and constantly checked 
if there were any updates, to confront and counteract uncertainty resulting from the 
long waiting period:
Someone is invited to the hearing, gives the interview and then absolutely nothing happens 
for one and a half years. Nothing! This is really […] demoralizing. (Interview D5_6)
This follow-up work turned out to be crucial in those cases where the authorities 
had noted that the designated deportees had “absconded”, as absconding resulted in 
the transfer time frame being extended from six to 18 months. In most of the cases, 
in which Nina spoke to the BAMF officers, the prolongation of the time frame was 
eventually withdrawn. However, this was only possible because of the involvement 
of lawyers and a member of a local charity organization who had personal contacts 
within the authorities. Even though insecurity cannot (fully) be dissolved by collec-
tive action, the described practices arguably lessen some of the demoralizing effects 
of deportability (Hasselberg 2016, 99).
8.7  Conclusion
Peutz and De Genova have pointed out how deportation “through its routinized 
practice” obscures how “deportability is produced and imposed” (2010, 6). The case 
of the Alliance against Deportations shows that employing the broader meaning of 
deportability can lead to a deeper understanding of anti-deportation protests. This 
framework makes visible the struggles and consequences of the protests that go 
beyond the moment of a deportation or prevention. For our analysis, we have looked 
at isolation, private visibility/ public invisibility, and uncertainty as crucial dimen-
sions of deportability. Through applying these concepts, we asked how the collec-
tive protests in Osnabrück, which brought together a wide range of participants with 
and without secure residence status, confronted these dimensions.
We found that the collectivity of the protests in Osnabrück was, in itself, part of 
how the participants questioned deportability. Namely, by getting to know each 
other and in some cases also building relationships of trust, people with different 
positionalities were challenging the isolation produced by the exclusionary policies 
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and practices of the deportation regime. We therefore argue that encounters and 
friendships between people with, and people without, a secure residence status may 
not only be a precondition for – or result of – protest actions, but can also be con-
sidered as part of the protest. Such relations can furthermore facilitate the difficult 
process of coming out about one’s own deportability and a pending deportation. By 
revealing their status to others, people without secure residence status are engaging 
in a dissonant speech act, which opens up possibilities for formal political claim-
making, the emergence of new political subjectivities and thus the reversal of public 
invisibility. While it is beyond the scope of collective action to dissolve the insecu-
rity, or what we have described as private visibility, of people threatened by deporta-
tion, collective acts can create (temporary) spaces of security and protection. In the 
case of the Alliance, this was done, for example: through shielding the designated 
deportee during the attempted act of removal, through church sanctuaries, and 
sleepovers after a prevented deportation. Finally, our research suggests that conten-
tious politics can lessen the uncertainty tied to the state of deportability. In our case, 
this was supported through establishing a certain routine around deportation pre-
ventions, as well as through follow-up work to inform people after the prevention of 
their deportations about the status of their case. Although some of those whose 
deportations were successfully prevented still face uncertainty about the outcome of 
their asylum applications, the possibility of a Dublin deportation could at least now 
be ruled out.15
The case of Osnabrück suggests that collective protests against deportation might 
be better understood as struggles against deportability than merely trying to prevent 
the act of removal or deportation. In how far this is true for other forms of anti- 
deportation protests remains an open question. The ongoing debate on anti- 
deportation protests would thus profit from further case studies applying the concept 
of deportability.
The actions of the Alliance also raise questions regarding the meaning of deserv-
ingness frames in anti-deportation protests. As we have illustrated in the case of 
Osnabrück, it was the general disagreement with the Dublin regulation as well as a 
concern for those threatened by deportation, rather than a focus on individual cases 
that was conducive for collective action against deportability. Perceiving or claim-
ing certain designated deportees as especially deserving is thus neither a necessary 
precondition for people to become engaged in protests, nor a characteristic feature 
of such anti-deportation protests. We propose that the employment of deservingness 
frames in anti-deportation protests represents a strategy that is connected to protest 
forms that heavily depend on public or political support. In contrast, disruptions of 
deportations, as in the case of the Alliance, can be successful without this framing.
15 At the time of the interviews, German authorities declared themselves responsible for processing 
asylum claims of those people whose Dublin deportations had been prevented (Interview D5_6). 
While some people are still waiting for their decision, between 10/2015 and 03/2016, four men 
came to the No Lager meetings to celebrate the fact that they had been granted a residence permit 
for 3 years (Personal communication during No Lager plenum on 10/22/2015 and 3/3/2016).
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Another point brought up by this case study – one that is closely connected to 
current debates within the Alliance  – regards the meaning of success in anti- 
deportation protests. Success in preventing the actual act of removal is both the 
motivation for, and goal of, collective actions against deportation. However, from a 
deportability perspective, practices that break isolation, reverse public invisibility, 
and (to a lesser extent) reduce private visibility go beyond a narrow understanding 
of success: Rendering deportations, persons in a state of deportability, and anti- 
deportation protests visible, can be a powerful means of contentious politics when 
changes in the (political) opportunity structures make it more difficult to prevent the 
enforcement of deportations.
Finally, the deportability perspective that we have developed in this article brings 
to the fore the importance of questions of citizenship that are negotiated in contesta-
tions over deportation. Despite the lack of a formal status or recognition, people 
without secure residence status become “(activist) citizens” (Isin 2008) through dis-
sonant speech acts. They thus call “into question the givenness of [the] body politic 
and open its boundaries wide” (Isin 2009, 384), or, in the words of Sandro Mezzadra 
(2004), they bring citizenship “into motion”. In Osnabrück these dissonant speech 
acts were part of a process in which people with different legal status, and from dif-
ferent groups of society became active as a community, thus creating new political 
subjectivities and understandings of belonging. This dynamic is captured in Wazir’s 
speech after the successful prevention of his deportation, in which he not only 
thanked the members of the Alliance, but made clear that he saw the action most of 
all as part of a common struggle for a society where everybody enjoys the right to 
have rights:
Good morning! Thank you all so much for coming here today ںیہ کیا بس مہ We belong 
together. There’s our fight for residence, our rights and the life of the human beings. I hope 
we will have more peaceful fights in future. Thank you all again my friends! – and the بس مہ 
(means: We all belong together in Urdu. (Interview D5_11 + 12 ںیہ کیا
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 Appendix: Interviews
All interviews were conducted in person by the authors, except for interview 
D5_11 + 12, which was conducted by Michael Ruf for the documentary theatre play 
Asyldialoge. All interviews took place in Osnabrück (Germany) in German except 
for the interviews D5_9 + 10 and D5_11 + 12, in which Urdu, English, and Somali 
as well as German were spoken.
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Abbrev. Interviewee(s) Date Comments
D5_1 “Bruno”, activist with secure residence 
status, No Lager
07/06/2015
D5_2 “Brigitte”, activist with secure residence 
status, AG Flüchtlingshilfe
07/08/2015
D5_3 “Paul”, activist with secure residence 
status, No Lager
07/16/2015
D5_4 Lawyer 07/20/2015 Not cited
D5_5 Neighbor, accommodation center 07/20/2015 Not cited
D5_6 “Nina”, activist with secure residence 
status
07/21/2015
D5_7 “Heiko”, activist with secure residence 
status
07/22/2015
D5_8 Church representative, AG 
Flüchtlingshilfe
07/22/2015 Not cited in this 
article
D5_9 + 10 “Maria” & “Ahmed”, participants of 
spontaneous protest, insecure residence 
status
09/15/2015
D5_11 + 12 “Wazir”, activist with insecure residence 
status, No Lager & “Linda”, activist with 
secure residence status, No Lager
12/10/2014 & 
12/14/2014
Provided by Bühne 
für Menschenrechte
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Chapter 9
“We Are Here to Stay” – Refugee Struggles 
in Germany Between Unity and Division
Abimbola Odugbesan and Helge Schwiertz
9.1  Introduction
Throughout the migration history of Germany, the positions, rights, and social 
inclusion of non-citizens have been contested, with migratory and refugee struggles 
playing a crucial role. Especially in the last decade, new protest movements self- 
organized by migrants and refugees as well as solidarity networks have emerged. 
These movements publicly fight against the exclusion of migrants and the denial of 
rights in the German-European border and migration regime. Besides relatively 
invisible everyday acts of claiming the right to mobility and access to resources, 
different forms of refugee protests have emerged that directly challenge migration 
policies through public action and campaigns.
We focus in our chapter on these “visible politics of migration” (Ataç et al. 2015, 
2016),1 though we recognize that arguably the largest part of migratory struggles for 
mobility, a place to stay, and everyday survival could be understood as “imperceptible 
politics” that shifts regimes “without ever intending it” (Papadopoulos et al. 2008, 
75; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). Drawing on the theoretical classification by 
Federico Oliveri (2016, 265), we can distinguish migratory struggles according to 
three main fields of contention: freedom of movement against bordering mechanisms; 
the right to stay and to choose where to live against irregularization and precarization 
1 We will use migration as the general term in this paper. However, in regard to the passages about 
specific struggles we mostly use the word refugee according to the self-definition of the actors 
involved.
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mechanisms; and the right to free and decent work against exploitation mechanisms. 
Even though these fields – mobility, residency, and labor – are clearly interconnected 
with one another, we primarily focus on the second: struggles over the right to stay 
and social inclusion. Challenging the dominant migration regime, these struggles 
aim less to advocate a comprehensive reregulation of migration policies, but more 
towards a radical fight for the right to have rights (Schwenken 2006, 308–316; 
Arendt 1968). In order to understand the political context of migrant and refugee 
struggles, we draw on a concept of the migration and border regime that has been 
developed to describe the heterogeneous network of governing migration with a 
focus on Europeanization (Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007; Kasparek 
and Hess 2010; Schwenken and Russ-Sattar 2014; Heimeshoff et al. 2014). As the 
struggles we analyze here are based in Germany, we conceptualize the political 
context as a specific German-European migration regime (Schwiertz and Ratfisch 
2016) that merges policies such as the German Residence Act and the European 
Dublin regulation (Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2018).
Analyzing different forms of struggles in Germany, we ask how migrants and 
refugees organize themselves in order to fight for the right to stay and social 
inclusion, according to their specific positions in the migration regime. Our central 
aim is to understand the conflicts within migratory and refugee struggles, unpacking 
the reasons why there is not a more united movement, given that migrants and 
refugees with precarious legal status are affected by the same German-European 
migration regime. We understand self-organization as the idea of building resistance, 
political events, and initiatives based on the condition of a social group affected by 
specific structures of power and domination. These structures, which deprive them 
of their rights as well as the constant discrimination that they face, compel them to 
become active. This concept of self-organization includes directly affected people 
becoming active in groups that build collective structures of support, empowerment 
and, visible politics. Critically, they identify issues that they themselves consider a 
priority and decide how to shape and articulate demands on their own. However, it 
also includes people taking the risk to organize and defend themselves in forms of 
everyday resistance and imperceptible politics.2
The main argument of this chapter is that the narratives and strategies of differ-
ent migrant and refugee protest groups are based to a large degree on their specific 
positionalities. These are positions that are rooted in post-colonial relations on a 
global scale and that are (re-)shaped by the German-European migration regime 
and its system of stratified rights and legal statuses. This hierarchical legal system 
and its division of migrants’ positionalities is therefore a major cause for conflicts 
within the broader movement of migratory and refugee struggles in Germany. 
This can sometimes lead to competition between groups. Nevertheless, according 
to more general and long-term goals of fighting against the dominant migration 
regime as well as for freedom of movement, the right to stay, and social inclusion, 
2 The concept of self-organization could therefore be distinct from pro-migrant organizing 
(Schwenken 2006, 71–72). However, in other contexts, such as the US, where the concepts of com-
munity organizing or grassroots organizing already imply its meaning (Delgado and Staples 2008), 
it is only rarely used.
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struggles of migration could further unite in the future. The potential for a  common 
perspective is already visible in many forms and aims of self-organizing, function-
ing as protest repertoires that emerging initiatives reproduce. However, migratory 
and refugee struggles often differ according to their particular and short-term 
goals of claiming rights based on their specific positionalities and legal status. 
This is more important for non-citizens than for citizen activists because of their 
precarious situation and the immediate need for change (From the Struggles 
Collective 2015).
Because of the new migrant and refugee movements emerging in Europe over the 
last 5 years, there is a growing body of literature analyzing these mobilizations in 
Germany (Ataç et al. 2015; Johnson 2015; Jakob 2016; Klotz 2016). Most of the 
studies focus on local protests in Berlin (Ulu 2013; Wilcke and Lambert 2015; 
Fadaee 2015; Glöde and Böhlo 2015; Schwiertz 2016a) and Hamburg (Benigni and 
Pierdicca 2014; Meret and Della Corte 2016; Borgstede 2016). As previous research 
has mainly focused on single cases, we seek to provide an overview of the refugee 
movement, including its history, as well as a comparison of three struggles 
concerning our research question on different forms of organizing. We have chosen 
the cases because of their specific social and political positionalities in the migration 
regime as well as in the wider movement: Women in Exile, a group of female 
refugees active since 2002; Youth without Borders (Jugendliche ohne Grenzen, 
JoG), an initiative of young refugees active since 2005; and Lampedusa in Hamburg, 
a collective of refugees active since 2013 that is especially affected by the Dublin 
regulation, requiring them to return to Italy, and that is connected to a broader fight 
for the right to the city.3 While the participants of these initiatives describe themselves 
mainly as refugees, we contextualize their form of self-organizing with other 
migratory struggles.
Applying methodological approaches of activist scholarship (Hale 2008; Garelli 
and Tazzioli 2013; Carstensen et al. 2014), we build our analysis on social movement 
literature and in particular, studies of migrant protests, as well as drawing on the 
experiences and knowledge produced through our own fieldwork and participation 
in the struggles. This encompasses participant observation in the role of an activist 
researcher, supporting political groups in the process of doing fieldwork, as well as 
observing participation, drawing insights from playing a leading role in the 
movement (Hamm 2013). Drawing on social movement literature, we base our 
interpretative framework for analyzing the cases on three categories in order to 
highlight various specific aspects and their interconnection. First, we look at the 
social positions of actors involved in initiatives as well as their relative rights and 
3 Due to the variety of recently published studies on the refugee protests in Berlin, we do not select 
these cases, but instead the case of Lampedusa in Hamburg, which also has been part of the new 
protest cycle beginning in 2012. While there are studies focusing on aspects of mobility (Benigni 
and Pierdicca 2014) or relations with the local political scene (Borgstede 2016), the case of 
Lampedusa in Hamburg is especially relevant for our analysis because of their particular position-
ality as refugees with a legal status from another European member state. To capture the diversity 
of positionalities and related effects, we also selected the less researched cases of Women in Exile, 
representing a female self-organization, and JoG, representing a self-organization of youth 
(Women in Exile and Gürsel 2013; Kanalan 2015).
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privileges – as well as the denial thereof – in the migration regime. Therefore, the 
category of socio-spatial positionality is crucial for analyzing situations of relational 
inequality within social space, elaborating on the construction, negotiation, and 
transformation of positionalities (Leitner et al. 2008; Sheppard 2002). Second, we 
focus on the framing and narratives of the initiatives (Benford and Snow 2000), 
which relates to the first category. Third, we describe forms of collective action and 
protest that different initiatives develop and employ (Tilly and Tarrow 2015).
In the following, we first sketch the German-European migration and border 
regime as the political context of our analysis before we describe the history of 
migratory struggles in Germany to highlight the continuities and ruptures of 
self- organization that still influence initiatives today. We then analyze our three 
cases in the main section of this chapter, in which we focus on their fight for the 
right to stay and social inclusion (housing, education, work permits, etc.). 
Finally, we will discuss the commonalities and differences of refugee struggles 
in Germany.
9.2  The German-European Migration and Border Regime
The self-organization of refugee groups must be understood against the background 
of the migration and border regime that compels them to engage in strategies of 
self- defense and survival.
The Europeanization of migration policies and the emergence of a European 
migration regime are shaped by processes of securitization and approaches to 
governing migration that preclude migration to a large extent and at the same time 
differentially include most arriving migrants by depriving them of their rights.4 
Those who survive the hazardous crossing of the militarized external borders of the 
EU are confronted with Europe’s internal border controls. An important characteristic 
of the protest of Lampedusa in Hamburg was the growing awareness of resistance 
to the Dublin Regulation on the European scale and its relation to the EURODAC 
fingerprint database. The Dublin Regulation attempts to stop refugees from being 
able to choose their country of destination, as it stipulates that the state of a refugee’s 
first point of entry into the EU is responsible for processing their asylum application 
(Lorenz 2015).
In addition to European regulations, migrants and asylum seekers are confronted 
with specific but closely connected migration regimes in each of the EU Member 
States. The German regime of migration management encompasses a “highly 
elaborated and formalised system of civic stratification” (Morris 2002, 30). Rather 
than governing migration through a binary process of legalization and illegalization, 
4 For detailed analyses of the securitization of migration, see Huysmans 2000, 2006. For a complex 
analysis of the European migration and border regime and the modes of differential inclusion, see 
Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013. For the specific German-
European context see Kirchhoff and Lorenz 2018.
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it has developed a differentiated “hierarchy of statuses” that offers structures of 
opportunity for some migrants as well as “a set of insuperable barriers for others” 
(ibid.). The hierarchical system of non-citizen status ranges from: the illegalized 
position of undocumented migrants; to the de facto illegalized status of toleration 
(Duldung), which is according to the German Residence Act only a temporary 
suspension of deportation; to the temporary status of the permission to reside for 
asylum seekers; to different temporary residency statuses issued by other European 
member states, which prevent a person with such a status from obtaining many 
social rights in Germany; to various forms of time-limited and unlimited residency 
permits. The German migration regime encompasses a broad range of laws that 
result in the legal denial of rights e.g. by residential obligations (Residenzpflicht), 
which prohibit asylum seekers from leaving an assigned county or state, force them 
into compulsory collective accommodation, prohibit them from working, and 
making them dependent on food packages and vouchers. It creates a system of 
isolation and hardship that encourages a “voluntary return,” the self-deportation of 
migrants (Ulu 2013).
However, although there are defined internal and external European borders, the 
European border regime has not been able to regulate and limit migration according 
to its proclaimed policy goals. Every day, migrants and refugees reclaim their 
freedom to move, and manage to enter Europe. However, after crossing the external 
European borders, migratory struggles remain at internal borders through the 
continued fight against their removal, for the right to stay, and for accompanying 
social rights.
9.3  Migratory and Refugee Struggles in Germany
9.3.1  History and Transformation of Migrants’ Resistance
Although migrants played leading roles in the labor strikes of the 1970s and 
struggles concerning housing in the 1980s, there is a gap in academic knowl-
edge and social movement history about migrants’ resistance in Germany in the 
second half of the twentieth century (Karakayali 2008; Bojadžijev 2012). With 
diverse forms of protest and organizing, migratory struggles pushed for changes 
in the state, in civil society, and indeed in social movements themselves in 
Germany, “but they often were not as visible and audible as today” (Kanalan 
2015, 12, translated from German by the authors). Despite unfavorable politi-
cal conditions and opportunity structures caused by precarious legal status and 
their exclusion from political participation, many migrant-lobbying groups and 
associations emerged. These cultural, religious, or labor associations were 
often organized according to countries of origin. Critically, when they were 
incorporated into parties, unions, churches, or other organizations of main-
stream society, they were more often than not in a subordinate position 
(Bojadžijev 2012).
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Interestingly, this shifted in the 1990s, when migrant organizations emerged that 
organized around the broader struggle against racism and the racist mobilizations 
and attacks in the reunited Germany – rather than specific home countries. Similar 
to the Black Power movement in the US, empowerment and self-defense were 
priorities for groups like Antifa Gençlik, FeMigra, Café Morgenland, and KöXüz. 
They installed alarm phones to protect against racist assaults, organized 
demonstrations after arson attacks, and intervened against anti-migrant baiting in 
public discourses (Lenz and Schwenken 2002; Heck 2008; Bojadžijev 2012). 
Despite specific actions and demands, migrant self-organization and defense 
became a goal in itself. Relatively independent from German civil society and the 
leftist scene, they raised visibility through their own political positions. The aim of 
KöXüz – a name that derives from the Turkish word for “rootless” – was to organize 
beyond the limits of specific home countries. They sought to create a political space 
for all those who themselves could relate to the social category of migrant (KöXüz 
et al. 2000). Through the common migratory struggle, they aimed to bring together 
or align migrants from different social positions by articulating a political 
positionality of those affected by racism.
As early as 1989, Roma who had not received asylum and were in danger of 
deportation organized several actions to fight for the right to stay in Germany (Heck 
2008, 119; Brenner 2000). They organized protest marches and squatted at a 
concentration camp memorial near Hamburg, the Cologne Cathedral, and other 
places. Although their demands were not met, these mobilizations could be seen as 
one of the first visible struggles of illegalized migrants in Germany (ibid.). In the 
second half of the 1990s, several self-organized groups of refugees emerged. They 
fought against the residential obligations, especially the collective accommodation 
system of refugee camps and deportations. The first political group of refugees 
living in camps emerged in eastern Germany, possibly because the isolation was 
more pronounced and there were a higher number of racist assaults in the East 
(Jakob 2016). For example, The Voice Refugee Forum was founded 1994  in a 
refugee camp in Thuringia. In the lead-up to the 1998 elections, this group was 
involved in initiating a Germany-wide network known as The Caravan for the Rights 
of Refugees and Migrants, who coined the anti-colonial slogan “We are here because 
you destroy our countries.” In 2000, following these actions, The Refugee Initiative 
Group of Brandenburg was established. On top of these organized groups and the 
everyday tactics of organizing a living despite disenfranchisement, several 
spontaneous protests of refugees took place inside collective accommodations and 
even in detention centers (Heck 2008, 119). Under harsh conditions, with scarce 
resources, and with little public acknowledgement, the self-organized refugee 
groups continued their political practices in the 2000s.
At the turn of the century, Kanak Attak developed a new approach to organizing 
migratory struggles, which also reflected their positionality; most members were 
born in Germany and studied at German universities. Their framing shifted from 
defending the asylum law to going on offense with a claim for freedom of movement 
and the right to stay, using political art and theater as forms of protest (Gürsel 2013). 
In 2003, together with the Respect Network, the Refugee Initiative Group of 
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Brandenburg, chapters of no one is illegal (kein mensch ist illegal, kmii), and other 
allies, they started a campaign calling for a broad legalization of migrants with the 
slogan “We are among you and we demand legal status!” (Association for Legalization 
2004; Schwenken 2006). Furthermore, several “mixed organizations”, consisting of 
migrant and non-migrant activists, like Transact, Welcome 2 Europe, and Afrique-
Europe-Interact, emerged that aimed to shed light on the situation of the European 
borders through, for example, setting up several No Border Camps. However, con-
flicts arose over the positionalities and the differentiation of migrant and non-migrant 
activists, e.g. with disputes around the notion of whiteness at the No Border Camp in 
Cologne in 2012 and the distinction between “citizens” and “non-citizens” at the 
Refugee Struggles Conference in 2013, where migrant activists with a residency per-
mit were excluded from a meeting (Transact 2014; Kanalan 2015).
Building on the struggles of the past, migrant activists set about “a new era of 
protest” in Germany and Europe in 2012 (From the Struggles Collective 2015; Ataç 
et al. 2015; Mokre 2018). Starting with a hunger strike of Iranian asylum seekers in 
the Bavarian town of Würzburg, different local struggles joined forces to form a 
broad, self-organized, radical, and highly visible social movement that broadly 
aimed to end the isolation and stop the denial of rights (Langa 2015; Ulu 2013). 
This group walked 600 km from Bavaria to Berlin with the Refugee Protest March, 
and upon arriving in Berlin established a protest camp on the Oranienplatz in the 
center of the city, followed by squatting in an empty school building in for a few 
months (Wilcke and Lambert 2015; Schwiertz 2016a). Soon after, some refugee 
activists went back to Bavaria and established a Munich-based initiative (From the 
Struggles Collective 2015).
Beginning in 2013, the group Lampedusa in Hamburg also formed part of this 
new cycle of refugee protests, and this group forms part of our analysis together 
with the older initiatives of Women in Exile and Youth without Borders. In the 
following section, we describe their specific positionalities – as women, as youth, 
and as refugees with a legal status from Italy – in relation to their narratives as well 
as their protest and action repertoires. We provide a more detailed analysis of these 
groups, which emerged at different moments and which make particular claims, in 
order to understand the diversity of the wider migrant and refugee movement and its 
conflicting relations between unity and division.
9.3.2  Women in Exile
The specific situation and positionality of female refugees in Lagers – collective 
accommodation where asylum seekers are obliged to live – became a crucial issue 
and led to particular narratives and forms of organizing. Within the compulsory 
collective accommodation system, “women and children were facing problems of a 
different kind […] such as lack of privacy, sexual harassment, and violence in the 
collective homes” (Women in Exile and Gürsel 2013, 88; Jakob 2016, 64–68). To 
make those specific problems visible, and in response to the prevailing disinterest of 
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male refugees, a group of female refugees in Brandenburg founded Women in Exile 
in 2002. They felt “that refugee women are doubly discriminated against,” both as 
refugees (by anti-migrant laws and racism), but also as women (Women in Exile n. 
d.). Therefore, they also sought to challenge male dominance in the refugee 
movement and “are one of the few links between the women’s movement and the 
refugees’ movement” (ibid.).
Women in Exile members visit the refugee camps and accommodations, which 
they call Lagers, to find out about the problems and needs of the residents, to discuss 
potential solutions, and, critically, to mobilize around their political struggle 
(Women in Exile and Gürsel 2013, 90). Self-organization is thus essential for 
building relations and credibility between the group and camp residents. The women 
from the camp are more likely to trust the organizers from Women in Exile, because 
they share similar experiences: “So you really have to talk to them and tell them 
what you have been through, give them the experiences. Then they can learn to trust 
you” (ibid., 94). Women in Exile organizes “Empowerment” seminars to inform 
women in the Lager about their rights and to encourage them to join the struggle as 
well as peer education seminars, where women are trained to become organizers 
themselves (Women in Exile 2013, 5).
In addition to being a space for mobilization, the Lager, as a central institution of 
migration control, is also the most important target of the political organizing of 
Women in Exile (Women in Exile and Gürsel 2013, 95f). Although police inspections 
and the threat of deportation, the strict residency obligations, and the prohibition of 
work were – and are – important subjects, the women-specific issues tend to relate 
directly to the compulsory accommodation. As such, the main demand of the group 
has remained: “No Lager for women and children, abolish all Lagers” (Women in 
Exile 2013, 2). This slogan captures how Women in Exile frames their claims, 
oscillating between the particular and more general.
In 2016, at the Refugee Conference in Hamburg, members of Women in Exile 
were part of a group that took over a panel discussion on self-organization and 
solidarity. This action further highlights how important speaking-for-oneself and 
the representation of female refugees is to them. Together with other refugee women 
and transgender people, they demanded an equal representation of men and women 
within the movement and a stronger awareness of their specific situation and per-
spectives (Kron and Perinelli 2016).
9.3.3  Youth Without Borders
Self-organizing and speaking-for-oneself is also crucial for Youth without Borders 
(Jugendliche ohne Grenzen, JoG), which follows the principle that those affected 
have their own voice and do not need paternalistic politics. JoG is an association of 
young refugees that has different local chapters throughout Germany. Its beginnings 
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can be traced back to the early 2000s, when youth with a status of toleration or other 
precarious legal statuses began to organize themselves. They sought to overcome 
the limited position designated to them by the state and civil society by developing 
their own political positionality as well as corresponding narratives and protest 
forms.
This initiative first focused on fighting for access to higher and professional edu-
cation in Berlin. However, as some successfully gained access to universities and 
job training, they realized “that education and labor rights did not grant any durable 
solution, as long as the fear of deportation was omnipresent and long-term opportu-
nities as well as social security were still denied” (Kanalan 2015, 5, translated from 
German by the authors).
Therefore, the migrant youth extended their focus to beyond their specific situa-
tion of being young people excluded from education. This was, however, used in 
conjunction with a framing strategy that highlighted their disenfranchisement and 
vulnerable position relative to their peers with citizenship status.
Inspired by the movement of Sans Papiers in France and other countries, refugee 
youth, some of whom later became involved in JoG, fought for a comprehensive 
right to stay. After fighting for the specific case of a 14-year old schoolgirl, the 
refugee youth organized an anti-deportation campaign called Stay Here (Hier 
Geblieben) in cooperation with a local counseling center, the refugee council, Pro 
Asyl (a non-profit organization), the Grips Theater, and the Education and Science 
Workers’ Union GEW (Hier Geblieben 2005).
Out of this organizing structure, JoG was formalized in 2005 at a conference 
with 70 refugee youth from all over Germany. These conferences, which they have 
held every year since 2005 in the same city as the Conference of the Ministers of the 
Interior, became their main political space to organize and voice political demands. 
The refugee youth were empowered by self-organizing workshops, demonstrations, 
and gala nights, by representing themselves at press conferences and by personally 
meeting politicians to discuss and confront them with their demands. Similar to the 
political practices of Kanak Attak, JoG not only uses conventional protest forms 
such as demonstrations and speeches, but also political art and theater to reach out 
to mainstream society and politicians (Jouni and Ziese 2016).
Causing some tensions, the framing and claims of JoG were at times perceived 
as less radical than those of other groups in the refugee movement, as they also had 
short-term and mid-term goals to improve the precarious situation of at least some 
refugee youth (Kanalan 2015, 9).
Particular claims based on their positionality as youth were crucial for the self- 
organizing of JoG, which led to a specific framing around youthfulness and several 
campaigns demanding an equal right to education and schools for all. However, 
despite these youth-specific claims, the “right to stay for all” has become a main 
slogan of JoG, reflecting the oscillation between particular and more general claims 
that we already described regarding the struggle of refugee women.
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9.3.4  Lampedusa in Hamburg
Parallel to the struggles occurring since 2012 in Berlin and Munich, a self-organized 
group of refugees that became known as Lampedusa in Hamburg emerged in 
northern Germany in 2013. This is a protest group of 300–350 refugees mainly from 
Sub-Saharan Africa, who had previously migrated to Libya and then fled from the 
civil war in the country that began in 2011 to Italy. They established their organization 
as a direct response to European migration laws. Coming from Italy where they had 
few opportunities to make a living, they challenged the limitations of free movement 
imposed by the Dublin regulation. In Hamburg, the group started to organize and 
develop collective political claims. Homelessness, the lack of health care, limited 
access to education, social exclusion, and a lack of basic social amenities  – the 
denial of social rights – were the major challenges that motivated the group to form 
and organize themselves politically. All of the group members had already gone 
through the asylum procedure of recognition in Italy, having their identities checked, 
meaning that they all had Italian residency permits before they came to Hamburg. 
Therefore, having a refugee status issued by the Italian government shaped their 
social position: this status gave them no real access to social rights, but did give 
them some legal possibilities to move within Europe via a temporary tourist visa. 
For Lampedusa in Hamburg, the permission to work was vital for survival, since 
crisis-ridden Italy had nothing to offer; there was neither work, nor support for a 
living. Therefore, their specific positionality shaped their claim to a right to stay and 
work in Hamburg, which is encapsulated in their main slogan, “We are here to 
stay!”
This powerful slogan challenges the idea that refugees are only here for a tempo-
rary amount of time. The protest forms of the group therefore derive their strength 
from this declaration of legitimate presence. Most of their efforts attempt to make 
this slogan a reality and – together with supporters and networks of solidarity – 
demonstrate that the group is already part of the local community, even though the 
Hamburg Senate denies this. Their political self-organization and mobilization has 
also motivated political groups and civilians in Hamburg who have given humani-
tarian and political support, showing that the group is part of a common social space 
(Borgstede 2016).
Lampedusa in Hamburg has engaged in a fundamental and vital struggle for their 
right to stay as well as for the rights of all refugees and migrants. Therefore, they 
began opposing procedures and laws that limited their right to dissent. On 5/22/2013, 
the group occupied the Town Hall, asking local authorities and particularly Mayor 
Olaf Scholz from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) to listen to their 
demands and start a dialogue; the politicians ignored these demands. As the struggle 
began to attract the attention of civil society and the media, the Senate of Hamburg, 
and in particular its governing party, the SPD, began to look for different opportunities 
to evict the group. One of these attempts involved using the St. Pauli church – which 
had provided shelter to some of the group members  – as an intermediary. By 
November 2013, this tactic had forced some members of the group into a second 
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asylum procedure with the precarious status of toleration. This could be seen as an 
attempt to discipline the Lampedusa in Hamburg protest by integrating the group 
members indefinitely into the procedures of German asylum law.
Nevertheless, the group’s political campaign against the inequality in refugee 
policies became an increasing challenge for the local state authorities. This only 
increased following a major demonstration on 11/2/2013, where around 15,000 
demonstrators marched in solidarity with the group. The visible and strong self- 
organization of the group brought together many political groups who were fighting 
for the same demands despite their political differences. Following the May Day 
Parade in 2014, some of these political groups came together and squatted in a 
building on behalf of Lampedusa in Hamburg and other refugees. It was a huge 
event under the banner of a much-needed Refugee Welcome Center. However, it 
ended when the police removed them from the building after a few hours.
The state’s harsh rejection of the demands of Lampedusa in Hamburg became 
manifest, as another peaceful demonstration in front of the Hamburg Town Hall on 
6/5/2014 resulted in repression, with the police brutally beating up and arresting 
members of the group (Lampedusa in Hamburg 2014). The police eventually 
targeted all major locations where the group members had been living, and began to 
stop and check the identity of any black person, which was an obvious case of racial 
profiling. Many of these racist identity checks were carried out in the left-wing 
neighborhood of St Pauli. In response, the neighborhood started a week-long protest 
action and the ongoing repression continued to attract the attention of civil society 
and the media.
However, the struggle of Lampedusa in Hamburg went beyond marches, protest 
tent actions, and occupations. Based on their specific position of exclusion from 
social rights, they initiated different projects to realize their demands that the group 
was here to stay, and that they would work and create a life. Eventually, ver.di, a 
trade union, became a strong partner, when they registered over 150 people of the 
Lampedusa Group as union members. This also led to the initiation of Lampedusa 
Professions, a project that exhibits the qualifications and the various potential 
professional skills the groups have. Since then, Lampedusa Professions has also 
become an art project featured in exhibitions like ort_m–migration memory. As 
such, the group not only marches in the street for the right to stay and work; they 
also convert these demands into practical activities and in actual cultural projects. 
The group has also cooperated with the Kampnagel theater on the Eco Favela and 
Migrantpolitan projects, and they are involved with the Silent University, Curating 
the City e.V., No Border Academy, the Here to Participate project (in cooperation 
with the Education and Science Workers’ Union (GEW)), and the Refugee Radio 
Network. The establishment of FC Lampedusa in Hamburg was another project of 
the group, aiming to develop skills and create opportunities for the soccer players 
among them. This soccer team was established with the support of FC St. Pauli. An 
interesting point about FC Lampedusa is that most of the earlier members of the 
soccer team had been members of Lampedusa in Hamburg and thus came from Sub- 
Saharan Africa. However, by 2015, the team had changed, with refugees from other 
countries of origin in the team. Although these new players have a different history, 
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they are happy and excited to portray the identities and the struggle of Lampedusa, 
which points to its unifying potential.
Although they have been included into the social networks of the city, the Senate 
of Hamburg has provided the group with no legal means for the right to stay and has 
instead ignored their case, hoping it will disappear through the voluntary return of 
the refugees to Italy. Nevertheless, despite the legal consequences of the Dublin 
regulation, the Senate could provide a group solution on the basis of §23 Residence 
Act (AufenthG). This could give them the right to stay and work in Hamburg (HAJ 
2014; Kanalan 2014). As Lampedusa in Hamburg argues, there is a sound political 
demand for this group solution, as their members meet the criteria of the policy; they 
have almost the same background and have faced the same human rights abuses.
However, it was civil society showed actual and genuine solidarity with 
Lampedusa in Hamburg, through the provision of accommodation, economic and 
logistical support, political understanding, and encouragement in their fight for 
rights. The humanitarian help and solidarity that the group experienced was much 
better articulated politically in comparison with the recent wave of civil engagement 
in the “summer of welcome” in 2015 (Karakayali and Kleist 2016). Even though 
Lampedusa in Hamburg could not succeed in pushing the Senate to grant them their 
rights, they managed to build a movement and a network that changed the social 
space of the city. Furthermore, they built a base from which to continue their struggle 
as well as contributed to the emergence of new alliances like Right to the City – 
Never Mind the Papers and other refugee, pro-migrant, and welcome initiatives.
9.3.5  Comparisons: Different Positionalities of Refugee 
Self-Organization
By analyzing different initiatives, we have stressed that the positionality within, and 
against, the dominant migration regime is the crucial starting point for the self- 
organization of refugees and migrants. These groups all shared the idea of developing 
self-organized political practice and resistance grounded in the specific situation of 
the social group in order to defend their rights and shape their political demands. 
Critically, one main strategy of the migration regime has been to isolate refugees 
and migrants, deny them a legitimate subject position, and silence their voices 
(Monforte and Dufour 2013; Ataç et  al. 2015; Schwiertz 2016a; Mokre 2018; 
Hinger et al. 2018). As a result, when these activists make their demands public, it 
is a key moment of self-organization, as they are making their own situation visible. 
Most groups emerge from an attempt to organize themselves and build a structure 
due to their personal issues and problems. And it is from this point that they develop 
and raise their demands. For Lampedusa in Hamburg, this was the right to stay in 
the city, but also more specifically the permission to work and gain recognition of 
their Italian documents. In asylum-seeker protests, such as the Refugee Protest 
March to Berlin, the right to stay is also a central claim. However, they are also 
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specifically fighting against the German asylum system in order to be recognized. 
Almost all refugee struggles call for the abolition of the German and European 
asylum system and demand their right to stay, but they organize themselves based 
on different situations and conditions related to their specific experiences and status 
in Germany. Their diverse positionalities relate to distinct “identities, experiences 
and perspectives” (Leitner et al. 2008, 163).
To a large extent, these different positionalities are derived from the stratified 
German-European migration regime, which produces a hierarchy of legal statuses, 
from full citizenship to illegality. Besides separating migrant subjectivities, this can 
create relative privileges and cause conflicts as well as internal challenges for 
organizing refugee and migrant struggles (From the Struggles Collective 2015, 
21–23). People from Lampedusa in Hamburg and other groups with Italian 
documents are in a different legal position than asylum seekers. At the Oranienplatz 
Camp in Berlin, it was a major challenge to bring together people with different 
legal statuses, as they did not always share the same specific demands; this led to 
huge conflicts. This stratified system of rights is produced by the state and is related 
to a (post-)colonial “divide-and-rule strategy” that led to rifts in the movement and 
made the eviction of the Oranienplatz Camp possible (Langa 2015, 8).
Furthermore, groups in the migrant movement also differ according to intersec-
tional power relations. Organizing around gender relations, Women in Exile fight 
specifically for refugee women’s rights and against patriarchy and male domination. 
Another specific positionality results from the category of age, leading JoG to focus 
on education and struggles particular to the rights of refugee minors and youth. 
Additionally, the compassion, solidarity and support of citizens in relation to self-
organized struggles are important. Their role has been critically discussed with refu-
gee activists, asking if claims based on their positionalities have been neglected, or 
in which way the distinction between refugees and supporters is itself problematic 
(Ulu 2013; Rosenberger and Winkler 2014; Mokre 2015; Ünsal 2015).
In the migrant and refugee movement, some self-organizations are more visible, 
powerful, and privileged than others because of their positionality in the migration 
regime. When Lampedusa in Hamburg started organizing, some refugees, who had 
been stuck in the German asylum system for years, had the impression that they 
were not included in this process. They had the feeling that the public did not 
recognize their situation in the same way. Furthermore, the activists from Lampedusa 
in Hamburg were not fully under German authority: If they got in trouble with law 
enforcement, they would be at worst deported back to Italy, where they have legal 
status. This gave them a relatively privileged position, and made more militant 
action possible, e.g. the protest at the Town Hall. However, it also allowed the group 
to join other struggles that were not as privileged, and to even go outside Europe. To 
do so, the group has shared part of their resources and has built a structure, like the 
info-tent, which other refugees have also been able to use.
According to their positionality and the specific problems and priorities that a 
given group identifies, migrant and refugee protests produce different frames and 
narratives. Their collective framing processes lead to “action-oriented sets of beliefs 
and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns” of the 
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different groups (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). As we have shown in the last 
chapter, Lampedusa in Hamburg has a specific story and on this basis, they demand 
their rights. They mainly argue for a right to stay for the 300–350 people of the 
group for two reasons: First, they claim that they are victims of the NATO war in 
Libya; second, that they already have Italian documents and working permits, but 
that the Italian state has failed to take responsibility for their lives in Italy. That their 
narrative focused on primarily claiming a right to stay for the group members also 
had strategic reasons. It is more realistic to approach the Senate of Hamburg, other 
politicians, and the broader public to demand a right to stay for around 350 people 
than to demand a right to stay for everybody. This made some supporters withdraw 
their solidarity, because they had the impression that Lampedusa in Hamburg had 
made themselves an exclusive group.
Many self-organized migrant and refugee groups have particular and pragmatic 
demands based on their particular situation, which can lead to sharp criticism by 
left-wing and other groups. However, compared to left-wing citizen activists – who 
already have full citizenship rights  – refugee self-organizations cannot wait for 
structural change and the right to stay for everybody. They have a vital self-interest 
in changing things as soon as possible, because they are affected every day by the 
regulations that they are pushing to change. For this reason, many refugee groups 
struggle to frame their demands in a way that can also resonate with dominant 
discourses, which would allow them to negotiate with politicians and other officials. 
In the context of this limiting migration regime, the attempt to build more inclusive 
organizations with differently positioned participants and alternative narratives 
remains a constant challenge for migratory movements across the globe (Schwiertz 
2016b).
9.4  Conclusions
In this chapter, we have analyzed three different forms of refugee struggles in order 
to understand how refugees and migrants organize themselves within and against 
the dominant migration regime. We showed that specific social and political 
positionalities, shaped by the German-European migration regime and its hierarchy 
of legal status, greatly influences the diverse and sometimes contradicting narratives 
and strategies of different initiatives. According to actor positionalities that we 
investigated in all cases, the framing of initiatives often oscillates between general 
claims for the rights of all refugees and migrants and particular claims for the rights 
of their specific social group. The three cases analyzed here are relevant for the 
refugee movement in Germany, because they succeeded in constructing social 
spaces for self-organizing as well as political stages for raising the voice of refugees 
so that their specific claims could be heard in public.
The demand “No Lager for Women and Children” is characteristic for the narra-
tive of Women in Exile, which focuses specifically on how the collective accom-
modation system of the Lager affects women and their families. Still, their slogan 
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also entails the demand to “Abolish all Lagers,” therefore including a claim for the 
rights of all refugees. However, fighting not only against the migration regime and 
racism but also against patriarchy, they are also challenging male activists within 
the refugee movement in an effort to make their own specific position more visible. 
The crucial contribution of Women in Exile has been to construct a platform for 
refugee women and to empower them to become political actors against all odds. 
This has also been the case with Youth without Borders (JoG), which created a 
unique social space for young refugees that has encouraged them to connect to each 
other and become politically active. Their slogan “Right to Stay for All” indicates a 
narrative that is generally open, yet at the same time, their organizing and framing 
builds on a specific positionality as youth. On the basis of a shared history, 
Lampedusa in Hamburg, with its slogan “We are Here to Stay,” mainly focuses on 
claiming a right to stay and social rights in the city for the group and its members. 
Nevertheless, the slogan also indicates the legitimate presence of all refugees and 
migrants. The achievement of the Lampedusa group has been to mobilize thousands 
of citizens in Hamburg to support and join their struggle, which was not only been 
visible in large scale demonstrations, but especially in the close- meshed networks 
built in the neighborhood of St. Pauli. In doing so, Lampedusa in Hamburg stimu-
lated not only new activities around anti-racist politics and the right to the city, but 
they also laid the groundwork for broad refugee support in 2015.
Besides Lampedusa in Hamburg, the other major mobilization of the new refu-
gee protest era, starting in Germany in 2012, is the Refugee Movement Berlin, who 
has been analyzed by several publications (Ulu 2013; Langa 2015; Wilcke and 
Lambert 2015; Fadaee 2015; Glöde and Böhlo 2015; Schwiertz 2016a). Their 
claims are part of one of the most inclusive and radical framing examples in the 
movement. This is captured in their three central demands: against Lagers, resi-
dency obligations, and deportations. Nevertheless, their narrative has mainly been 
applicable to the positionality of asylum seekers. Hence, the arrival of refugees who 
already had a legal residency status from Italy but no access to social rights in 
Germany caused conflicts over how to prioritize the three demands. According to 
their specific positionality, the Berlin Refugee Movement has consequently inte-
grated “the right to work and study” into their demands.
In this paper, we analyzed different approaches of refugee self-organization, 
building on the history and experiences of migratory struggles in Germany. As we 
have shown above, refugee and migrant protests are by no means new, but the scale 
and nature of the recent actions in the 2010s are unprecedented. The protesters’ 
demands go beyond individualistic claims and target not only national but also local 
and supranational policies. Like at the International Conference of Refugees and 
Migrants in Hamburg in 2016, they seek to establish translocal and transnational 
networks and coalitions against these policies. Building on the history and 
experiences of groups like KöXüz, Kanak Attak, or The Voice, which are still active 
today, self-organized migratory and refugee struggles could develop strategies to 
further unite their fights within and against the German-European migration regime 
beyond their specific positionalities.
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However, within the migrant and refugee movement, it remains a challenge to 
establish common initiatives and networks. This becomes even more difficult on a 
transnational scale, where people have to struggle with different local and national 
manifestations of the supranational migration regime. Its hierarchical legal system 
and its division of migrants’ positionalities, characteristic of the German-European 
migration regime, shape the narratives and strategies of different self-organizing 
attempts. Despite this dividing regime of control, migrant and refugee groups 
repeatedly form networks beyond their particular struggles. These networks build 
narratives and strategies based on a common positionality of being directly affected 
by a nationalist and racist regime, as well as a shared fight for freedom of movement 
and the right to stay for all.
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Chapter 10




In October 2012, members of the Somali community in Austria held a 48-hour protest 
in front of the Austrian parliament building in Vienna. In November 2012, asylum seek-
ers living in the initial reception center in Traiskirchen marched some 30 km from 
Traiskirchen to Vienna in order to protest against living conditions in the center and the 
constant threat of deportation. This was the beginning of the biggest self-organized 
protest of asylum seekers and sans-papiers in Austria, and it continued for about a year.1 
It took place at the same time as several other refugee protests, above all in Germany, 
but also in Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, France, and the Netherlands (see Kovacic 2013; 
transversal 2013; Gržinić and Tatlić 2014; Mokre 2015; Ataç 2016; Jakob 2016).
The protest movement called itself “Refugee Protest Camp Vienna” and involved 
asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers, and other sans-papiers (refugees in the 
protest camp’s terminology), as well as EU citizens, third-country citizens with 
valid documents for residence in Austria, and (a few) recognized refugees (support-
ers in the protest camp’s terminology). At their first press conference, the refugee 
activists emphasized that they would speak for themselves and that they understood 
the term refugee to include all asylum seekers, recognized refugees, migrants, and 
sans-papiers in Austria (Refugee Camp Vienna 2012e).2
1 Other self-organized refugee protests had taken place in Austria earlier, e.g. the protest of Bosnian 
refugees in 1991.
2 In connection with the Refugee Protest Camp Vienna, the author will use the terms “refugee activ-
ists” and “supporters” as defined by the movement. In order to differentiate the self-defined term 
“refugee” from its legal meaning, people whose claim for asylum was accepted will be designated 
as “recognized refugees”.
M. Mokre (*) 




The chapter analyzes the opportunity structures, activities and structures of the 
Refugee Protest Camp Vienna, thereby focusing on the potential strength of refugee 
activists to defend their “weak interests” (Willems and von Winter 2000), and on 
possibilities for self-organization. It also looks at problems of mobilization and the 
internal structure of a movement of refugees and supporters, i.e. of people with radi-
cally different privileges and opportunities, facing very different risks and under 
constant threat of state repression.
The main research questions are: How and why did the protest start? How and to 
what degree was it possible to defend the weak interests of the refugees? How were 
relations between refugees and supporters structured?
By providing an in-depth analysis of this case against the backdrop of various 
political theories, the article aims to contribute knowledge about the influences on 
and the dynamics of protest movements supporting the rights of asylum seekers, 
refugees, sans-papiers, and migrants, as well as of other social movements.
The perspective of the author is twofold: that of a political scientist, as well as of 
a political activist within the movement.
10.2  The Timeline
October 
10–12, 2012
Somali protest in front of the Austrian parliament in Vienna.
November 24, 
2012
30-km march of several hundred asylum seekers and supporters from the initial 
reception center in Traiskirchen to Vienna. Erection of the Refugee Protest 
Camp Vienna in front of the Votivkirche (Votive Church) in the center of Vienna.
December 18, 
2012
Occupation of the church by some of the refugee activists from the camp.
December 23, 
2012
Several refugee activists start a hunger strike in the church.
December 28, 
2012
Destruction of the camp by the police.
January 22, 
2013
Suspension of the hunger strike for 10 days.
February 1, 
2013
Resumption of the hunger strike.
February 18, 
2013
End of the hunger strike.
March 3, 2013 The activists move from the church to an empty monastery (Servitenkloster).
July 29–30, 
2013
Eight refugee activists staying at the monastery are deported.
July 30–31, 
2013







The activists must leave the monastery.
October 29, 
2013
The activists ask for protection at the Academy of Fine Arts.
November 5, 
2013
At the request of the vice-chancellor and due to the threat of police intervention, 
the activists leave the Academy.
December 23, 
2013








First day of the trial for human trafficking.
March 27, 
2014
The remaining six accused refugee activists are released from custody on the 








The human trafficking trial ends with seven convictions and one acquittal. The 
convicted refugee activists are sentenced to between 7 and 28 months in prison; 
in all cases, they already had served the determinate part of the sentence in 
custody.
Spring 2015 Further refugee activists receive asylum or subsidiary protetction.
10.3  The Beginning of the Movement – Seizure of a Political 
Opportunity or the Presupposition of Itself?
The question if and how political opportunities influence the emergence and success 
of political movements has figured prominently in literature since Eisinger’s 1973 
study on riots in US cities. Political opportunities are defined by Tarrow as “consis-
tent–but not necessarily formal or permanent–dimensions of the political environ-
ment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting 
their expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow 1998, 76–77). Other authors, how-
ever, use the concept of political opportunity structures (POS) not only in regard to 
the emergence of political movements but also to their chances of success, i.e. for 
policy change (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1462–1463). Generally, the openness of a 
particular government is seen as the main factor in both cases (e.g. Eisinger 1973; 
Kitschelt 1986). Here, Meyer and Minkoff (2004, 1464) differentiate between struc-
tural openness and openness with regard to a specific issue (structure versus signal). 
However, other academic work shows that political movements have not been trig-
gered by the openness of governments but rather by particularly “hostile and belli-
cose” government policies (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1462). Furthermore, scholars 
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differ with regard to the question of whether POS are mainly formed by objective 
factors or rather by the perception of opportunities by the actors.
The analysis of POS for the Refugee Protest Camp Vienna has led to ambiguous 
results. The beginning of the movement cannot be explained by favorable 
POS. Traditionally, both Austrian governments and society have not been especially 
open to intervention by political movements (Dolezal and Hutter 2007; Merhaut and 
Stern 2018). Even though the Austrian model of consociational democracy has 
developed into a competitive democracy since the 1990s, this competition has 
mainly taken place in the political center where loyalty to political parties has been 
replaced by general Austrian patriotism (Pelinka 2006). The Green Party’s partici-
pation in the Viennese government could perhaps be interpreted as a specific oppor-
tunity for the protest movement, but this participation goes back to 2010. With 
regard to the specific issue of asylum policy, political opportunity structures can 
generally be described as unfavorable since the Austrian population has been skepti-
cal if not openly adverse to foreigners and especially asylum seekers (Friesl et al. 
2010). Political party elites have increasingly focused on questions of security while 
rarely linking asylum and migration issues to discourse on universal human rights 
(Merhaut and Stern 2018; Haselbacher and Rosenberger 2018). At the beginning of 
the protest, asylum policies had neither changed for the better nor for the worse. In 
addition, the highly problematic situation in Traiskirchen, which triggered the pro-
test, was not a recent development but rather an ongoing condition.
The movement started as a result of combined individual motivation and the soli-
darity structures able to channel this motivation. Concretely, the start of the refugee 
protest was closely related to the activities of a Pakistani refugee who had met 
German activists in the “jungle” camp at the Serbian-Hungarian border. Arriving in 
Traiskirchen, he was appalled by the situation there and contacted his German 
acquaintances who established contact to activists in Vienna. Thus, planning for the 
march from Traiskirchen to Vienna was kick-started by individual initiative and 
transnational contacts. These, however, were activated by chance rather than as part 
of organized transnational activities. In this way, the movement emerged in reaction 
to particular issues and developed sustained and deliberate efforts to achieve change 
while addressing a specific political issue. It can therefore be seen as a protest move-
ment as defined by Ruedin et al. (2018). It also corresponded to the definition of a 
social movement by aiming at profound social change (cf. Bader and Probst 2018).
However, there is no satisfactory structural explanation for the Refugee Protest 
Camp Vienna. It could thus be argued that this protest was an event in the sense of 
Badiou (2005), “modifying the regime of the appearance of multiplicities in the 
world” (Badiou 2006, translation M.M.). As in every theory of origin, “the point of 
origin remains in a certain sense inaccessible, it is only accessible by its conse-
quences, its effects, or the direct force it delivers in the moment of its appearance” 
(Badiou 2008, translation M.M.).




This was the case, for example, when illegal immigrant workers occupied the church of St. 
Bernard in Paris: they publicly declared the existence and valence of what had been without 
valence, thereby deciding that those who are here belong here and enjoining people to drop 
the expression ‘illegal immigrant’. (Badiou 2004).
A similar assumption can be made with regard to asylum seekers whose presence 
can become a site for an event: “(…) for there to be an event, there must be the local 
determination of a site; that is, a situation in which at least one multiple on the edge 
of the void is presented” (Badiou 2005, 179).
However, for an occurrence to be declared an event, it must be constructed retro-
spectively through intervention, i.e. through its interpretation as an event and by 
fidelity to the event, including establishing signs and/or reasons anteceding the 
event. “Strictly speaking, a site is only ‘evental’ insofar as it is retroactively quali-
fied as such by the occurrence of an event” (ibid.).
In the retrospective construction of the event in the focus of this article, the march 
from Traiskirchen to Vienna marks the beginning of making the impossible possi-
ble–bringing the non-existent into existence. In this way, the movement created a 
political opportunity structure out of itself for those who decided to support it and 
thus found the possibility to pursue personal or political goals (cf. Bader and Probst 
2018).
10.4  Framework: Weak Interests and Non-losable Lives
Research on interest representation differentiates between weak and strong interests 
according to the resources of (potential) interest groups. Here, resources include 
above all financial means but also the degree of organization and networking of 
actors. According to Clement et al. (2010, 7), weak interests are those of actors hav-
ing few resources at their disposal and are difficult to organize for structural rea-
sons. This rather broad definition includes groups primarily qualified by their lack 
of material resources, such as poor, homeless or unemployed persons, as well as 
groups whose common interest is not easy to define or represent, such as consumers 
or tax payers. According to Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action (2002), the 
latter groups tend to constitute a mass of egotistical free riders, while the former 
lack mobilization potential and impact and are thus condemned to “suffer in silence” 
(Olson 2002, 104, 165). However, more recent research contradicts this dismal con-
clusion, pointing to an increasing number of associations representing latent as well 
as marginalized interest groups (Sebaldt 2004, 10). Still, the question for empirical 
research remains as to how and under which circumstances the organization of 
weak interests is possible and successful.
Arguably, migrants are actors with weak interests as they represent both a latent 
and “super diverse” interest group, and usually lack resources due to multiple dis-
crimination (Mikuszies et al. 2010, 95), above all with regard to legal rights. For 
example, they do not have the right to register a demonstration. Furthermore, while 
this group is highly diverse with regard to individual situations and the interests of 
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its members, in mainstream discourse it is frequently described as an indistinguish-
able mass of people often perceived as a threat. Here, each and every member of the 
group is seen to pose a threat, just as the (potentially unlimited) group does as a 
whole. According to Sayad (2015, 36–38), the basic structures of our political 
thought are national and thus immigration, or the presence of non-citizens on 
national territory, disturbs the national order. This disturbance supposedly leads to 
chaos and the complete destruction of any order when large numbers of migrants 
enter the country. These two linked arguments can be found, explicitly or implicitly, 
in most political mainstream discourse on migration: migration is an abnormality 
that may lead to uncontrollable consequences if not kept at bay. Political distinc-
tions can be found with regard to the form and scope of regulation, ranging from the 
complete closure of borders to the acceptance of well-educated and/or affluent 
migrants or refugees (see Valluy 2008; Merhaut and Stern 2018).
Several structural factors additionally hinder migrants from organizing. Apart 
from differences with regard to race, nationality, gender, class, etc., migrants from 
the Global South–as a “group”–are also clearly differentiated internally by legal 
definitions and the use of the latter in public discourse. Only few migrants success-
fully apply for a work or study permit (see AMS n.d.; OEAD 2016). Another option 
for obtaining a residence visa, which is increasingly being restricted, is family 
reunification (e.g. based on marriage. See BMI n.d.; Mokre 2015, 178–186). 
Certainly, the most vulnerable group is made up of irregular migrants without any 
legal right to stay in their country of residence.
Refugees represent a special case. Their right to remain in a country of which 
they are not citizens is backed up by the Geneva Convention (1951) which states 
that signatory states may not send a refugee back to a country where his/her life or 
freedom is threatened due to race, religion, nationality, membership in a social 
group, or political conviction. The receiving state is obliged to investigate on an 
individual basis whether the refugee’s fear of such a threat is well-founded. Once 
this has been established, refugees enjoy a relatively privileged position, which in 
many aspects equates the formal rights of citizens.3
As an abstract principle, the right to claim asylum, i.e. to request protection if 
threatened in one’s own country, is rarely contested. Even nationalist and xenopho-
bic political organizations shy away from generally rejecting the Geneva Convention 
and the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights on which the convention is based. 
Discourses contesting the rights of refugees to come to Europe and/or a specific 
nation state are based on two lines of argumentation: a rather implicit one focusing 
on the above-mentioned understanding of migrants as an unspecified threatening 
mass, and an explicit one doubting the motives of individual asylum seekers (see 
Welz 2015).
The so-called protection of EU external borders (as well as the more recent clo-
sure of national borders by member states) is promoted on the grounds of the threat 
3 However, in Austria the position of recognized refugees has become increasingly precarious, e.g. 




to Europe posed by “refugee flows”. This threat is supposedly so big that defending 
Europe against it even legitimizes the deaths of thousands of refugees. This argu-
ment and related politics are obviously problematic, at least from a human rights 
perspective, and contradict basic values of European societies, such as the protec-
tion of human lives. But as Judith Butler (2009) points out, it depends on forms of 
framing whether “we apprehend or, indeed, fail to apprehend the lives of others as 
lost or injured (lose-able or injurable)” (Butler 2009, 1).
In contemporary conditions of war and heightened nationalism, we imagine that our exis-
tence is bound up with others with whom we can find national affinity, who are recogniz-
able to us, and who conform to certain culturally specific notions about what the culturally 
recognizable human is. This interpretative framework functions by tacitly differentiating 
between those populations on whom my life and existence depend, and those populations 
who represent a direct threat to my life and existence. When a population appears as a direct 
threat to my life, they do not appear as “lives” but as the threat to life (a living figure that 
figures the threat to life). (Butler 2009, 42).
Thus, “what we feel is in part conditioned by how we interpret the world around 
us; (…) how we interpret what we feel actually can and does alter the feeling itself” 
(Butler 2009, 41). This differentiation between lives which should be protected and 
lives which form a threat is usually not explicitly spelled out but forms an implicit 
part of argumentation, such as in the following statement by the German Minister of 
the Interior in 2015, “(…) we cannot accept in Germany or Europe all people com-
ing from crisis regions or fleeing poverty” (de Maizière 2015), or the recent demand 
by the Deputy Mayor of Vienna that recognized refugees should be deported if they 
breach criminal law (Gudenus 2016). In both cases, the right to claim and receive 
asylum is questioned, though this is not spelled out. The same holds true for the 
recent limit on asylum applications imposed in Austria on the basis of an assumed 
threat to public order and security. This comes very close to the explicit application 
of this argument (BGBL 2016, 3–4).
On an individual level, the right to legal protection is contested by condemning 
asylum claims as wrongful, unfounded, etc. Procedures linked to the investigation 
of the rightfulness of an asylum claim are frequently led by general suspicion about 
“fake” applications. Public opinion also tends to mistrust the claims of asylum seek-
ers (see Mokre 2015, 35–44). Thus, asylum seekers are an especially weak group of 
migrants, making the “event” of the Refugee Protest Camp Vienna all the more 
interesting.
10.5  The Organization of Weak Interests in the Refugee 
Protest Camp Vienna
People participating in the march from the initial reception center at Traiskirchen to 
Vienna were mostly asylum seekers and thus in an especially weak position as 
described above, in a potential status of deportability (Hinger et al. 2018). The pop-
ulist right called them “asylum cheaters” (for example, see Gudenus 2013) and the 
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Austrian government rejected all the protest’s demands (see Mikl-Leitner 2013). 
Still, the refugee protest managed to remain active for about a year and the partici-
pants found a way out of their individual invisibility by gaining access to the “space 
of appearances” (Arendt, quoted in Hinger et al. 2018).
During this time, the refugees’ appeals ranged from general demands for free 
mobility and rights for all migrants and refugees, and particular demands in connec-
tion with (differently defined) sub-groups, e.g. specific refugee activists threatened 
by deportation (see Refugee Protest Camp Vienna 2013c).
The refugee activists framed the march from Traiskirchen to Vienna as a protest 
in support of the rights of all refugees, sans-papiers and migrants (Kovacic 2013). 
The first list of demands issued before the march focused on legal procedures and 
living conditions in Austria, especially in Traiskirchen. The refugees requested new 
and better translators, legal and medical aid, language courses in the camps, more 
pocket money, better food, Internet connections, etc. A general stop to deportation 
was also part of this list (Refugee Camp Vienna 2012a).
Immediately after the march, the two most urgent demands were issued:
 1. Our asylum should be continued as far as the situation in our countries does not 
get better. If this is not the case, we should have the possibility to prolong our 
legal stay here in Austria. If you don’t allow us to stay any longer here or before 
you decide to deport us, please cancel our fingerprints so we have the possibility 
to seek for asylum in other countries and avoid getting us deported.
 2. We need a work permission. We want to be self-sustainable, we don’t want to 
depend on the State. We reclaim back our dignity as human beings. (Refugee 
Camp Vienna 2012b).
On December 18, a list of “concretized demands” was published on the Refugee 
Protest Camp’s website. It included demands for better conditions during asylum 
procedures, as well as the “recognition of socio-economic motives in addition to the 
previously recognized escape reasons” (Refugee Camp Vienna 2012c).
Rather surprisingly, no further list of demands was published after December 
2012. However, the refugees uttered and repeated their demands on various occa-
sions: in discussions, at demonstrations, in press releases. The development of these 
demands shows how the general appeal for refugee rights changed to focus on the 
situation of the protesting refugees themselves. In this vein, one of the main aims of 
the hunger strike was the recognition of “toleration” status (Duldung) for the pro-
testing refugees (Refugee Camp Vienna 2012d). Further press releases dealt with 
the situation in the church and later in the monastery (Refugee Camp Vienna 2013a), 
protesting against police control and arrests (Refugee Camp Vienna 2013b, c) and 
against the deportation of eight refugee activists (Refugee Camp Vienna 2013d).
These shifts in the movement’s public statements show an oscillation between 
universalist and particular demands. Certainly, this oscillation to a great extent 
reflected the activists’ need for solutions to their individual problems. However, 
these shifts could also be interpreted as various attempts to strengthen the represen-
tation of the weak interests of refugees and to change public preferences (cf. 
Kirchhoff et  al. 2018). The universalist approach appealed to human rights–as 
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enshrined in the Declaration of Human Rights  (1948)–partly going beyond this 
document, e.g. by claiming the right to free mobility. The focus on a specific sub- 
group–not nationally defined but joined in a common struggle–enabled the protest-
ing refugees to stand out from the indefinite mass of refugees and migrants and thus 
to become recognizable “lives” in the sense of Judith Butler. Even in the early phase 
of the refugee protest, forms of individualization and personalization became dis-
cernable that allowed for such recognition, e.g. posters showing the faces of indi-
vidual refugees alongside the slogan “I want to stay”. With reference to Bader and 
Probst (2018), one could describe the strategies of the protest as “partly personify-
ing” and “partly exemplifying”.
However, the strengthening of individual interests and opportunities also led to 
exclusion and de-solidarization within the group. Some of the refugees had more 
plausible reasons to flee their countries than others (even if these were not accepted 
by authorities). They had quite clear-cut stories of forced migration leading more or 
less directly from their country of origin to Austria and were able to emphasize their 
individual “deservingness” (Bader and Probst 2018) based on their reasons for 
flight. Other activists came from states for which asylum is usually not granted 
(especially from Algeria and Morocco), while others were transmigrants who had 
already spent many years in various European countries, either illegally or transi-
tioning between legal and illegal status. Some also had prison experience, having 
been in detention and/or having served sentences for property and drug offences 
(Mokre 2015, 189–210).
Thus, within the weak group of protesting refugees some had stronger arguments 
for their legal claim to stay while the arguments of others were less substantial. 
State regulations led to legal differences between the groups forming part of the 
movement and these distinctions were partly reproduced internally. Differentiation 
between “real” and “economic” refugees, and between “good” refugees willing to 
integrate and “criminals” influenced self-definition within the group and intersected 
with distinctions relating to the country of origin (on similar dynamics in German 
movements, compare Odugbesan and Schwiertz 2018).
Not least, the hunger strike in the Votive Church highlighted a small group of 
refugees willing to risk their health, if not their lives, for their struggle. At the same 
time, due to the precarious situation in the church and the high health risk for the 
striking refugees, a prominent Austrian NGO, Caritas, was brought in by state and 
church officials to regulate the situation. Caritas is a Catholic organization that car-
ries out many tasks for the state in the field of asylum, e.g. distribution of financial 
support and the management of refugee centers. As in these centers, Caritas intro-
duced a strict regime inside the church, limiting access, creating regulations, etc. 
Caritas later set up the empty Servitenkloster monastery to serve as a collective refu-
gee center. State regulations for refugee centers implemented by Caritas thus had a 
direct impact on the movement and led to further exclusions (Müller 2013).
The issue of exclusion became especially prominent when, in July 2013, eight 
refugee activists were accused of human trafficking. Most of the supporters doubted 
the accuracy of this accusation. For many, it seemed probable (and understandable) 
that refugees had supported friends and family members who wanted to cross 
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 borders–and had not been motivated by commercial reasons. Besides, many sup-
porters understood the criminalization of help in crossing borders as an unjustified 
limitation of the right to free movement. Some of the refugees in the monastery, 
however, held the view that those taken into custody had endangered the whole 
group by helping other refugees in activities deemed illegal.
Exclusion from and restrictions within the group defining itself as the refugee 
movement certainly represented a problematic development from a normative politi-
cal perspective advocating universal human rights for all migrants. Even though the 
refugee activists upheld their claim to also represent sans-papiers and migrants, 
neither group was included in the self-assigned name “refugee movement”. However, 
this narrowing of definition may have contributed to the movement’s partial success 
with regard to the legalization of individual refugee activists. Limiting the group 
and thereby making it stand out from the indefinite group of refugees can be seen as 
a functional means of strengthening weak interests.
At the same time, the protest’s universalist claim can be interpreted as a strategic 
move aiming to gain maximum support from migrants with varying legal status and 
opportunities, as well as from Austrian civil society. This led, at least in the begin-
ning, to a broad solidarity movement supported by a wide range of NGOs and indi-
viduals, and provided the necessary material and personal resources for maintaining 
the movement over a relatively long period of time.
Finally, the movement’s activities can be interpreted as “acts of citizenship”, 
extending citizenship beyond its national container. The refugees constituted them-
selves as citizens by performing their “right to have rights” (Isin 2009, 370–372; 
Arendt 1949, 760). They thereby challenged the foundations of the nation state, as 
well as its concrete policies, and constituted themselves as political subjects. Still, 
this form of subjectivization remained precarious and endangered–a situation that 
proved difficult for the joint political struggle of refugees and supporters (see Ataç 
2013).
10.6  Refugees and Supporters: A Complex Relationship
Around 150 refugees and 50 supporters started on the march from Traiskirchen; 
when it arrived in Vienna, it consisted of 100 refugees and 400 supporters. During 
the self-organized camp in front of the Votive Church, several hundred refugees and 
supporters were present and active. Thus, qualitative as well as quantitative mobili-
zation took place (Rucht 1988). A relatively small, but at this point growing, group 
of activists committed themselves to the limit of their power capability and beyond 
(the “hard-core” of supporters in the words of Bader and Probst 2018), while a large 
number of individuals as well as some organizations provided occasional support 
and took part in demonstrations and other public action. These weak ties were 
important for increasing publicity, as well as for including legal experts in the move-
ment; they had little influence on the main decisions concerning the movement 
taken by the hard-core supporters but contributed to their implementation and, 
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through their quantitative significance, gave the movement democratic legitimacy 
(see Bader and Probst 2018).
This form of legitimacy declined over time. The group of refugees continuously 
shrank as some of the protestors moved into the church, the camp in the park was 
destroyed, and the remaining protestors moved to the monastery. People left the 
protest partly for personal reasons, but also partly because they were not satisfied 
with the development of the protest and with the changes in  location. In parallel 
with these developments, the group of active supporters dwindled and public atten-
tion declined. At the same time however, ties within the remaining group of refugees 
and supporters became closer and stronger, and friendships and love relations devel-
oped. In combination with the lack of structure in the movement, this situation made 
it difficult for new activists to enter. In the terminology of Granovetter (1973, 1375), 
it could be argued that at this stage the protest lacked weak or “bridge” ties, which 
are of crucial importance for networking and political mobilization.
Relationships within the core group of refugees and supporters were not only 
based on diverse emotional bonds but also on different understandings of the aims 
of the movement and the means to achieve them. With regard to the latter, two 
approaches predominated: support for individual refugees and collective political 
action. These differences were more relevant for the group of supporters than the 
refugees. Some supporters clearly inclined toward the one or other understanding of 
the movement and its aims on the basis of their respective backgrounds–some were 
politically active in leftist organizations, while others were involved in social work 
or legal support structures. At the same time however, these conceptualizations con-
stantly blended into one another in the daily actions of the group and of every mem-
ber of the group. Collective political activism and the social and legal aid given to 
the refugees by supporters went hand in hand, while at the same time leading to 
constant tensions and contradictions within the movement. While these activities 
were driven by the same overall aim to establish a stable situation for the refugees 
in the country they wanted to live in, inevitably the means of achieving this were 
extremely different. This became obvious, for example, in the contrast between the 
radical slogans displayed at demonstrations (“nobody is illegal”; “no border, no 
nation, no deportation”) and the wording of letters of support for individual refugees 
emphasizing the perfect integration of the applicant, the benefits for Austria if he or 
she was allowed to stay, etc.
Both understandings of the movement faced and created problems in daily activ-
ity. Collective political struggle was difficult to sustain at eye level in a group con-
sisting of people in radically different life situations and with contrasting privileges, 
and confronted with radically different risks relating to their political activities. In 
fact, individual support was frequently inevitable in order to enable political activ-
ism. However, in contrast to collective political protest, legal aid granted over a long 
period of time, the provision of accommodation, and active resistance to deportation 
are forms of support that can only be provided for a limited group of people. Thus, 
these activities, as well as financial support for individuals, continuously led to the 
question of who was part of the refugee movement and who was not, and thereby to 
exclusion detrimental to the movement’s general political aims.
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Friendships and love relationships further jeopardized collective action for the 
refugees and solidarity within the protesting group. Obviously, supporters were 
more inclined to help their friends and partners than other people; this led to dif-
ferentiation within the group, tensions, and jealousy. Effective individual support 
toward stabilizing the situation of a refugee required a high amount of energy, time, 
and funding, and thus significantly reduced the resources available for the whole 
group or for the movement’s general political goals (Mokre 2015, 141–188).
On the other hand, it should be underlined that the strong ties (Granovetter 1973, 
1361) within the core group of refugees and supporters, as well as friendship and 
love, probably also contributed to strengthen the movement and make it more sus-
tainable. After all, desire is an important trigger for political action and a high level 
of political activism including considerable effort and risk could not have been 
upheld without a strong desire for community (see Rancière and Confavreux 2016).
10.7  Conclusions and Outlook
It has been the aim of this chapter to analyze the refugee protest movement in 
Vienna from different theoretical perspectives. It was argued that the beginning of 
the movement should be understood as an event in the sense of Badiou (2005) since 
no specific POS could be discerned for the protest, neither in the form of favorable 
political conditions nor in the form of deteriorating conditions for refugees. With 
regard to the strategies of the movement, the chapter took as its starting point the 
assumption that migrants’ interests are weak for two reasons: (1) migrants have 
multiple and diverse interests, and (2) they are a marginalized group. In line with 
Judith Butler, this marginalization was described as the “non-recognition” of 
migrants’ lives. Within the group of migrants, refugees have a special position: rec-
ognized refugees are relatively privileged migrants while the resources of asylum 
seekers are very limited. The Refugee Protest Camp Vienna, consisting mainly of 
asylum seekers, defended its weak interests by combining universalist and group 
claims, as well as individual claims. While this diverse strategy can be understood 
as a means to strengthen representation, it obviously also led to problematic contra-
dictions and exclusion. At the same time, the movement was unified by the subjec-
tivization of asylum seekers as citizens (in the sense of Isin 2009). This political 
subjectivization, however, remained precarious due to the lack of a legal founda-
tion–this marked the essential difference in status and opportunity between refugees 
and supporters in the movement. The relations between the two groups involved in 
the protest were described according to quantitative and qualitative mobilization, 
strong and weak ties, and as a mixture of individual support and collective political 
action. Again, several contradictions in the movement’s actions and relations were 
identified. These were, however, largely inevitable due to external conditions, as 
well as to the specific structures of movements of refugees and supporters.
Obviously, this analysis of the movement through various theoretical lenses does 
not imply that the activists developed consistent strategies based on various and 
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contradictory instruments. Rather, they reacted partly rationally, partly intuitively, 
partly in a planned way, and partly spontaneously to repressive framing conditions 
and the precarious situation of the refugee activists. Still, a theory-led analysis can, 
perhaps, help to assess different forms of political protest and their impact.
At this point, the overall evaluation of the political success of the movement must 
come to a rather pessimistic conclusion. Not only has the situation of refugees 
within the EU as a whole become much worse since 2013, with Austria playing a 
decisive role in this by closing its borders and thus the whole Balkan route, as well 
as denying all responsibility for the problems in other EU countries, most notably 
Greece (see ARD 2016). Moreover, already in 2012 and 2013 it became clear that 
the government would not change its policies in favor of refugees in general and 
was unwilling to make collective concessions to the refugee activists, priding itself 
in not being blackmailed by the protest (Mikl-Leitner 2013). Thus, while being able 
to change public preferences, at least for some time, the movement did not achieve 
policy change (cf. Kirchhoff et al. 2018).
With regard to the individual situation of the refugee activists, a more differenti-
ated assessment is necessary. Clearly, the support of people with experience in the 
Austrian legal system helped the refugees. They received better legal aid: some 
lawyers worked for free or for a reduced fee covered by donations or, in some cases, 
by Caritas. Thus, legal resources were partly successfully used (cf. Kirchhoff et al. 
2018). Whether the fact that authorities knew about the political involvement of 
these people helped or rather harmed their cases, or perhaps played no role at all, 
has remained an open question up till now. On a quantitative level, the outcome 
could be assessed as positive. Most of the refugees in the movement came from 
Pakistan; in 2012, less than 1% of asylum seekers from this country were granted 
asylum in Austria. The share of positive decisions for people in the movement was 
considerably higher and, in general, the recognition rate for asylum seekers from 
Pakistan increased a little in the following year to around 2%. However, several 
refugee activists received negative asylum decisions and, more importantly, eight 
were deported and eight accused of human trafficking. Seven of these were con-
victed. In the latter case, it became obvious during court proceedings that the activ-
ists had been under police observation for several months. Additionally, it should be 
mentioned that in the spring and summer of 2013, deportations of Pakistani citizens 
took place who were not members of the movement and had lived in Austria for 
several years–without legal documents but also without having had major problems 
with the police. These people and their families made the movement responsible for 
their deportation as its activities had drawn attention to people from Pakistan in 
Austria.
Still, refugee movements all over the EU were able, at least for some time, to 
make refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants visible in the public sphere and to 
point to the possibility of a society in which migrants belong and act as citizens, and 
in which their lives are as valuable as those of any other citizen.
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For decades many countries in Europe have experienced right-radical and right- 
populist activities (Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Decker et al. 2015; Filietz 
and Laloire 2016). However, these were predominantly analyzed with respect to 
political parties and electoral behavior (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Mudde 2007; 
Art 2011). Over the last few decades in most European countries far-right radical 
parties have failed to attract many supporters, whereas right populist parties have 
fared much better. However, Germany has proven the exception in two ways: First, 
no significant right-populist party existed at the national level; and second, right- 
wing groups and networks in Germany had carried out a high number of aggressive 
and/or violent acts. Particularly since the early 1990s, these groups have engaged in 
a large number of protest activities against refugees and asylum seekers, including 
arson attacks and murder (Kleffner and Staud 2015). Critically, in recent years these 
groups not only intensified their networking between each other but also established 
links with right-radical parties. Furthermore, the right populist parties, most notably 
the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), though not endors-
ing physical violence, have fuelled broader xenophobic sentiments through signal-
ling understanding and empathy for the enraged mob. Taken together, these various 
groups–with somewhat different ideological leanings and strategic preferences–
have become elements of a thriving right-wing movement in Germany. This move-
ment cannot be fully grasped by a single term or fully understood by looking only 
at party politics and electoral behaviour. A focus solely on right-wing parties is also 
too narrow because these parties are embedded in and fuelled by an activist environ-
ment where right-wing issues and demands are debated and negotiated.
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For these reasons, it is useful to look at the complete ensemble of the right, 
including those groups, organizations and networks that act in the background and 
sometimes even in explicit distance to right-wing parties. I argue that the structure 
and activities of this ensemble can be described and analyzed by concepts and tools 
developed in social movement studies. In this chapter I will concentrate on the most 
visible and most disputed aspect of right-wing activities, namely their protest activi-
ties directed against refugees and, more particularly, asylum seekers. How have 
these activities evolved over time in terms of frequency, participation and form? To 
which extent are they embedded in and nourished by more general sentiments and 
beliefs among parts of the German population? What are the economic, political 
and cultural underpinnings that foster both xenophobic sentiments and concrete 
behaviors?
To answer these questions, I will firstly outline a brief overview of the develop-
ment of xenophobic sentiments and activities in Germany from the 1950s to the 
present. The second and main part of this chapter will describe, analyze and inter-
pret the extraordinary rise of such sentiments and activities during recent years with 
regard to (a) the structural properties of these groups and networks and (b) their 
publicly visible performances and protest activities. Thirdly, broader background 
factors as well as more specific political and discursive opportunities for the rise of 
xenophobic sentiments and actions will be discussed before, finally, offering some 
concluding remarks and a short prediction of how this may evolve in the future.
11.2  Xenophobic Sentiments and Activities in Germany: 
A Brief Overview
The end of World War II by no means meant the end of racist attitudes in Germany. 
In East Germany, with its self-definition as an anti-fascist state, the authorities 
denied or rigorously suppressed all kinds of anti-Semitic expressions. In later peri-
ods, however, xenophobic and racist sentiments were directed against the imported 
workforce from communist “brother-nations”, predominantly from Poland and 
Hungary from the mid-1960s, later followed by North Vietnam (by far the largest 
contingent in 1989), Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola and China. The East German regime 
used the presence of these so-called contract workers for both propaganda purposes 
and as a cheap labor force. At the same time, little effort was made to integrate them 
into society (Krüger-Potratz 1991).
In West Germany, negative sentiments against culturally or ethnically distinct 
groups (e.g., Jews) could still be expressed in some places, though they were 
strongly condemned in public (Bergmann 1997). Right-wing groups and especially 
those that still embraced Nazism faced strong opposition when acting in public. 
This was particularly true for anti-Semitic groups, although anti-Semitism still 
existed and occasionally manifested itself in clandestine activities or Nazi graffiti.
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In reaction to the massive influx of so-called guest workers coming from pre-
dominantly Southern European countries, a minority of West Germans complained 
about the presence of these “foreigners”1. There were also some isolated acts of 
aggression. However, this did not result in coherent and organized collective xeno-
phobic activities (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1967; Körner and Spiess 1982).
Despite the guest worker immigration program officially ending in 1973, the 
number of “foreigners” living in West Germany has continued to increase until 
today. In part, this was due to guest workers who not only decided to stay, but also 
brought their family members to Germany. In later periods, legalized work force 
mobility within the EU as well as several refugee movements contributed to rising 
numbers of “foreigners” in (West) Germany. According to official statistics, in 2014 
about one fifth of the population in Germany had a migration background. Among 
this fifth, two thirds are first generation immigrants and the rest are second and third 
generation immigrants.
Representative surveys undertaken from the 1950s to the present day indicate 
that the proportion of Germans who hold right-wing or right-radical worldviews 
and, often connected to this, those that express xenophobic sentiments, has changed 
little over time. Generally speaking, right-wing attitudes are firmly anchored in 
parts of the German population (Stöss 2010; Heitmeyer 2011). Depending on the 
survey instruments, precise wording and timing, between 15 and 25% of the adult 
population fall into this category. These people provide the central resource pool 
and sounding board for decidedly right-wing organizers and agitators and a solid 
base for xenophobia. In addition, xenophobic ideas also resonate in other strata of 
the population, including people who place themselves in the middle and even the 
left section of the political spectrum (Zick and Klein 2014; Decker and Brähler 
2016; Decker et al. 2016).
People holding certain ideas and attitudes do not necessarily turn those beliefs 
into practice. Rather, beliefs can form a potential for action resulting from previous 
or ongoing processes of consensus mobilization (Klandermans 2013). Occasionally, 
this potential is more targeted in attempts of action mobilization. The extent to 
which people can be activated, or put differently, the extent to which they are will-
ing to take action, depends on many factors, both internal and external to the net-
works and movements under study. Action mobilization, ranging from: public 
speeches or symbolic statements, to collective rallies in the streets or to violent 
attacks, does not occur randomly but rather manifests itself in waves. Quite often, 
such waves are strengthened or triggered by catalytic processes, e.g. perceptions of 
crisis, threat, vulnerability, injustice and so forth (Koopmans 2004). It has been 
argued that the rise of xenophobic activities in Germany was encouraged by the 
increase of “foreigners” in certain time periods. One crucial period began in the late 
1980s. Apart from the many immigrants with German roots coming from the Soviet 
1 This vague term “foreigner” (Ausländer) is widely used in the German context. It may be applied 
not only to people without a German passport but in right-wing circles also to German citizens 
with an immigrant background.
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Union2, the numbers of asylum seekers from various countries rose relatively 
quickly, passing the symbolic threshold of 100,000  in 1988 and reaching almost 
200,000 in 1992. Mass media fuelled latent anxieties about “the flood of foreigners” 
with headlines such as “the boat is full.” And, as such, discussions about immigrants 
and refugees in the now united Germany intensified. More importantly however, 
aggressive acts against asylum seekers and refugees sharply increased in numbers 
and intensity, culminating in arson attacks and murder. The hotspots of this aggres-
sion–Solingen, Mölln, Rostock-Hoyerswerda–have become part of the German col-
lective memory.3
Public debate in the early 1990s focused on the liberal right to asylum enshrined 
in the German constitution as a lesson learnt from the Nazi past. This right, some 
argued, was a pull factor for asylum seekers especially for people from some Arab, 
Asian and African countries. Surprisingly quickly, leading political decision- makers 
agreed to restrict the right to asylum as well as implement a number of administra-
tive regulations to reduce the number of refugees (Luft and Schimany 2014). As a 
result, the numbers of refugees decreased in the following years, as did the number 
of violent acts against “foreigners”. However, xenophobic sentiments and right- 
wing activities did not completely dissipate. In the period from 1993 to roughly 
2013, there was no significant quantitative change in the number of activities 
recorded. There were a few occasions during this period where the far right was able 
to mobilize up to 7000 right-wing activists to take to the streets, most notable was a 
public exhibition on war cruelties committed by regular German troops during 
World War II and the right-wing dominated commemoration of the bombing of the 
city of Dresden. Yet despite these specific and infrequent events, right-wing protest 
mobilization remained relatively small when measured by the number of partici-
pants. At the same time, the sheer number of right-wing protest events that included 
violence, remained high after the peak in 1992/93 (Rucht 2003).
In turn, the rise of xenophobia also strengthened the counter-mobilization of the 
radical left, moderate left and liberal groups. Some of these, most explicitly the so- 
called Antifa-groups (a short hand for left-radical anti-fascist groups) specialized in 
observing and protesting right-wing protesters. Not surprisingly, direct encounters 
occasionally ended in skirmishes, physical battles and, though not in the context of 
mass protest, in the killing of some individuals. During this period, the network of 
right-wing groups also became more dense, with a strengthening of the social move-
ment component and relative to this, a weakening of the connections to political 
parties. In this process, the use of new media, including the Internet, was an impor-
tant facilitating factor.
2 Numbers of immigrants with German heritage also rose sharply from 1987, reaching a peak of 
almost 400,000 in 1990. In addition, there was migration from East to West Germany, culminating 
in almost 440,000 people by 1992.
3 There is conflicting data on this issue with the German government listed 75 people killed by 
right-wing groups from 1990 to 2015. According to data published by the Amadeu Antonio 
Foundation, 178 people were killed by right-wing groups in the same period.
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Starting in 2013/14, further changes in the right-wing movements could be 
observed. Firstly, the popularity of right-populist groups (partly distancing them-
selves from neo-Nazi groups) grew rapidly. They organized themselves in various 
ways, as a political party, as formal associations and informal groups. Secondly, 
their numbers of public appearances increased, as did public participation in dem-
onstrations and rallies. Thirdly, xenophobic aggression rose sharply, culminating in 
a series of mainly arson attacks against shelters for asylum seekers. A catalyst for 
these developments were the slowly rising, then accelerating numbers of asylum 
seekers arriving in Germany.4 However, more important than the objective figures is 
their interpretation. To a greater extent than in the years around 1990, the influx of 
asylum seekers was now perceived as an immediate threat for the welfare, political 
stability and cultural identity of the German people. Other factors contributed to 
such anxieties and will be explored in the following section (see below). Yet, in its 
most simplistic form, this interpretative xenophobic frame was offered by right- 
wing groups and found fertile ground among the wider and more moderate seg-
ments of the population.
11.3  The Profile of the Recent Right-Populist and Right- 
Radical Xenophobic Mobilization
Before offering a description of the structural underpinnings and actual protest 
activities of xenophobic right-wing groups, it seems appropriate to sort out the 
major ideological tendencies on the right side of the political spectrum.
11.3.1  The Four Sections that Make Up the Right-Wing 
Spectrum
For analytical purposes one can distinguish four right-wing positions that differ in 
their ideological leaning and strategic preferences: conservatism, right-populism, 
right-radicalism and right-terrorism. When considering the numbers, recent right- 
wing mobilization accompanied by explicit xenophobic statements, claims and 
protest acts, is anchored in the realm of right-populism and right-radicalism/extrem-
ism5. In the last few years, these two sections have grown and partly interlinked, 
finding growing popularity in parts of the German population.
4 In 2015, 476,649 asylum seekers were officially registered. The total number of refugees (includ-
ing asylum seekers) who arrived in Germany reached about one million in that year. Another 
657,855 asylum seekers were registered from January to September 2016.
5 The term right-extremism is much more often used in research, public debates, official reports and 
law. It usually refers to the juridical definition of political extremism as incompatible with the 
existing liberal-democratic constitutional order (Freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung). In 
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Simply put, right-populists are critical of established politics (including conser-
vative parties) and elites, share nationalist sentiments, and wish to keep “foreigners” 
out of Germany. As all brands of populists, right-populists idealize the common or 
everyday people as a homogeneous and authentic entity whose needs and interests 
are grossly neglected or violated by self-centred, privileged and immoral political, 
economic and cultural elites. This position separates them from most conservative 
groups and parties. Yet right-populists also tend to keep Nazi, neo-Nazi and other 
anti-Semitic groups at arm’s length, at least on the public record. Additionally, they 
refrain from using violence, though often express understanding for those who 
resort to such acts. By contrast, right-radicals are more ambivalent and sometimes 
look more favourably towards such positions, but they stop short from engaging in 
terrorist acts.6
While right-populists embrace instruments of direct democracy without neces-
sarily rejecting liberal democracy as such, right-radicals are highly critical of the 
system of democratic representation, the separation of powers, the protection of 
minorities, etc. Right-radicals endorse strong leadership much more overtly than 
right-populists. Most importantly, they believe in the natural superiority of the 
domestic ethnicity and culture over others. While such racism is inseparable from 
right-radicalism and expressed quite candidly in right-radical circles, right- populists 
tend to do not, or not openly, embrace racist positions (Sturm 2010).
These remarks referring to more or less distinct and explicit positions indicate 
the difficulty in drawing neat boundaries between the groups. Clearly, as long as 
they are neighbouring each other on the political scale there will be areas of ambi-
guity and interpenetration between them. This applies especially to the field of 
extra-parliamentary politics where there is room for multiple affiliations and tactical 
alliances. In contrast, in the field of party politics the boundaries between these 
groups are more clearly marked because voting follows the rules of a zero-sum 
game. This may result in tough competition and open animosities between different 
right-wing parties, however this is usually more pronounced between the leaders of 
competing parties than the rank-and-file membership.
For these reasons, it would be misleading to treat right-populist and right-radical 
groups in isolation from each other. In a similar vein, it would be misleading to 
study right-wing political parties and other formal associations in separation from 
informal groups and networks as if they were completely different with no interac-
tion between them. Convergence becomes particularly pronounced when it comes 
to blaming refugees and asylum seekers, along with permissive political elites, for 
my understanding, radicalism encompasses more than this because it includes claims and activi-
ties, e.g. for a non-violent revolution, that are not necessarily illegal.
6 Right-terrorist acts consisting of planned and ruthless arson and murder increased in the first half 
of the 1980s, then again in the early 1990s and eventually in the early 2000s. However, compared 
to the tens of a thousand right-wing radicals in Germany, the number of right-wing terrorists is 
small and probably does not exceed one or two hundreds. The “National-Socialist Underground” 
responsible for the killing of ten people between 2000 and 2007 consisted of three activists to 
whom one might add a so far unknown but small group of collaborators.
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undermining or even destroying the “German fatherland.” In this regard, otherwise 
quite different groups exhibit a common denominator.
11.3.2  The Composition and Structure of Contemporary 
Right-Wing Groups
Because of their structure, the plethora of German right-wing groups can be called 
a social movement, insofar as they consist of loosely coupled networks composed 
of political parties, citizen initiatives, comradeships, cliques, music bands, intellec-
tual circles, journals, press houses, stores, online-services, meeting centers, pubs, 
etc. Some of these components, most notably political parties such as the National 
Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), The Right (Die Rechte), The Third Way (Der 
III. Weg), Pro Germany (Pro Deutschland) and the populist AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland), are public and therefore easily observable. Others tend to act in a 
semi-public way (e.g., Hooligans against Salafis) or at the local level (e.g. Pro 
Cologne, pro NRW, Pegida and Legida). Further along the spectrum, there are those 
acting in closed circles (e.g., various so-called comradeships) because they are 
afraid of being closely monitored by media, counter-activists and/or the intelligence 
service.
Some parties with a strong xenophobic focus grew out of former associations, for 
example, Pro Cologne and Pro North Rhine-Westphalia (Pro NRW). However, these 
parties remained insignificant in terms of membership and voters. This has changed 
in the last 2–3 years when two groups in particular, the right-populist party AfD and 
locally anchored association named Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamization of the Occident), a blend of right-populist and right-radicals, moved to 
the fore.
Right-populism should not only be equated with certain political parties, as there 
also exists a growing network of right-populist groups at the local and regional lev-
els. Because of this I shall first explore the domain of the extra-parliamentary right 
with a special attention to right-populist groups before turning to the radical right.
The organizational consolidation of right-populism can be traced back further 
than the recent so-called refugee crisis. In several parts of Germany, groups or small 
parties critical of immigration more generally, and the rising number of Muslims in 
particular, have existed since the 1990s. These groups were particularly popular in 
Cologne and the state of North Rhine-Westphalia where there is a sizeable Muslim 
population. Here the outright xenophobic Pro Cologne and Pro NRW served as a 
model for similar groups in other parts of the country. One of the key goals of these 
groups was to prevent the construction of mosques on German territory.
The other stronghold was in Eastern Germany and especially in the state of 
Saxony, which, interestingly, had also been a stronghold of the right-radical party 
the NPD. It is important to point out that the number of people with a non-German 
background is very small in East Germany, and the number of Muslims is barely 
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significant. Recent research has suggested that not in spite of but because of this low 
number, xenophobic attitudes have flourished as the locals lack practical exchanges 
with “foreigners” and therefore use them as scapegoats to project their prejudices, 
anxieties and fear onto (Zick and Küpper 2015; Zick et al. 2016). Although public 
xenophobic statements and protest activities were on the rise, the established parties 
did little to counter these tendencies or allay these fears, thereby strengthening the 
impression of these groups that the political establishment is self-centred and tends 
to ignore the sentiments and demands of the populace.
The creation of Pegida in Dresden in the fall of 2014 served as a catalyst and 
magnet for the above mentioned free-floating sentiments. Pegida became known for 
its weekly protest event, which still continues today (for details see below). When 
Pegida began they received huge media attention in part because in its early phase 
little was known about this group that claimed to represent “the people”, but also 
because they aggressively criticized and called most members of the media liars. 
Pegida in Dresden, as well as its affiliates in a range of other cities faced consider-
able counter-demonstrations (Marg et al. 2016) that occasionally resulted in skir-
mishes with Pegida participants and/or police.
While populist groups such as the AfD and Pegida are clearly positioned ideo-
logically on the far right, this is less clear for some of their participants. According 
to various surveys, a significant proportion of these groups’ followers are not driven 
by right-wing ideology but rather a general frustration over established politics, 
fears of economic deprivation and of an intensified struggle over scarce resources 
and facilities due to the influx of refugees. Research has shown that these organiza-
tions predominantly recruit people who had previously voted for conservative par-
ties or who abstained from voting because they felt politically alienated and 
neglected. But it was also found that right-populist groups attract people who posit 
themselves right in the middle or even to the left of the political spectrum. The sur-
veys also showed that a minority of trade union members were attracted to these 
right-populist groups (see Daphi et al. 2015; Geiges et al. 2015; Patzelt and Eichardt 
2015; Reuband 2015; Rucht 2015; Vorländer et al. 2016).
Further to the right, there exists a bunch of right-radical parties, comradeships 
and other groups that are explicitly anti-democratic and racist (Häusler and Virchow 
2012). The federal and state-based agencies for the Protection of the Constitution 
and the criminal police closely observe these groups. Some of them have been 
declared illegal, an act which usually results in a re-organization of the group or 
network under a new name. On ideological grounds, there is nothing very new about 
these groups.7 On structural grounds and tactics, however, they seem to have become 
more professional in their way of decentralized organizing, their use of electronic 
means of communication, and their ways of recruiting new members; often by 
7 There has been a gradual shift from the outright racist Nazi or neo-Nazi ideology to a more 
nuanced ideology that accepts the legitimacy and specific values of different ethnicities as long as 
these remain confined to their original geographical homelands. For this more recent strand, the 
idea of identity, as promoted by the network Die Identitären and the party Die Rechte, is key.
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 infiltrating local leisure clubs, voluntary fire brigades, and local social associations 
(Radke and Staud 2012).
Also worth mentioning is the existence and activity of clandestine groups, most 
notably the series of murders committed by the National-Socialist Underground 
(Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, NSU) between 2000 and 2006. While this 
group appeared to be small, one should also consider that, according to official data 
from March 2016, 372 right-wing activists (of which 342 had been previously sen-
tenced) were living underground.
Another component of the right-wing infrastructure, and one that partly tran-
scends national borders, are the relatively small numbers of intellectuals, scientists, 
journalists and artists who directly or indirectly support the right. They serve as 
reference points and allegedly credible sources for right-wing claims. Sometimes 
these people have a long history of involvement in right-wing politics, sometimes 
there are also defectors who have moved from the far left to the far right. In the 
context of Pegida, several people of this kind gave speeches or were cited by others 
in the movement.
To sum up, over the last few decades right-wing groups have created loosely con-
nected and flexible structures that allow for effective communication and mobiliza-
tion. The nodes in this structure vary in their concrete ideological orientation and 
organizational forms. While many of these groups were explicitly created to pursue 
political aims, there were also right-wing individuals or small groups who, nomi-
nally private, are active in non-political pockets of civil society. In organizational 
terms, these groups range from formal and hierarchical nationwide organizations 
(including political parties) to completely informal and local friendship circles. 
Some groups and organizations have existed for decades; others split and unite, 
change labels, or remain completely informal. In some cases, the link to the political 
right is unobtrusive, as exemplified by some music bands or web-based stores. The 
density of right-wing infrastructure varies considerably within Germany. In some 
places, it is almost absent, especially where a leftist culture prevails. In other places, 
most notably in some rural areas in East Germany, right-wing groups have acquired 
a hegemonic status so that it has become risky to express a dissenting view, let alone 
to live there as an apparent non-German recognizable by, for example, being non- 
white (Schröder 1997; Döring 2007). This anchorage and embedding in local and 
regional communities not only increases the self-confidence of right-wing activists 
but may also encourage them to engage in criminal acts such as arson attacks on 
asylum shelters: Acts that are sometimes publicly applauded by local bystanders, as 
occurred in the city of Freital (Saxony) in 2015 alongside other cities in 2015/16.
11.3.3  Performances and Protest Activities
Right-wing public performances and protest activities tend to be widely reported 
and are therefore well known. An outwardly directed facet of this activity; directed 
to the wider public and media, is the presentation of a collective body, arranged as 
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a densely packed crowd that epitomizes coherence, will, energy, determination and 
power. The explicit messages are conveyed by repeated and loudly shouted slogans 
such as “Liar Press” and “We are the people,” flags, signs, placards, posters, and 
banners. In the case of Pegida, even a special anthem was composed. Also a sizeable 
number of marshals, eager to draw a clear boundary between the committed partici-
pants and curious bystanders, maintained the physical shape of the collective body.
The organizers’ directives to the participants and speeches were–although also 
having an external character–the main methods for transmitting internal messages. 
One important aim of these messages was to maintain discipline through the ban-
ning of alcohol and violence, and instructions to unconditionally follow orders of 
the police. The nature and tone of the speeches varied considerably; sometimes the 
claims and demands were moderate and soft and on other occasions they were sharp 
and aggressive (Knopp 2016). At some protests the same speaker may play both 
cards, although moderation can quite often be just a disguise to prevent, for exam-
ple, juridical sanctions. Frequently used rhetorical devises at these protests were to 
make vague allusions about what you are saying or present an opinion in the form 
of a suggestive question so that the audience will still pick up on the intended 
message.
It is very likely that both subtle and more direct forms of xenophobic allegations 
and verbal attacks encourage more determined and risk-taking right-wing groups to 
engage in aggressive and partly violent actions. The history of such actions can be 
traced through the annually published governmental reports and protest event analy-
ses carried out by academic researchers.
An analysis on protest events based on reports of the newspapers Süddeutsche 
Zeitung and Frankfurter Rundschau showed distinct patterns and changes in right- 
wing protests from 1950 to 2002 (Rucht 2003). Until the late 1980s, right-wing 
protests in West Germany accounted for only a small proportion of all protest events. 
Moreover, the turnout to these events was negligible. Since the 1990s, right-wing 
protests have become more frequent, although numbers of participants remained 
insignificant. During the 1990s, the political violence that had been previously con-
centrated on the left side of the political scale shifted to the right. The proportion of 
all right-wing protests that were violent dramatically increased, reaching up to 80% 
during these years. Research also showed that, especially when considering popula-
tion size, right-wing protests, including violent ones, were much more frequent in 
East Germany than in West Germany (Rucht 2003, 84–90).
Since the turn of the century, there have been several instances of collective 
xenophobic outbursts that are worth mentioning. One example was the series of 
protests against the construction or even existence of mosques, initiated by groups 
such as Pro Cologne and Pro NRW. Other examples were the partly violent xeono-
phobic acts in the small city of Mügeln in Saxony in 2007. Interestingly, local and 
state politicians and the local and regional media grossly trivialized these events 
(Schellenberg 2016).
A third example was the emergence of a German group, inspired by the English 
Defence League, calling themselves Hooligans against Salafist. This group, as indi-
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cated by its name, especially targets the Muslim Salafists who had made some 
 previous problematic public appearances.8 In a public protest in Cologne in October 
2014, Hooligans against Salafists was able to mobilize some 4000 demonstrators. 
Many of these engaged in severe clashes with a largely unprepared and overstrained 
contingent of 1300 police. Although xenophobic activities had been on the rise dur-
ing 2014 these actions had remained scattered. However, the situation changed dra-
matically at the end of 2015.
One key development was the quick rise of Pegida in Dresden and its affiliations 
in dozens of other cities across Germany and beyond.9 After existing for only a few 
months, by January 2015 Pegida had already attracted more than 20,000 partici-
pants in one single rally, by far the highest turnout of a right-wing protest in Germany 
since the end of World War II.  Numbers declined in the subsequent months for 
several reasons; among these were the disclosure of Lutz Bachmann’s–a leading 
figure of the movement–criminal past and his offensive remarks about refugees. 
This, together with increasing racist tendencies, triggered an internal struggle within 
the Pegida leadership resulting in the more moderate sections leaving the group.
It was the so-called refugee crisis that eventually turned the tide not only for 
Pegida but also for all kinds of right-populist and to some extent right-radical 
groups. Participation in Pegida’s weekly protests rose again, reaching a second peak 
of roughly 20,000 demonstrators at the group’s first anniversary protest in September 
2016. After that, the numbers in the weekly demonstration declined and fell down 
to roughly 2500.10
A second important catalyst and background factor for the increasingly aggres-
sive mood against refugees and asylum seekers was the rise of the political party the 
AfD. Although the party had been temporarily weakened after its split in the sum-
mer of 2015, against the backdrop of the “refugee crisis” and the rise of Pegida, the 
AfD was not only revitalized but became stronger than it was before the split. 
Critically, they also moved further to the right. Both organizations, though officially 
separate, promoted essentially the same ideology; presenting themselves as a 
mouthpiece and incarnation of the “German Volk” according to the slogan “We are 
the people” (Wir sind das Volk). In terms of their actions and tactics, the AfD is, at 
least since 2015, clearly a social movement party transcending the action repertoire 
of established parties. On several occasions, the party, most notably the branch in 
the state of Thuringia with its aggressive frontman Björn Höcke, has organized 
street protests that resemble those of Pegida in both form and rhetoric.
8 For example, some of them walked through the inner city of Wuppertal in December 2015 pre-
tending, through the words printed on the back of their vests, that they were a “schari’ah police” 
whose task was to identify violations of Muslim rules.
9 On various attempts to establish Pegida affiliations in other countries, see Berntzen and 
Weisskircher 2016.
10 For detailed numbers since Pegida began as well as turnout in counter-demonstrations in various 
cities, see Wikipedia’s entry on Pegida. The second anniversary of Pegida again triggered a higher 
turnout with 5000–8000 participants on October 16, 2016.
11 Mobilization Against Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Germany: A Social…
236
Adding to this and parallel to the rise of Pegida and its affiliates, and the AfD and 
similar-minded right-populist groups, Germany experienced an explosion of 
 right- wing and/or xenophobic actions. According of official statistics, right-wing 
oriented criminal acts (most of these classified as non-violent and were instead cat-
egorized as propaganda) rose sharply between 2014 and 2015 (see Table 11.1).11 As 
did the number of right-wing public demonstrations, violent acts and, more particu-
larly, assaults against shelters for asylum seekers. The official reports also highlight 
that about three quarters of these events took place in East Germany, especially in 
the states of Saxony and Thuringia.12
Drawing on various sources and including not only official statistics, a more 
detailed collection of instances of anti-asylum seeker mobilization in East Germany 
noted that in 2015 there was a total of 974 cases of which 580 were classified as 
“protest” and 394 as “attacks” (Westheuser 2016, 20). The evolution of both kinds 
of events during 2015 shows a similar pattern with a striking peak in fall. There is 
also a peak of the numbers of demonstrators during the same period. However, 
while participation levels were also high in January 2015 (mainly due to the Pegida 
rallies), the number of events was still relatively low. When controlled by popula-
tion size, Saxony clearly takes the top position regarding protest events, followed by 
11 A similar picture is reported for the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (Grün 2016, 88). The num-
ber of right-wing demonstrations and gatherings with more than 25 participants rose from 40 in 
2014 to 135 in the following year. In half of the latter cases, Pegida or similar-minded groups had 
initiated the protest event.
12 When considering all kinds of violent right-wing activities per million of the population, the 
figures are much higher in all East German states (ranging between 58.7  in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern and 33.9 in Thuringia) compared to an average of 10.5 in the western states (Die 
Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2016, 10f).
Table 11.1 Right-wing activities in 2014 and 2015
2014 2015
Right-wing criminal acts +34% 22,960
Offences against shelters 965 1031
  arson 6 94
  attempted killing 4
  attempted bombing 8
Right-extremist rallies (without Pegida 
Dresden)
225 640
Concerts of right-wing bands 199
Right-extremist rallies 225 640
NPD: Calls for rallies 123 266
Die Rechte: Calls for rallies 21 95
Der III. Weg: Calls for rallies 8 31
Pro NRW: Calls for rallies 20 6
Non-party affiliated right-extremist groups: 
Calls for rallies
56 290
Source: Data drawn from Bundesminister des Innern 2016
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Thuringia, whereas Saxony-Anhalt is at the bottom of the 5 Eastern states. 
Considering the ratio of attacks against asylum seekers, Saxony again clearly takes 
the lead with Saxony-Anhalt at the bottom, but Thuringia is now in the fourth posi-
tion (ibid., 20–21).
This trend continued in 2016: Between January 1 and August 1, 2016, official 
statistics documented 665 offences against shelters and almost all of these (92%) 
were attributed to so-called right-wing motivated perpetrators. Out of this number 
there were 118 cases that used violence (of which 55 were arson attacks).
Protest event data derived from the daily newspaper Die Tageszeitung show simi-
lar results, most notably the spectacular rise of the issue of ethnic minorities and 
refugees in 2014 and 2015 (see Fig. 11.1).
Interestingly, the total number of protest activities in favor of ethnic minorities 
and refugees is relatively close to the numbers of those against (48% vs. 52%) in the 
period between 2010 and 2015. A similar relationship exists for the number of par-
ticipants (pro 46% vs. con 54%) When considering protests specifically around asy-
lum rights and (shelters for) asylum seekers, 60% are supportive and 40% against. 
Again, differences between West and East Germany are significant. With regard to 
the broader category of protests centered around ethnic minorities and refugees, the 
proportions are 55.7% (pro) vs. 44.3% (con) in the West, and 36.6% (pro) vs. 63.4% 
(con) in the East. Among violent protests against ethnic minorities and refugees, 























Fig. 11.1 Protest activities (pro & con) related to ethnic minorities and refugees in Germany, 
2010–2015 (Source: Protest event data compiled by Rucht based on the daily newspaper Die 
Tageszeitung)
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11.4  Conditions and Factors for Recent Xenophobic 
Mobilization
Right-populist and right-radical movements should not be reduced to their peak 
periods of mobilization. Instead, we should distinguish between conditions that fos-
ter the long-term and at times more latent existence of such movements, and the 
additional factors that may explain short-lived waves of exceptional mobilization. 
In taking such a perspective and drawing mainly on the approaches and tool kit of 
social movement studies, I will try to explain and interpret the most recent wave of 
right-wing mobilization in Germany. Firstly, I will highlight some broad macro- 
structural factors that nourished certain anxieties within segments of the German 
population, before turning to three particular undercurrents that have been impor-
tant for spreading both mistrust in elites and xenophobic attitudes and actions. 
Secondly, I will specify a set of conditions that could explain the shift from consen-
sus mobilization that saw refugees and asylum seekers as a problem, to action mobi-
lization that directly targeted these groups.
11.4.1  Macro-Structural Conditions for Consensus 
Mobilization
Macro-structural conditions affect right-wing movements in objective ways but also 
in the way they are subjectively perceived and interpreted. Because of their relative 
stability and structuration, such factors cannot explain the short and dynamic ups 
and downs of action mobilization. However, they are important for providing the 
breeding ground for widespread sentiments and perceptions that can be instrumen-
talized by social movements, organizations and protest entrepreneurs. Regarding 
the spread of populist, right-wing and xenophobic attitudes since the late 1990s, one 
important reference point is the processes and conditions attributed to globalization. 
In contrast to left-wing politics, where only some aspects of globalization (e.g., neo- 
liberalism) were heavily criticized, those of the right tended to reject globalization 
on principle and predominantly recruited supporters from the losers of globalization 
(Kriesi 2008). This process was fostered by the declining role of nation states in an 
internationalized economy, the recent global financial crises, the increasing gap 
between the rich and the poor, and the expected rise of competition among the 
middle and lower classes for scarce resources.
Another key background factor that fostered the growth of right-wing sentiment 
during this period were certain far-reaching cultural developments. Generally 
speaking, right-wing groups tend to fundamentally question the co-existence and 
blending of different cultures and ways of life. In wider society there has been a 
growing trend towards multiculturalism, spurred on by a whole range of factors 
such as economic globalization, globalized cultural patterns and styles, tourism, 
refugee and labor migration. This growing multiculturalism manifests itself not 
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only in the abstract but also in daily life, for instance in parental assemblies, hearing 
foreign languages on subways or in supermarkets, or a growing number of “foreign” 
restaurants or mosques. Right-wing groups have reacted to such experiences by 
drawing clear boundaries between us and them, requiring “foreigners” to either 
completely assimilate or leave the country voluntarily or by force. Accordingly, one 
of the slogans uttered at right-wing demonstrations is: Who does not love Germany 
should leave Germany (Wer Deutschland nicht liebt, soll Deutschland verlassen).
While racism is clearly one basis for drawing boundaries there are other less 
overt reasons. These might be based on parochial localism, nationalism or the evo-
cation of a larger identity such as “our Christian-Jewish Occidental culture” 
(Position paper Pegida, December 10, 2014, translation by the author). However 
right-wing groups do not univocally reject liberal values. For example, in an early 
position statement, Pegida supported the protection of “war refugees and people 
prosecuted for political or religious reasons.” In other contexts, however, both lead-
ers and followers of Pegida, AfD and similar groups have questioned asylum and 
refugee rights on principle and do not shy away from expressing illiberal or outright 
racist positions. This was clear at one Pegida protest where a banner that read 
“Islam = Cancer” could be seen. Right-wing groups or activists do exhibit differ-
ences in how and where they delineate their own collective identity. However, when 
moving to the more general level of widespread beliefs among the populace, we see 
that Germany–along with most other European countries–is increasingly marked by 
a kind of cultural clash between those groups upholding universal principles of 
human rights and cultural liberalism, and groups who, for different reasons, seek to 
preserve a more or less strict separation of their own ethnicity and/or culture from 
those perceived as being inherently alien, and/or of lesser value than their own 
imagined community. These opposing cultural perceptions can gradually develop 
into institutionalized organizational forms and, accordingly, become a structural 
background factor.
11.4.2  Three Undercurrents Fostering Xenophobic Sentiments 
and Attitudes
Still taking a long-term perspective, I argue that besides the very general macro- 
structural factors there are also three specific and relatively static developments that 
must be taken into account when explaining the rise of xenophobic and right-wing 
protest groups. These can be framed as perceptions of economic deprivation, politi-
cal alienation and cultural disorientation (Rucht 2016). I call these developments 
undercurrents because they are not directly visible. It is the contemporary junction 
of these undercurrents that organizers can exploit to move actors from shared beliefs 
or consensus mobilization into protest activities.
Relative Economic Deprivation As previously mentioned, one important dimen-
sion of xenophobia is the perception of material disadvantage or discrimination, for 
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example the fear of unemployment or decreasing retirement benefits. Groups that 
are often used as yardsticks to compare relative positions are either those above; the 
wealthy people in the domestic country, or members of the lower classes that are 
perceived as work-shy and lazy parasites, who in comparative terms, enjoy unde-
served benefits. Those on the right tend to particularly characterize “foreigners,” 
asylum seekers and refugees in this way, often claiming, and contrary to empirical 
evidence, that these groups are treated better than Germans.13
Political Alienation Although in principle democracy is highly valued by the vast 
majority of the German population, during the last two decades various indicators 
have suggested a growing gap between ordinary citizens and their political repre-
sentatives. Distrust of the political class is widespread and growing as is distrust in 
various political institutions, including parliament and executive branches. There 
has been one notable exception to this growing general distrust, the police. As sur-
veys of Pegida demonstrators have shown (see Daphi et al. 2015), distrust in estab-
lished political leadership is extremely high among these groups. It seems clear that 
the simple explanations and equally simple solutions put forward by populist agita-
tors are attractive to those who feel alienated and neglected. In contrast, the cumber-
some negotiations and compromises omnipresent in mainstream politics are met 
with suspicion. Interestingly, these feelings of being neglected of even cheated by 
established politicians are accompanied by growing calls for direct democracy as a 
tool that can authentically express and implement the will of the common people.
Cultural Disorientation Besides sentiments of material deprivation and political 
alienation, perceived deprivation could also refer to what is vaguely called culture. 
This concerns the fear of being culturally marginalized by strange or even perverse 
cultures imported by “foreigners.” In this context, right-wing groups maintain a 
blanket criticism of multiculturalism, and, more specifically, of non-German or 
non-Christian religious practices and infrastructures, such as slaughtering methods, 
funerals, gender roles and so on. They claim that gradually these practices will 
come to dominate their own traditional culture, which in the long run will be extin-
guished unless it is actively defended (Häusler 2008).
11.4.3  Political and Discursive Opportunities
The concept of political and discursive opportunities is particularly useful in 
explaining the ups and downs of protest mobilization and the strategic and commu-
nicative leverage points used by the movement’s organizers (for an overview, see 
Kriesi 2004; Snow 2004). Favorable opportunities can be, for example, forthcoming 
13 Time and again, this view is expressed in interviews with right-wingers as well as in 




or pending political decisions, international summits of political leaders and organi-
zations, divisions among domestic political elites, economic and political crises, 
24-hour media cycles, but also contingent events such as scandals, police infringe-
ments, or catastrophes.
Right-populist and right-radical movements operate in a largely favorable politi-
cal opportunity structure, despite–and sometimes because of–negative reactions 
from parts of the political establishment and counter-movements such as the net-
work of leftist antifascist groups. These opportunities are encapsulated in the elec-
toral successes of right-populist parties in a number of European countries. In this 
regard, the rise of German right-populist parties has been somewhat delayed. 
Arguably, this may be because of the rivalries among several right-wing parties, the 
lack of a charismatic figure, and the notorious struggles over ideology, strategy and 
power between leaders of various groups and networks.
Since their significant rise in the early 1990s, right-wing and xenophobic groups 
had not been able to gain a foothold in mainstream politics and discourse. However, 
for a number of reasons this began to shift around 2013/14: The so-called refugee 
crisis brought with it a sharp increase of refugees in countries such as Sweden, 
Austria and Germany, there was an informal suspension of EU rules for dealing 
with asylum seekers and refugees, the heavy strain on EU, national and local admin-
istrations facing the influx of refugees, and lastly the way that both established poli-
ticians and the mass media were reporting and commenting on these problems. All 
this contributed not only to the salience of the issue but also to a sense of crisis that, 
especially in the eyes of the right, showed the unwillingness or inability of the 
established political forces to handle the situation. Some conservative politicians, 
notably leading figures of the conservative CSU, shared this critique, and, despite 
remaining part of the government attacked the Merkel-led governmental line. Thus 
there was little surprise that these voices were cited by, and reflected in, these popu-
list groups to increase their credibility. Alarmist sentiments were further exacer-
bated by both rumours of violent clashes between groups of refugees, criminal acts 
of some refugees, attempts of some refugees to disguise their country of origin or 
personal identity, and sexist behaviour, for example.
Interestingly reactions to right-populist claims and activities, even when very 
critical, can also act as favorable opportunities. In this regard it is important to stress 
three interrelated factors: First, right-populism, especially when overlapping with 
right-radicalism, attracted enormous media attention which, when compared to 
other movement’s activities, could be considered significantly disproportionate. 
Ironically, the fact that Pegida leaders had initially refused to talk to the media con-
tributed to the media’s interest in the group. The second factor was the numerous 
and partly diverging comments and judgements by leading politicians. While some 
were pleading to take these groups seriously and engage in dialogue, others charac-
terized them as a pack, mad, idiots, racist, and Nazis to be ignored or repressed. The 
third factor was the counter-protest undertaken by left-wing and liberal groups. 
These protests were mostly peaceful, however in some instances they also in 
included blockades and physical attacks.
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The combined effect of these reactions was to increase the visibility and promi-
nence of right-populism. To some extent, these reactions also contributed to right- 
populists’ ambivalent self-perception as victims who are empowering themselves to 
become heroes. These groups interpreted negative reactions as further proof that the 
pluralism upheld by the political mainstream was empty of meaning.
11.5  Conclusions and Outlook
As consumers of mass media we are tempted to follow the media’s issue-attention 
cycles and ad hoc interpretations of events. However, such a perspective misses the 
historicity, the broader cross-regional and cross-cultural comparative potential, and 
the stable and probably less spectacular aspects of the object under study. The lack 
of such a perspective can mislead observers to proclaim a new right-wing movement 
whenever a wave of mobilization is on the rise.
Right-wing movements and mobilizations can only be fully understood against 
the backdrop of long-lasting structures and undercurrents in combination with 
issue-specific opportunities. These opportunities can include more contingent fac-
tors such as the high numbers of refugees and asylum seekers that allowed the issue 
to be politicized beyond right-radical parties (Meyer and Rosenberger 2015), verbal 
attacks by leading politicians, an unprecedented resonance in the media and, last but 
not least, a strong counter mobilization that occasionally resorted to violence. It is a 
key task of the social sciences to study and analyze these structures and their impact 
on groups and movements. Based on such a perspective, I conclude that since the 
early 1990s right-populist and right-radical movements in Germany were facing 
favorable structural conditions that, in combination with more recent and partly 
contingent factors such as the so-called refugee crisis, allowed for their dramatic 
rise in popularity.
Research on political parties and electoral behaviour is often too narrow and 
short-sighted when it tries to explain right-populism and right-radicalism and their 
activities against refugees and asylum seekers. Theories and concepts of social 
movement studies, I argue, can provide a wider and thus more useful lens. These 
approaches imply fruitful instruments for explaining and interpreting movement 
phenomena in different time frames and on different levels of analysis ranging from 
the micro to macro. Research in this field must move beyond quantitative empirical 
description by developing multi-causal explanations, and interpretative and herme-
neutic approaches based on thick description. Also we need to employ multi-level 
analyses with an eye on historical developments utilizing different methodologies.
Regardless of whether they are acknowledging the status of a minority or claim-
ing to represent the will of the vast majority, xenophobic right-wing activists will 
continue their struggle. Accordingly, there is little opportunity to shift their posi-
tions through argument alone, as the current conditions are highly conducive to 
ongoing, and probably increasing, right-populist and right-radical mobilization. 
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However, I also speculate that rather than a homogenous or singular right-populist 
movement emerging in Germany, it will remain somewhat fractured.
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Amid rising asylum applications in the past years, European countries have faced a 
major crisis in their reception systems, struggling to provide housing, infrastructure 
and support for new arrivals. Migration as a “crucial field of contentious politics” 
(Cinalli 2016, 86) has become a core issue in European and national politics, which is 
highly contested and leading to new (inter-)national tensions (Trauner 2016). Societies 
have reacted differently to this situation: partly supportive and welcoming, partly 
repellent. Liberal and humanitarian beliefs are opposed by nationalist and anti-migrant 
attitudes. Welcoming initiatives originating from a broad alliance of civil society 
groups have provided help for arriving refugees and promoted tolerance (Aumüller 
et al. 2015), while at the same time resentment toward asylum seekers has been grow-
ing stronger and right-wing parties are becoming ever more successful at the polls 
(Jakob 2016). Certain societal segments along with certain political actors express 
their refusal to admit and accommodate asylum seekers openly, as demonstrated, for 
instance, by the anti-Islam movement Pegida in Germany (see Rucht 2018).
Increasing protest activities against the reception of refugees and, more gener-
ally, against ethnic and religious diversity have also occurred in Austria. Unprepared 
and unwilling to welcome these numbers of asylum seekers–Austria was among the 
countries to have received the most arrivals per capita1–new protest networks have 
formed to oppose governmental decisions regarding the establishment of accom-
modation centers. The issue of asylum has been a highly sensitive political topic in 
Austria for decades (Gruber 2010, 2014). In this context of ongoing negative 
 politicization and currently rising asylum applications, waves of protests have 
1 In 2015, more than 85,000 asylum seekers were officially registered in Austria. The number of 
applicants per million inhabitants was only higher in Hungary and Sweden according to Eurostat.
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emerged to prevent new shelters (Rosenberger and Haselbacher 2016). We term this 
type of collective action asylum-center protest. This definition includes all protest 
activities directed against the political decision to establish a facility that hosts and 
accommodates asylum seekers.
Most of the research done in the field of protest and mobilization relates to aspir-
ing and altruistic social movements (Schaeffer 2014). Scholars predominantly 
explore collective action as committed to facilitating social change and pursuing the 
goals of liberty, equality and solidarity. However, in the political reality of diverse 
societies, activities and objectives vary between different types of movements. 
Protest groups do not only propose emancipatory goals, for instance to expand citi-
zenship or to promote women’s rights, they also defend restrictionist ideas and take 
inequality and exclusion as political principles. As defined by the sociologist Robert 
K. Schaeffer, restrictionist protest refers to nationalist and xenophobic movements 
fighting for the preservation of social inequality, opposing processes of democrati-
zation. Often supported by state authorities, restrictionist protesters have used the 
authority given to them by the state to engage in collective action (ibid., 12). 
Following this idea, we here demonstrate that the close interaction between institu-
tional actors and protest networks, as well as the active involvement of institutional 
politics in performing and organizing protest activities are central features of 
asylum- center protest.
To repeat, the academic tendency within protest research leans toward left-wing 
movements. Nevertheless, there are some precursors to approaching right-wing and 
anti-migration activities with the toolkit of social movement studies (della Porta and 
Diani 2006; Fillieule and Accornero 2016). Inspired by analytical strands and cate-
gories examining mobilization, this chapter follows an actor-centered approach 
within social movement studies, combining both exogenous determinants on the 
one side and endogenous resources of powerful protagonists on the other (for a 
similar approach see Caiani et al. 2012; Caiani and Borri 2016; Cinalli 2016). In this 
chapter, we argue that specific institutional and discursive opportunities are relevant 
for the understanding of the emergence of protest against the establishment of 
accommodation centers. However, to understand the high rate of success of these 
protests, the specific actor constellation and its closeness to decision-making bodies 
are decisive.
Empirically, we look into the extent to which institutional actors are involved in 
the organization of protest activities and what types and forms of repertoires they 
make use of. We focus especially on the verbal justification of protest, in other 
words the frames these actors adopt to give their activities meaning, and to mobilize 
followers and the public. Overall, this chapter aims at providing insights into mech-
anisms of how restrictionist protest operates in the domain of asylum, why these 
activities emerge, and why they are comparatively successful in terms of achieving 
their main claim, namely the prevention of an accommodation center. By doing so, 
we offer insights into rising cultural tensions and cleavages on the local level which 
foster (extra-)institutional political activities.
The findings presented here are based on 113 protest cases which occurred 
between January 2014 and September 2015  in Austria. Based on media reports, 
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official documents, gazettes and a broad range of protest materials, we collected 
comprehensive information about protest cases and carried out a protest event anal-
ysis as well as a framing analysis.
In the next section we introduce studies on protest against the reception of asy-
lum seekers in order to identify certain characteristics and factors of protest which 
we can draw upon in our analysis.
12.2  Studying Protest Against Asylum Seekers
Despite the salience of the phenomenon, studies on protest and opposition against 
the reception of asylum seekers are quite rare. The scant literature available shows 
that collective action against political decisions to shelter asylum seekers occurs 
almost exclusively on the local level. As demonstrated in this section, it is mostly 
rural communities which are not only hesitant, but also adverse to the presence of 
refugees in their neighborhood.
Phil Hubbard (2004, 2005) examined protest discourses and attitudes of the local 
population towards asylum seekers and their reception in the English countryside. 
He traced the justifications of protestors and demonstrated how processes of other-
ing and the construction of whiteness are central to anti-asylum resistance. Hubbard 
stresses the contingency of this resistance upon racial identities as well as “connec-
tions between rhetorics of displacement and (deeply rooted) rural fears of racialised 
and sexualised difference” (Hubbard 2004, 3).
A slightly different point of view was offered by Ralph Grillo (2005), who 
detected similarities between discursive strategies of the British National Party 
(BNP) and local opponents of a collective accommodation center, who are express-
ing strong negative emotions like fear. Relevant interpretations of this political lan-
guage and action refer to NIMBY initiatives (not in my back yard) loaded with 
ethnical and cultural meaning. The construction of a pure and homogenous rural 
identity is used to (re-)define the limits and boundaries of the given community, 
aiming at preserving its whiteness and homogeneity.
Marcel Lubbers et  al. (2005, 2006) investigated the influence of institutional 
contexts on the emergence of protests against shelters in the Netherlands. The 
authors identified certain characteristics of the affected communities (such as eco-
nomic indicators) and features of the facility itself (such as the size of the reception 
center or the demographic structure of the inhabitants) as key factors triggering 
protest from below. In brief, their studies revealed that bigger facilities are more 
likely to cause protest than smaller ones and that new centers face greater opposition 
than existing ones.
Research on physical attacks against the reception of asylum seekers in Germany 
goes back to the 1990s, when a wave of violence occurred and major outbreaks 
drew public attention (see Ohlemacher 1998; Prenzel 2015). More recent research 
elaborates on various determinants that support or hinder the acceptability of new 
locations in the immediate vicinity (Aumüller et al. 2015; Lamberty and Wichmann 
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2015). As Pegida activities demonstrate, thousands of people take to the streets to 
send a strong signal to political authorities that there is no place for “others”, “for-
eigners”, or “Muslims” (Daphi et al. 2015).
In Austria, citizens and (local) politicians staged the first protest against the pres-
ence of asylum seekers in the 1980s. Involving a large number of people, this protest 
was directed against a collective accommodation in a military barrack (Bauböck 
1999, 119). In the 1990s, some violent incidents occurred including arson attacks, 
mostly perpetrated by individuals with a neo-Nazi background. Political scientist 
Raimund Pehm (2010) researched protest in the field of reception policies after the 
adoption of the Basic Care Agreement for Asylum Seekers 
(Grundversorgungsvereinbarung). Analyzing discontent, Pehm described how pro-
test networks consisting of citizens and local elites criticized the lack of communi-
cation in the process of the establishment of new accommodation centers. In other 
words, protesters felt disregarded and ignored by political authorities and decided to 
resort to extra-institutional repertoires. A more recent study on protest discourse 
showed that cultural and identity-based displeasure expressed by local protesters 
reflects well-established populist discursive strategies, such as “us against those up 
there” and “us against the other” (Rosenberger and Haselbacher 2016).
12.3  Contextual Determinants of Asylum-Center Protest
In the following, we introduce some contextual factors we consider to be relevant 
for the emergence and outcome of protest activities in the policy area of asylum. 
What are the institutional and discursive determinants that nurture protests? In what 
environment and under what parameters does asylum-center protest appear? 
Restrictionist protest in Austria is embedded in a comparatively moderate civic pro-
test culture (see Merhaut and Stern 2018), restrictive migration policies, a signifi-
cant anti-migrant mobilization driven by the right-wing Austrian Freedom Party 
(FPÖ), and centralized decision-making procedures, leaving only few competences 
to the local level.
12.3.1  Strong Anti-migration Mobilization
The reception of asylum seekers has been highly contested over the past decades. 
There is plenty of evidence for the negative politicization of the issue–expressed in 
terms of issue salience and its polarization (van der Brug et al. 2015; Grande et al. 
2016). A driving factor for anti-migration mobilization in Austria is the FPÖ (see 
Gruber 2014). With the FPÖ, Austria has a history of an electorally successful right- 
wing populist party. It has been politicizing the issue of asylum since the 1990s and 
has shaped the exclusionist and assimilationist discourse as well as policies in this 
field, which are becoming ever more restrictive (Kraler 2011). In terms of framing 
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migration and asylum issues, Oliver Gruber (2014, 125) showed that restrictive 
frames dominate over liberal frames. The narrative of the “bogus” asylum seeker 
enjoys great popularity and nurtures politics of restriction and control (Krzyzanowski 
and Wodak 2009), whereas arguments based on human rights and defending a right 
to entry and to stay are losing significance.
These tendencies are underlined by recent opinion polls indicating significant sup-
port for parties promoting the reinforcement of border controls as well as for further 
legal restrictions in asylum and alien laws (SWS Bildstatistiken 2016). In the latest 
regional and municipal elections, the FPÖ achieved significant gains2 and entered 
two provincial governments, forming a coalition with the Social Democratic Party of 
Austria (SPÖ) in Burgenland and with the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) in Upper 
Austria. Asylum was a central topic in these election campaigns and post- polling 
surveys showed that it was mentioned as the most important motive for voting.
Against this background, our research anticipates the FPÖ to be the main actor 
in protest against the establishment of accommodation centers.
12.3.2  Centralized Decision-Making in Reception Policies
The accommodation of asylum seekers lies both within the sphere of responsibility 
of the federal government and of the provinces (Länder). The federal government is 
responsible for asylum legislation, asylum procedures as well as initial reception in 
the course of the admission procedure, and operates a limited number of accom-
modation centers. The provinces are obliged to accommodate asylum seekers after 
entering the asylum procedure, to provide, supervise and to manage reception facili-
ties, and to bear part of the costs. However, the provinces have often been hesitant 
in fulfilling their task of accommodating refugees according to the respective size of 
their populations, not least due to the resistance of local municipalities. That way, 
the issue of the spatial distribution of asylum seekers has become a constant subject 
of political conflicts on the federal level (Rosenberger and König 2011).
By contrast, the municipalities have no official say in the field of reception poli-
cies. This originates from centralized federal structures in the field of asylum policies 
and results in a gap between decision-making power and the execution of practical 
tasks (Fallend 2006). The accommodation and integration of asylum seekers has to be 
principally performed by the municipalities even though they are not included in the 
decision-making process of opening new accommodation centers (Wimmer 2010).
The municipal level is shaped by a local collective identity and powerful and 
prominent political individuals (van Deth and Tausendpfund 2013). The character 
of a personalized local elite has been strengthened by the introduction of direct elec-
2 Regional elections: Burgenland, May 2015, FPÖ +6.0%; Styria, May 2015, FPÖ +16.1%; Vienna, 
October 2015, FPÖ +5.0%; Upper Austria, September 2015, FPÖ +15.1%.
Municipal elections: Lower Austria, January 2015, FPÖ +1.79%; Styria, May 2015, FPÖ 
+7.3%; Vorarlberg, March 2015, FPÖ +2.7%.
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tions of mayors in a majority of the provinces. In most cases, mayors enjoy great 
closeness to their citizens and occupy an important position in communicating with 
the local community. Moreover, their close ties with the electorate result in a com-
paratively high confidence of the population in local government (Steininger 2006).
Considering this framework of competences, we deduce that the disparity in the 
decision-making process on the one hand and the local responsibility for integration 
tasks on the other motivates municipal protest activities. Moreover, this gap pro-
vides incentives for institutional actors to express resistance against decisions of the 
upper levels of government in order to demonstrate solidarity with the local 
constituency.
12.4  Data and Methods
The following analysis covers the period from 01/01/2014 to 08/31/2015, a period 
during which asylum applications were on the rise and new facilities had to be pro-
vided for arriving asylum seekers.
The subject of this investigation are individual protest cases, defined as a range 
of collective actions that targeted federal or provincial proposals to open and run a 
transit camp or accommodation center. Although we do not focus on individual 
protest events, we employ the toolkit of protest event analysis for the quantification 
of the characteristics of protest (Koopmans and Rucht 2002, 231). Specifically, in 
the following we describe and analyze protest features such as their topic, frequency, 
actors, claims, forms, success and justifications.
Our data collection builds on a list of accommodation centers across the country 
provided by the Austrian Broadcasting Company (ORF; data available for June, 
August and September 2015).3 Based on this list, we searched for protest activities 
directed against the opening of a reception facility. This information was retrieved 
via an internet search (using the name of the municipalities and key words such as 
“resistance”, “protest” and “asylum seeker”). This search brought to the surface a 
total of 113 protest cases for the defined time period. Based on the estimated num-
ber of new facilities, this figure demonstrates that roughly one third of all newly 
opened facilities provoked resistance.4
Moreover, counter-groups emerged in 22 cases taking the side of asylum seekers. 
As a result, some municipalities were confronted with conflicting tendencies within 
their community, with some groups challenging the reception of asylum seekers 
while others were formed to welcome and support the new members of the 
community.5
3 We thank Jakob Weichenberger, data journalist with the ORF, who shared the data on the distribu-
tion of accommodation centers in Austria.
4 There is no accurate data available that indicates the date of the opening of accommodation cen-
ters. Estimations are based on our internet research, media reports and the data of the ORF.
5 We coded support initiatives in the municipality, information regarding the establishment of the 
facility and information such as the date of the beginning of protest activities etc.
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Our protest analysis is based on multiple sources including local, regional and 
national media reports, municipal gazettes, social media and protest material (leaf-
lets etc.). Altogether 712 texts were identified and coded. The resulting codebook 
lists the major categories of protest research, namely (a) actors (institutional and 
extra-institutional), (b) repertoires (appellative, demonstrative, confrontational and 
violent), (c) frames and (d) outcomes (success, partial success, no success). This 
data was supplemented by contextual information about the locality (urban versus 
rural areas and former experiences with migrants looking for international protec-
tion) and the facility (proposed number of inhabitants, type of center and former 
utilization of the facility).
Based on a content analysis of our material, we assessed the frequency of the 
compiled categories. This was complemented by a framing analysis, exploring and 
identifying communicative techniques and mobilization strategies (Goffman 1974; 
Benford and Snow 2000). After counting the nominal justifications, we compiled 
three diagnostic frames inductively, that provide insights into social problems and 
cultural conflicts that underlie protest activities (Caiani et al. 2012, 14).
12.5  Attributes of Asylum-Center Protest
Following Schaeffer (2014), asylum-center protest can be ascribed to the category 
of restrictionist protest. So far, however, in the field of migration and asylum 
research, not much is known about the features of this type of protest. We want to 
fill this gap by identifying and describing characteristics of restrictionist protest 
activities. We will begin by providing substantial information on the reception cen-
ter and the target of protest (political authorities), before moving on to our findings 
on various significant protest categories.
12.5.1  Issue-Specific Features
It is often small, rural communities that generate asylum-center protests: More than 
two thirds of protest cases are located in small municipalities (defined by up to 5000 
inhabitants) and, most significantly, 80% of these municipalities are accommodat-
ing asylum seekers for the very first time.
With regard to the type of accommodation center, our data shows that both for-
mer hotels accommodating between 20 and 40 refugees and mass-accommodation 
facilities such as tents or military barracks with over a hundred people are more 
likely to stir protest than smaller shelters or shelter provided in private homes. The 
fact that converted hotels are most affected by protests might be an indicator of 
economically weak geographies, as the establishment of a reception center may be 
seen as an opportunity to improve the economic situation of the area or of certain 
individuals.
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The type of decision-making body is another factor influencing the relative 
 resistance of locals. In Austria, during the procedure, asylum seekers are assigned to 
collective centers. Most of them are run by regional authorities. The federal govern-
ment only has executive responsibility for initial reception centers, transit centers 
and emergency facilities. In sum, there are only few accommodation centers within 
the responsibility of the federal state; the vast majority is organized by the provinces 
(Koppenberg 2014, 12). Executive responsibility has a marked impact on the prob-
ability of staging protest action. Almost all of the facilities that were established and 
lie within the federal sphere of responsibility triggered protests, whereas only one 
fourth of the ones within the responsibility of the provinces were contested. 
However, it has to be taken into account that the question of competence is mixed 
up with other adverse characteristics of the location itself: Federal facilities are 
mostly larger in size and have partially been set up as emergency shelters (contain-
ers, tents and camps).
Contrary to political assertions and some academic studies (for instance Hubbard 
2004, 2005; Lubbers et al. 2005, 2006), the share of asylum seekers per capita on 
the local level is not decisive for triggering protest. Figure 12.1 demonstrates that 
protest most frequently takes place in municipalities where the proposed rate of 
asylum seekers in relation to the local population is comparatively low. Most collec-
tive activities occur in municipalities that are expected to host a relatively small 
number of persons, but there are also municipalities designated to take in a rather 
large number that face protests.
The variation in the share of asylum seekers per municipal capita points to the 
fact that protest activities occur in an environment of politicization of asylum (on 
politicization, see Hutter 2014; Grande et al. 2016). Increasing refugee immigration 
causes rising public attention on the topic of accommodation and reception, rein-















Fig. 12.1 Share of asylum seekers per municipal capita
n = 113 protest cases. The figure sets the absolute number of asylum seekers in relation to the 
number of inhabitants of the municipalities
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therefore be seen as a product of politicization–protesters take action because the 
issue is already on the political and media agenda–and as a mechanism of politiciza-
tion itself, meaning that protest activities contribute to the further (negative) politi-
cization of the issue.
12.5.2  Protest Actors
Who is involved in protest activities and employs repertoires designed to counter 
proposals to open new reception centers? Which groups and individuals initiate 
resistance against the authorities by organizing the first instances of protest?
In analyzing the type of actors, we employ a typology applied in social move-
ment studies which differentiates between institutional and extra-institutional actors 
(Tilly 1978). The former comprise political parties and political-administrative offi-
cials, the latter civic groups, individual citizens and grassroots initiatives which 
constitute a potential rival to existing political authorities and institutions. We 
adapted this analytical scheme to look for coalitions between actors, taking into 
account “that the two worlds of inside (institutionalized, conventional) and outside 
(protest, unconventional) politics are not as neatly separated as this model suggests” 
(Kriesi 2015, 668).
Besides identifying the role and significance of certain institutional and extra- 
institutional actor groups, we distinguish between two manifestations of participa-
tion: initiation and involvement at a later stage of the protest.
Figure 12.2 illustrates the extent to which institutional and extra-institutional 
protagonists were actively involved. Interestingly, institutional actors, especially 
mayors, constitute the predominant activist group involved in protest against accom-
modation centers. By contrast, citizens are less present and moreover constitute the 
only extra-institutional actor we could identify.
Mayors form the central node in the system of municipal, regional and federal 
contestation over the reception of asylum seekers. They are actively involved in two 
thirds of all protest cases. By contrast, there are only five cases (out of 113) where 
mayors publicly positioned themselves contrary to protestors and thus tried to 
demobilize protest.
Mayors are not lone actors, but rely on strong local protest networks and enjoy 
the backing of the municipal council. Regarding party affiliation, no peculiarities 
can be observed: Mayors from all camps oppose federal and provincial proposals 
for asylum seekers’ reception. Most are linked to the ÖVP or the SPÖ, while some 
mayors do not have a party affiliation (10 out of 113 cases) and four mayors belong 
to the FPÖ. This distribution resembles the local political landscape of Austria, 
which is dominated by mayors of the two major parties. Hence, these findings dem-
onstrate that asylum-center protest has become a non-partisan issue, expressing gen-
eral tensions, grievances and hostility regardless of party affiliation.
Beside the dominant group of mayors, representatives of the FPÖ are to a large 
extent involved in protest activities. This actor group is dominating mass- and 
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social-media oriented means of mobilization. Rejections of specific accommoda-
tion centers tend to be interwoven with general criticism about the asylum system, 
since statements made by FPÖ officials do not clearly distinguish between the rejec-
tion of (national) migration politics on the one hand and specific, facility-related 
opposition on the other. Resistance against the proposals of the locality in question 
is mixed up with national discourse and serves as a point of reference to make criti-
cal statements about the Austrian asylum system as a whole.
Finally, we turn to the numerically less relevant group, namely the citizens. They 
are present in asylum-center protest but clearly to a lesser extent than institutional 
actors, meaning that, while they do articulate their discontent, they are rather pas-
sive in terms of organizing collective action. Likewise, it is striking that civil society 
actors (NGOs and voluntary associations) are only marginally engaged. When citi-
zens act, they do so as individuals but not as part of an existing civil society organi-
zation. Furthermore, while citizens support initiatives launched by institutional 
actors, they play the role of followers instead of organizers. At a second glance, 
however, it becomes clear that local citizens mobilize “their” mayors by expressing 
grievances, fear and discontent over the pending issue. In doing so, they exert pres-
sure upon politicians whom they expect to take action against an accommodation 
center in their vicinity.
With regard to the initiation of protests, the most relevant actors are institutional 
actors, with more than two thirds of all protest cases having been initiated by politi-
cal parties and mayors.6 This is especially true for facilities falling under the execu-
tive responsibility of the federal government. Here, the very first protest event was 
almost exclusively conducted by political representatives. Thereafter, a coalition of 















Fig. 12.2 Institutional and extra-institutional protest actors
n = 113 protest cases; multiple coding possible. The figure includes the four most relevant actor 
groups and their active protest engagement, defined as employing action repertoires. Mayors, the 
FPÖ and regional politics are classified as institutional actors, citizens as extra-institutional actors
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institutional actors on the local and the regional levels has frequently been formed 
to target federal authorities. In these cases, regional politics support mayors and 
vice versa. This indicates a high degree of incorporation of political claims into the 
political system and goes far beyond confrontational activities against politics.
In his seminal work, Kriesi (1993, 9) wrote on the issue of actors and resources:
A group of citizens may be very concerned about a given situation […]. But if they are 
unaware of their mutual concern […] they will not act accordingly. If there is no one taking 
the initiative, no collective actor organizing a campaign to articulate their concern, our citi-
zens have no opportunity to get actively involved.
Drawing on Kriesi’s resource approach, we underline the fact that triggering 
protest requires powerful actors and resources to create an environment that facili-
tates the involvement and participation of citizens. With regard to protest against 
proposed asylum seekers’ homes, the resourceful actors are elected political repre-
sentatives like mayors and other local and regional politicians. These protagonists 
create the environment in which unorganized citizens are able to express their 
opposition.
12.5.3  Protest Repertoires
Existing protest literature has classified different types of repertoires applied in 
campaigns and collective activities. Rucht and Neidhardt (2001) distinguished in 
their research between appellative, demonstrative, confrontational and violent 
instruments.
Our empirical findings emphasize that appellative means like petitions, open let-
ters, or written and oral complaints are highly prevalent. Demonstrative means 
(demonstrations and public assemblies) are employed but are outnumbered by 
appellative instruments. Hardly any large-scale rally emerged before the summer of 
2015, with informal meetings and get-togethers constituting the dominant format. 
Confrontational and violent forms are widely absent.7 Some incidents have occurred 
in which the right-wing extremist Identitarian Movement was involved by display-
ing banners in front of reception centers or distributing leaflets. Furthermore, there 
have been cases where unidentified persons sprayed swastikas and anti-asylum slo-
gans in the environs of asylum seekers’ facilities.
Figure 12.3 illustrates the most frequent repertoires, showing that forms of action 
differ in type and intensity depending on the protest actors. Each actor group 
employs repertoires closely related to the extent of its institutional embeddedness: 
State actors employ institutional means, intermediary actors such as political parties 
employ public channels, while citizens turn towards social media. As we can see, 
mayors draw on instruments like municipal council resolutions to intervene in 
7 According to a parliamentary inquiry, there have been incidents concerning property damage of 
reception centers. However, violent attacks have been on the rise since the period of investigation, 
as a later parliamentary inquiry shows, including a case of arson.
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higher political levels, utilizing their networks and their social and political ties as 
party representatives. The FPÖ employs means that generate public attention, con-
tributing actively to the discourse and shaping its substance. Citizens set up 
Facebook pages in order to condemn a given reception center, or organize petitions. 
Regional politicians are rather passive, relying on their institutional networks and 
contacting party colleagues to enforce their requests.
In sum, these results resonate deeply with the general protest culture in Austria, 
where illegal protest activities and violent operations as well as diverse creative 
forms and means of protest have a very limited tradition and are unlikely to happen 
(Dolezal and Hutter 2007). Concerning established appellative and demonstrative 
forms of action, it is quite difficult to mobilize a large amount of people and it 
requires the support of political representatives who play a crucial role in organizing 
potential participation and popular mobilization (Plasser and Ulram 2010).
12.5.4  Protest Outcomes and Consequences
Solid scholarly studies on the outcomes and successes of protest actions as well as 
determinants and factors for success or failure are rare. This research gap is due to 
the complexity of factors which influence policy outcomes, but it is also due to 
methodological flaws over the definition and operationalization of protest success 
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Resolution of the Municipal Council (37)
Public Meeting (14)
Petition/ List of Signatures (14)
Facebook/ Social Media (24)
Facebook/ Social Media (17)
Press Statements (39)
Press Statements (25)
National, Regional, Local Motions (14)
Fig. 12.3 Most frequent protest repertoires per actor group
The table displays the three most frequent protest repertoires per actor group. In total, a number of 
382 repertoires in 113 protest cases have been coded. The number for each actor group indicates 
their active protest engagement (see also Fig. 12.2)
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By contrast to most social movement activities, which aim at social change and 
policy reform, the cases analyzed here include the rather explicit implementation 
claim of preventing the opening of an accommodation center. The measurement of 
success of this very specific claim is feasible and its outcome traceable.
First of all, our research underlines a high rate of successful protest outcomes. 
This finding derives from the investigation of three outcome variables: first, the pre-
vention of a specific facility (success); second, a reduction of the occupancy and/or 
a shift to a smaller building (partial success); or third, the opening of the accommo-
dation center (no success). The first outcome, prevention, was achieved in one third 
of the protest cases analyzed. In another third of the cases, the original proposal was 
prevented at least to some extent–the opening of the facility ultimately took place, 
but the pressure exerted by the protest altered the original proposal so that the center 
was moved to a seemingly more “appropriate” building, or a reduction of the occu-
pancy was obtained. In another third of the cases, protest had no impact on the 
implementation and it was realized as envisaged. Taking the protest development 
into account, we observed that in the cases in which the centers were ultimately 
opened, protest activities ended as soon as refugees moved into the building.
Policy and political responses are much more difficult to identify than clear-cut 
implementation claims. In Austria, at least two institutional and organizational 
responses have to be mentioned:
 (1) On the political level, the Austrian Association of Municipalities (Gemeindebund) 
engaged in measures to prevent the sort of conflicts discussed above, and pro-
vided assistance on dealing with new community members. The mayors of 
municipalities accommodating asylum seekers established networks and orga-
nized meetings to strengthen their positions in the field of asylum policies.
 (2) On the level of policy reform, the federal government reacted to intensified pro-
test activities with measures aimed at running facilities without the support of the 
provinces or the municipalities. A consequence of protest was the adoption of the 
Accommodation and Distribution of Aliens in Need of Aid and Protection Act 
(Durchgriffsrecht des Bundes) and the implementation of a so-called municipal 
quota. This law reform aims at improving the coordination of the dispersal of 
asylum seekers between the federal government and the provinces (and thus also 
the municipalities) and allows the Ministry of the Interior to establish reception 
facilities in municipalities which did not fulfill the reception quota of 1.5%. This 
proposition can also be enforced against the declared will of the municipalities.
12.6  Framing Strategies
Interpretative framing as an action-oriented set of opinions and beliefs inspires and 
legitimates protest activities (Benford and Snow 2000). It is the collective construc-
tion of action frames that provides potential followers with “rationals […] for par-
ticipating and supporting their organization” (Caiani and Borri 2016, 76).
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In framing theories, three dimensions are distinguished, namely diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational framing. We here focus on diagnostic framing, which 
emphasizes the identification of predicaments. The conversion of a phenomenon 
into a social problem later serves as a justification for protest activities. Frames 
point to societal conflicts that (re-)emerge through the “process of the attribution of 
meaning” (Caiani et al. 2012, 14). In the following, we analyze which frames are 
applied in asylum-center protest and which conflicts lie behind them.
Based on our study, we identified a broad range of justifications. The communi-
cative rationales offered by protest actors refer to different material and immaterial 
dimensions, emotions such as fear and anger, impending economic losses and social 
dynamics within a changing society. Most of the selected media articles include 
quotes about the fear of citizens and their anger over proposed accommodation 
centers, making the subject of fear a substantive element of mobilization against 
reception centers. The three most frequent nominal justifications are “too many per-
sons for the community”, the “lack of involvement of the municipality in the 
decision- making processes”, and the facility being “inappropriate” for this 
purpose.
After having counted and identified justifications, we then deduced three major, 
partly complementing frames, which we denoted as democracy frame, distribution 
frame and belonging frame. The democracy frame consists of arguments regarding 
local disempowerment and frustration about the distribution of decision-making 
power, referring to the lack of involvement and competences of municipalities in 
this policy field. The distribution frame pertains to perceived economic losses and 
seemingly limited municipal material resources in apprehension of a re-distribution 
of space due to the proposed accommodation center. Finally, the belonging frame is 
constructed on the grounds of different expressions of identities and cultural percep-
tions over the role of homogeneity and multiculturalism, addressing asylum seekers 
as a potential threat to the social and cultural composition of the local community.8
Figure 12.4 illustrates the prevalence of the diagnostic frames applied in protest 
activities by all actor groups. This clearly demonstrates that the belonging frame is 
the most common communicative pattern. Exclusive, racist and hostile arguments 
are delivered by the whole range of actors, by citizens and political representatives 
alike. The frame is composed of rhetorical elements that are directed against asylum 
seekers, in particular against specific categories such as men or Muslims. 
Predominant justifications resemble what Hubbard (2005, 52) analyses as an expres-
8 The three frames comprise the following justifications:
Belonging frame: too many persons; specific groups of refugees (e.g. Muslims, young men); sex-
ual harassment; preferential treatment compared to Austrians; rising criminality; threat to 
social peace.
Distribution frame: the location of the building is inappropriate (for example next to a bus station, 
next to a kindergarten); the building is inappropriate; lack of infrastructure in the 
municipality.
Democracy frame: lack of involvement of the municipality in the decision-making process; non-
transparent information policy; general critique of asylum and reception policies.
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sion of the people’s desire for the “maintenance of white privilege”, creating bound-
aries to protect the community and excluding a certain (marginalized) group of 
people (Yuval-Davis 2011).
The prevalence of the belonging frame is surprising because the institutional 
profile of the protagonists would make us expect to see the democracy frame domi-
nating. All actors rely on cultural justifications circling around the topic of identity, 
which reflects and reproduces dominant national debates on migration and asylum.
Both dominant protest groups, namely mayors and the FPÖ, adopt a certain 
deliberative mobilization pattern in order to challenge national or regional political/
administrative authorities. Within this pattern, “the people” are referenced as a sov-
ereign unified subject, which opposes authorities and decisions from above (Roberts 
2015, 684). Protest is justified with ostensible facts and perspectives, but also with 
negative emotions and moral judgements. However, as we can see, cognitive ele-
ments of the democracy and the belonging frames are outnumbered by emotional 
expressions. Political and economic arguments are therefore primarily used to com-
plement cultural and identity-based evocations, so that asylum-center protest shows 
various features of populist politics. According to Cas Mudde (2007, 23), populist 
ideology “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’.” In the case of anti- 
asylum protest, the opponent is the higher political level, which is deemed to be 
acting against the general will of the local community. In this context, populist 
mobilization is spurred from above, with the mayor as a central figure who articu-
lates “popular interests and […] a shared political project for ‘the people’” (Roberts 
2015, 684). According to Ruth Wodak (2015, 21), demarcation and dissociation 
includes at least two levels, namely boundary-drawing in opposition to political 
elites and to people who are perceived as “the other”:
Right-wing populist movements are based on a specific understanding of the ‘demos/peo-
ple’ […] who defend the man/woman on the street against both ‘those up there’ and ‘the 
Barbarians’ who might take away Austrian […] jobs from Austrian […] workers.
Our research results show that actors adopt frames which are well established 










Fig. 12.4 Distribution of nominal justifications per frame
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 asylum. Both dimensions mentioned in Wodak’s work are present. The demarcation 
that is taking place is closely connected to the general negative politicization of 
foreigners and asylum in the context of cultural and religious diversity and identity. 
Politicians adopt national discourses and make use of populist political styles. At 
first glance, protest claims are directed against properties and buildings that are 
intended to accommodate asylum seekers. However, as our interpretative analysis 
suggests, this discourse constructs boundaries that create inclusiveness and exclu-
siveness of certain groups. These boundaries can be spatial and related to a specific 
locality (Antonsich 2010), in our case the accommodation center, but first and fore-
most they exclude (vulnerable) people. Adopted frames are directed against human 
beings, against asylum seekers, and not against buildings.
12.7  Interpreting Protest Emergence and Success
In the previous section, we analyzed how restrictionist protests operate. Along with 
their local and rural character, our inquiry revealed a high involvement of institu-
tional actors, who take action in defense of local and personal interests. In this sec-
tion, we interpret our major findings with the aim of providing answers as to why 
these protests emerge and why they are relatively successful. For that purpose, we 
discuss exogenous institutional and discursive opportunities for the emergence of 
protest and concentrate on endogenous protest factors in order to explain their suc-
cessful outcome.
12.7.1  Emergence of Protest
To understand the contestation of accommodation centers, both short- and long- 
term developments need to be taken into consideration. Current events, such as the 
increasing refugee immigration in the period under examination, contribute highly 
to the overwhelmingly negative politicization of asylum and the reception of asylum 
seekers, not least due to extensive media coverage and strong public attention. Aside 
from these recent developments, of course, long-term institutional and discursive 
opportunities have a significant influence on the emergence of protest. Together, 
these aspects create an environment that nurtures protest activities against new 
facilities.
As discussed in the sub-chapter on contextual determinants, we considered two 
aspects to be influencing asylum-center protest: the gap in decision-making proce-
dures in the field of asylum and reception policies (1) and the long history of anti- 
migrant mobilization in Austria (2).
 (1) Municipalities face a disparity between their involvement in decision-making 
processes and practical implementation as well as integration tasks. Under 
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 certain conditions, this gap may open up room for grievances and political 
opposition. Our data proves this assumption and reveals that institutional actors 
from the sub-national level express resistance against decisions of the upper 
levels. Mayors play an especially important role in organizing collective action 
against accommodation centers. As they feel left out, local politicians have a 
strong incentive to speak up against actors on the national level, claiming their 
involvement in consideration of local interests and sentiments.
 (2) This institutional dimension of protest is supplemented by symbolic practices 
and discourses in the field. In Austria, asylum-center protest takes place within 
a highly politicized context due to the intensive, nationalistic discourse on refu-
gee immigration. The history of a strong anti-migrant mobilization provides a 
very fertile ground for individuals to feel personally affected and threatened by 
demographic and cultural transitions in their immediate surroundings. 
Respective framing strategies show that anti-elite elements (the sense of betrayal 
by national political decision-makers) are intertwined with hostility against 
asylum seekers, refugees and foreigners. Migration is presented and perceived 
as an “internal challenge” (Cinalli 2016, 87) and serves as a motive for mobili-
zation to protect the local community. As Mudde (2007, 223) puts it, people 
want “to hold on to what they have in the face of […] perceived threats.” The 
generalized, sometimes diffuse and abstract national discourse about the dan-
gers and threats of immigration materializes in the space of local communities 
due to the proposed opening of an accommodation center. In this moment, the 
sense of insecurity and the fear about social and cultural change suddenly 
becomes very concrete. National political debates and topics turn into personal 
experiences and concerns.
The gap in decision-making procedures and the politicization of the issue–
enforced by the recent increase in asylum applications–work as strong incentives to 
initiate protest activities. Moreover, these factors are accompanied by strong anti- 
migration emotions on the individual level as additional drivers for mobilization. 
Citizens mobilize politicians with their grievances, fears and angers. Local politi-
cians take up these concerns and position themselves against decision-makers at 
higher levels, acting as immediate representatives of the community and articulating 
interests publicly. Due to their position, mayors have a strong political interest in 
representing the claims of their electorate.
In the course of protest, a specific view of the local as a victim of national politics 
is developed (Caiani and Borri 2016, 75; della Porta 2016, 43). This serves as a 
justification for the active engagement of institutional actors, since they are standing 
up in the interest of the local population. Simultaneously, it is the support of institu-
tional actors that reduces the individual costs of citizens in getting actively involved 
and which contributes to the legitimization of protest against the establishment of 
accommodation centers. This depicts a mobilization pattern, with citizens and local 
politicians forming a cycle and influencing each other to get active.
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12.7.2  Successful Protest Outcomes
To understand the high rate of success of asylum-center protest, endogenous factors 
are relevant. In particular, two aspects of the protest contribute to the outcome: the 
institutional protest profile and the clear-cut implementation claim.
In the course of protest activities, new networks have emerged, consisting of citi-
zens and politicians of the local level. Asylum-center protest does not follow a com-
mon “movement versus politics” relationship (Hutter 2014, 339), since the 
interaction between political actors is a more complex system. Or, as Goldstone 
(2003, 2) stated, “there is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary between institution-
alized and non-institutionalized politics.” In the case of protest against the establish-
ment of accommodation centers, the network between citizens and institutional 
actors as well as the relations between different state actors are decisive for the 
protest outcome. It is the resources of institutional actors, in the first place direct 
access to decision-makers, that contribute highly to the success of protest 
activities.
In this network, mayors perform the role of “protest brokers” (Tarrow 1977) and 
of “political entrepreneurs” (Caiani and Borri 2016, 77). They play an intermediary 
and resourceful role, lending citizens their voice and providing their social and 
organizational infrastructure. Due to their position in the political system, they are 
able to “foster key […] interactions across the public and the policy domain” 
(Cinalli 2016, 94). Mayors are more likely to attract public attention as they have 
direct access to political networks and decision-makers resulting from personal, 
partisan and institutional ties. The proposed compensation of “democratic deficits” 
(ibid, 95) serves as a legitimization outside the local community, whereas the inter-
nal strength of the protest derives from the common feeling of marginalization. 
Mayors are the ones who employ strategic repertoires of action, who often intervene 
at the regional level, and who provide ideological justifications.
Especially in protests against the use of (former) army barracks or the creation of 
large initial reception facilities, this actor coalition has even been extended to state gov-
ernors, who have protested side-by-side with mayors and citizens. In these cases, mobi-
lization is bigger, repertoires are more diverse, and protest events are more frequent.
Not to be played down is the scope of the claim as another endogenous factor 
favoring success. It relates to the level of implementation and is therefore very spe-
cific. This is contrary to more general claims for policy reforms which are at the 
center of many social movements. The central claim of asylum-center protest is 
restricted to the local community and does not primarily extend beyond the locality. 
Both actor groups, institutional and non-institutional protagonists, are closely con-
nected to the issue as such (the asylum center), since it is located in their immediate 
living environment.
In addition, we have to consider the power of action itself in creating and recreat-
ing environmental opportunities and organizational structures that favor further 
mobilization (della Porta 2016, 49). Protest often occurs in clusters, traveling from 
one municipality to another, mutually conditioning further mobilization. Together, 
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these protest activities form a picture of local, institutionalized protests that would 
not be able to attract public attention separately, but collectively have the potential 
to put decision-makers under pressure to revise policy proposals.
12.8  Conclusion
Although protests are not unique in the field of migration and asylum, they are cur-
rently occurring at high frequency, spreading from one community to another and 
cultivating considerable public attention in questioning the current admission and 
reception system. The significance of protest as a channel to make claims visible 
and heard is underlined by the fact that one third of all new facilities have so far 
triggered protest activities.
Due to its strong institutional character, we locate this protest movement as a 
movement from above. Strong negative emotions play a crucial role when citizens 
speak up to exert pressure upon decision-makers to take action. Political authorities 
and parties demonstrate alongside citizens and lend protests their institutional voice, 
which is heard and seen in the public. This underlines the importance of (resource-
ful) institutional players in protest activities.
Protest originating from this actor constellation is mainly small-scale and local, 
which points to the fact that protest events are closely connected to the locality 
itself–the accommodation center–and that it is overwhelmingly local politicians 
who mobilize and employ repertoires to target higher political levels.
Adopted frames resemble not only populist rhetorical styles but also reveal social 
and cultural cleavages. The dominance of the belonging frame shows that not only 
negative, but also exclusive, racist and hostile references form the argumentative 
strategy of restrictionist protests. In other words, the language of contestation is 
inflammatory. Restrictionist protest is characterized by its nationalistic and xeno-
phobic nucleus, with its inherent frames resembling those racist attitudes. They are 
intertwined with other discursive elements which point to political and economic 
tensions, but these are just seemingly neutral arguments which serve as an excuse 
for the exclusion of asylum-seekers from the municipal territory.
An important and in the international context rather surprising finding is the rela-
tive absence of physical violence. Applied means can be classified as moderate and 
small-scale, whereas physical violence against buildings and people are the 
 exception. This observation contrasts with the often violent protest actions against 
refugees and asylum shelters in Germany (see Rucht 2018). The different involve-
ment of institutional actors might explain this varying extent of violence.
Moreover, our results give sound empirical evidence for the significance of rising 
cultural tensions over “protecting the rural, preserving whiteness” (Hubbard 2005, 
12). Based on decisions made by federal or provincial authorities, new reception 
centers were to be opened in small municipalities which often had only little 
exchange with asylum seekers and individuals from different ethnic, cultural and 
religious backgrounds. In this way, “the other” would have entered the immediate 
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living environment of hitherto culturally rather homogenous communities. To pre-
vent this, loosely knitted local protest networks took collective action and exerted 
pressure upon governmental authorities to refrain from their proposals.
This regional and mostly rural protest has effects that go far beyond the local 
level, as national policy reforms demonstrate. Single protest events have accumu-
lated to a supra-regional phenomenon which cannot yet be classified as a specific 
asylum-center protest movement, but which, due to cross-fertilization, has multiply-
ing effects that are strong enough to put decision-makers under severe pressure.
The ultimate protest goal is to avoid social and demographic change. The local 
community, both political representatives and civilians, express an interest not to 
change the social composition of the local population. It is exactly this type of gen-
eral claim which makes the protest activities restrictionist in the sense of Schaeffer 
(2014). In other words, the ultimate goal of restrictionist protest activities is the 
prevention of social change and the maintenance of existing social and cultural 
norms which should not be influenced or altered by the presence of asylum seekers.
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Chapter 13
Protests Revisited: Political Configurations, 
Political Culture and Protest Impact
Gianni D’Amato and Helen Schwenken
13.1  Introduction
Migration and asylum issues are an important and contested policy field (van der 
Brug et al. 2015; Cinalli 2016). Migratory movements affect the issue of state sov-
ereignty as much as they change societies. The modes of contestation and politiciza-
tion, however, vary and change through cycles of attention and within different 
national and local contexts. This book brings together new empirical research on a 
set of three protest types: first, solidarity protests, second, refugee self-organized 
protests and third, mobilizations against newly arrived refugees in three countries, 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland. By looking at supportive, self-organized, and 
counter movements, we expect to provide a nuanced portrait of contemporary bot-
tom- up mobilizations and contestations in the field of refugee and migration poli-
cies. In line with social movement studies, this study on political protest takes as its 
starting point the assumption that grassroots activism, civil disobedience, resistance, 
lobbying efforts, and more traditional forms of claims-making and politics together 
constitute an important policy field and are co-constitutive for an adequate under-
standing of modern democratic governance. However, it is not easy to decipher how 
such co-constitutive processes work and whether and how bottom-up mobilizations 
have an impact (Giugni et al. 1999) on societal debates, the governance in the field 
of asylum, migrant and refugee reception, and their inclusion. In order to investigate 
these and other issues with the necessary thoroughness, the volume’s contributions 
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engage prominently with protests in one sub-field of migration-related contesta-
tions: deportations (part II and some contributions in part III). The contributions on 
refugee self-organized protests (part III) and restrictive protests (part IV) as well as 
the contextualizing chapters in Part I enable us to grasp and contextualize the lines 
of solidarity and conflict (see Rosenberger 2018).
Why make an empirically-based analysis through the lens of deportation? Nancy 
Hiemstra (2016), in her review essay on recent studies on deportation and detention, 
lamented that existing research identifies deportation and detention “as routine 
responses to immigration” (2016, 3), but does not examine the potential for change 
or disruption. This has been a key motivation for this book and the comparative, 
trilateral research project on anti-deportation protests that forms the foundation of 
many of the chapters. Deportations are indeed subject to societal debate and provoke 
civil society actors’ collective action. Therefore, one initial added benefit of this 
volume is that it presents entirely new data in the field of comparative deportation 
studies regarding repertoires, strategies, and the impacts of political protest. Research 
on deportation has so far been either comparative on a macro level (by comparing 
deportation statistics and policies in “deportation nations,” Wong 2015), but failed to 
take into account bottom-up mobilizations, or it has operated less with systematic 
empirical research, but more in terms of theorizing (De Genova and Peutz 2010). 
Our research project contains two types of systematic data: first, a new comprehen-
sive quantitative data set on protests against deportations from media analysis 
(1993–2013) in three countries, and second qualitative data from 15 strategically 
selected case studies. These data provide a basis for analyses that can say more than 
that protests are “place- or circumstance-specific,” as Hiemstra (2016, 3) character-
ized most research outcomes so far. A second added benefit of the volume is that it 
contributes with its broad data basis to the question whether anti- deportation protests 
constitute a transnational movement (Tazreiter 2010). As our data indicates, there is 
not much evidence for such a transnationally connected movement. On the other 
hand, it is exactly this same data that points to another type of connection, which has 
not been taken into consideration often. There is a broad and often indirectly as well 
as directly connected spectrum of protests around the issue of non- citizens’ rights 
and national sovereignty. It therefore intends as a third added benefit to overcome the 
tendency to take an isolationist approach in much of the social movement literature. 
Its objective is to better understand the constellations, repertoires, and mechanisms 
contributing to movement dynamics and to protest outcomes.
In this concluding chapter, we take stock of contributing to the study of movement 
dynamics and protest outcomes. Furthermore, we discuss these in the light of social 
movement theories and existing scholarship on deportation and pro-migrant and anti-
migrant and refugee mobilization. Given the systematic and comparative research 
design of the trilateral research project on anti-deportation protests, these results will 
be predominantly discussed in the conclusion. In this chapter, we first look from 
above, so to speak, onto our research field, and then go back to our initial theoretical 
approach, namely the Political Opportunity Structure Approach (POS) from social 
movement studies. Here, we focus in particular on national political  settings as well 
as protest characteristics and inquire into their significance. Then we go deeper into 
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the protests and look at the repertoires and trajectories of protest and the importance 
of creating ties, as well as the question of whether any of these findings are related to 
diffusion processes. In the final part, we consider the outcomes of the protests.
13.2  Political Configurations: Convergent Political Dynamics 
from Above
In comparing and contextualizing protest activities, it becomes apparent to what 
degree the policies of the three countries under scrutiny have moved towards con-
vergence over the years when confronted with asylum migration that has been 
labeled by vocal politicians and some parts of society as unwanted. Even though all 
three countries recognized the Geneva Convention of 1951 and its principle of non- 
refoulement early on, all three states installed effective asylum laws late in the 
1980s and amended these laws on asylum and on migration subsequently, following 
increasing numbers of people seeking protection. In Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland, these amendments were concerned with the continuous restructuring 
and accelerating of asylum procedures, with the enforcement of deportability of 
allegedly undeserving asylum seekers through a prohibition of stay, and with the 
introduction and continuous expansion of safe third-country regulations. With the 
European harmonization of asylum policies with the Dublin regulation of 1990 and 
the persistence of difficulties in deporting asylum seekers, the policies converged 
with regard to the toleration of those people who are not transferable, with the cre-
ation of new entitlements to stay (refugees escaping gender-based violence), and the 
formulation of integration as a marker allowing asylum seekers to settle in the coun-
tries, or at least increasing their likelihood of doing so. Moreover, the procedures 
were increasingly concentrated in limited areas in order to accelerate the process 
and nevertheless guarantee minimal protection under the Geneva Convention.
In all three countries, deportations of rejected asylum seekers were carried out 
(with very different numbers in total, see Part I in this volume), although the “depor-
tation gap” (Gibney 2008), which is the difference between the number of persons 
who were to be deported and the de facto deportation numbers, has been significant. 
Our findings confirm what Matthew Gibney identified a decade ago as a “deporta-
tion turn” in the policies of many states, meaning a tendency of governments to turn 
to this “complicated and controversial state power” (2008, 147). Gibney further 
argued that, until 2001, states clearly preferred other forms of immigration control, 
because deportations were difficult to carry out and constituted a risky endeavor for 
politicians. In fact, what our quantitative data and the case studies in this book show 
is that deportations have become increasingly an issue in civil society in all three 
countries, too. Convergences from above are confronted with distinctive national 
protest cultures “from below” (Rosenberger et al. 2017). The question is therefore 
not if, but how, such protests take place, and what explains their characteristics. The 
strong mobilization of civil society in Germany, predominantly in urban settings, is 
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due to a configuration of power that concedes formal, but not informal access to 
decision making. Therefore, unconventional challengers are immediately con-
fronted with exclusive strategies by the state. However, administrators know that a 
persistent and media-fueled protest wave may coerce political decision makers into 
changing their attitudes (Eule 2014). Consociational states such as Switzerland have 
many entry gates for challengers suited to their institutions of direct democracy. 
These are binding forces in political campaigns and make visible street protests less 
probable, channeling disruptive opinions in their institutional access to political 
power. In Austria, protest actors show a rather low civil engagement in the form of 
social movement-type activism, which nevertheless peaks sporadically, especially 
as a reaction to increasing right-wing mobilization and by everyday, low-profile 
protest at the local level, often in rural areas.
A further dimension to be taken into account is the sub-national level in all three 
countries. Protests sometimes find very different regional, or even local, political 
opportunity structures. This can be due to regional or coalition governments, differ-
ing legal frameworks, or political legacies concerning the existence of informal net-
works or collaborations. The data clearly shows how the policy issue of deportation, 
which is by definition an issue of national sovereignty (Anderson et al. 2011), is 
influenced to a large degree by sub-national regulations that differ significantly. 
Such sub-national specificities thus provide very different political opportunity 
structures. Another factor that matters is how protest is configured along the lines of 
citizenship status, legal entitlements, and residence status by those who become 
active. These factors have also to be taken into consideration to explain different 
repertoires of protest as well as different protest outcomes in the field of migration- 
related contestations.
13.3  Repertoires of Protest
Protests may have different sources and may aim at different political objectives: 
They may be caused by self-interest or by solidarity for those who are in need of 
help–or, in the case of restrictionist movements, against the effects of immigration 
and refugee admission. The support of those not threatened by deportation may be 
seen especially as an act of civil courage, acting on behalf of others who are, in 
particular when they are in situations of extreme stress and (legal) deprivation, not 
able to speak and act for themselves in the same way others might be. A significant 
percentage of these solidarity protests, though the figure varies from country to 
country, are organized in collaboration with the affected, either the deportees them-
selves or members of their communities and networks. Therefore, protests may aim 
for larger social and political change or for individual solutions for potential deport-
ees, depending on the motivations of those who are mobilizing. The creation of 
personal ties and the transmission of emotions may help to increase the mobilizing 
effect. In this respect, access to formal political channels may be beneficial, as it 
increases the leverage on political decision-makers. However, given the situation 
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that the demand to stop (a) deportation is directed against a formal state decision, 
this poses difficulties. Protest actors’ legitimation strategies and the framing of the 
protest often take that into consideration by pointing to ethics and the necessary 
exemption from the general rule or refer to errors in the legal procedures. In the case 
of restrictionist mobilizations, this works to the contrary. Due to their anti-civil 
orientation, these are often directed against the potential establishment of social ties 
and the ordinary presence of refugees in society, addressing their protest particu-
larly against refugee housing. However, as Haselbacher and Rosenberger (2018) 
point out, there are also contradictions, as restrictionist mobilizations often refer to 
equally restrictionist public policies and statements by politicians. In their reper-
toire of protests in the field of asylum and deportation, the role of the state is there-
fore suspense-packed.
In Austria, extra-parliamentary protest culture is more moderate than in Germany 
or Switzerland. Austrian political culture is traditionally oriented toward consensual 
decision making, particularly for those strata of society that are integrated into the 
neo-corporatist system. Social protest movements are usually excluded from insti-
tutionalized politics; this is also generally true for anti-deportation mobilizations, 
though in Austria (as in Switzerland) the analysis of case studies revealed the impor-
tance of state representatives, such as mayors or governors, in taking sides for spe-
cific deportees, while this phenomenon was entirely absent in the German case 
studies. However, state authorities have also frequently supported or encouraged 
restrictionists’ mobilizations, as the study of Austria has demonstrated (see 
Haselbacher and Rosenberger 2018). In Germany, the strong state built around a 
representative parliamentary system results in the judiciary becoming the entry 
point for challengers and protesters. This is the reason why the protest repertoire in 
Germany is more disruptive and often far from being moderate, whereas in 
Switzerland a rather weak federal state and consensual direct democracy offer sev-
eral entry gates for collective action. While in Austria in particular, and to some 
degree in Germany, protest is more likely to focus on specific deportations, the 
emphasis in Switzerland tends to be on policy reforms. In all three countries under 
scrutiny, deportees themselves are the ones most probable to engage in confronta-
tional protest, whereas grassroots organizations, NGOs, and church-related actors 
tend to be active in demonstrative protests.
13.4  Trajectories of Protest and Their Explanations
While the number of protest events against deportations increased in Austria during 
the time period under investigation, it decreased in Switzerland, following a moder-
ate peak at the beginning of the 2000s. In Germany, the number of protests was high 
during the 1990s, before decreasing rapidly during the early 2000s, only to increase 
again in the last years under consideration (2012 and 2013). These differences 
clearly underline that protest frequency is not associated with the number of 
enforced deportations: In Austria, protests have increased significantly while the 
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number of deportations has declined; in Germany, the number of deportations has 
declined, coinciding with a large number of protests in some years; in Switzerland, 
the number of deportations has increased, while the frequency of protest has fallen. 
There is thus apparently no direct connection between the numbers of deportations 
and the frequency of protests against them, nor are there necessarily more protests 
when there are more deportations, nor are there declines in the number of deporta-
tions due to a larger intensity of protests. Thus, an important result of the overall 
research project is to note a decoupling of deportation and protest incidents in all 
three countries.
The clear differences and changes over time suggest that protest against the 
deportation of rejected asylum seekers is strongly influenced by national particulari-
ties and the situational context. Hence, as the quantitative media analysis shows (see 
Ruedin et al. 2018), political opportunity structures for protest against the deporta-
tion of rejected asylum seekers vary between the three countries and offer a plausi-
ble explanation for differences in protest. The overall higher level of demonstrative 
protest forms over the period of investigation emphasizes the status of Germany as 
a “movement society” (Roth and Rucht 2008). While the participating actors, their 
repertoires, and the focus on specific deportations and individual solutions reflect 
Austria’s more moderate protest culture, the strong focus on policy-oriented claims 
in Switzerland may be embedded in its tradition of direct democracy. Moreover, in 
Austria and Switzerland, protest frequency is disconnected from the legal adaption 
of migration and deportation policies. Only in Germany was protest aimed at the 
adoption of more restrictive policies as early as the 1990s.
However, there are also striking similarities in protest trajectories among the 
three countries (see Ruedin et  al. 2018): Demonstrative protest forms are much 
more common for individuals and communities with and without personal ties. 
Moreover, unlike NGOs, church-related actors, and politicians, potential deportees 
have a high probability of engaging in confrontational protest. Similarly, potential 
deportees and individuals with personal ties to the affected asylum seekers are more 
likely to focus on the specific deportation, while NGOs usually seek policy reform. 
Put differently, the same kinds of actors tend to use the same kinds of repertoires and 
make the same kinds of claims across countries. Differing political cultures in the 
countries under scrutiny may explain some exceptions to this rule, such as that ‘ordi-
nary citizens’ in Austria and Germany tend to perform different kinds of protest, and 
the likelihood of them engaging in demonstrative protests is higher in the “move-
ment society” of Germany than it is in Austria. Moreover, politicians rarely form 
part of protest mobilization in Germany, whereas in Austria and Switzerland mayors 
and politicians may sometimes align themselves with deportees. These similarities 
and deviations may lead to the conclusion that protesters close to the social move-
ment sphere tend to engage in similar protests, while actors that do not engage regu-
larly in collective action or who are committed to civil society engagement are more 
influenced by the given modes of political engagement in their respective societies.
Protest on behalf of an individual person or a family constitutes a large propor-
tion of the protest events, especially in Austria and Germany, although in all three 
countries, protests against deportations have increasingly focused on policy change 
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rather than on preventing specific deportations. In Switzerland, where protest is 
more likely to focus on policy change, the situation appears to be somewhat idiosyn-
cratic due to the entrenched tradition of direct democracy and the explicit possibility 
of expressing opposition against decisions by government and parliaments at all 
levels of governance. Finally, anti-deportation protests are identified as predomi-
nantly solidarity protests, organized at the local level and focusing on individual 
solutions rather than on social or legal change of the migration and border regime.
There are several intervening conditions that favored the organization of protest. 
In the Osnabrück case, for example, the creation of personal ties in order to break 
the isolation of asylum seekers confined to their accommodation was a central ele-
ment of the local protest movement. Forming friendships and knowing the deport-
ees was essential for the constitution of a local protest movement that aimed to 
reverse the public invisibility of asylum seekers (see Hinger et al. 2018).
Becoming “recognizable” was also important in the Vienna case (see Mokre 
2018) and in the dynamics of the solidarity protest in Switzerland (see Bader and 
Probst 2018). The creation of strong relations between refugees and supporters 
helped to create a structure addressing the mobilization of private resources to start 
claiming rights of access to residency in the country. Friendship and romantic rela-
tionships were the glue which reinforced collective struggle. Emotions and ties have 
the power to build up connections between different social groups. These ties and 
the active taking sides of protestors for specific beneficiaries can sometimes last 
over a long period. Both in the media analysis as well as in some of the case studies, 
we found ties that ran over many years. This also explains the unexpected outcome 
of the case study analysis in circumstances where deportees were in fact deported 
(see Kirchhoff et al. 2018), they were in all but one case able to return. It was not 
always possible to precisely reconstruct the occurrences of the return, but there are 
strong indications that the supporters maintained contact with the deported indi-
viduals or families. There are a number of options for return, but all require ties that 
last longer than the immediate process before deportation.
As evinced by the quantitative media analysis and in most case studies, deportees 
were previously in touch with other persons (citizens or other migrants) who sup-
ported them in their struggles against deportation (see Ruedin et al. 2018). There 
were, however, also cases where protests emerged without these contacts, such as 
through a support group for deportees in a detention center. Such protests are driven 
not by personal empathy, but by more general claims for social justice or solidarity. 
Social and personal ties are an important relational resource, but they cannot be 
mobilized as easily as for example monetary resources, because building trust and 
ties takes time.
This leads us to the next issue, specifically the role of emotions, which is cur-
rently greatly discussed in social movement studies and other social sciences (the 
“emotional turn”). When conceptualizing the research project on deportation 
 protests, we hypothesized that social ties and emotions would be central to success-
ful protest mobilization. While we indeed found robust indications for the signifi-
cance of social ties, the issue of emotions was more complex: Across all three 
countries, we found many cases where protest protagonists articulated strong and 
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positive feelings for the beneficiaries. However, there were also cases–mainly in 
Germany and Switzerland–where the impulse for the struggle originated with a gen-
eral political motivation that did not necessarily have anything to do with the plight 
of individual deportable subjects. These mixed results mirror findings from other 
recent scholarship on deportation and detention. Rosenberger and Winkler (2014) 
demonstrated in the Austrian case that compassion and social ties are crucial to 
explaining anti-deportation protests. These actors are indeed largely focused on par-
ticular cases and cannot be assessed to be emotional rather than political, even 
though a commitment to one singular case may sometimes develop into a more 
general critique and lead to an investment in broader issues, once awareness of 
political issues has been raised. This evidence stands in contrast to the findings of 
Nick Gill (2016), who argued on the basis of data from the UK that the detention 
and deportation system produces moral distance, for the staff working in these insti-
tutions as well as for bystanders, locals, or potential volunteers and supporters.
The analysis of deportations as a conflicted issue would not be complete without 
a look at the role of challengers of anti-deportation protests.1 There are two kinds of 
challengers: first, people and organizations that mobilize for stricter enforcement of 
deportations, and second, mobilizations against refugees in general or in related 
thematic terrains, such as the housing of asylum-seekers.
In the media analysis for the trilateral research project, only a handful of pro- 
deportation events could be identified. This confirms the rule that it is much harder 
to act against individual people than against sectional policies (Lahav 2004). No 
protests for the deportation of a specific individual or family could be identified, and 
there were no organized campaigns for deportations. What we found were some 
election campaigns or referendum materials that called for stricter enforcement of 
deportations in general.
Far more significant and influential are the broader mobilizations against refu-
gees that took place, and still take place, in all three countries. They were analyzed 
in this volume in the chapters on Germany by Rucht and on Austria by Haselbacher 
and Rosenberger. The types of radical-right and right-wing populist parties and 
movements, however, differ significantly among the three countries. In Germany, 
radical-right parties for a long time did not attract significant numbers of voters, yet 
a significant proportion of the population nonetheless holds right-wing or radical 
right-wing worldviews, while sometimes deadly racist attacks spread fear among 
refugees, migrants, and visible minorities. Dieter Rucht (2018) identifies four sec-
tions of the right-wing spectrum: conservatives, right-wing populists, right-wing 
extremists, and right-wing terrorists. Given their organizational structure, Rucht 
considers the majority of German right-wingers’ movement-type groups.
Reflecting these right-wing, restrictionist mobilizations in the light of anti- 
deportations protests, we would like to point to two observations:
1 Given the original research design of the trilateral Taking Sides project, restrictionist protests or 
activities by self-organized refugees were not coded. However, these two facets of refugee-related 
mobilizations were nevertheless taken into account in order to provide a broader perspective on the 
contentious field of asylum and immigration in this book.
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First, as mentioned, in none of the three countries under investigation in this 
book is there a movement for deportations. This is interesting insofar as in the pol-
icy field of deportations, the logic does not follow a contender logic. It is not the 
policy issue as such that is contested by oppositional movements. Instead, right- 
wing mobilizations choose different targets, such as refugee housing. The number 
of violent attacks in Germany (including setting fire to refugee accommodations 
that are under construction or even inhabited) has skyrocketed since 2015.2 During 
the strong mobilization cycle against deportations in the early/mid 1990s, this was 
also the case. But why do restrictionist movements not mobilize for deportations? 
One explanation could lie in the character of anti-deportation mobilizations as 
implementation struggles (Rosenberger et al. 2018), which means that the broader 
public might be ‘in general’ in favor of strict immigration policies, but in the spe-
cific case of implementation, it breaks the heart of ordinary citizens if well- integrated 
children or a member of their soccer team is to be deported. When the deportee 
becomes a face, it is difficult even for right-wingers to win public support in favor 
of a deportation.
The second point we would like to make is on the relationship between the state 
and the protests. As mentioned, in Austria, restrictive protests find themselves often 
in a rather “close interaction between institutional actors and protest networks” 
(Haselbacher and Rosenberger 2018). This is noteworthy as the protestors legiti-
mize their actions with reference to what official stances are, while anti-deportation 
mobilizations are characterized by a constellation of “state against migrants” 
(Ellermann 2009). Thus, right-wing mobilizations, even those using violence 
against property and people, position themselves closer to official policies than 
those anti-deportation protest actors who often legitimize their actions with appeals 
to human rights or compassion. This also indicates that, from a political opportunity 
structures perspective, the allies for anti-deportation protests tend less to be found 
within state apparatuses than it is the case in other movements, such as on gender 
equality. At the same time, in the cases of Austria and Switzerland, allies were also 
to be found among conservative political elites. Depending on the political culture, 
the relationship to the different levels of the federal state is configured by the differ-
ent protest actors. These findings from the comparative and multi-level oriented 
research project call for further research on the role of state actors, including may-
ors and street-level bureaucrats.
13.5  Refining Patterns to Understand Outcomes
Social ties play an important role in the organization of protests on behalf of deport-
ees. These ties are weak rather than strong, particularly since the persons to whom 
deportees have strong ties rarely have the competence and influence to effectively 
2 The website chronicles violent attacks against refugees in Germany: https://www.mut-gegen-
rechte-gewalt.de/service/chronik-vorfaelle (accessed July 9, 2017).
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find a path to help. Therefore, beneficiaries of support activities turn towards sup-
porters perceived as capable of finding solutions, such as legal or social counseling 
services by NGOs or churches, even if there is no affective relation between the 
beneficiary and the supporter. In “personifying protest” (see Bader and Probst 
2018), social ties with supporters arise thanks to the beneficiary’s participation in 
social structures and networks of the host society. Often, these supporters are either 
colleagues, classmates and their parents, or professionals and representatives of 
associations. In the latter case, the social tie linking the beneficiary to the protesters, 
though weak, has a bonding power since it triggers a networking process initiated 
by the civil society actors first informed about the beneficiary’s situation.
These committed citizens are at the center of the protest, deciding on the right 
strategies to use, and managing the different protest activities. They invest time and 
resources in order to make the protest successful. The request for assistance often 
resonates with core values linked to charity, justice, and human rights. The so-called 
“hard core” of the protest movement is motivated by the sympathy towards the ben-
eficiary’s personality and life story, provoking a personal tie to them and inciting 
emotions of solidarity that fuel the protest. Citizens holding very different views on 
societal issues such as migration join together in order to defend a particular person 
or case they consider meriting their support. However, there are also generalized 
forms of protest in line with a larger political orientation that aims to challenge 
existing migration policies. As such, they address the drive for social change and 
remove certain negative outcomes of societal evolutions. Accordingly, the hard core 
is here mainly composed of politically left-wing oriented persons who are often 
engaged in activities for the defense of migrant interests.
The strategies of argumentation may be personified, highlighting the singularity 
of the case and the high degree of personal commitment of the beneficiary to the 
host society. This person–as the argument goes–deserves to stay since he or she 
shares all the mainstream values of the host society. “Deservingness” is the central 
argument in personified protest. By contrast, when the arguments are generalized, 
the supporters long for political reform. They courageously assume a strategy of 
public civil disobedience. They non-violently accept exceptionally breaking the law 
in order to let overarching constitutional principles prevail. The realization of this 
strategy is strongly indebted to the achievements of a liberal-democratic constitu-
tional state: The objective to prevent deportation is done through public engagement 
and in the knowledge of potential legal consequences for these people. Their inten-
tion is to change the legal setting, thereby modifying or even ending the practice of 
deportation, since in their eyes the constitutional state fails to defend the substance 
of its arguments.
We are confronted according to Richard Dworkin (1985, 107) with “justice 
based” civil disobedience. Citizens feel an obligation to overturn a policy judged 
contrary to the rights of others. This type of civil disobedience is compatible with 
the liberal-democratic constitutional polity, since the fact of having rights vis-à-vis 
majorities is part of the conditionality of the principle of majoritarianism. Some 
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protestors may share the belief that borders should be abolished as along with poli-
cies that limit free circulation. All deportees may here be seen as case studies to 
document the violation of fundamental rights. Although the personal life story of 
the beneficiary is used to exemplify the consequences of inhumane migration laws, 
the beneficiaries appear as interchangeable in order to demonstrate the need for a 
change towards a “cosmopolitan” order or a “free choice” model of mobility. The 
central question that arises from these debates basically focuses on the future of our 
societies and its relationship to unselected migration.
In this context, the concept of deportability is also useful. In the literature the 
term has predominantly been used to capture the degree to which non-citizens are at 
risk of being deported (e.g. De Genova 2002; Paoletti 2010). When we look at the 
concept from the angle of anti-deportation struggles, the concept changes slightly. 
The mobilizations and tangible legal support for deportees attempt to make the ben-
eficiaries of the solidarity action less deportable. As the data from the media analy-
sis as well as the qualitative case studies of the Taking Sides project and the 
complementary case studies in this volume indicate, anti-deportation mobilizations 
are more likely to be successful if the factors that increase the likelihood for depor-
tation–such as prominently a status of legal limbo and no legal counseling, social 
isolation and spatial segregation–are countered (Kirchhoff et al. 2018). It also indi-
cates that a deportation is not only prevented when it is directly implemented, such 
as through raids or when someone is taken to a deportation charter flight, but also 
through all actions that decrease the deportability of a person at risk of being 
deported. Taking this into account, one could pose the question whether not only 
explicit anti-deportation actions–such as those that have constituted the sample of 
the Taking Sides project–but more generally all efforts to incorporate migrants and 
asylum-seekers with precarious legal status into the fabrics of society as well as 
support activities that empower them to become more knowledgeable about their 
rights and options, are part of the protests against deportations. Here, questions of 
intentionality (of the actors) and of indirect impact come up that were not part of 
this research project. This also refers to our next topic: the diffusion and the paths 
that social movement activities take.
13.6  Diffusion in Social Movement Activities
The data from the media analysis on anti-deportation protests in Austria, Germany, 
and Switzerland (1993–2013) demonstrates that these were unconnected, small- 
scale protests at the local level that were not part of a transnational social movement 
(see Ruedin et al. 2018). Moreover, the 15 qualitative case studies vary significantly. 
A key explanatory factor for these variations lies in the differing political cultures of 
the countries in question. However, if we examine the data from a different perspec-
tive, the media analysis as well as the qualitative case studies have shown that there 
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are cross-cutting, common issues at stake: A similar set of actors is active in all three 
countries, using the same kinds of protest activity repertoires and developing similar 
demands and claims. How can we explain these similarities–perhaps by diffusion? 
Diffusion is an issue that has been much discussed in recent social movement litera-
ture, particularly given the existence of relevant global movements and cross-border 
activities in policy fields such as economic globalization, environmental issues, and 
human rights. This might also be the case for migration issues, including deporta-
tion, as there are various cross-border dimensions: the topic itself, the protagonists, 
international and transnational policies such as the international human rights 
instruments including the Geneva Convention, the European Dublin regime, or 
Frontex deportation and border control missions.
Diffusion is broadly discussed in the social movement literature and several use-
ful differentiations have been introduced: first, the question about the content of 
diffusion, second the forms of diffusion, and third their impact (Kolins Givan et al. 
2010, 2–3). Diffusion is not self-generated within movements, but linked to institu-
tions, and there might be horizontal and scale shifts in diffusion. For the purposes of 
our brief wrap-up, we think of diffusion in two ways: first, as elements, themes, or 
forms of protest that diffused into the protests against deportations and hence influ-
ence it; and also the effects these mobilizations have on other protests.
The case study of Osnabrück (Hinger et  al. 2018) shows how a spontaneous, 
rather radical form of protest–blocking an attempted deportation at night–spread, 
which one could call a horizontal diffusion. Within a short period of time, a broad 
spectrum of sympathetic locals engaged in this protest form. Later, refugees who 
had heard of the successful protest form also formed such a blockade themselves. 
The protest form then also diffused to other cities, and for some time in 2015 it 
became the most successful form of protest against so-called Dublin deportations in 
Germany. However, experiences from other places have also demonstrated how 
place-specific such a success is, because in other cities blockades led to more repres-
sive responses by state forces. In the other countries under consideration as well, in 
particular in Switzerland, civil disobedience and forms of direct action were applied 
in Dublin cases. These diffused because of the specific political opportunity struc-
ture of the Dublin Regulation, which stipulates an exact time limit after such a pre-
vented deportation after which a transfer to the country of first entry into the EU 
would no longer be executed. Conclusions on diffusion based on our data cannot be 
strong, but there are indications that the more similar a policy and issue is (such as 
in the Dublin cases), the more likely it is that stories about successful protests travel 
from place to place and result in a replication of protest forms.
For other features of protests against deportations, diffusion is only indirect. 
What can be observed is that many of the anti-deportation activities counter the 
isolation and/or individualization of the deportees. The latter is a key characteristic, 
as deportation “tends to operate as a radically individualizing and thus also […] 
isolating event” (De Genova and Peutz 2010, 23). The protests that have been 
 analyzed in this book, though, apply different strategies, legal as well as social, so 
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that the deportees can become visible as denizens in local and private contexts, by 
facilitating connections to actors and protests elsewhere. Questioning isolation as a 
strategy has diffused into protests against deportations over the past decade, particu-
larly in the German context. The slogan “Break the isolation!” has been central to 
the self-organized refugee activities, criticizing the fact that many of the refugee 
accommodations and reception camps are situated in remote areas. This has not 
only been criticized as erecting barriers to social life, but also as a political strategy. 
Findings such as these indicate that there are similarities, but these do not go back 
to direct diffusion. However, what we can say is that in cases where protest actors 
are connected through virtual or personal networks with other anti-deportation or 
anti- racist groups, similarities go beyond mere coincidence.
Another means of diffusion, which could contribute to the emergence of a trans-
national social movement, can be observed after the period of our systematic media 
analysis, specifically with refugee protest activities in 2012 until the present in vari-
ous European countries. The chapters in this book by Odugbesan/Schwiertz and 
Mokre are all about refugee protests during more or less the same period in time. 
They seem to be hardly connected, except through traveling activists who act as a 
means of contact and potential diffusion. The case of the occupation of the Votive 
Church in Vienna (see Mokre 2018), for example, was watched closely by refugee 
activists in Germany. There are also links between local anti-deportation protests 
and transnational activities, such as the March for Freedom, in which local activists 
participated and returned home with new ideas and knowledge of the existence of 
protests elsewhere.
To conclude on the question of diffusion, the similarities in anti-deportation pro-
tests in most cases do not result from diffusion. Instead, the protests are highly local 
phenomena, in particular those of “ordinary citizens”. However, there is a notable 
exception in cases where social movement or refugee activists participate, where we 
can observe more diffusion, in particular on a discursive level (similar slogans and 
framings) and to some degree also in terms of forms of action. We return to the 
impact of anti-deportation protests on other social movements, another dimension 
of diffusion mentioned in the literature, in the next paragraph.
13.7  Some Implications of Protest Against Deportations
We already mentioned that protests against deportations cannot explain any rise or 
fall in absolute deportation numbers. Protests and deportation numbers are decou-
pled. There is no evidence for a connection in any of the countries. Furthermore, the 
official statistics (see Part I in this volume) do not contain data about failed deporta-
tions due to protest. In the German case, there are figures available for deportations 
that had to be stopped due to the resistance of the deportee (at most 3%), but these 
numbers do not include cases where deportation orders were revoked due to earlier, 
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for example judicial, interventions. Moreover, successful and ongoing protest may 
raise the political price for members of the executive branch and incline them to 
reverse or stop the procedures, against the measures taken by their bureaucracies 
(Eule 2014). To conclude, despite the decoupling of protests and overall deportation 
numbers, to pretend that such protests do not have any impact at all would be short-
sighted. On the contrary, the case studies show at least four areas in which anti- 
deportation protests had relevance:
 (a) The Case Impact
Even though there is no immediate relation between the number of protests and 
the number of deportations, we recorded several cases at the local level in which the 
likelihood of success for deportation protest was quite high. Our data shows many 
situations in which the engagement of outsiders, often professionals or individuals 
with links to professionals, such as lawyers or counselors from NGOs or charities, 
led to a questioning of the procedures and in which a deportation could be pre-
vented. From the broad protest repertoire we examined, involving altruistic as much 
as instrumental reasons, we can conclude that more radical forms, such as block-
ades, were only (potentially) successful in those cases in which there was a follow-
 up, such as a legal means to stop the deportation or to submit a follow-up asylum 
application. Therefore, protests against deportations on the level of individual cases 
do indeed have an impact. In particular, certain campaigns have a chance of being 
successful if they address judicial scrutiny, because the central discursive resource 
of the liberal-left–the notion of human rights–better suits the judicial argumentation 
of the constitutional liberal state than the conservative notion of the sovereignty of 
nations. Nevertheless, although articulated in several professional or grassroots 
organizations, their central goal is to remove certain negative policy consequences.
 (b) The Movement Impact
Such local, case-related initiatives might also extend beyond individual cases. In 
our sample of cases of anti-deportation protests, there is sufficient evidence for 
learning effects, often facilitated through personal networks with national or trans-
national justice organizations or through media coverage. Individuals or loose sup-
port networks in other cities asked for advice from those activists who had been 
involved in similar cases. The research teams also found evidence for a connection 
between case-related anti-deportation protests and the activities of self-organized 
refugees whose networks and groups functioned as transmission lines. They received 
information about successful anti-deportation protests, and even when the local sup-
port group (in successful cases) was dissolved, they could pass on the information 
and contacts. However, we cannot speak of a social movement against deportations 
as such, because the protest activities do not amount to a real movement: The collec-
tive actions often take place in isolation (with the notable cases of connections), and 
not all persons and groups involved have a feeling of belonging to a joint movement. 
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Instead, we would characterize the activities in urban areas as being connected, and 
sometimes part of, other social movements, such as anti-racist and pro-migrant 
movements, and in rural areas they tend to either not be aligned at all to such move-
ments, or they are aligned to faith-based or other groups that are also involved in 
other struggles for human rights, ethical trade, and the like.
 (c) The Discursive Impact
An important contribution of protests against deportations is the resulting 
increase in visibility of the issue and, as mentioned earlier, a counter-acting effect 
against the isolation of many asylum seekers. Deportations are often conducted at 
night, and asylum-seeker accommodation is situated in remote areas. Therefore, 
protests against deportations and media coverage thereof bring the issue to the 
attention of a public that usually has no contact with deportees. In order to success-
fully prevent a deportation, people also need to talk about their risk of being deported 
and to go public when they receive a letter informing them of their upcoming depor-
tation (see Odugbesan and Schwiertz 2018). Given the widespread association of 
deportees with criminals (for example, through detention prisons, through deport-
ees being taken by police during the night, or through pictures of handcuffed deport-
ees), knowledge of the phenomenon and of the specific circumstances of deportations 
makes these criminalizing practices debatable.
 (d) The Politicizing Impact
The visible presence and discursive impact of deportees or deportable popula-
tions is a prerequisite for another outcome of these protests, specifically the politi-
cization of protest actors that were not previously social movement activists. As our 
media analysis and case studies have shown, individuals from a wide spectrum of 
age groups, political orientations, educational backgrounds, and professions poten-
tially participate in anti-deportation protests. Several protest actions from among 
civil society in different places were conducted to voice disapproval with official 
asylum and deportation policies. The strategies were personifying–focusing on the 
deportation of a specific person or family who is or are seen as integrated in the 
community and thus deserving of the right to stay. Conversely, generalizing protests 
are conducted by religious groups or left-oriented activists using the case(s) of one 
or several migrants as examples illustrating the outcomes of a policy, which they 
perceive as unjust and whose reform they demand. The activists under scrutiny in 
this research were beyond the spectrum of social movement activists, political party 
members, or religious groups. The qualitative case studies demonstrated the signifi-
cant personal impact that a deportation order can have on acquaintances. In some of 
the interviews, we were able to follow the interviewee step-by-step through the 
phases of moral shock, organizing protest activities on different levels, broadening 
their perspective, and learning about asylum procedures and asylum policies in gen-
eral, thereby changing the political and ethical judgments they had initially held.
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13.8  Outlook
The results of this book show that in countries in which deportations belong to the 
established reaction to unwanted immigration, deportations are also contested. Most 
protests are directed against clearly defined deportations of individuals or families; 
in Switzerland and Germany, however, some of the protests also tend to take a more 
general direction and criticize broader policy orientations. The protests are driven 
by humane as well as political motivations, and the actors hold a wide spectrum of 
political views, and in particular in Austria and Switzerland, depending on the local 
context, including conservative forces. Furthermore, the repertoire of protest forms 
is similar in all countries, with differences going back to national protest cultures 
with, for example, more demonstrations in Germany, more institutionalized forms 
in Austria, and more public statements in Switzerland. The broad set of quantitative 
and qualitative data that has been generated by this trilateral research project clearly 
shows that there are differences in the three countries under investigation that can be 
explained by differing political opportunity structures, and in particular the factor of 
political culture. In the case of protests directed against the Dublin deportations, we 
can see interesting similarities, suggesting the relevance of a European opportunity 
structure (here, through the Dublin Regulation) that pre-configures the spectrum of 
successful responses to such deportations. Here, follow-up research focusing 
entirely on the contestation of Dublin transfers would be desirable. Another issue 
for further research involves the sustained effects of protest and the role of social 
ties in these. In almost all qualitative case studies that ended with a deportation, the 
deportees were able to return after a while. Here, a look into the black box of what 
happened after the deportation would be insightful. A third area for further investi-
gation would be the biographical impact of anti-deportation protests, with further 
concentration on self-organized refugees and their potential role as grass tops or 
policy entrepreneurs in communities that are threatened with deportation, but also 
on the so-called ordinary citizens that had never before been politically active or 
been involved in such actions.
This book is not only to be read as a contribution to the increasing literature on 
deportation studies, but as a European input to the more general social movement 
literature, to a certain extent bridging the persistent divide between American and 
European scholarship. According to Accornero and Fillieule (2016), European 
scholars concentrate their analysis on major structural issues–the structural causes 
of social movements, their ideologies, and the relationship with the culture of 
advanced capitalist societies–whereas the focus of American research is predomi-
nantly on groups and individuals, their forms of action, and their motivations. This 
book combines these approaches and goes beyond a structural analysis, including 
emotions and social ties as a source and resource for collective political behavior. It 
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therefore follows an innovative research agenda, in which the interest in activists’ 
and actors’ trajectories is accompanied by a strong focus on the emotional aspects 
of the engagement (or disengagement) process. This book has not only kept an eye 
on progressive pro-immigrant mobilization, but has also investigated the  mobilization 
of restrictive protest against asylum seekers and its political demand to reduce their 
presence and visibility. This diversification of “contentious politics” corresponds to 
a more comprehensive analysis of the deportation field, using different approaches 
to understand the structural conditions as well as the contingent political and socio-
psychological factors that have contributed to a revitalization or persistence of anti-
immigrant protest. Therefore, this book contributes to a methodological expansion 
in understanding collective protest action, having referred to a variety of disciplines, 
such as anthropology, sociology, political science, history, social psychology, and 
demography. These interdisciplinary approaches provide an important input to the 
increasingly hybridized literature on social movements. We are deeply convinced 
that only with pluralistic perspectives and empirically grounded research can new 
social realities evolving outside of theories be comprehended, particularly when 
accelerated by events.
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Glossary: Legal Terminology1
Asylum application/claim A formal request for protection under the Geneva 
Convention of 1951 or national refugee law made by a foreigner or a stateless 
person.
Asylum seeker A foreign national or stateless person who has applied for asylum, 
but where a final decision to grant asylum has not yet been taken.
Rejected asylum seeker Person whose asylum application was rejected and that 
consequently has to leave the country.
Irregular/undocumented migrant/sans-papiers Person staying in a destination 
country without having been allowed to do so by the country’s authorities.
Designated deportee Migrant who, based on a negative asylum decision, received 
notification to leave the country, but has not done so.
Refugee Person who fulfills the conditions of the Geneva Convention on Refugees 
or national asylum laws regarding refugee status and was granted asylum. These 
conditions demand that the person can prove a well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, but interpretations thereof may vary.
Deportation/removal/forced return (Abschiebung AUT, GER; Ausschaffung 
CH) The act of a state in the exercise of its sovereignty in forcefully removing a 
person from its territory after refusal of admission or termination of permission 
to remain.
Voluntary/assisted return Assisted or independent return to the country of origin, 
transit or third country, based on the decision of the returnee. Assisted returns 
include financial and logistic help by the removing country. The volition of 
return may be spontaneous or obtained under coercion of a forced return (i.e. 
deportation).
1 Sources: BMI, TERMDAT, EMN Asylum and Migration, GCR, IOM, UNHCR.
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Custody pending deportation (Schubhaft AUT; Abschiebehaft GER; 
Ausschaffungshaft CH) Disposed arrest with official notice by the alien’s police 
to secure proceeding or forced removal.
Tolerance (Duldung GER) Tolerance: Residence of a foreigner, who is not legally 
residing in the country but whose stay is tolerated if a deportation is not possible 
due to legal or factual reasons.
Enforcement postponement (Durchsetzungsaufschub AUT) Enforcement post-
ponement: Postponement of exit requirements for the length of up to three 
months (only for EEA citizens, third country beneficiaries and foreigners with 
residence according to the Settlement and Residence Act).
Right to stay (Bleiberecht AUT) Non-Austrian citizens who are residing in Austria 
irregularly or with precarious right of residence can apply for Bleiberecht, which 
is defined as the grant of legal residence based on humanitarian, pragmatic or 
human rights reasons. Bleiberecht is enshrined in the Settlement and Residence 
Act.
Case of hardship (Härtefall GER, CH) Foreigners who esteem that a deportation 
would imply particular hardship for them can claim a right to stay in front of a 
hardship commission on this ground. If a case of hardship is given, the foreigner 
may receive a residence permit, even though the legal pre-conditions for the 
granting or the renewal of a residence permit have not been met.
Subsidiary protection Asylum seekers may be given the status of subsidiary pro-
tection if authorities esteem that neither asylum law nor refugee protection is 
applicable, but serious threats for health and life make a person’s return impos-
sible from a human rights point of view.
Dublin regulation Regulation determining the European member state responsible 
for examining an application for asylum lodged in one of the member states of 
the European Union (Switzerland participates).
Dublin transfer European member states can–based on the Dublin Convention–
make a takeover request claiming that another signatory state is responsible 
for an asylum application. However, if the transfer is not carried out within six 
months, the member state that requested the takeover is considered responsible 
for said asylum application.
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